Hybrid Warfare (merged thread)
Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars?
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The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies has just released a new monograph that presents an alternative view of the character of warfare in the 21st Century. This new model argues that future conflicts will blur the distinction between war and peace, combatants and noncombatants.
Rather than distinct modes of war, we will face “Hybrid Wars” that are a combination of traditional warfare mixed with terrorism and insurgency.
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Research Fellow Frank Hoffman, summarizes the background and analysis of the changing character of warfare in our time. Examining the debate over the past decade about the evolution of modern warfare in the post Cold-war world, several thinkers have claimed that we were in the midst of a “Revolution in Warfare.” Hoffman takes this discussion to a new and much more mature level by recognizing that we are entering a time when multiple types of warfare will be used simultaneously by flexible and sophisticated adversaries. These adversaries understand that successful conflict takes on a variety of forms that are designed to fit one’s goals at that particular time—identified as “Hybrid Wars” in Conflict in the 21st Century...
War is a serious business.
As we all know. Therefor, it seems to me that it is incumbent on everyone who engages in warfare at any level, from the politician who sends units forth to the last Snuffy (yes, even him...) to read as much as possible on the topic and to discuss with others the various potentials and probabilities. Everyone who addresses war should be noted to the extent possible. Discussion is important but I've learned far more over a couple of drinks than I've learned in structured discussions. The important thing is to kick it around.
We are confronted with the fact that most of our political masters will not do this, therefor it's important that all practitioners do it and be thorough in their study so they can give the best possible advice. I think, though, that two thoughts should always remain in mind:
1. The theoreticians are human, that means they have experience (or not), education, heredity and environmental factors that have shaped them and their thoughts and thus, consciously or not, are subject to have some biases and possibly some gaps in knowledge. They also write for a specialist audience -- more frequently for other theorists than for practitioners --and thus these two factors can skew what they write or say and one is well advised to read or listen, evaluate and take that which ones instincts say are valuable while not hewing to anyone's line. That simply because no one has all the answers.
2. At the end of the day, you'll be on a hill watching your Division deploy to meet the Screaming Horde approaching at from 3 to 300 kilometers per hour. Or you'll deplane with your company or troop in the middle of nowhere with skulking opponents everywhere. Or you'll be on a lonely street at Oh-dark-thirty wondering whether to shoot the two vaguely human shapes that seem to be approaching you. None of the theoreticians will be there with you...
Hybrid, Mixed, Blended - or Chaoplexic?
Hi All. I just picked up on the release of Frank Hoffman's report today, and I'm on UK time right now, at 00:57, so won't be reading it until tomorrow. I noticed some of the discussion here got to the usual frustration with definitionalism, the utility of labeling, the utility of the label "hybrid", and so on.
Well, here's another to chew on: at a recent British International Studies Association (BISA) meeting, Antoine Bousquet, a new PhD graduate from the London School of Economics, presented what I thought was a pretty interesting paper on scientific metaphor in military thought.
More specifically, he gets into how the metaphors of four broad era in scientific developments/thought in the West have, in parallel, shaped military understanding of and approaches to war. The first three are fairly straightforward: clockwork/mechanical (ordered), thermodynamic (energetic), and cybernetic (think information and information loops). For the fourth era (now), he adapted a hybrid (!) term, chaoplexity, drawn from chaos and complexity theory and coined a little over a decade ago in a book entitled The End of Science: Facing The Limits Of Knowledge In The Twilight Of The Scientific Age.
Personally, I'm skeptical not of the uses of new labels and reconceptualization in general, but of overlabeling and relabeling the issues of now. A lot of the confusion and debate on what is and what isn't "new", I think, is gobbledygook longhand for "what we don't yet understand" and "insufficient historical hindsight to get a grip". In this case, though, I think Hoffman's work is worth considering; so's Bousquet's.
Here's the link to Bousquet's paper: www.bisa.ac.uk/2007/pps/bousquet.pdf
Thoughts?
Mike
War *is* war -- but the rules change...
So do the players.
Unfortunately, we don't get to choose what type(s) of war we'll be involved in and any attempt to concentrate on one spectrum or another would be quite foolish. The "only big war" folks are off base; the "COIN Divisions" proponents are off base. I think that most people realize we have to be a full spectrum force (and IMO that applies to all services) and hopefully, when the battles over roles and missions sort out, they will have succeeded.
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
It is disappointing to see that the Marines are attempting to get a grasp on the type of war we're fighting now, while many in the Army are resorting to name calling in a weak attempt to isolate those with new ideas, or new spins on old ideas, but at least they realize the world is changing.
A significant part the problem is the arcane and foolish way Congress plays money games. That system literally forces communities (for lack of a better term) to compete with each other on a playing field that's far from level. This leads to people espousing positions that they think will gain traction as opposed to laying out what's required and pursuing the proper goals. I'm not at all sure how we fix that...
. . .
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While COIN certainly isn't new, and 4GW has it weak points, it is foolish to state war is war, if that was the case then we would have got it right in OIF sooner. Technology (especially information technology), globalism, and an assortment of other structural and cultural changes influences what war will look like. Based on some of the comments on this thread, I can see we still have leaders who lead our men on a calvary (the real calvary, mounted on horses) charge against an armor unit, because nothing ever changes and war is war.
I'm not a sports fan but to use that metaphor (this is for Marc T), look at last nights game. I suspect that many a Coach realized the way to defeat the Patriots was to shut Brady down. I'm sure they tried but either their plan wasn't good or their execution was flawed (regrettably, sometimes people just don't do their jobs very well...). The Giants Coach developed an effective plan to neutralize Brady and his guys executed it well. The result was an upset and a win.
