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One of the over utilized tools of my early tour in Iraq was the TCP (Traffic Control Point). These rarely yeilded any useful information, were easily avoided and seemed to be done mostly to "do somthing". My question is, when is it appropriate to use a TCP and what are better options for squad and platoon lvl intel gathering?
Reed
A good answer to your question would get into specific TTPs that are not appropriate for discussion on an open forum.
I recommend you initiate a discussion on the BCKS COIN forum with the same question. (AKO Log-in Required)
If you take the time to look around a bit, you will also find useful info on CALL and MCCLL (the latter requires CAC card access)
Other members: Please keep replies to this post general in nature and refrain from discussing current TTPs.
I was never a big fan of TCPs...for one, it is an escalation of force (normally unecessary) waiting to happen. Secondly, the bad guys avoid them, for the most part, IMO.
To keep it at the open source level, I would point out that TCPs were used outside of Fallujah and in other locales where similar large-scale clearing operations occured. They were also used in OIF I during the invasion, as civilians fled population centers, to check vehicles for fleeing combatants. How well they were executed is open to debate, but their purpose seems legit.
Without getting into TTP specifics, I would just say to look at the weaknesses mentioned and think of how they can be overcome. They can be, and many units have figured out how.
METT-TC applies as to how, when and if. If they're done right and smart, they'll be successful. The key is need -- and placement; you can't just say "Gun to be mounted here," there has to be a common sense plan and generally, several TCPs will be needed (to be non-specific). Of course, the key to all that is training...Quote:
Originally Posted by Schmedlap
Schmedlap's correct; like everything else in war, some units do things better than others.
From my "armchair" the British Army and RUC (police) used fixed and mobile TCPs in Northern Ireland throughout. There have been a number of open source comments on the gains, in particular the remarks in the history of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), a locally recruited Army unit (A Testimony to Courage, by John Potter, pub. 2001).
On the mainland the police and sometimes with other agencies have mounted TCPs for law enforcement primarily. They've also been used a SOP for CT work, invariably when there is an alert or alas after an attack.
UK use of TCPs has been greatly enhanced by the use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) cameras; which has increased the "hit" rate even if thousands of vehicles pass through. This tactic is based on a document in the public domain: http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/polici...5_12x04x05.doc
I appreciate in COIN arenas these tactics may look bizarre.
In UK police use TCPs can attract criticism as they are invariably not explained, even to those who are stopped and not prosecuted etc.
davidbfpo
One has to wonder when LE runs holiday CP's do they usually catch more folks DUI at the point or trying to avoid it:confused:
Ron,
Don't know about the US experience (although I can ask), here the problem is whether the possibly drunk driver realises what is ahead, takes action to avoid or just drives through. Then the decision is whether a pursuit is worthwhile as a drunk driver driving scared is often even more dangerous. Mind you it was fun (LE humour can be bad) to see those who tried to avoid get into even more trouble; some evil LE set up better TCPs on the supposed escape / avoid roads.
Of course the LE response to avoiding a TCP varies across borders; some LE have used lethal force, others aim to disable the car with stop-sticks etc.
Best not to drive drunk / DUI.
davidbfpo
When it is directed by any command above a battalion, it usually isn't a good thing.Quote:
My question is, when is it appropriate to use a TCP
I tend to agree that they are good for very little, unless a lot of preparation, planning, and shaping of the "battlefield" has taken place before execution.
Dropping one, even if for only a few brief moments, does little more than offer force protection problems in my experience. Since they require a lot of training to get done right, they are typically done poorly.
Good luck finding a better way to skin that cat.
Amen!Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
At least earlier on in Iraq, the TCP was a relatively easy and harmless tactic that units employed because we didn't know how generally useless they were. Good units figured it out and used other means to counter the insurgency. In 2003, my battalion figured out quickly that they don't work well and implemented the OP strategy (covert and overt). Much more effective.Quote:
I tend to agree that they are good for very little, unless a lot of preparation, planning, and shaping of the "battlefield" has taken place before execution.
The last time I was there, the static TCP was a favorite of the IA.
