From The Independent,
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...cle1195264.ece
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From The Independent,
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/...cle1195264.ece
Not the "next small war", but a good brief article on the ever-changing political environment in the Mid-East and the problems of perception management...
The Economist, 19 Oct 06:
Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, are the pillars of a rapidly strengthening alliance in the world's most volatile region.
Quote:
...So entrenched now is the idea of an American-led assault on Muslims that virtually any new development is immediately enlisted as further evidence. The fact that terror attacks on Westerners, carried out in the name of Islam, may have raised some hackles goes without mention. So does the fact that countries such as Syria, under the cloak of resistance to the West, continue to promote agendas in Lebanon and elsewhere that have nothing to do with anti-Americanism, but with cementing their own regional influence.
Even high-minded Western initiatives now arouse suspicion. The effort to deploy a tougher peacekeeping force in Darfur, where some 200,000 people have been killed and perhaps 1m displaced by a government-assisted slaughter of Darfuris, is widely seen as a subterfuge. The head of the Egyptian lawyers' union, a group which might be expected to defend the rights of the weak, recently declared that the true target of UN peacekeepers was Egypt: Sudan was simply “the next stop after Iraq on the road to the heart of Cairo”.
The manner of the ceasefire in Lebanon aroused scepticism, too. To many, the insertion of a UN peacekeeping force was aimed at recouping by diplomacy what Israel had lost by fighting. A recent poll found that 84% of Lebanese believe the war was “a premeditated attempt by the United States and Israel to impose a new regional order in the Middle East”. As for the international siege of the Palestinians until they renounce terrorism and accept the right of Israel to exist, the popular perception is that the West, having claimed to support democracy, is now punishing Palestinians for having elected Hamas in a fair vote...
Case studies recently posted at the United States Institute of Peace:
- Algeria: Transitions from Liberalized Autocracy? by Robert Parks, University of Texas, Austin
- Democracy in Jordan: Opportunities Lost by Ellen Lust-Okar, Yale University
- And Now for the Hard Part: Moving Beyond Liberalized Autocracy in Morocco by Guilain Denoeux, Colby College
- Transitions from Liberalized Autocracy: The Case of Egypt by Jason Brownlee, The University of Texas, Austin
- The Transition from Liberalized Autocracy? The Case of Kuwait by Michael Herb, Georgia State University
The thread title is taken from an article in Intelligence Review - 14 February 1946 - and as with that article, it is a bit misleading in regard to the substantive content of the piece. Although certain of the terms used clearly date the writing, it is clear not a helluva lot has changed from the basic premise back in 46:
Quote:
The Present Estimate
If the Moslem states were strong and stable, their behavior would be more predictable. They are, however, weak and torn by internal stresses; furthermore, their peoples are insufficiently educated to appraise propaganda or to understand the motives of those who promise a new Heaven and a new Earth.
Because of the strategic position of the Moslem world and the restlessness of its peoples, the Moslem states constitute a potential threat to world peace. There cannot be permanent world stability, when one-seventh of the world's population exists under the economic and political conditions that are imposed upon the Moslems.
1946, about the time the great oil boom was getting ready to start and untold hundreds of billions of dollars have been generated in oil revenues in the subsequent 61 years since that Intel report. I don't see much improvement in the quality of life for the average muslim on the planet despite the staggering wealth. In looking at social evolution in relationship to economic growth we here see steady expansion since 1946. In that year, Black veterans in many places couldn't sit down to eat in a cafe with fellow White veterans. Many Blacks couldn't vote. There were many jobs women simply didn't even apply for, let alone do. Lobotomies were a method of treatment for the mentally ill. The handicapped were pretty much excluded from employment. Kids with special needs never had their abilities developed. People that seriously mistreated animals for the most part were never prosecuted. Drunk drivers were often laughed at. Smoking was considered glamorous. I see little correspondence in social evolution in the Islamic world despite the presence of wealth to enable said evolution.
Article by Vali Nasr summarizing his book in the latest MR, arguing that the American invasion of Iraq and the subsequent election of a Shia-dominated religious government has empowered Shiism throughout the Middle East.
CEIP, 25 May 07: Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World
Quote:
Secular parties in the Arab world—a broad range of political organizations that vary in their political orientation from liberal positions to vaguely socialist programs—are facing a crisis. Caught between regimes that allow little legal space for free political activity on one side and popular Islamist movements that are clearly in the ascendancy throughout the Arab world on the other, they are struggling for influence and relevance, and in some cases even for survival.
Results of recent elections across the region have exposed the weaknesses of secular parties and thus created a new sense of urgency among their leaders and members. They no longer hide—from themselves or others—the depth of the crisis they are facing, but they have no ready solutions. They know that they have stagnant or even dwindling constituencies, whereas the Islamists have growing and increasingly well-organized ones. And most admit that, at present, they do not have a strategy on how to regain the ground they have lost in countries such as Morocco and Egypt or to take advantage of new opportunities in countries such as Yemen and Kuwait. There is often a plaintive tone to the arguments set forth by secular parties in the Arab world. They feel victimized by authoritarian governments that thwart their activities. They feel disadvantaged by the competition of Islamist movements that use mosques for proselytizing and charitable institutions to build constituencies. They feel, in other words, caught in the middle and fighting on two fronts...
First issue of a new pub from the World Security Institute: Arab Insight
Unfortunately, individual articles are not linked, so you have to download the entire 112 page pdf:
Quote:
U.S. Foreign Policy and Islamists
Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?
Khalil al-Anani, Egypt
Alone at the Ballot Box: American Rejection of Islamists
Atef Abou Saif, Palestinian Territory
Trial and Error: Washington and Iraq’s Shiite
Ibrahim al-Baydani, Iraq
The Cold Embrace: U.S. & Islamists in North Africa
Mohamed el-Ghali, Morocco
Islam Outside the Mosque
Islamic Roots of Good Governance
Mazen Hashem, Syria
Islam and Human Rights: Revisiting the Debate
Jumana Shehata, Egypt
A Response to Western Views of Islamist Movements
Radwan Ziadh, Syria
Separation of Islam & Political Islam: The Case of Morocco
Hossam Tamam, Egypt
Thanks for posting this. I am getting into it.
I'm having some difficulty understanding the difference between these three terms:
Sharia
Islamic Law
Fiqh
I have a feeling, based on different things I have read, that there is a great deal of confusion concerning these three terms. Different sources (both Arab and English) seem to use them in different ways.
