Non-Violent Insurgency: How Smart Rebels Win small wars
In my own work on Insurgency I have come over time to the postion that Insurgency is much more accurately a condition rooted in the perceptions of a populace towards its governance than it is any specific family of actions or organizations. How those conditions manifest is a choice made by the rebelling segments of the populace; but the causation itself is rooted in the governance. This is why one may well have several pockets of subversion and insurgency with unique views on ideology, tactics, goals, etc all orbiting about one hub of "poor governance"
The goal of this thread is to look at the relative merits of Violent vs. Non-Violent approaches on the part of the insurgent.
There is a body of work that makes a strong case for the smart insurgent (who I hope are reading this thread) to abandon violent approaches and to embrace non-violent apporaches instead. Not just because we seek greater stability and security for the populaces that are affected by the condition of insurgency, but because the U.S. stands very much for the principle of "good governance."
Governments rarely change of their own accord, and often it is necessary for the populace to force change upon their government. While current "war-based" COIN is rooted in preserving the current government and convincing the populace to stand down; suggested here is that it may well be far more effective to instead focus on encouraging those same popualces to take non-violent approaches, while at the same time encouraging those poor governances to listen to their people and evolve.
I will post a variety of products to support this premise. This is a debate that needs to take place. We have been trapped by our doctrine and definitions into narrow lanes that tend to cast violence as warfare, and all populace violence as insurgency. I hope to explore new, and more effective ways to characterize these activities as a part of this thread as well.
Some initial Data Points from Dr. Maria Stephan
What is Civil Resistance?
"The waging of determined conflict by strong forms of nonviolent action, especially against determined and resourceful opponents who may respond with repression."
---G. Sharp
Has this approach been applied over the past century, if so, where?
Indians, ‘20s-40s
Salvadorans, ‘44
African-Americans, ’60s
Poles, ‘70s-’80s
Czechs/Slovaks, ‘80s
Chileans, ‘85-’88
Filipinos, ‘86
East Germans, ‘89
Mongolians, ‘90
Malians, 91
Russians, ‘91
South Africans, 92
Serbs, ‘00
Georgians, ‘03
Ukrainians, ’04
Lebanese, ‘05
What are some examples of non-violent approaches to Poor Governance?
I. Nonviolent protest and persuasion
Petitions, wearing symbols, vigils, marches, humorous skits, walk-outs, renouncing honors, mock awards
II. Non-cooperation
Boycotts, strikes, social ostracism, stay-at-homes, refusal to pay taxes, civil disobedience
III. Nonviolent Intervention
Hunger strikes, sit-ins, alternative institutions, blockades
What is the track record of taking such approaches?
Study comparing 323 violent and NV campaigns, 1900-2006, found that NV campaigns succeeded 53% of the time, compared to 26% success rate for armed struggles (Stephan/Chenoweth)
Why: Participation, Pressure, Legitimacy
50/67 transitions from authoritarianism from 1970-2005 driven by bottom-up nonviolent resistance (Freedom House, How Freedom is Won)
Small Wars Journal now Small Politics Journal?
Wilf,
Rarely in my knowledge has the use of violence not been preceded by a non-violent phase, notably a public statement of the campaigns aims and so this thread addresses Small Wars in its widest application. I have recently read a book on the Baader-Meinhof gang / Red Army Faction and cite that as an example.
IIRC Frank Kitson's books also covered the pre-violent phase and that the military should stay away then.
So, SPJ it maybe Wilf and no harm is being done here:D. We are here to discuss and learn - within limits we know well.
Another time for a response to Bob's World.
Force or the threat of force always matters
Posted by Dayuhan,
Quote:
Some dictatorial regimes (eg Philippines 86) collapse before non violent resistance because they have already decayed to the point where they no longer command the loyalty of their own armed forces.
I think you hit the nail on the head, another peaceful protest would have simply been crushed by Marcus if he believed he could control the military, but he knew his military was divided and the U.S. Government gave him and Imelda a comfortable exit. He didn't have to worry facing a violent end like like Mussolini did; otherwise he made have made a different decision.
Many of the examples given as noted by Wilf are not accurrate. King's Civil Rights Movement was NOT an insurgency, it was simply a political movement working largely within the established legal framework. There was no intent to overthrow the government.