The real success of VCPs, as we say in the UK, is the SNAP VCP, inserted by helicopter or vehicle, that just occur without warning. They are a de facto surprise attack, on moving traffic, and highly effective in restricting the bad guys freedom of action.Quote:
Originally Posted by reed11b
I am also sceptical of the fixed VCPs as they are usually just targets and sources of confrontation. Obviously they do serve some useful purpose, but it is limited.
I'm in complete agreement with your take on the military utility of both aspects. I'd just like to add - perhaps the obvious - that the former requires good intelligence to be effective. This builds on JC's comment that Since they require a lot of training to get done right, they are typically done poorly. - not only does rapid insertion of a TCP require specific training, it requires a high level of coordination among disparate elements to obtain results reflective of the effort.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
As others have elaborated on, fixed TCPs in a hot environment are a bad idea. However, when the op environment is less hostile, their purpose is more as a show of presence and a deterrent (like DUI checkpoints) than an aggressive collection effort - although they often manage to roll up a few of the dumber criminals. (As an aside, I recall a couple of towns in CA whose PDs were forced to do away with their DUI checkpoints because of accusations that they were engaged in "racist profiling" to pick up illegal aliens)
They were a favorite of Saddam's security forces as well. Wandering about Baghdad during the UNSCOM timeframe, they were obvious at various points throughout the city. However, they were definitely static locations, and smuggling, prostitution and other various illicit activities managed to criss-cross Baghdad all around those checkpoints.....Quote:
Originally Posted by jkm_101_fso
Its simple.
TCPs are an MP task. If the Commander's Intent is to establish security in the population, TCPs are an economy of force TTP that is as much PSYOP as it is law enforcement. It tells the people who the owner of the street is, and seeing that 90% of TCPs are manned by ISF nowadays, it demonstrates to the population that the ISF is taking over the security/law enforcement role.
If in fact you "own the street", it's not because of the TCP. It's because of a whole range of other actions (none of which are necessarily economy of force) that you are employing concurrently.Quote:
TCPs are an economy of force TTP that is as much PSYOP as it is law enforcement. It tells the people who the owner of the street is, and seeing that 90% of TCPs are manned by ISF nowadays, it demonstrates to the population that the ISF is taking over the security/law enforcement role.
TCPs (by doctrine?) are static, and passive actions. We can't win COIN through passive means.
Oh, and if you run a TCP only on easily controlled streets and routes, there's not much PSYOP to it as the bad guys continue to run the ratlines elsewhere because "there's IEDs down in that zone" statements speak volumes about risk aversion. The locals know what's up.
Solid truth. I should emphasize that static TCPs are not an economy of force op. Consider the personnel and time involved in planning, executing and providing support - and standing by to support the fixed target. TCPs can be a useful deterrent when the environment permits - and I don't just mean a cooling of the insurgency. Iraq still is plagued by criminality and the ISF manning TCPs today are just as ineffective as the example I gave earlier of Saddam's TCPs in regards to ongoing illicit activity. The country needs to progress a lot further before static TCPs truly become an economy of force operation. Right now they are still a waste of manpower.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Others have mentioned, and I also feel, that intelligence-driven, rapidly-inserted, temporary TCPs have a place in COIN ops. However, as you stated, the training and support necessary to make that sort of TCP effective (not to mention the specific type of intended interdiction) implies that to for it to be an effective tactic, it should be used infrequently.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Exactly. In this case, a static TCP becomes PSYOP that contributes to the image of the effectiveness of the bad guys. When the bad guys are able to operate around the TCP it demonstrates to the population that the owners of the TCP are ineffective, unaware, and afraid to move out and engage the bad guys.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
I did not say you own the street because of a TCP.
Perhaps you were involved in the later period of OIF in which patrols were FOB-launched and insurgent-focused, I don't know. We were there right after Baghdad fell and there were NO POLICE anywhere except CF. Most of the day the traffic lights were out. We had to dismount our convoys to unclog traffic jams sometimes hundreds of cars/trucks thick just to get through an intersection.
TCPs were also used to enforce the curfew. Or do you disagree that curfew enforcement is neccessary in establishing the rule of law? It was/is a law enforcement type task. COIN requires securing the population. I don't know how anyone could argue that it was not an economy of force TTP when you had maybe 50k troops trying to secure a city of 8 million people with zero remaining infrastructure.