One of the three seems to correspond closely to what we in Anglophone countries would call "common law," but I have seen each of these three terms described in a way that resembles common law. One of the authors in Jedburgh's post describes fiqh as Islamic Jurisprudence which is then defined by the author as "an aggregation of individual opinions and juristic interpretations, which differ not only from one country to another, but which also change with the passage of time." That author then says that Islamic Law is based on fiqh. That sounds a lot like our idea of common law; but is that somehow a wrong metaphor?
One of them almost certainly has more to do with abstract principles, like "constitutional" parts of law. Is this Sharia? Or is Sharia an older version of Islamic Law?
Is there someone amongst us who has the sophistication to help me out on this?
I have an Arab friend who is an expert on Islamic banking and finance (which is intimately connected to Islamic legal thinking), so I asked him to help me out with the question I just asked. Here is his answer. Please note that it is one answer (he says "I have argued" which is a sure sign he means that his answer is his considered opinion and that there is some controversy here...fyi).
I'm afraid that this more or less confirms what I thought from my own reading. Different writers use these terms in varying ways, so we're stuck with paying attention to context and not expecting too much consistency of usage across authors.Quote:
Hello Nat:
I have argued that practical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) has in fact been common-law like. The reason for lack of transparency, however, is that the rhetoric of Islamic law sounds as if it is an immediate interpretation of a canon law (Shari`a). To add to confusion, most Arab countries have secular civil codes, adapted from French and Swiss codes, and that has shaped their understanding of Islamic law as well.
Let me see if I can make the terms clear to you:
* Shari`a is the Arabic equivalent of the Jewish Halakha, an all encompassing code for life. It includes things such as honor, etc., which far exceed "law" in the narrow sense.
* Authors are often careless re the distinction between Shari`a and Fiqh. The formal legal definition of Shari`a refers to revealed, immutable Law (capital L), as present in the Canon consisting of the Qur'an and Prophet Tradition. Fiqh literally means "understanding", i.e. the application of the Law to a specific instance, which requires going through multiple stages: (1) understanding the issue, (2) legal framing of the question, (3) application of the Legal (capital L) principle to the specific event.
* It is very common for people to usurp Divine authority, as it were, by using the term Shari`a for matters that are really issues of fiqh. Legal scholars distinguish between the two by saying that Shari`a is immutable, but that fiqh, exercised through the two channels of qada' (court rulings) and fatwa (scholarly opinion), varies by time, place and circumstance. When you call your preferred policy an application of Shari`a, it sounds more authoritative, and makes it more difficult for others to argue against your position.
* People who use the term "Islamic law" often mean Shari`a, rather than fiqh. Unfortunately, Shari`a is consistent with many different interpretations, and there has not been a coherent codification of Islamic fiqh since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That is why British courts twice dismissed provisions of applying Shari`a in contracts, since they concluded that different scholars will interpret Shari`a provisions differently for the cases before them, and "Islamic law" did not qualify as the law of a sovereign nation and therefore could not be applied based on the Rome convention.
I like the writings of Wael Hallaq, but they are a bit involved.
The book that best compares Islamic law to Anglo-American common law, as you requested, would be Lawrence Rosen's The Justice of Islam, Oxford, 2000.
A good text for western audience is Bernard Weiss's The Spirit of Islamic Law, U. Georgia Press, 1998.
I hope that this helps.
Also, it sounds like we should be a little suspicious of claims that something is a matter of Shari`a, as my pal suggests that such claims are frequently little more than a rhetorical device.
Nat
The differences in what many wrongly characterize as a rigid religion are what have driven the creation and the conflict between the various and many schools of Islamic thought. There is no simple answer for the question you posed to your friend or us here. It was a good question, one impossible to answer terms or any fashion combining both brevity and accuracy.
Best
Tom
Hat Tip: Prof./Col. Richard Augustus NortonQuote:
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: The Middle East.
Eighth Report of Session 2006–07
Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence
Published on 13 August 2007 by authority of the House of Commons
WINEP, Sep 07: Pushback or Progress? Arab Regimes Respond to Democracy's Challenge
Quote:
....Arab regimes usually neutralized the democratic challenge by using a multilayered response that included repression, redefinition, and co-optation. In some cases—which deserve more attention than they have received to date—governments even made some domestic changes. Clearly, every country managed the issue in different ways.
What is most significant, however, is not that the democratization project was largely a failed effort, but rather that the way regimes responded to this challenge is defining how Arab governance will work in the coming decades. Assessing whether Arab regimes will become weaker and more unstable because of this reaction, as well as how such efforts have affected the relative chances of competing forces in the future, is extremely important.
Although the balance differs in each country, the main responses include reassertion of a traditional agenda, delegitimization of opponents, repression and harassment, pretense or co-optation, and, finally, actual reforms. Both liberal and Islamist oppositions have adjusted in this process, and the strategies of both are examined in this paper....
Arab Insights, Fall 2007: Missing in Action: The Democracy Agenda in the Middle East
Quote:
Over the last several decades, the United States government has claimed to have significantly changed its policies toward the Middle East. After decades of supporting repressive and undemocratic Middle Eastern regimes during the Cold War, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would begin a policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East. However, that democratic agenda has been unevenly applied and even reversed when democratic elections produce governments that did not favor U.S. policies. Supporting elections in Egypt and the Palestinian Territories until the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas were democratically favored, the U.S. government appears to show only conditional support for Middle East democracies. In its occupation of Iraq, the U.S. has made an even greater blunder: under the guise of “spreading freedom,” it has actually increased chaos and insecurity throughout the Middle East.
Arab perceptions of America have been greatly harmed by the ways in which the U.S. government has attempted to spread democracy in Iraq and beyond. The negative perceptions of the United States fostered by Cold War policy could have been alleviated by peaceful promotion of democracy in the Middle East; instead, however, the forceful methods and double standards of democracy building have further damaged the U.S. image in the Arab world.....
USIP, Nov 07: The Challenge of Islamists for EU and US Policies: Conflict, Stability and Reform
Quote:
....In the first section of this volume, two contributions look at the challenges for and the framing of policies for the Muslim world. The contributions offer insights into the diverse factors that shape US debates and policies towards the region, including threat perceptions and geo-strategic interests. While Daniel Brumburg focuses on the question of why certain foreign policy paradigms dominate at certain times, Steven Heydemann develops a matrix to understand the different elements that add up to specific policies at particular junctures. The second section examines the political inclusion of Islamists in Muslim majority democracies. Steven Cook points out the tremendous reform achievements that the Islamist AKP government in Turkey has realized. Felix Heiduk stresses the complexity of the Islamist scene in Indonesia. In both Turkey and Indonesia, EU and US policies, while being quite different, have been inadequate with regards to promoting democratic transitions. The third section focuses on the use and abuse of Islam in framing conflicts and policies. Two contributions, from Dorina Bekoe on Sudan and Anette Weber on Somalia, analyze the role of Islam in violent conflicts and point to the multiple sources of conflict behind religious appeals. They also underscore teh relevance of the inclusion of Islamist actors for the peaceful transformation of conflicts. The fourth section on the political participation of Islamists in authoritarian systems discusses the relevance of Islamist actors for the peaceful transition of authoritarian systems and European and US policies towards Islamist movements, parties and authoritarian governments. Eva Wegner looks at the effects that political inclusion has had on the development of the Islamist movement in Morocco. Mona Yacoubian points out the relevance of the Islamist-secular opposition alliance in the case of Yemen. Les Campbell summarizes the experiences that the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has made in engaging Islamists in democracy promotion efforts. A final paper by Muriel Asseburg sketches out elements of a shared US-EU agenda towards the Muslim world in the fields of democracy promotion, stabilization policies and efforts to peacefully transform conflicts......
CSIS, 10 Jan 08: Security and Stability in the Greater Middle East
Complete 53 slide briefing in pdf format at the link.Quote:
Six Strategic Challenges
• Energy export capacity and security
• Adjustment of military posture in Iraq, and the Gulf.
• Deciding how to deal with Iranian proliferation, growing asymmetric warfare capabilities, and use of proxies.
• The lack of near-term prospects for a real Arab-Israeli peace process, and potential further military clashes in Lebanon and between Israel and the Palestinians and/or Syria.
• The region-wide impact of Neo-Salafi Islamist extremism. The franchising of Al Qaida, and its impact inside and outside the region.
• Dealing with the war in Afghanistan, potential destabilization of as nuclear Pakistan, and its impact on proliferation and Islamist extremism in the Middle East.
22 Jan 08 testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on That Which is Not Obligatory is Forbidden: Censorship and Incitement in the Arab World:
Joel Campagna, Committee to Protect Journalists
Richard Eisendorf, Freedom House
Kenneth Jacobson, Anti-Defamation League
FIIA, 1 Feb 08: Sectarian Identities or Geopolitics? The Regional Shia-Sunni Divide in the Middle East
Complete 62 page paper at the link.Quote:
The purpose of this study is to enhance understanding of the new geopolitical situation currently unfolding in Middle Eastern politics that has emerged since the onset of the United States-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The paper focuses on the notions of the Sunni-Shia divide and the Rise of the Shia.
In this study it is argued that the present dynamics of the regional-level Sunni-Shia divide are reinforced and catalysed by both geopolitical considerations and the national security interests of states. History and identity alone are not sufficient to explain the logics of the divide at the regional level. The study seeks to explain how and why geo- and power politics reinforce the present-day sectarian divide in the Middle East. It also suggests that the divide has the potential to become an era defining feature of the post-Saddam Middle East in the way pan-Arabism and pan-Islam have defined the past decades of the region.
The study takes as its point of departure the division of Middle Eastern politics into two levels of analysis: the domestic level and the regional level. Different kinds of geopolitical readjustments and power balancing take place at the two levels, on which different fault lines can be identified. The analysis in this study is concentrated on the regional level, where the sectarian dynamic or rhetoric is not yet as apparent as at the domestic level (in some states), where sectarian struggles have brought two states, namely Iraq and Lebanon, almost to breaking point....
CEIP, 26 Feb 08: The New Middle East
Complete 48 page paper at the link.Quote:
.....The Middle East of 2008 is indeed a vastly different region from that of 2001, and the war in Iraq has been the most important driver of this transformation, although by no means the only one. The outcome, however, is not what the Bush administration envisaged. On the contrary, the situation has become worse in many countries. Despite the presence of over 160,000 U.S. troops in Iraq at the end of 2007 and an improvement in the security situation, Iraq remains an unstable, violent, and deeply divided country, indeed a failed state. Progress is being undermined by the refusal of Iraqi political factions to engage in a serious process of reconciliation, as the Bush administration has repeatedly warned. Furthermore, with the demise of Saddam Hussein, the balance of power between Iran and Iraq has been broken, increasing the influence of Tehran in the Gulf and beyond. Meantime, Iran continues its uranium enrichment program undeterred by United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions or the threat of U.S. military action.
The Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains unsolved, but its parameters have changed considerably, with a deep split in the Palestinian ranks and the effects of decades of unilateral Israeli actions calling into question whether a two-state solution can possibly be implemented. Although Lebanon has been largely liberated from direct Syrian domination, the country is deeply divided and teeters on the brink of domestic conflict. The power of Syria has been diminished by the forced withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon, but the country maintains its potential as a spoiler. The threat of nuclear proliferation is not just limited to Iran; from Morocco to the Gulf, a growing number of countries are declaring their intention to develop a nuclear capacity—for civilian use, to be sure, but a nuclear capacity nevertheless. Confessional and ethnic divisions have acquired greater saliency in many countries.
There has been no successful democratic revolution in any Middle Eastern country. Instead, the democratic openings advocated and supported by the United States have either led to sectarian division or revealed the greater popular appeal and strength of Islamist rather than liberal organizations, one of several reasons the United States has retreated from democracy promotion. Far from having leapfrogged over old problems, the United States is now confronting most of the old problems, often in a more acute way, as well as new ones.....
I am sure this will be warmly reviewed at AEI...
Parameters, Spring '08: The Mythical Shia Crescent
Quote:
Sometime in late 2006, America awoke to the realization that, by deposing Saddam Hussein and toppling his Ba’athist regime, it had inadvertently removed a major obstacle to Iranian dominance in the Middle East. Assessments of the associated events reached hyperbolic levels. Dire warnings of a growing Iranian hegemony began to surface. Sunni leaders such as Jordan’s King Abdullah II began to warn the West of an emerging “Shia Crescent,” led by Iran and encompassing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The idea caught fire in American media and became the dominant narrative in discourse on Middle East policy.
But how realistic is this amalgamation? Is a Shia Crescent really emerging that is capable of challenging more than a millennium of Sunni domination in the Islamic world? Will Iran lead it? On the surface, the idea appears plausible. Yet, a more in-depth examination of the prospective members of this geopolitical realignment raises numerous questions. This intellectual shorthand may be blinding the United States to opportunities that could yield tangible progress on several strategic fronts in the Middle East, while providing a new ally in the global war on terrorism.....
CEIP, 4 Jun 08: Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: Restoring Credibility
Quote:
The Bush administration’s effort to foster democratic transformation in the Middle East has not had a significant impact on Arab countries, which remain largely autocratic. After a brief period of ferment in 2004–2005, Middle Eastern politics has become stagnant again. Moreover, the Bush policy—never clearly defined, long on rhetoric, short on strategy, and fitfully implemented—has undermined U.S. credibility and will make it more difficult for the next administration to devise a successful approach to political reform in the region.
The new administration must devise a new policy. While it is imperative that the United States abandon the mixture of simplistic assumptions and missionary fervor of the last few years, ignoring the need for reform and simply supporting friendly regimes are not a viable alternative. Such policy will not maintain stability in a region that is transforming rapidly economically and socially, because stability will depend on the ability of regimes to adapt to change rather than cling to the status quo. Moreover, fewer countries now, and even fewer in the future, are willing to embrace the United States unconditionally: “Friendly to the United States” has become a relative concept at best. Thus, the United States needs a new approach toward regimes that are facing deep political challenges but do not see the United States as either a model to imitate or a reliable ally....
2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll Survey of the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland (with Zogby International) Professor Shibley Telhami, Principal Investigator.
Survey conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAE
Some key findings:
Full version here (.pdf) and here (.ppt).Quote:
Iraq: Only 6% of Arabs polled believe that the American surge has worked. A plurality (35% ) do not believe reports that violence has in fact declined. Over 61% believe that if the US were to withdraw from Iraq, Iraqis will find a way to bridge their differences, and only 15% believe the civil war would expand. 81% of Arabs polled (outside Iraq) believe that the Iraqis are worse off than they were before the Iraq war.
Iran: In contrast with the fears of many Arab governments, the Arab public does not appear to see Iran as a major threat. Most believe that Iran has the right to its nuclear program and do not support international pressure to force it to curtail its program. A plurality of Arabs (44%) believes that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, the outcome would be more positive for the region than negative.
The Arab Israeli conflict: There is an increase in the expressed importance of the Palestinian issue, with 86% of the public identifying it as being at least among the top three issues to them. A majority of Arabs continues to support the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, but an increasing majority is pessimistic about its prospects. If the prospects of a two state solution collapse, 50% believe it would lead to a state of intense conflict for years to come, while only 9% believe it would lead to a one-state solution, and only 7% believe that the Palestinians would eventually surrender.
Palestinian Divisions: In the conflict between Hamas and Fatah, only 8% sympathize with Fatah most, while 18% sympathize with Hamas, and 38% sympathize with both to some extent. In so far as they see Palestinians as somewhat responsible for the state of affairs in Gaza, 15% blame Hamas’s government most, 23% blame the government appointed by President Mahmoud Abbas, and 39% blame both equally.
The Lebanese Crisis: Only 9% express sympathy with the majority governing coalition in the current internal crisis in Lebanon, while 30% sympathize with the opposition led by Hizbollah, 24% sympathize with neither side, and 19% sympathize with both to some extent.
Popular Leaders: Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, increased his popularity as the most admired leader in the Arab world (26%) There was also an increase in the popularity of President Bashar Assad of Syria. Also striking, however, was the emerging popularity of modernizing Sunni Arab leaders, particularly Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid al Maktoum of Dubai, when respondents identify the two leaders they admire most.
Attitudes toward the US: 83% of the public has an unfavorable view of the US and 70% express no confidence in the US. Still, Arabs continue to rank the US among the top countries with freedom and democracy for their own people. 32% believe that, from the point of view of advancing peace in the Middle East, American policy will remain the same, no matter who wins the US elections. 18% believe that Barack Obama has the best chance of advancing peace, 13% believe Hillary Clinton has the best chance, while 4% identify John McCain as having the best chance for advancing peace.
Global Outlook: France continues to be the most popular country, China continues to make a good showing, and views of Pakistan have declined.
Media: Al-Jazeera continues to command the largest share of the Arabic news market, with 53% of Arabs polled identifying it as their first choice for news, with practically no change from last year. Egyptian Television and Al-Arabiya have made some gains over last year. To a plurality of respondents, the quality OF both Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera has improved over previous years, with only a small minority perceiving a decline.
CEIP, 17 Jul 08: The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S.
Quote:
Many Arab countries traditionally aligned with the United States are showing increasing reluctance to follow Washington’s lead in addressing regional problems. This tendency toward an independent foreign policy is particularly evident among the Gulf countries. Even states that host major U.S. military facilities on their soil, such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, consider U.S. policy in the region counterproductive and are forging a new diplomacy.
Gulf countries have refused to enter into an anti-Iranian alliance with the United States, and have chosen instead to pursue close diplomatic contacts with Tehran, although they fear its growing influence. They are trying to bring about reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine, while the United States is seeking to isolate Hamas. They have helped negotiate a compromise solution in Lebanon, while the United States has encouraged the government to take a hard-line position. Yet, the new diplomacy of the Arab countries is not directed against the United States, although it contradicts U.S. policies.....
ISN, 15 Oct 08: Conceptualizing the Sunni-Shi'i Encounter in the Modern Period
This study examines the issues of religious authority and legitimacy in Islam. The author compares and contrasts traditions of jurisprudence and juridical authority in Sunni and Shia Islam. The author considers the major related points of discussion among Islamic religious scholars, especially on the issue of interpretation. The study also considers the Islamic Revolution in Iran, its impact on Islamic ideology and the revitalization of the study of Islam.
NPR, 20 Nov 08: Speaking of Faith: The Sunni-Shia Divide and the Future of Islam
Quote:
We seek fresh insight into the history and the human and religious dynamics of Islam's Sunni-Shia divide. Our guest says that it is not so different from dynamics in periods of Western Christian history. But he says that by bringing the majority Shia to power in Iraq, the U.S. has changed the religions dynamics of the Middle East......
USIP, Jun 09: Justice Interrupted: Historical Perspectives on Promoting Democracy in the Middle East
Quote:
Summary
• Foreign affairs experts routinely use historical analogy to develop and justify policy. However, as professional historians have long noted, attractive analogies often lead to bad policies. Officials regularly choose analogies that neglect or distort the historical case they aim to illuminate. Nonetheless, history can be used effectively in international relations.
• To do so, practitioners must first recognize the difference between historical analogy and precedent. Historical precedent, drawn from the past of the region in question, is a safer guide to policy than historical analogy, which is based on comparisons to events in other regions. Because historical precedent is a self-limiting form of analogy restricted to a certain place, people, and time, it provides a better indication of how a certain society understands and responds to a given situation.
• The recent U.S. intervention in Iraq highlights the misuses of history: American leaders employed analogies to World War II to justify the invasion and to predict success in establishing a democratic regime after. These analogies proved to be a poor guide to nation building in the short term. In the long term, they have deeply aggravated U.S. relations with Iraqis and the rest of the Arab world.
• A more effective use of history would have been to refer to the precedent of World War I, a crucial moment when American policy could have supported indigenous Arab constitutional democracy—but, fatefully, did not.
• For the new administration, the Arabs’ experience of “justice interrupted” after World War I can still be a useful touchstone for promoting democracy in the region.1 This precedent alerts us that foreign intervention can spark a deep-seated and negative political reaction in the postcolonial Arab world and that reform in Arab politics must begin with respect for national sovereignty. It also reminds us that constitutionalism and the desire to participate in the community of international law are enduring values in Arab politics.
The Telhami poll is must reading for anyone who is considering American policy in the Middle East. It is also very depressing. Even on an interpersonal level, I found it very difficult to get to any reasonable middle ground when talking to Arabs in the region about politics. Our starting points as to what a reasonable middle ground should be are so different that it is very difficult to get to any common understanding on key issues. For instance, one might think that some shared perception of an Iranian threat could spur cooperation in the Gulf, yet even in that case, the polls show that Gulf Arabs do not share American concerns.
The 2009 Arab public opinion poll is out:
PPT & Key Findings.
Quote:
Summary of Key Findings:
1. Attitudes Toward the President of the United States: Overall, 45% of Arabs polled have a favorable view of President Obama (50% outside Egypt), 28% are neutral, 24% have negative views. Remarkably, 79% of Saudis have a favorable view of President Obama and only 14% have negative views. Consistently, in all six countries, the negative views of the President are remarkably low.
2.Attitudes Toward the United States: The most important consequence of their favorable views of President Obama appears to be expressed hope for American foreign policy in the Middle East. After a few weeks of the Obama administration, a majority in all countries, 51% (59% outside Egypt) expressed hopefulness about US Middle East policy, 28% were neutral, while only 14% were discouraged.
3.Attitudes Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Unlike the case of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war, when most Arabs believed Israel lost the war and Hezbollah won, most Arabs polled believe that Israel was the biggest winner of the Gaza war in 2008-2009, and that the Palestinian people were the biggest losers.
4.Attitudes on Iraq: 65% of Arabs polled (compared with 61% in 2008) believe that if the US withdraws its forces from Iraq as planned by the end of 2011, Iraqis will find a way to bridge their differences. 72% believe Iraqis are worse off than they were before the Iraq war, but this is a decrease from 82% in 2008.
5.Attitudes Toward Iran: There are indications the criticism of Iran, particularly in Morocco and Egypt, is having some impact. 13% identify Iran as one of their two biggest threats (compared with 7% in 2008), and outside Egypt, 20% see Iran as one of the two biggest threats to them, compared with 11% in 2008.
6.Attitudes on Global Leadership: The attacks on Hezbollah’s leader Hasan Nasrallah, especially in Egypt and Morocco, appear to be having an impact. In an open question to identify the leader they admire most outside their own countries, only 6% identify Nasrallah (in contrast with 2008, when he led with 26%). However, he maintains solid popularity in Jordan (21%). The net winner is Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, who was identified as the most admired leader with 24% of those polled (compared with only 4% in 2008).
7.Media Trends: The use of the internet continued to grow with 36% stating that they use the internet at least several times a week and only 38% stating that they never use the internet (compared with 52% in 2008).
The Berkman Center, 16 Jun 09: Mapping the Arabic Blogosphere: Politics, Culture and Dissent
Quote:
This study explores the structure and content of the Arabic blogosphere using link analysis, term frequency analysis, and human coding of individual blogs. The authors identified a base network of approximately 35,000 active Arabic language blogs (about half as many as we found in a previous study of the Persian blogosphere), discovered several thousand Arabic blogs with mixed use of Arabic, English and French, created a network map of the 6,000 most connected blogs, and with a team of Arabic speakers hand coded over 4,000 blogs. The goal for the study was to produce a baseline assessment of the networked public sphere in the Arab Middle East, and its relationship to a range of emergent issues, including politics, media, religion, culture, and international affairs.
CEIP, 28 Jan 11: Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World
Quote:
Over the past decade, the Arab world has seen an increase in protests, strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of social protest. The uprising that started in Tunisia in late 2010 was not a completely new development, but rather a more dramatic example of the unrest common across the region, particularly in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan.
But the protest movements in the region have severe limitations. The various organizations involved—labor groups, youth organizations, bloggers, political parties, and Islamist movements—have different constituencies, demands, and organizational styles. Indeed, in some countries there has been, until recently, a deliberate decision not to coordinate and particularly to keep socioeconomic and political demands separate. This helps incumbent authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes stay in power despite the high levels of discontent in many countries.
Despite the absence of large cohesive movements, Arab regimes are right to worry about the possibility of an uprising in their countries. The underlying conditions of difficult social and economic conditions coupled with political repression, lack of political freedoms, and corruption exist everywhere. Publics in Arab countries are also right in feeling inspired by events in Tunisia and in believing that they can force change. Ultimately, however, change depends not on Tunisia’s example, but on the ability of protesters to coordinate their efforts and link socioeconomic with political demands and on the governments’ response—that, plus the imponderable catalyst.
Has anyone shown a correlation between OIF and recent uprisings against non-democratic governments in the Arab World? Was the former administration right that removing Saddam would be a catalyst for the spread of democracy in the Middle East? I suspect this has been addressed, but I haven't seen any studies, articles or commentaries on this line of thought. Please share if you have seen it.
I think few, if any, analysts saw this recent wave of uprising coming. I have not seen any article showing a relation between the removal of Saddam and current events. There are some studies that show that as long as a muslim autocratic regime maintains a defiant stance towards the West, it has less to fear from its own population than when it is seen as a lackey of the West (e.g. because it fails to denounce western military operations in the Middle East).
However, I think that - with the benefit of hindsight - studies will be written that show a correlation between OIF and the recent uprisings against non-democratic governments in the Arab World.
Brother Bill,
It would seem to stand to reason that after dropping a trillion dollar rock into an oxbow lake waves from that event would travel to every point in the lake; I would argue that it’s still too early to say conclusively that that event has fully reconnected things (when using the Assyrian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, etc. as reference points) to the mighty multi-generational river that is globalization. IMHO Iraq, Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are just a few of the interesting places to look to for hints.
Let’s consider three ‘substantive’ viewpoints from Iraq
Iraq’s last patriot, by Anthony Shadid, NYT, 4 February 2011
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“We came in naïve about what the problems were in Iraq,” Gen.Raymond Odierno, the American military commander in Iraq, told me last August, a few days before he was to end his third tour. He had spent four years in Iraq. “I don’t think we understood what I call the societal devastation that occurred, we didn’t realize how damaged Iraq had been from 1980, in the Iran-Iraq war.” The list went on: Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the 1991 gulf war, international sanctions that crippled Iraq’s middle class. “And then,” Odierno added, “we attacked to overthrow the government.” The same naïveté affected American efforts to mold Iraqi politics, with its ethnic and sectarian divisions. “We just didn’t understand it,” Odierno said.
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Maliki’s victory ended eight months of utter political dysfunction, and what have become Iraq’s key players were all represented in some fashion. “A big step for Iraq” is how an American briefing paper described the result. “A government that is made in Iraq.” Former American diplomats were less encouraged. Before it had all finished, Crocker offered a typically insightful prediction. “There will be a little for everybody, probably,” he said. “It’s going to be fairly inclusive among the elite. But the promises that are made, the deals that are dealt, are really not going to involve any promises or commitments to make life better for people in Iraq. That’s just not what the transaction is in Iraqi politics.”
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In my first interview with Allawi, back in May, he offered a suggestion, with a laugh. “This is my advice to you — go and ask President Bush how Iraq is going to get out of this mess. Bush, Bush, your Bush, Bush Jr., you ask him. He’ll probably have the right answer. I think so. He introduced the de-Baathification, he introduced the dismantling of the army, he introduced the sectarian quotas in the Governing Council. He should know what he did — the process, how this process is going to move forward.”
I would argue that the OIF experience, good and bad, has raised the expectations of the hoi polloi, and as a result many of the changes resulting in some level of transparency & accountability (Al Jazeera style) at the Nahiya, Qada, Province, and National levels in Iraq are unstoppable, and will indeed continue.Quote:
I asked which was better — the Iraq of Saddam Hussein or the Iraq of today. He shook his head with the disdain of an expatriate. “The only difference is that we have this democracy.” He uttered the word with contempt.
Al-Maliki gives Iraqi officials 100 days to improve — or else, By Rebecca Santana, in the Washington Times on 9:53 a.m., Sunday, February 27, 2011
If we accept that Egypt is indeed the cultural vanguard of the Arab World, it’s interesting to think about the demographics of the country and who might be representative of the different viewpoints associated with a market segmentation analysis. Yusuf al Qaradawi (25 to 30 percent of the Egyptian populace is said to favor a Muslim Brotherhood derived vision), General Ismail Etmaan(Egyptian Army, Higher Military Council), Al Jazeera (New Media), and ‘Arab Youth’ (60 percent of the Arab region is said to be under 25 years of age) are part of the topology.Quote:
BAGHDAD (AP) — Iraq‘s prime minister, following a string of deadly anti-government protests, gave his ministers on Sunday 100 days to improve their performance or risk being fired.
The warning from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came two days after thousands of protesters took to the streets across the country to demand better public services. It demonstrates the worries Iraqi officials have that protests here inspired by the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt could spiral out of control.
After Long Exile, Sunni Cleric Takes Role in Egypt By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK, Published: February 18, 2011 in the New York Times
Person in the News: the Arab youth, By Rould Khalaf, Published: February 25 2011 22:33, Financial TimesQuote:
Sheik Qaradawi, a popular television cleric whose program reaches an audience of tens of millions worldwide, addressed a rapt audience of more than a million Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square to celebrate the uprising and honor those who died.
“Don’t fight history,” he urged his listeners in Egypt and across the Arab world, where his remarks were televised. “You can’t delay the day when it starts. The Arab world has changed.”
Middle East: Uncertain horizons, By Tobias Buck in Jerusalem, Published: February 23 2011 21:51, Financial TimesQuote:
He is the young Egyptian who occupied Tahrir Square, and awakened a sleepy population. She is the young Libyan defying the madness and brutality of Muammer Gaddafi. He is the empowered Bahraini and Yemeni youth raising his voice in a resolute call on governments to listen to their people instead of oppressing them. Each revolt has drawn in swaths of its own society, but it is the young Arab who is the driving force; the unassuming leader. Whether in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen or Libya, the more established forces in society, including political parties, tribes and the military, have been followers, forced to jump on the bandwagon lest they too are left behind.
Citizens not serfs can save Saudi Arabia, By David Gardner, Published: February 27 2011 19:06, Financial TimesQuote:
The real problem for the IDF, however, lies not so much in the human fallibility of senior officers but in their inability to formulate a coherent response to a changing security environment. That, at least, is the thesis advanced by Ron Tira, an Israeli military analyst and a former air force pilot. “We are now facing a new warfare paradigm by the enemy. The old approaches are not very useful, we need to come up with something new – and we are not there yet,” he says.
The threat today is not invasion or battlefield defeat. Instead, argues Mr Tira, Israel’s enemies in Iran, Syria, southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip have launched a war of attrition aimed at the “long-term erosion of the Israeli will and the long-term erosion of Israeli legitimacy”. The approach cleverly combines political and military elements, conventional and non-conventional warfare, and draws on the international community’s increasing frustration with Israel.
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On his return from months of hospitalisation and recuperation in the US and Morocco, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia was characteristically unstinting in his generosity. He lavished $36bn on his subjects, in pay rises and debt forgiveness, and to help them buy houses and start businesses. As munificence goes, this was princely. Whether it was politic is another question.
It might buy off whatever unrest is brewing underneath the kingdom’s thick layers of political, military and religious control. Or it may be perceived as the panicky response of an absolute monarchy to the wave of revolution unfolding across the Arab world; the rulers of neighbouring Bahrain offered their people a similar bribe but they took to the streets anyway. Yet King Abdullah’s decision to hose Saudis with money to pre-empt any revolt is certainly old politics in a new era – and unless it is followed by political reforms the king himself has timidly championed, the future of the kingdom must be in question.
Marc and Steve,
I agree it is too early to tell. While we successfully removed Saddam's regime, our attempt to transform Iraq is still largely a failed experiment in forcing Western values and political processes upon a people who didn't embrace them. I don't think any of the popular uprisings desire to follow the model we established there, BUT on the other hand, our occupation of Iraq probably motivated some interesting political discussions among the youth in several Arab nations and they decided they wanted change so much, that it broke the bonds of fear that the government had over the people.
Unfortunately in my view, we see people throughout the Middle East demonstrating against their corrupt and inefficient governments and seeking a greater say in governance, yet because these corrupt governments are our allies in the war on terror we don't have a policy for responding to these events. We seem to be paralyzed and letting a potential opportunity to let the Arab people reform the Middle East (something we can't do) slip through our fingers. It seems by our actions, or lack of action, that we would have preferred the status quo to remain, because the bastard you know may be better than the bastard you don't, but on the other hand we claim our policies are at least partially based on human rights, freedom and democracy. Once again we're losing credibility in the Middle East.
From my very bias seat, I see this as the a great opportunity for Special Forces to support the oppressed rise up against their corrupt governments, but, and maybe with good reason, we're too nervous about the morning after to engage.
Marc, I agree that the anti-western rhetoric in the Middle East had legs, but that seems to be waning a little. If we don't always support Israel, if we get past our desire to re-make the Middle East in our image, and we support legimate change that is desired by the Arab people, etc., then there will be less reason for the anti-western rhetoric to resonate. Saddam didn't have any answers, and I don't recall any other leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage that were effective in providing for their people. Iran isn't in the Arab world, but their anti-western rhetoric isn't winning them the support of their people. Saddam's anti-western rhetoric didn't win support from his people, but it did generate support from various anti-Israeli extremists, much like Qadaffi's anti-western rhetoric (before he allegedly became our friend) won more support from radicals outside Libya than his own people.
I think we'll be learning and relearning lessons for a long time based on these current upraisings. I only fear we'll discover the truth too late to act in ways that would benefit our interests and the Arab people.
Elliot Abrams had an opinion piece to that effect in the Washington Post about a month ago.
I would argue that in many regards the current rise of democratically minded protest is in spite of, rather than because of OIF and our GWOT efforts. I do believe that in the long run Iraq has the potential to provide a powerful example of how to evolve toward a form of effective democracy appropriate to this region, but that is a future benefit.
Consider that the countries where the populaces are rising up now, emboldened by the success of Tunisia and the US response, are also the countries that were:
1. The greatest source of foreign fighters to travel to Iraq and fight against the US under the AQ banner;
2. All (Libya new to that first list) U.S. Allies and all topping the charts of the "least free" nations on earth;
3. All countries where the US has focused CT efforts and capacity building efforts to help these regimes more effectively deal with the "terrorists" within their borders. One man's freedom marcher is another man's terrorist; and our GWOT focus has been decidedly in support of the perspective of these despotic leaders in that regard. Even Libya became an ally in our war on terror, and leveraged that to gain greater license in the suppression of her own people.
Sadly, the many populaces standing up to oppression are in large part doing it is spite of the US support to their governments, rather than because of the US support to concepts of liberty and democracy. Our words have been of the latter, but our actions have been firmly toward the former.
The key is how we move forward from here. How does the U.S. recover and refocus to lend stability to what could easily become a violent and chaotic process that is not in our best interest, or the best interest of the people involved. Dark forces will absolutely step up and seek to exploit these tumultuous conditions for their own purposes and we will need to be alert. Hopefully the CT guys are dialed up, because there is a good chance some of the real terrorists may break cover or get careless as they seek to grab this advantage. We need to scrub those target lists hard though, because I suspect there are many on the list that are nationalist patriots rather than international terrorists, and we do not want to fall back into the business of being manipulated by our allies to take care of their problems for them.
We live in dynamic times.
Bill,
If you can be both soft and tough enough you can simultaneously be friends with Venus and fight alongside of Mars. Our friend Sun Zu knew how, unlike much of our old guard who are slaves to CvC in all things. In short we lack balance in our approach.
So much for the past; what is a possible solution to help us move forward?
Pragmatism = DIIME+PPP = whole of government approach + public private partnerships = inputs< outputs
What if we were to have a five person strong government working group regularly sitting at our President’s table providing him with sound whole of government advice regarding DIIME issues outside our nation’s borders? We, fortunately, see synergies with the Team Clinton-Gates (DoS and DoD – the D and M of DIIME) just as we did with Team Crocker-Odierno in Iraq. As for I (Intelligence ) once upon a time the Central Intelligence Agency was just that, however it now falls under some administrative fiefdom or another, while our 16 member strong intelligence community appears to happily drift along while burning through 50 billion USD or so a year. Horrible things have happened to the USIA and it appears that we have no one at the table who can represent or speak to our nations governmental Information needs. Similarly who would represent governmental Economics issues for our nation; USAID (external), Department of Commerce (Internal), the Export-Import Bank, etc?
What if we had a five person strong private partnership working group regularly sitting down with our President providing him with sound private partnership advice regarding DIIME issues outside our nation’s borders? What if membership was limited to a single representative from the top US Company in each of the DIIME arenas and membership was transparently reviewed and competed for every two years?
What if these two working groups had to develop quarterly combined work break down structures, schedules, cost estimates, and workplans for their proposals that would be subjected to our Executive, Legislative, and Judicial systems? What if working group members were held accountable for their successes and failures and concepts such as Return on Investment were used as benchmarks? What if the process was transparent and accountable to the population of the US?
Either it’s the beer or I must have bumped my head…. :D
Steve
Counterproductive, I suspect. When the operation ceased to be secret (wouldn't take long) those rising up would be de-legitimized, branded pawns of a meddling foreign government. Foreign intervention, especially if it involved arms, would also make it much easier to justify an armed crackdown, and once we are revealed as a participant we'd lose any credible status as mediator.
These uprisings are good things and should be helped along, but it has to be very subtle and if we go out trying to provoke them we are likely to make a mess.
Calling Libya a "US ally" is well exaggerated. They came off the "untouchable pariah" list but that's about all.
The Libyan regime never asked for or needed any license to oppress. Not many people do, really. They do it because its what they do; they don't ask permission and they don't care what we think.
Presley,
Agree, the US waged the Cold War hard in the Middle East. And well from our perspective. The problem is that we locked those Cold War control measures in place and rode them from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the fall of the Twin Towers. Then, we modified them by adding an aggressive CT layer of engagement and HN security force capacity building directed at capabilities to go after "terrorists." AQ guys are really very few. AQ AP, HOA and Maghreb are made up primarily of nationalist insurgents with a handful of AQ hardcores running the UW program to organize, train, finance, supply, etc.
We let our intel guys throw a big net over the whole mess and call it "terrorism" and granted hunting licenses, provided support and encouraged aggressive pursuit of all.
If we are going to do Security Force Capacity Building with some Ally we need to focus it on dealing with external threats 99% of the time. Help the Saudis deter or defeat an attack by Iran? No problem. Help the Saudis round up the dissenting members of their own populace? I have a problem with that. If the Saudis want to do that, that is there business, but it flies in the face of US principle and law and it weakens us globally when we support suppression abroad of actions that are legal, encouraged, and honored at home.
Bottom line is that we got off track. Our handling of the current rash of popular uprisings, both in how we deal with those governments and how we deal with those populaces, is critical to getting back onto azimuth with our national ethos and principles. We will still do hard things when hard times such as the Cold War dictate. But now is not such times, and there must be healing when conditions change.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/...6?pageNumber=1
We started down that path in 2007. I suspect there is little coincidence that this coincided with the Surge in Iraq, what with Libya being one of the major sources of foreign fighters to that conflict.
Agreed. Yet we used our power and influence to encourge this behavior all the same. And I suspect you underestimate our ability to either push things in the direction we desire, or steer them elsewhere. Here we pushed where we should not have, and we will never know what might have happened if we had tried to steer in stead.
Bill, you are right. The effect of anti-western rhetoric is waning. However, the anti-western theme is still important. One analyst that did see the Egyptian uprising coming is David B. Ottaway, who published an occasional paper entitled "Egypt at a tipping point" in the summer of 2010. This is what he wrote about Mohamed ElBaradei:
In other words Ottaway says that ElBaradei's OPPOSITION increases his credibility on the Egyptian political scene.Quote:
A Ph.D. graduate in international law from New York University
School of Law, the balding, owlishlooking diplomat has spent his entire professional career working abroad either for the Egyptian foreign ministry or
at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Geneva. For 12 years he was the IAEA’s director general, emerging from bureaucratic obscurity with his outspoken criticism of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003
Another thing. There are leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage AND were effective in providing for their people. This approach is at the core of many Islamist movements' strategies. Hizbollah, Hamas and Sadr's movement all combine effective humanitarian and social services programs with anti-western rhetoric.
I agree with you that anti-western rhetoric is no substitute for a lack of attention for the people's need, but I think that an emerging leader that combines anti-western rhetoric with effective policies concerning education, health care, and social assistance will quickly gain massive popular support.
Bill, you are right. The effect of anti-western rhetoric is waning. However, the anti-western theme is still important. One analyst that did see the Egyptian uprising coming is David B. Ottaway, who published an occasional paper entitled "Egypt at a tipping point" in the summer of 2010. This is what he wrote about Mohamed ElBaradei:
In other words Ottaway says that ElBaradei's OPPOSITION to OIF increases his credibility on the Egyptian political scene.Quote:
A Ph.D. graduate in international law from New York University
School of Law, the balding, owlishlooking diplomat has spent his entire professional career working abroad either for the Egyptian foreign ministry or
at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Geneva. For 12 years he was the IAEA’s director general, emerging from bureaucratic obscurity with his outspoken criticism of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003
Another thing. There are leaders in the Middle East who played the anti-western theme to their advantage AND were effective in providing for their people. This approach is at the core of many Islamist movements' strategies. Hizbollah, Hamas and Sadr's movement all combine effective humanitarian and social services programs with anti-western rhetoric.
I agree with you that anti-western rhetoric is no substitute for a lack of attention for the people's need, but I think that an emerging leader that combines anti-western rhetoric with effective policies concerning education, health care, and social assistance will quickly gain massive popular support.
For those interested, the Ottaway paper is here. I would disagree with the characterization that Ottaway saw the revolution coming - he rated such an event as highly unlikely.
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Might Egypt have its own version of Eastern Europe’s “color revolutions” or Iran’s mass street protests? No Egyptian I talked to felt either was very likely. They cited the apolitical and easy-going nature of most Egyptians, the limited number of activists and the government’s skill in keeping economic and social discontent from turning into a political opposition—at least so far. “The Dream of the Green Revolution,” the title of a new book timed to ElBaradei’s return, was pretty much just that.
On the other hand, Western diplomats reported that the Mubarak government appeared to live in constant fear of a major social explosion at any moment. They worried how long Egypt could remain peaceful while faced with such a yawning gap between rich and poor, a bulging population, mounting worker unrest, worsening living conditions in Cairo and high unemployment among the of thousands of graduating university students.
I would posit that "anti-Western rhetoric" is not going to be central to the next Egyptian government, which will likely be focused overwhelmingly on economic and institutional reform issues.
Note that the organizations you listed all originated as clandestine resistance movements in countries under Western military occupation, which might have something to do with their penchant for such rhetoric.
Tequila,
Hamas is an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Gaza was Egyptian until 1967). Please note that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's ideologue at the time (Said Qutb) never needed a Western military occupation to have a penchant for anti-western rhetoric. In case you still have a doubt, please consult Qutb's writings.
Hamas != the Egyptian MB. It has no operational ties with the MB and has evolved in quite a different direction. Hamas post-1982 has little in common with the original network of mosques.
The Egyptian MB also had its roots in resistance to British occupation, BTW. As for Qutb, that's a much longer conversation that needs its own thread, but I would categorize him as a political Islamist who saw Islam and unswerving adherence to sharia as constituting the perfect society, and those who deviated or disagreed (including non-Muslim Western powers, but principally non-Islamist Muslims) as enemies of God.
Also, it should be noted that el-Baradei was proven 100% correct with regards to his objection to OIF.
Regardless of the above details, I do not think that Egypt's main political concerns going forward will involve foreign policy unless a crisis is forced upon it.