Gandhi was NOT responsible for India's independence. Serious Indian and British historians will tell you that Gandhi's civil movement had minimal impact on Britian's decision to give up India. As a matter of fact, Gandhi's movement died 10 years before the British decided to leave. Several factors influenced their decision, but the main one according to knowledgeable historians was the revolts of Indian National Army led by Bose. Although the military revolts failed, the subsequent trial of the militants exposed that Britian lost control of Sepoy's and could not count on them to maintain order in India. Furthermore, not only didn't Gandhi's movement contribute in any significant way to India's liberation, it didn't stop Britian's decision to divide India and create a separate country for the Muslims (East and West Pakistan), which led to consider slaughter on both sides (Hindu and Muslim). Since the Hindu nationalist movement wouldn't support Britian during WWII, the Brits relied on willing Indian Muslims to do so, and in return for their support they were rewarded with Pakistan (a gift that just keeps on giving).
Violence or the threat of violence has always played a key role in these movements. In the case of the Philippines the critical role of the threat of violence was mitigated because Marcus's behavior alienated much of his military. The movement started by Aquino and supported by Cardinal Sin definitely set the conditions for this to happen, but if the military remained loyal to Marcus the movement would have failed.
Rex, this is very similar, but with a key difference
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
This is force majeure (or realism, or deterrence, or pragmatism), however--it isn't legitimacy.
To draw a parallel, my very first teaching job was on a First Nations reservation. All of my students would have regarded the Canadian government as an unshakeable reality. Very few (if any) of them would have regarded it as "legitimate." (None of them would have regarded Canada as having a "right to exist," to draw another parallel and use the formula often cited in the Israel-Palestine context.)
If those same students believed that they could prevail over the Canadian government and its security forces, but for the support of the U.S. acting as a stooge of Canada and committed to protecting them; you would have a very different situation on your hands. Probably an insurgency (and they would then make a choice as to employ violent or non-violent means to illegally challenge that government).
But in fact, I suspect they believe that while they do not like the fact that they were defeated and now a new power reigns the land of their ancestors, they know they lost and that the new victor has a legitimacy borne of his power to win to begin with and to suppress any challenger of his own capabilities.
Israel may very well be able to ward off all challengers on her own as well; but it is the perception in the minds of many Arabs that she could not that fuels the conflict. I know from my own experience with the Egyptian Army in the first Gulf War that none of the officers I spoke to had ever been defeated by the IDF. I found this to be an interesting perception then, but I am only coming to appreciate the importance of that perception now.
Case of beer for that one
Dayuhan,
Fully concur with your last post, and even agree with many of COL Jone's ideas, but I do have a rub. There are discussions on policy that should be identified as such to avoid confusion (and unintended insult). Too often the posts sound like the poster is accusing the military for policy decisions, and imply if the military would only implement this policy everybody could live in perfect harmony.
Recommendations for policy makers and recommendations for Soldiers asked to achieve the policy objectives are two separate discussions, and while I agree both should be discussed here by all who desire, even those of us in uniform, we need to better clarify when are discussing TTPs for achieving the given policy, and when we're discussing policy itself. Many of COL Jone's inputs are directed at the policy, not the military units involved in achieving the policy objectives, yet they read like the military developed the policy and the military needs to change it. He obviously knows that isn't the case, he is an experienced strategic planner, but his posts often read like the Bde or Bn Commander needs to change their political policies.
Just a simple change in writing style would alleviate much of the confusion.
If you mean non-violent resistance
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
What is Civil Resistance?
Poles, ‘70s-’80s
Czechs/Slovaks, ‘80s
East Germans, ‘89
Serbs, ‘00
Georgians, ‘03
Ukrainians, ’04
Could you be more specific? While in Poland there was a non-violent resistance organisation called Solidarnosc, the same cannot be said of Czechoslovakia, or East Germany. If you say there was NV resistance against communist rule it is generally true for all eastern european countries like Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania too.
OTOH serb, georgian and ukrainian movements in th 21st century were much rather political than classical resistance to oppressive systems. Same can said of the african american movement in the USA. In that sense you can add the Tea Party or Greenpeace to the above NV movemenent list.
The selected and oversimplifying knowledge and usage of history is seriously limiting the NATO's capability.
Is that the CJCS or the Secretary of State
Posted by Bob's World,
Quote:
"Mr. President, our initial assessment is that the current government lacks legitimacy in the eyes of their own populace, and our intervention will not only exacerbate that condition; but because of it we will likely end up in a campaign that could take years rather than months.
Great advice that I hope the Secretary of State shares with the President, and I hope the CJCS concurs with her.
CJCS with SECDEF's concurance says to the President, "Sir, based on the Secretary's assessment I think the military role should be----------------------------, in order to achieve your political objectives. There are several risks that we'll face with this approach, and if the State Department fails to achieve its objectives of course the military will be left holding the bag, and then America will be looking for a military solution for a non military problem. I recommend we go back to the drawing board sir, and design a plan that minimizes our risk of getting stuck in a quagmire that will drain our miliary resources and increase our risk elsewhere in the world."