Like I said, the ISF is manning almost all the TCPs now. They can tell who is Sunni, Shia, Christian, Kurd, or foreign just by glancing into the car or at the ID. That's something our guys just could not do. That matters in Iraq.
As far as PSYOPs, I don't know how you could decide that it was ineffective PSYOPs to have a Bradley Fighting Vehicle or an M1 Main Battle Tank overwatching a bridge or intersection. Sheikh Sattar asked for an M1 to be parked in his front yard when he threw in with 1-1AD in Anbar, but hey, what did he know about standing up to terrorists.
Emplacing an armored vehicle in a fixed position to overwatch/secure key terrain/infrastructure/personalities is not the same as a static TCP.Quote:
Originally Posted by MSG Proctor
The use of sarcasm to emphasize the point made by that false analogy does not add to credibility. I recommend that you drop the habit.
During the first 6 months of OIF III (mech infantry company) we did almost nothing but snap TCPs because we had rolled into a city where we had no intel, no contacts, and no control whatsoever over the situation. It was a very effective way to disrupt enemy supply and C2, put a dent in IEDs, and start snatching some bad guys to get some intel. As we gained intel and slowly strangled the enemy's supply lines and picked off HVI's, snap TCPs became far less frequent and we were able to do more targeted raids and finally enter the "mop up" phase of just doing fire team and squad-sized ambushes to pick off the occasional unskilled IED emplacer.
Economy of force? PSYOP? Something else? I don't know. I just know that they served a good purpose when used appropriately.
In the wake of Baghdad's fall (and yes, I was there), we were not practising COIN. We were trying to find our ass with one of our hands.Quote:
I don't know how anyone could argue that it was not an economy of force TTP when you had maybe 50k troops trying to secure a city of 8 million people with zero remaining infrastructure.
And what was the other up to? :DQuote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
You win the quote of the day, hell make that the week, and maybe even the month
Tom
Haha...thanks Tom. It doesn't make us bad guys. It's just a fact that we had shortfalls. :D
that a generation of US political and military leaders had a number of shortfalls that adversely impacted your ability to do your jobs.
If the senior folks hadn't tried to drop FID and COIN by the wayside, you and everyone there would've had the training. They did drop it, you didn't get the training -- and that's not your fault; you did what you were trained to do and did it well. Any errors, as they say, accrue to the upper echelons.
Hopefully, the next generation will not repeat that mistake.
I'd also note that your OIF I experience and Schmedlap's OIF III experience were two different wars. Just as this one coming up will be different again.
Keep on pushing.
Please speak for yourself.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y44...ndABN/82nd.gif
Some units were doing things differently than others.
MG Charles Swannack, All American 6Quote:
Operational Approach
The primary mission of the 82nd Airborne was to capture or kill those trying to kill U.S. soldiers. In order to achieve that goal, the division had to gain the support and assistance of local populations. In August 2003, the division received an average of twenty tips per week regarding insurgent activity. By March 2004, this figure had increased to 300 per week. Encouraging Iraqis to support the U.S. military is the key to achieving stability, and these figures show that U.S. forces have made significant headway. As little as one percent of the population is actually interested in attacking coalition forces. Most of the remaining 99 percent of Iraqis are on the fence; they are potential supporters of either the coalition or the insurgency. For the most part, it seems that they have supported the coalition because they want a better future for Iraq.
July 2004
Kid was with that patch for OIF II and they were doing things differently than their neighbors. Some things better, some not. Important thing is where we are now.
What occurred then with various units doesn't change the fact that the senior leadership of the Army, to a lesser extent the Marines and to a greater extent, the body politic that is the US Guvmint screwed the pooch post 1990; even post 1972 -- Munich was a wake up call, the Nixon directed commission on terrorism accurately predicted the future -- and no one of any import paid attention to it. Lick on all of 'em. There were other over the years; all ignored while we prepared for a conflict that wasn't going to come. :mad:
Important thing is that we not do that again. Business as usual is not going to cut it.
Okay, I'll wade in. This is the sort of stuff where we got ourselves behind the bow wave.Quote:
Originally Posted by MSG Proctor
From April to November 2004, I argue that we were not practising COIN. People may have thought that, but heck, we didn't even have an insurgency then :wry:.