That applies to fighting wars. Both the plan AND the execution have to be competent; a sluffing in either can ruin your day. The relative complexity and degree of integration of the world today in all aspects means that warfare is going to be more complex and that the separate types are going to blend -- we saw that in Viet Nam.
The North used all aspects of Hoffman's hybrid model, worldwide information operations, criminal activity -- many a kid got sucked into drugs and or the black market in country -- guerrilla techniques up to conventional attacks and every permutation in between. It was all there.
Yet, we ignored it. Surely we will not be that stupid again...
That's why I'm not a sports fan, Rob
Folks are always changing the rules and in discussions, there are always "well, if..." things thrown in. None of those things you posit happened to get to this point:
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"...and you have a good set of conditions to better understanding the difficulty in considering cause and effect."
This did happen:
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...In the end, it may not matter - the NYGs went home the winner - The Giants not only had a plan, but had the where-withall to take advantage of the conditions as they emerged.
With the last clause being by far the most important part of all that. Way far (plans have a tendency not to survive the first contact as they say)...
I suspect that you comparing me to a dead Prussian is geriatric abuse. I'll have to consult my Attorney on that... :D
Countering "Quds" like capabilities
I was reading the SWJ Blog 5 APR OPED and hit the Kagan and Kagan piece from the Weekly Standard "What Happened in Basra".
The Kagans' analysis says Iranian Quds were involved in Basra in both a Train, Advise and Assist role, but also to some degree in the fight. Would this fit our definition of a UW (Unconventional Warfare) campaign?
A few thoughts came up as I read the article:
1) If Iran has demonstrated a strong UW capability and capacity in the region to achieve its political goals, what are the conditions required for that capability to be effective? What are its limitations? What other ways does Iran use its influence and tools to compliment its UW capabilities? What would a continued use of UW to achieve its policy goals indicate for the region in the short and long term?
2) Where states like Iraq have some or all of the conditions required for a UW campaign to be effective, what capabilities are required to counter or mitigate those conditions within their borders? I don't want to limit the capabilities or actions to security and intelligence forces as some of the conditions required for a foreign UW campaign to be effective cannot be solely addressed by them.
3) With regard to our own efforts in Security Force Assistance - from foreign military sales to advising, from Iraq to the region, are we assessing this threat correctly in terms of its short and long term risk to our goals, and by extension the goals of our regional partners & allies (acknowledging that there are different degrees of partnership, cooperation and competing interests)? What are their shortfalls? What tools would be more appropriate for our partners and allies, and are in their long term interest to develop? Arguably Iran has had degrees of success with supporting, assisting, sustaining, training, advising proxies to extend its influence, is their success relevant to larger picture? why? What should we do about it and capabilities like it?
I really don't want to debate the Kaplans' analysis too much, except where to do so answers some of the questions. I think its also interesting to consider the level of autonomy the Quds have in Iraq, and the question of how much they are allowed to pursue their own interest independent of Iran's broader FP goals.
I think there are a few other things to think about that are relevant to the questions above. Its worthwhile to consider what other capabilities exist in the region. Iran has some capabilities with regard to conventional forces, para-military & intelligence capabilities oriented looking in, there is the question of Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities, Iran's terrain and demographics play a role, Iran's role with regard to the Caspian area, energy security from an International perspective, etc. I think that when considering UW capabilities like the Quds, or their support of proxies - we need to consider the broader environment that shapes their "ends/ways/means" thinking, or however you wish to frame the way Iran pursues its objectives.
Best, Rob
Emerging Threats and Hybrid Warfare
Colonel David Gurney (USMC Ret.), Editor of Joint Force Quarterly and Director of National Defense University Press, when not closely following the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile, seeks out the best and brightest for their views on the potential threats we may face in the not so distant future – and of course any such search leads to Frank Hoffman.
Colonel Gurney has, again, kindly – and we, again, greatly appreciate this – granted SWJ permission to post Frank's Hybrid Warfare and Challenges that will appear in the January 2009 issue of JFQ.
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The U.S. military faces an era of enormous complexity. This complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers. America’s vaunted military might stand atop all others but is tested in many ways. Trying to understand the possible perturbations the future poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our best aid to interpretation. In particular, that great and timeless illuminator of conflict, chance, and human nature Thucydides—is as relevant and revealing as ever.
In his classic history, Thucydides detailed the savage 27-year conflict between Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelming land power of its day, and its hoplites were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his kinsmen about Athens’ relative power, but the Spartans and their supporters would not heed their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched through Attica and ravaged the Athenian country estates and surrounding farms. They encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war.
The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history—the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides’ ponderous tome on the carnage of the Peloponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy. These key lessons are, as he intended, a valuable “possession for all time.”
In the midst of an ongoing inter-Service roles and missions review, and an upcoming defense review, these lessons need to be underlined. As we begin to debate the scale and shape of the Armed Forces, an acute appreciation of history’s hard-earned lessons will remain useful. Tomorrow’s enemies will still get a vote, and they will remain as cunning and elusive as today’s foes. They may be more lethal and more implacable. We should plan accordingly.
One should normally eschew simplistic metanarratives, especially in dynamic and nonlinear times. However, the evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with. Of greatest relevance are the converging modes of war. What once might have been distinct operational types or categorizations among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and irregular warfare have less utility today...