We were practising SASO. SASO/SOSO and COIN are two different constructs, and this is where our doctrine, training, and execution failed us during our effort to OODA on just what hit us. That is why I use the analogy of one hand trying to find our ass. The other hand was trying to soothe the bruise from the whacking we were ABOUT TO GET.
MSG, I am b no means trying to play down the actions of you and your men. But reality is reality. For the fragile months following 3d Bn, 4th Marines' destruction of Saddam's likeness, we were not practising COIN in the classical, current, or any, sense.
I am having a hard time finding the doctrinal definition, but what is the joint description of a TCP anyway? And is there a different one for VCP?
Bingo. Dead on. My "Hearts and Minds" missions were to get co-operation in rebuilding because that was the right thing to do, not to deny support to the "insurgents". Some of us low ranking grunts had that hair on the back of the neck feeling that the "dead enders" were not just going to go away, but no-one knew for sure, myself included. Of course, a few better decisions from the top, like not criminalizing the entire Baath party and disbanding the Iraqi Army then SASO may have been enough.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
Reed
AFAIK TCPs and VCP are identicle
jcustis:Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
I sincerely admire your candor and transparency. I am sure your unit did everything in their power to adapt to the situation with courage and professionalism.
In May 2003 the 2nd BCT 82nd Airborne Division occupied battlespace in the southern districts of Baghdad known collectively as Al Rashid. There was no government, no infrastructure and no manual for setting up a government while fighting FRLs, religious extremists, criminal gangs, and foreign terrorists.
2nd BCT was spread out with 14 combat outposts not including temporary platoon patrol bases. Mind you, we had none of the sexy ISR equipment or digital bandwidth today’s modular BCTs enjoy. We had no RSTA Squadron, no STB, and no CPOF or real-time digital COP.
COL Kurt Fuller tells Karl Zinsmeister in Dawn Over Baghdad that this was the first time in history when US forces have participated in large scale urban fighting while simultaneously rebuilding the area being contested.
In the period of May-Dec 2003, 2nd BCT conducted more than 500 raids, searched more than 25,000 houses, captured more than 2,200 suspected insurgents, set in motion $17 million worth of building projects, repaired 320 schools and 24 medical clinics, and established 15 NACs (neighborhood advisory councils) across the city.
The paratroopers accomplished this while engaging in 130 fire fights, 39 mortar attacks, 25 ambushes, 41 RPG assaults, and 140 IEDs.
Today’s pacification of Baghdad is frequently referred to as the “lowest incidence of SIGACTs since February 2004". That’s the month we left.
2nd BCT’s TTP included dismounted foot patrolling, night Ops, religious leader engagement, combined patrols with the embryonic ISF (then known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps), and what is recognized today as the forerunner of clear-hold-build.
Not saying we were all that and a bag of chips, but the TTP and accomplishments I’ve described here are certainly not far from the doctrine described in FM 3-24.
Airborne/Air Assault units had extensive training in this type of warfare for years. What we didn't have was the cultural awareness or experience in governance that was needed. That was all made up on the fly.
Sorry for boasting, I'm just damned lucky to have been a part of such a great bunch leaders and paratroopers.
My unit sure as heck wasn't doing COIN. My CO scolded me after conducting am ambush on Canal Street in late June 2003 because, as he put it, "the war is over." Once again, that was in late June. How did he get such a skewed view of the war? By sitting with his fellow CO's indoors, on a couch, drinking soda, watching VCD's, and swapping war stories while the insurgency gathered steam all around them. Being a hard-headed, loud-mouthed, ignorant SOB helped, too. I won't shame the otherwise proud history of the unit by naming it, but I can say with a lot of confidence that from at least Brigade on down, nobody knew WTF they were doing and none of them were too eager to leave their TOCs and try to figure it out. I'm pretty sure the Division knew what they were doing though. They were setting up a Burger King and MWR facility at the airport. Amenities are the water that the fobbit fish swims in. They started pumping it in early.
Yes we catch a good number of folks that are DUI. We also catch a number of people with outstanding warrants as wellas make a few drug arrests,Quote:
Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey