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I'm thinking of doing a research project into military staff systems. I want to look at the strengths and weaknesses of our system (which, as far as I know, is more or less standard internationally) with past and present systems. I've only found a handful of books that specifically discuss the functions of a staff system. I don't have any hands on experience with staff (yet), so any guidance, especially personal experience, would be welcome. Thanks.
unless it was an academic endeavor. I have spent the majority of my professional life as a staff officer and it is neither fun nor interesting. The only saving grace is that if it is done right (knowing that you work for the best interests of the line) it can make life easier for soldiers. Variations of that statement are bandied about to the point of it being a cliche, but that doesn't make it less true.
Have any of these made it to your list of secondary souces?Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805
by Charles Edward White
Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff system by Christian O. E Millotat
The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945 by Gordon A. Craig
The Right Hand of Command: Use and Disuse of Personal Staffs in the American Civil War by R. Steven Jones
Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff (The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986) by Gordon Nathaniel Lederman
The Chief of Staff: The Military Career of General Walter Bedell Smith by D.K.R. Crosswell
Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons: Staff and Headquarters Operations in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865 by J. Boone Bartholomees
Thanks CR.
I'm doing it for an academic project at MIOBC. I've found the Millotat and Craig books, and one another. Thanks for the sources.
Part of my intent is to identify why this experience exists as it does. Off-hand, AFAIK staff officers were relatively prestigous in the 18/19th century Prussian system for example.Quote:
I have spent the majority of my professional life as a staff officer and it is neither fun nor interesting.
American Pride,
If you can solve the staff problem and make it fun and interesting (CR6: Sir, you are correct in your assessment), you will be a king among men.
I am at the CCC, currently learning MDMP. If you want to see the Army staff process, come upstairs and watch a squad of Captains learning FM 5-0. It is all smiles.
I recommend you spend your time here learning MI and about your role as a LT. Commanders and the staff will expect you to be the intelligence expert, and to work hard to accomplish the mission, not be the staff history expert. But again, whatever floats your boat. BTW, was this topic assigned? The only paper I wrote at FAOBC was an essay on why the guy next to me fell asleep the first day of Fire Support class.
patmc,
The assignment is part of a (relatively) new aspect of MIOBC (afaik) called the Van Deman program. The culmination project is a short essay and 0-6 brief on a topic of our choice; perferrably something real-world and that as MI officers will have some kind of experience with. Other topics, for example: language training at MIOBC, the utility of BOLC2, and so on.
EDIT: My thesis-in-progress will have something to do with shifting the primary focus of the staff from supporting the commander to supporting the mission. Thought of it today, so still working on it.
Rather than an academic exercise with literature research to establish why Staffs are organized as they are -- or to explore better ways of organizing them since neither of those things is likely to provide any change, I have a suggestion.Quote:
shifting the primary focus of the staff from supporting the commander to supporting the mission. Thought of it today, so still working on it.
Why not do some interviews with the MIOAC students and see if you can determine why MSG/1LT/CPT/MAJ Heebly reports to the Staff and for 89 days, rigorously and vigorously fights for the units and to downplay the power and intrusions of the Staff on said units -- and thus adverse Mission impacts.
Then, on the 90th day, MSG/1LT/CPT/MAJ Heebly becomes the quintessential Staff warrior and concerns for the unit and to an extent, the mission, are ignored.
Obviously, I'm overstating the case and equally obviously, we're talking about people so there are many variations on the theme. However, I think if you talk to some folks who've been there, they'll acknowledge that most people come to a Staff intending to do their best for the mission and units -- but that many succumb to what I call Staffitis and lose that focus. Some escape it and never do that -- but most do to one degree or another and in my observation, most who do that do so at about three months on the (or that particular) Staff...
{{Added: An interesting aspect is that rarely, some staffs do not have that problem; generally due to proper staff focus at the behest of a good commander. It has been my observation that the Staffitis phenomenon does occur most of the time on most Staffs even as various commanders and staff types, officer and enlisted, rotate through.}}
That has an adverse mission impact of some magnitude. It also may be amenable to change as most people do not necessarily want to become a part of the problem...
That sounds better than the strengths and weaknesses of the staff system, which would probably be quite an exciting doctoral work (no offense intended if anyone on this site has produced such a document). They're trying to bring back a mentorship program here between LTs and CPTs, and we were just linked up with the most recent OBC class, but If I or my classmates can help out, let me know. We're pretty friendly, and only a couple branch detail guys bite. Good luck.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
AP,
This is really close to a project that was on my desk for about a year. Historically, the key point in the development of the staff was when Napoleon and Berthier hammered out the rudiments of what we call a staff. The Germans lept on it in 1806 as part of the reforms after they took a thrashing at the hands of Napoleon and Berthier and their buds. This gets really interesting when you look at some of the other developments of the period. Stochastic prediction, linear prediction, wargaming, the rise of meritocracy, the application of many of the theoretical developments of the late 1700s came together and led to basis of the staff structure and procedures that carried us through WWII and pretty much up to about 20 years ago. That's when we started the FLAILEX of figuring out how to move from hierarchical staff processes to non-linear, distributed staff processes.
What is interesting is that Aufstragstactik is more viable than ever with the rapid dissemination of mission essential information to the lowest levels, while the same enabling technologies allow seniors to micro-manage from a different time sone in a fashion that LBJ only dreamed of.
The staph experience is one of those things that I think it is difficult to write about unless you have endured it. I think your point about staph being less prestigious now than it was in years past would be a good point to focus on. It speaks of a shift in the mindset of the officers - something that you can probably glean through research - rather than requiring you to do research into unrecorded details of a system that you have not yet suffered through, relying upon anecdotes.
But, if you want a good glipse at organizational nonsense, a quick read, partly for its entertainment value, is "The Spit-Shine Syndrome: Organizational Irrationality in the American Field Army" - see here at amazon.
Some people think that Captains are driven out of the Army by lengthy deployments and family hardship. My decision was based entirely upon the realization that my career would have been about 2/3 staph, 1/3 command time. I would second the earlier comment about the one rewarding aspect of the job being that, if you work hard enough, then you can help the guys on the line. But what is frustrating is that the system actually seems as though it was designed to create mountains of work and red tape that prevent you from helping them unless you expend hours/days/weeks on mindless tasks and procedures. The Herculean efforts that go into getting the simplest means of support for a subordinate unit is so stupid that when you finally achieve your goal, you're just left thinking to yourself, "that was so f-ing stupid. I should be able to get x item or y support for these guys with no effort. Instead, I had to fight against a system that is designed to impede progress. And the system will be there again, tomorrow, kicking me in the nuts all over again."
I would recommend two other books:
"History of the German General Staff" by Walter Goerlitz
"The Training of Officers" by Martin Van Creveld
Hear, Hear! This is a chance to do research on something something you really like and want to learn more about.Quote:
Originally Posted by patmc
Once you get to be a coveted staff puke (the fate of most intel folks), you will get to pound your nuts into a pulp often enough doing meaningless research that does not mean squat to most of the operational force but is a pet rock for some senior officer.
Quote:
Originally Posted by patmc
{shameless plug alert}
If you'd be interested in a workbook to help streamline the MDMP, check out:
Amazon.com: Battle Staff MDMP & Operations Order Planning Handbook
The author is a genius! :D {/shameless plug}
wm,
Believe it or not, I'm very interested in the staff system and staff work. My particular interest is in campaign planning. Of course, I haven't actually done it yet so I'm still an idealist. My dad always told me the Army took the fun out of flying -- I can only imagine the horrors of Army staff work. I'll probably focus on the system of the Prussian Kingdom and the German Empire where staff work seemed to be held in extremely high regard, and some chiefs of staff having more prominence than the commander they were meant to support. Is it because of command culture, American culture in general, the structure/assumed purpose/resources of Army staff that results in a completely reverse staff experience for American officers? Or something else entirely?
Other subjects related to my grade/MOS, such as targetting, culture in COIN, and so on seem either saturated with views already, near full development, or don't pass the 'so what' test IMO.
"Let me tell you about the benefits of being on a staff..."Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
"This should be a short conversation."
LtCol to Lt Col (EUCOM)
"Cheese-dickery abounds at this Command." LtCol (EUCOM)
Make no mistake, the planners on the German General Staff were miserable too. I'm sure von Moltke's S3 Plans was a miserable bastard. Of course, he was German, and thus enjoyed his misery. ;)
Staff is rarely fun but occasionally rewarding, especially when you support the line well. I had a blast as an S4, but mainly because my XO and CO underwrote my shenanigans to support our BN. S3 Ops was also rewarding because I knew I was supporting the line.
That said, what would be the difference, in your mind, between supporting the "mission" and the "commander"? Why is this currently a problem? Would staff acting to support the "mission" actually cause more problems because it de-syncs the commander's intent? Staffs already tend to go wild on their pet projects, overwhelming subordinate commander's with good ideas that if not properly held in check by the XO/CO cause havoc on the line.
Also, consider this thread of wisdom.
Also, as a new 2LT if you're headed to a line unit you will be a BICC, which means your life will primairly consist of arms room inspections, physical security inspections, security clearance processing, OPSEC inspections, coffee making, slide flipping, and staff duty. :D
If you have a willing BN CDR you MIGHT get a scout platoon if you prove yourself. I've seen it done. I would actually as your BN CDR in your intro interview if you would be considered for a line PLT. In OIF 1 our CHEMO became a tank platoon leader due to his competence and a shortage of AR LT's.
First off, please don't confuse campaign planning with staff work. That aspect of being on staff amounts to a grain of sand small enough to fit through the eye of a needle--and don't expect to get too exposed to it as a LT either.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
If this subject really excites you, then you might want to look at the work by then Secretary of War Elihu Root, who is responsible for the formation of our US General Staff. I have a thesis that while Root gave us the rudiments of a good system, a lot of our staff (mis)organization and (mis)use comes from the AEF's experiences while being trained primarily by the French during WWI. (Check out Robert Doughty's book Pyrrhic Victoryfor info that formed the genesis of my thesis.) I have no real sources for proving/disproving this thesis and have too many other interests to really dig into it.
As a supplement to Gordon Craig (mentioned by CR6), Dennis Showalter's book, The Wars of German Unification, might give you some newer/different sources on the Prussian/German General Staff, especially if you read German.
so does Schmedlap:You ask an extremely good and I think a very important question:Quote:
"The Herculean efforts that go into getting the simplest means of support for a subordinate unit is so stupid that when you finally achieve your goal, you're just left thinking to yourself, "that was so f-ing stupid. I should be able to get x item or y support for these guys with no effort. Instead, I had to fight against a system that is designed to impede progress. And the system will be there again, tomorrow, kicking me in the nuts all over again.""
I think you'll find that the issue is not an American peculiarity, with the exception of some but not all Germans, I've found staff malaise to be a universal phenomenonQuote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Someone suggested that it occurs because the 90 day point just happens to be when one is due for the first formal performance counseling session. I think that's coincidental. I retired before counseling got to be a hot item; it was in fact quite rare before the mid 70s. I first observed 'Staffitis' in the 50s -- and no one in those days even knew what the word 'counseling' meant...Quote:
...Or something else entirely?
My belief is that there are too many smart guys with too little to do being driven too frequently by less than competent senior people to produce 'stuff.' I also have long wondered if the size of the staffs had/has a significant bearing -- been my observation that the bigger the Staff, the deeper the malaise. The FORSCOM staff back in my day was really, really sad...
However, even at Bn level I've seen the effect and, before counseling became an issue, that 90 day figure was generally about it...
I developed a perspective on staff work and the evolving role of the staff that might be of help to you.
In the 19th century and well into the 20th, the difficulty of moving information and, I suppose, the nature of command, meant that the staff was primarily responsible for gathering information that the commander could use to make decisions.
Somewhere in the late 20th century, with the advent of e-mail, secure communications, powerpoint, and all the other techno-impedimentia, the role of the staff began to transform into filtering information to allow the commander to make decisions. This transformation continues and is not yet complete, but I believe that staffs twenty years from now will look superficially the same but will in fact function quite differently.
I say this because I spent most of the last couple of years of my staff career distilling mountains of info into ideas or propositions for the commander to digest or decide upon.
Look at CALL Special Study 04-1 Transforming the Tactical Staff for the 21st Century--requires AKO access
Tom
My first contact with a staff was in the early 50s -- and the staffs I saw were notable for getting out and doing things-- gathering information and spreading the word.
As I later 'progressed' (after fighting and avoiding it as long as humanly possible) to a staff it just happened to be about the time that staff sizes and ranks were increased and more information became available for use -- both those things due to a variety of factors.
At the tail end of my nominal career, I was on a large staff that truly had access to more information than it could digest but in visits downstream, I noticed the same thing at all levels; the staffs had become a filter and the ability to do something truly directed at mission accomplishment was an exception to the rule of constant filtering.
Look at that as it goes upstream; trying to do something for a Bn mission impacts the Bde staff as it becomes something to filter; at Div it becomes just another item of dust...
Thus your point:is I'm sure correct and one has to wonder if the staff malaise factor which is quite real and an at least mildly adverse impactor on individual retention and on unit performance will be addressed in the process of that development...Quote:
"...This transformation continues and is not yet complete, but I believe that staffs twenty years from now will look superficially the same but will in fact function quite differently."
You may have noticed I said that staff ennui was pretty universal -- except for some Germans.
I think that may be due to the fact that the German GS system gives far fewer and lower ranked than US or British norms Staff Officers some or even a lot of actual authority whereas the US and Commonwealth (well, except for the Australians who as always are a bit different...) most of the larger number and higher ranked Staff Officers are precluded from any meaningful exercise of authority, many simple decisions have to be bounced to the commander and distressingly often, up the chain of command.
My limited contact with the French indicates they fall somewhere between the German and Anglosphere traditions. Most Asian armies seem to mirror US / British practice to at least an extent.
Don't know how many nations have LnOs at the Intel School but you may want to talk to those that are there and get their impressions.
Another thought on malaise.
I used to say Major was the most dangerous rank in the Army because that was the only rank at which one normally was unable to command (Platoon Leadership is a subst of command, IMHO, USMC has it right with their title of Platoon Commander).
Army officers tend to be Type A folks who want to call the shots or lead. When you are a staff guy, you don't get to lead; you just get to recommend to a leader, who accepts or rejects your recommendations. Maybe 90 days is the window of time that it takes for the "rejection" syndrome (recognition that you are not really calling the shots anymore) to set in.
Drawing on Eden's perspicacious analysis, we might say that in the days of a staff as information gathers, you could still be something of a leader. (This presupposes that leaders are folks who get other folks to do things.) You could go to subordinates and make them do something for you--give you info.
With the explosion of automated reporting of information (digitized terrain, Blue Force Tracking, GPS/SADL, LOGMOD, etc) now, rather than make people do things, staffers satisfy their leadership cravings by making databases do things (by setting up queries and filters).
Also by being the holder of a filtering role, a staffer may get to be something of the grey eminence behind a leader's decisonmaking process--since the staff briefs (provides information to) the commander, it is a decider at one remove. I think that staffers have always had a significant filtering function, but it is more obvious in a world where information gathering requires much less human intervention that previously was the case.
You may want to try and get hold of Col Jim Storr's work, on Staffs. He has written numerous articles for the British Army Review on how staffs are too big and don't work properly.
Type "Jim Storr" and Command into Google and you'll get the phone book.
At first, I thought Ken's point about the 90 day thing was off base because I thought to myself, "that never happened to me." I was the same anal-retentive, overcaffeinated perfectionist that I was when I left my AS3 slot as when I began it. But, then it dawned on me: I was only there for 90 days - and then I PCS'd.
I knew that the slot was temporary and I also knew that I had a lot on my plate for those 90 days. We had just returned from OIF III, my S3 and most of our NCOs in the shop were outprocessing to PCS, leaving me only two E-7's, a transient 1LT, and a cherry 2LT waiting on a platoon for me to sort out over 20 small arms ranges, Brad and Tank gunnery, and a slew of other exercises that would kick off before I PCS'd. Given the short time frame, there was no incentive for me to re-write (or write) the S3 SOP, nor was there any reason for me to go hunting for new bright ideas to implement. My only "pet project" was to make sure that whatever was left on my plate when I PCS'd could be handed off to the incoming S3 and 1LT when I left, without them needing to call me every 30 minutes for the following month.
Looking back, this only reinforces my belief that 1) we have too many staff officers and 2) officers spend too much time in staff positions. If I was able, in my 3 shop that was over 50% understaffed, to do what other battalions were doing (some of which were overstaffed), then that tells me that either I'm superhuman or we have too many staff billets. And while there is something to be said for being in a job long enough to learn its ins and outs and refine processes in place, that sounds more like the job of the NCOs, not an officer with a head full of bright ideas borne of too much idle time.
This personal anecdote is not to say, "look at me, I did it right." I screwed up a lot of stuff. But I didn't make unnecessary work for anyone other than myself. And that, too, is not because I had a gift for staff work - I didn't. It was entirely because I lacked the personnel to dump anything new onto and I lacked the idle time to dream up dumb ideas.
My impression is that, when fully staffed, a unit's staff is where good officers go to have their skills dulled and their talents wasted. Eliminate some of those slots and you will remove the incentives to create PowerPoint eyewashes, remove the idle time for their masters to dream up dumb ideas, and force them to focus on what is important, rather than those nice-to-have things that create red tape and unnecessary delays.
What got me thinking on this course was reading about how in the Prussian system, if the chief of staff disagreed with a commander's decision he could, in writing, appeal to the higher unit commander for some kind of intervention. I don't imagine that something like this is imaginable in the present US staff system. From what I've seen, the staff is entirely submissive to the commander. I haven't yet explored fully the practical differences between the two, though I would argue that at the very least it would give the staff significantly more autonomy in its work. I'm curious if it would be desirable for someone (the "chief") on the staff to have someone from the next higher unit (CO/XO) as his rater. As for the commander's intent, ideally it should fulfill his commander's mission. I'm sure the majority of the time it does. What partly I'm interested in is whether or not an adversarial staff can develop better intents, COAs, and so on based on the higher unit's tasking. I think this would also lessen the impact of a commander's personality on MDMP. Thoughts?Quote:
Originally Posted by Cavguy
I lack current experience but for the period 1949-1995 that was far from a universal truth; I've seen many a Staff type bulldoze or cover for a weak Commander and even more go around an overly authoritarian type.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Lot of practical problems with implementing that, not least distance and separation in many cases; i.e. it will work in garrison, in peacetime and in some low intensity combat situations but not in all and will not work at all in mid or high intensity combat. The latter may be the exception rather than the rule with regard to time but the latter are the ultimate reason for existence of any staff and thus their requirements have to be the arbiter.Quote:
...I'm curious if it would be desirable for someone (the "chief") on the staff to have someone from the next higher unit (CO/XO) as his rater.
The intent is or should be the commanders, it is NOT up to the staff to develop that and no good Commander will allow that other than as a training measure; in the actual plan or order, it must be his.Quote:
...What partly I'm interested in is whether or not an adversarial staff can develop better intents, COAs, and so on based on the higher unit's tasking. I think this would also lessen the impact of a commander's personality on MDMP. Thoughts?
The adversarial approach is much used in many communities, in a military setting it is seldom helpful and is vastly over rated as a method.
The commander's personality is not the only impactor on the MDMP (which is BTW entirely too slow to be used in mid or higher level conflict below Corps level and IMO should be scrapped...), staff personalities and squabbles can also affect it. So, even more so can higher hq -- and subordinate units...
Ken,
Thanks for your input. A few more questions:
If a unit's mission is received from higher, why is it necessary that the unit's intent (to achieve that mission) be developed exclusively by the commander? As I previously said -- I have no experience with staff, so I'm probing for underlying purposes, assumptions, etc in how the system functions.Quote:
The intent is or should be the commanders, it is NOT up to the staff to develop that and no good Commander will allow that other than as a training measure; in the actual plan or order, it must be his.
Do you think technology (for example, electronic OERs) could mitigate the problem of seperation? What other practical problems do you think exist with the idea?Quote:
Lot of practical problems with implementing that, not least distance and separation in many cases; i.e. it will work in garrison, in peacetime and in some low intensity combat situations but not in all and will not work at all in mid or high intensity combat. The latter may be the exception rather than the rule with regard to time but the latter are the ultimate reason for existence of any staff and thus their requirements have to be the arbiter.
Why is an adversarial approach in a military setting seldom helpful and overrated? I understand the concern with 'unity of command'. Does separating a commander from the planning process undermine his ability to execute missions?Quote:
The adversarial approach is much used in many communities, in a military setting it is seldom helpful and is vastly over rated as a method.
I haven't seen MDMP at 'combat speed'. Can you give me an idea of what drawbacks you think it has to warrant abandoning it? What do you think is a better alternative? I just finished up another essay (for the same Van Deman program) regarding the differences in instinctual and procedural thinking and decision-making.Quote:
which is (MDMP) BTW entirely too slow to be used in mid or higher level conflict below Corps level and IMO should be scrapped...
Do you think that's a consequence of Army culture?Quote:
Originally Posted by wm
Let me answer your question with two counter-questions: What's the point of a commander? Why aren't units lead by committee?Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
The problem isn't seperation. What loyalties would the Chief/DCO/XO have to the commander? Again, what's the point of the commander?Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
For the sake of the team, which is what a good unit functions as, it isn't helpful, productive, or effective to have an adversarial staff. Constant disagreement for the sake of a possibly better product leads to hate and discontent. It also violates the characteristics of a good staff officer, as outlined in appendix C of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
• Competence.
• Initiative.
• Creativity.
• Flexibility.
• Confidence.
• Loyalty.
• Team player.
• Effective manager.
• Effective communicator.
This isn't a board room, its a TOC. There is a chain of command and our oaths of office indicate we "follow the orders of the President and the officers appointed over us." I'm also reminded of a couple little winners from GEN Patton on staffs:
1. "A Commander will Command."
2. "Too much if'n, perhaps'n, and maybe'n will never win a battle."
3. "No good decison was ever made in a swivel chair."
It doesn't undermine it. It prevents him from conducting his duties as a commander. It detaches him from reality. Do the New York Giants set up the game plan this week for their game with Philadelphia without Tom Coughlin? Does Eli Manning get with the rest of the offensive starters and figure out how their going to get the ball around Brian Dawkins and then let Coughlin put on the headset Sunday and let him call plays? Hell no!Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
It also defeats three of the 16 activities, responsibilities and duties of the staff as outlined in Appendix D of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.
1. Advising and informing the commander
2. Preparing, updating, and maintaining staff estimates
3. Making recommendations
The Regimental and Squadron MDMP processes I've been a part of as both an engineer and assistant S3 have been abbreviated with a limited amount of COAs or directed COAs that the staff has worked to make better within the confines of the commander's intent, key tasks, and endstate. It's the same way OPORDs are developed at the platoon level on a macro scale with backbriefs to the commander to ensure they synch with his overall scheme of maneuver.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
That's the way it is. You seem to readily discount the power, necessity, and reality of the fact there's a commander in charge. That's a bit disturbing to be quite honest.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Which I imagine were determined in large part by the commander's qualitative assessments based on his judgement, experience and intuition. Ostensibly those characteristics are why a commander was selected to command. Many council members can cite exceptions to this I'm sure, but that's for another thread.Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
MDMP's biggest problem is that it is an analytical model that doesn't lend itself to time constrained environments, even in an abbreviated format unless analysis is tempered with intuition and judgement to move the process along.
we could get a look at that paper. Sounds interesting.Quote:
I just finished up another essay (for the same Van Deman program) regarding the differences in instinctual and procedural thinking and decision-making.
RTK,
Thanks for your input. I'll do my best to answer your questions. Your statements are allowing me to see more clearly some of the underlying purposes and assumptions in the Army's command culture.
Aside for his legal obligations, I believe the "point" of a commander is to lead and to execute. He is to inspire by some way, act, or process his men to perform their duties, and to execute the missions tasked to his unit. In the absence of such tasks, he is to ensure that his unit is able to conduct them, or to the best of his knowledge fulfill the intentions of his boss. Units are not led by committee for a very specific reason; however, I believe that leading and planning are two separate and distinct functions. Notable historical commanders, including American ones, often held war councils with subordinates prior to a battle to determine a COA. Some went so far as to hold votes as to which COA to take. I'm not suggesting a democratic staff system, but I certainly think there is room to make staffs more powerful and more effective. Our present conception of a commander's role is not the first held by the Army, and, IMO, open for improvement. Part of my intent is to identify in other staff systems the relationship (in terms of decision-making, planning, etc) the staff had with the commander and what lessons we can draw from that.Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
I do not doubt that can be true. However, isn't that a cultural problem not properly addressed by training? This is sidetracking a little, but I think the Army only gives lip-service to character development and can do much more in that regard. I imagine that separating one's feelings from one's own ideas would be a mark of professional decision-making. It's one of the components in "self-actualization" theory. People like to 'own' ideas and I think that's a contributing factor to the problem you cite. Can that desire be mitigated?Quote:
For the sake of the team, which is what a good unit functions as, it isn't helpful, productive, or effective to have an adversarial staff. Constant disagreement for the sake of a possibly better product leads to hate and discontent.
The same loyalties you cited in your next set of questions: "follow the orders of the President and the officers appointed over us."Quote:
What loyalties would the Chief/DCO/XO have to the commander? Again, what's the point of the commander?
I will not argue with the desirability of those traits, but I will dispute that adversarial decision-making necessarily undermines loyalty or teamwork. It can and it does undermine, but I do not think that it must necessarily follow from disagreement as you suggest. I also disagree with the connotations of "violate". FMs are not law.Quote:
It also violates the characteristics of a good staff officer, as outlined in appendix C of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.
I disagree with the effectiveness of the analogies and because analogies can quickly spiral beyond control, I'm going to avoid it. I should have clarified my earlier statement: separate was too strong of a word. Perhaps distance would have been better.Quote:
It prevents him from conducting his duties as a commander. It detaches him from reality. Do the New York Giants set up the game plan this week for their game with Philadelphia without Tom Coughlin? Does Eli Manning get with the rest of the offensive starters and figure out how their going to get the ball around Brian Dawkins and then let Coughlin put on the headset Sunday and let him call plays? Hell no!
In the current understanding of commander-staff relationships and functions, yes. Number 1 clearly sets the tone for the position of the staff relative to the commander (I believe I said "submissive" in another post). Part of my intent is to find out (1) whether alternative relationships exist in other staff systems and (2) if such alternatives can produce better results than what we have now.Quote:
It also defeats three of the 16 activities, responsibilities and duties of the staff as outlined in Appendix D of FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces.
1. Advising and informing the commander
2. Preparing, updating, and maintaining staff estimates
3. Making recommendations
That's not a helpful answer. If personality types have a measurable impact on performance, then I think taking advantage of that is something worth looking into.Quote:
That's the way it is.
Not really. I'm probing the extent of that "power, necessity, and reality". I'm very interested in the abstract principles and assumptions that goven commander-staff relationships, and what, if anything, can be modified and improved. Obviously my comments so far indicate an interest in increasing staff powers relative to a commander. That's liable to make the commander types upset. ;)Quote:
You seem to readily discount the power, necessity, and reality of the fact there's a commander in charge.
I think the major contributing factor to our disagreement is the fundamental contradiction in our initial assumptions: I believe your assumption is that an intuitive, direct single decision-maker will make, on average, better (or more relevant?) decisions than a collaberative, deliberate process. I am assuming the opposite. Am I accurate? If so, what do you think are the implications of those opposing assumptions?
Do you think the thoroughness of MDMP is effective? Also, if a staff were semi-autonomous, do you think it would be helpful for it to run continuous MDMP (with the necessary changes) similar to continuous IPB?Quote:
Originally Posted by CR6
Ron,
I can make the paper available to anyone who wants to eye it. I finished it a few days, so it's still a rough draft. PM me and I can e-mail it -- unless you have another preferred method.
The unit's mission is received; how it executes that mission is determined by the unit (or should be -- it usually is). The Commander is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do -- ergo, the Commander prescribes HIS (or HER) intent. He may let the staff provide him an or some idea(s) or even written intents to assist those staff types in preparing to command at his level -- but in the actual order or plan, the Commander's intent should be just that. Occasionally a weak commander will allow a strong S3 to develop it but that's just wrong. See also RTK above.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
No, not really -- we could do away with OERs IMO but HRC sort of needs them due to DOPMA. You cannot truly rate someone unless you interface with them frequently and personally. Lacking that, hearsay and rumor start to dictate what is written. Also and again see RTK.Quote:
Do you think technology (for example, electronic OERs) could mitigate the problem of seperation? What other practical problems do you think exist with the idea?
Because it takes up too much time and a staff is not a debating society. Blunt but that's reality. Separating the commander from the planning process isn't going to happen; recall "all the unit does or fails to do..." The commander really is the principal planner at Bn/Sqn level and that makes sense, in theory, he is the most experienced person there. That is also generally true at Bde level.Quote:
Why is an adversarial approach in a military setting seldom helpful and overrated? I understand the concern with 'unity of command'. Does separating a commander from the planning process undermine his ability to execute missions?
The MDMP should be taught at BNCOC and at OBC. It is an orderly way to develop COA and recommendations. I susepct in the process of OBC you'll see the problem. At mid or higher level combat speeds (either of which can occur occasionally or even frequently in LIC), time to go through all the steps just is not usually available. Thus some steps must be omitted. Which steps? Which steps do you omit due to time constraints? The usual answer is to try to omit none because people slavishly do what they've been taught. Guess what happens?Quote:
I haven't seen MDMP at 'combat speed'. Can you give me an idea of what drawbacks you think it has to warrant abandoning it? What do you think is a better alternative? I just finished up another essay (for the same Van Deman program) regarding the differences in instinctual and procedural thinking and decision-making.
The Division takes time to do all the steps because the big staffs, a two button boss and inertia exist. This means they will be late in getting their order to the Bdes. The Bde will try to accomplish most of the steps but will eliminate some steps (Cdr or S3 dependent; IOW a crap shoot on what doesn't get considered...) and thus will get their order to the Bns/Sqns REALLY late -- those guys will not have time to do most if any of the steps and thus, the trickle down effect robs the old tip of the spear of anywhere near adequate planning and preparation time, the poor Companies or Troops will not even approach adequate time to develop and issue the order. Here's an article I ran across some time ago that makes a good case -- but I believe even their solution takes too much time. LINK. MDMP has its adherents and detractors, it works and is all encompassing -- but even the Army realizes it is a lengthy process and not necessarily always applicable and provides some shortcuts (or used to in 101-5, probably still does in 5.0).
Obviously there are exceptions and I'm overstating to make a point -- but it can often be that bad. Even more fortunately, there are a few truly competent and intuitive Commanders out there who can skip unneeded step and eliminate COAs rapidly to concentrate on what should be done. There aren't enough out there but there are some. The formulaic and the mathematically inclined types are reluctant to eliminate any steps in the MDMP and thus they get out-thought by the instinctive types. Like Ron, I'd be interested in seeing your paper on the differences between instinctual and procedural thinking...Wm can answer but my thought is that it's a function of what personality type is drawn to military service and will stay with it. Most of us, even the non-type As like me, react to challenges (real or perceived... :D) and operate on the 'do something even if it's wrong' principle. There's no question the culture reinforces those attitudes thus you get a lot of the condition wm laid out and that, I think, is a big cause of my 90 days into staffitis problem for many.Quote:
Do you think that's a consequence of Army culture?
I do think our staffs are way to large and this exacerbates the problem as more people are poured into the frustrating bucket. Bertrand Russell contended that 20% of the people did 80% of the work in the world. After watching staffs at all levels from Bn to 4-star Hq for a good many years, I'm absolutely certain those figures are about right applied to US military staffs. Colonel / Dr. Jim Storr who Wilf recommend above posits that 40% of the folks on a typical British staff contribute little or nothing -- I'd agree with that also for most US staffs.
ADDED: Saw your response to RTK; several items there I'd like to answer but I'll wait for RTK. I will provide one thing you may wish to consider.
You mention more powerful staffs. Personally, I think that's a bad idea based on experience. If you look at US staffs, you'll discover that pre-WW II, Bn staff officers were LTs; Regt or Bde staff officers were Majors and Div had LTCs -- deliberately done so that a staff officer would not outrank the next subordinate commander. That worked quite well and lasted pretty much through WW II. Post WW II and Korea it changed due to less time in grade required for promotion and thus, inadequate experience for the staff types. CPTs were allotted to Bns. By the time of Viet Nam, only two years service to Captain meant that the S3 was upgraded to MAJ at Bn, LTC at Bde. My belief is that the quality of staffs deteriorated as they garnered more rank and power -- and grew in size (Parkinson's Law applies as do Augustine's Laws V and XXX). I think that's another of those be careful; what you want, you may get it things...
I read (CRS where) an article that said the MDMP was a process that we developed to help untrained staffs support inexperienced commanders (maybe during WW2?). It seemed to make sense at the time.
I've also read (maybe the same article) that our current staff system was developed in WW1, as a copy of the French copy of the German staff system. The point, if I can condense it, was that the French copied the form of the German staff without the function, and then we copied the form of that, without the rigorous selection and training criteria that was the foundation of the German system.
After experience on BN and BCT staffs, I'd argue that staffs are TOO large and powerful, sort of the point made by Ken at the last post. I think that a BN needs a deputy CDR (a MAJ), a strong CPT to plan operations, and good warrant officer to run sustainment. Everything else can be managed by WOs/senior NCOs- it is (or should be) executing a plan, not making a plan- battle CPT, IPB analysis, maint, budget execution, personnel admin, CHS, etc. At the BCT level, I figure that if you do a single function, you are a CPT (with WO and NCO assistants), if you integrate one of the six warfighting functions, than a field grade officer is required- this would reduce the current 18+ MAJs to 6, with a LTC Chief of Staff and a COL Deputy (the BCT CDR should be a BG, but that's another kettle of fish).
It doesn't happen often, but I disagree with you here, at least for the OBC part. After 2 years, 19 classes and 1500 lieutenants, there is no way they could comprehend MDMP adequately to even give a familiarization. They have difficulties grasping TLPs, let alone MDMP.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
As for American Pride, I'm not going to respond to a great deal of your "points" below. You remind me of a PL who I relieved. You're arguing a better way without knowing what the current way is really all about and, seemingly, for the sake of argument.
I will say this: You've decided in your mind, without experience or operational relevance, that the Army command system and staff climates are inadequate. I would argue that they are very good. However, your biases will not serve you very well in a learning environment and will likely piss of your first series of bosses. You're a thinker, which isn't all bad (also, as indicated by your 156 posts thus far, go back and see how many of them began with the statement "I think" or "I thought." I did. A good deal of them). But you're a new lieutenant, and you aren't going to "fix" the army in your first 6 months.
In all honesty, the subject for your paper is well above your head.
A bit of advice: You haven't been trained nor have you adequately researched the doctrinal backing of the current staff products, principles, or methodology. You have, however, formulated preconceptions, biases, and assumptions in your head. I appreciate your ability to ask questions; I do not admire your flimsy stances based upon no experience or research. If your intelligence analysis at the tactical level in the future is conducted in the same method (ie. preconception without fact) you will get people killed. Given you might turn out to be my BICC or S2 that, to me, is of grave concern.
The function of the staff officer is to do his or her damnedest to convince the commander that he/she has the best solution to the problem the commander has been tasked to solve by higher or has identifed him/herself. Once the commander decides on a COA, the staff officers' duty is to do their utmost to ensure that COA is successfully executed. Adversarial relationships among the members of the staff tend to make this second requirement a lot tougher.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
MDMP is really just an involved way of proposing and evaluating various options. The biggest issue with it is that it can become a crutch for folks who are not too good at simultaneous multi-level analysis. For linear thinkers, MDMP is extremely time consuming because each COA gets worked through in series rather than by working all the COA in parallel or multi-threaded processes.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
As Ken pointed out, your response sort of puts the cart before the horse. The perception of Army culture includes draws certain types of folks. They were type A before joining and that may explain why they joined. It also may explain why some of them leave after having had the revelation that they might get to spend less than 30% of their time being the MFWIC (Mo-Fo Who's In Charge)--Schmedlap already alluded to this as the reason for getting off AD in a prior postQuote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Some final thoughts.
--You might wish to consider that the staff function as something like a deputy or 2IC for a unit. (I think that was how Rommel used his OpsO in the desert).
--One could also split the staff into two sections (each with expertise from all of the various staff sections, 1-9 as appropriate to the HQ level involved)--1 section gets to manage the current operation for the commander while the second section plans the follow-on operation. When the follow-on operation kicks off, that staff section now manages it and the first staff section becomes the planning cell for the next step--keep alternating the process. It would keep folks busy and might lessen the likelihood that they get paid too many visits from the "good idea fairy" while ruminating about stuff outside their areas of competence. (This a variation on the multiple command post theory--a fwd CP that fights the current fight; a Main CP that plans the next fight;and a Rear CP that supports both the current and future fights, cleans up the mess from the last figh, and manages rear area protection to boot.
I want to clarify I am not arguing for the sake of argument. I do not know if there is a better way, and if there is, I don't know what it is. That's what I'm probing to find out. IMO, this is the place to do it. I'm not going to approach my CO or BC and say "Hey sir, I'm fresh out of MIOBC and I think this is how you should run the unit." But I'll state what I believe and think here in an open forum; and if I'm wrong, oh well, I'll be corrected and I'll learn something.Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
You're right. I have no illusions about transforming the Army as an O1. Please remember, however, that this is for an academic project, and part of that project requires that I make a claim. I'm not going to say the staff system is worthless or weak; if anything, our continued battlefield successes illustrate the complete opposite. What I want to find out is where the chinks in the armor are, if any, and what can be done to address them. My eventual research may or may not support any extent or component of what I've put forward already. I might conclude just the opposite of the opinions I've expressed. They're just ideas.Quote:
I will say this: You've decided in your mind, without experience or operational relevance, that the Army command system and staff climates are inadequate. I would argue that they are very good. However, your biases will not serve you very well in a learning environment and will likely piss of your first series of bosses. You're a thinker, which isn't all bad (also, as indicated by your 156 posts thus far, go back and see how many of them began with the statement "I think" or "I thought." I did. A good deal of them). But you're a new lieutenant, and you aren't going to "fix" the army in your first 6 months.
I don't think the personal characterization is called for or necessary. But I understand your concern. I have no personal attachment to an idea -- like I stated before, if the research, etc demonstrates my opinion(s) to be wrong here (in a discussion forum), it's an opportunity for me to learn and improve.Quote:
In all honesty, the subject for your paper is well above your head.
A bit of advice: You haven't been trained nor have you adequately researched the doctrinal backing of the current staff products, principles, or methodology. You have, however, formulated preconceptions, biases, and assumptions in your head. I appreciate your ability to ask questions; I do not admire your flimsy stances based upon no experience or research. If your intelligence analysis at the tactical level in the future is conducted in the same method (ie. preconception without fact) you will get people killed. Given you might turn out to be my BICC or S2 that, to me, is of grave concern.
If we agreed all the time, one of us would be unnecessary -- and we both KNOW that ain't true!!!
Even if no one else knows it... :D
Understand -- do recall I say and firmly believe that OBC should be about a year long... ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
I also think MDMP is way overdone and needs to be greatly simplified. It came about in an effort, as 82 Redleg saidThough IIRC, it was post Viet Nam and due to DOPMA insuring that we would have too many untrained staffs and inexperienced commanders. ..:mad:Quote:
"...that we developed to help untrained staffs support inexperienced commanders (maybe during WW2?). It seemed to make sense at the time.
Don't get me started on MDMP and procedure as a fix for untrained staffs....we add bodies and process to fix what is a training AND experience issue because as soon as one gets competent, they get moved, probably to never repeat the same job but rather to start the learning by doing cycle all over again. Bigger BCT staffs have on exacerbated the issue.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Tom
This is my last post in this thread:Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Check it out - It was called for in your first post:
You asked for advice. You then disputed the perspectives given to you. I've evaluated 1500 lieutenants just like you in the last 2 years. I've punted 15% of them. Take that perspective and advice for what it's worth.Quote:
I don't have any hands on experience with staff (yet), so any guidance, especially personal experience, would be welcome. Thanks.
Have a very Brave Rifles Day.
A point on Command -- leading and inspiring is good but not a mandatory item; unfortunately, getting people to lay their lives on the line requires more than leadership and inspiration. It requires the force of law and command authority. That's why commanders are not called leaders.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Leading -- or commanding -- and planning are indeed two separate functions. However, the Company Commander is responsible for both and has no staff to assist. Higher commanders have staffs to assist but the responsibility for the plan is theirs, not the staff's...
I've already said but will reiterate because it's important -- staffs are too powerful now; they need less and not more power.No, the Army cannot do much more for character development, it does not have the time -- and more importantly, that is NOT the Army's job; that was the job of parents, educators and society. If a person in the Army has character flaws, place the blame where it belongs.Quote:
... I think the Army only gives lip-service to character development and can do much more in that regard.
Adverserial decision making undermines cooperation and / or teamwork -- as you'll later see -- far more importantly, it just takes up too much time. In an academic exercise, it can be illuminating -- in combat it is an attempt to replace a rapid good enough plan with a far too slow closer to perfection plan. Won't work -- will get people killed.Quote:
...I will dispute that adversarial decision-making necessarily undermines loyalty or teamwork. It can and it does undermine, but I do not think that it must necessarily follow from disagreement as you suggest...
You say better results. On what basis do you think current results are unacceptable?Quote:
...Part of my intent is to find out (1) whether alternative relationships exist in other staff systems and (2) if such alternatives can produce better results than what we have now.
They have been looked into, numerous times by untold numbers of people and organizations. Check the research data; no sense in reinventing a wheel.Quote:
If personality types have a measurable impact on performance, then I think taking advantage of that is something worth looking into.
Abstract principles are all very well. It has been my observation that entirely too much effort in the Army is directed toward those at the expense of preparation for dealing with reality. If you're going to increase the power of the staff vis a vis the commander, you're going to turn over 5,000 years of military history around -- good luck with that.Quote:
...I'm very interested in the abstract principles and assumptions that goven commander-staff relationships, and what, if anything, can be modified and improved. Obviously my comments so far indicate an interest in increasing staff powers relative to a commander. That's liable to make the commander types upset. ;)
You might want to eschew the abstract principles and try for practical solutions that can realistically be expected to offer a prospect of improvement...Might I suggest that your statement of your assumption appears to be correct as this thread illustrates but that your stated belief that RTK's assumption is as you state may be in error as in his case it is not an assumption at all but an acceptance of demonstrated fact?Quote:
I think the major contributing factor to our disagreement is the fundamental contradiction in our initial assumptions: I believe your assumption is that an intuitive, direct single decision-maker will make, on average, better (or more relevant?) decisions than a collaberative, deliberate process. I am assuming the opposite. Am I accurate? If so, what do you think are the implications of those opposing assumptions?(emphasis added / kw)
I'd also very strongly suggest that you replace the word I emphasized with 'timely.' You may or may not wish to do that; I can assure you that most people in combat will do so.Why would anyone want a staff that was semi autonomous??? Who would they serve??? Far more germane to the issue, what purpose would they serve???Quote:
...if a staff were semi-autonomous...
No and no.Quote:
Do you think the thoroughness of MDMP is effective? Also, if a staff were semi-autonomous, do you think it would be helpful for it to run continuous MDMP (with the necessary changes) similar to continuous IPB?
I appreciate your input. Duly noted.Quote:
Originally Posted by RTK
I noticed that claim before. Sorry I missed it earlier. In what ways are staffs too powerful? Too much authority? To much bureaucratic inertia? I recall you mentioned their size, as did several others, as a problem also.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
I agree that one type of decision-making is more 'timely' than the other as a fact -- and also appreciate the suggestion to use that word in place of relevant. As far as one making 'better' decisions than the other, I'm not entirely sure. I'll have to investigate it some more, though I will state that my assumption has been (and continues to be) that it's good to seek a 'best' solution as opposed to a 'sufficient' solution; I will further caveat that by stating I understand that it's not always possible or desirable to find the 'best' solution when constraints compel sufficiency (the implied questions being: what constraints; their origins/causes? real or perceived? imposed/self-created? etc). Is it a "fact"? I think that's an open debate.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Not unacceptable. See above about my assumptions. Also -- when comparing the satisfaction of US staff officers, and the perception of staff work, with that of historical examples, there seems to be a major difference. How that affects output, I'd like to look into also.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
For discussion purposes, I'd like to detach the staff's planning and facilitating responsibilities. A knot is tied between the two, I understand, but I'd like to talk about the former before addressing the latter. In that regard, I think a semi-autonomous staff focused on/addressing/otherwise conducting planning would be in a greater position to conduct continuous planning (I understand this goes on already in a variety of ways through means other than MDMP). Rather than time-bounding COAs and then comparing them, the staff could build a continuous stream of action; adding and detaching activities and tasks to a central timeline. I'll have to take some time to think on the practical differences of the concept I'm attempting to explain in order to flush out it more fully. I know it sounds like what already occurs in some ways; X echelon planning Y months ahead; but it sounds different in my head. I promise. ;) I'll get back to you on it when I've thought it more through.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
What is the cause or reasoning for the continual reassignment? Another poster mentioned DOPMA -- is the 'up or out' process a significant contributing factor in your opinion?Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
At the BN level, most staff officers are CPTs or specialty branch LT (ie SIGNAL or CHEM). 1/2 those CPTs are usually recently promoted, awaiting CCC or if really lucky, a command. The other 1/2 are CPTs waiting on command. When a slot opens in a company/battery, or CCC orders come in, or a tasking for an officer comes in, one CPT moves in, and someone else has to fill that slot. KD, formerly Branch qualified CPTs are not authorized by MTOE in non life-cycle units. With officers constantly moving in, and the push to get KD so you can be utilized elsewhere, most officers do not stay in primary staff jobs that long. I was a S4 for 7 months, then got 12 months as S2 before HRC realized my branch detail expired and sent me to CCC. I asked to stay for a deployment, but was told negative.Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
To really get good at your staff job, it can take many months, if ever. Often, by the time you learn it, you are moved out to fill elsewhere or leave. Also, I was not a volunteer for the S4 slot. If I had been forced to be S4 for 19 months as a FA/MI officer, I would likely be Mister, not Captain right now (not joking). Few jobs are fun, but some are much less fun than others. If you forced officers into multi-year jobs, they would become specialists, and if they did not like that job, retention and satisfaction would drop.
There are likely other players and forces involved, but that's my view from below.
"c. Both of the above." Also they're very rank heavy, officer and enlisted. That is far more designed to build a mobilization base and to cover possible shortfall in retention than it is due to any need for those ranks and that many on the staff (though Parkinson's law applies). Those extra people and that over-ranking contribute a great deal to the noted malaise. The size factor contributes to the problem in that if X people are on the staff, then X people need to be involved in the 'production' of staff products. Not correct at all but an understandable phenomonen as some try to insure all are 'productive.'Quote:
Originally Posted by AmericanPride
Staffs today also, as Eden noted, filter a tremendous amount of information to present only what is 'pertinent' to the Commander -- thus the staff, with minimal responsibility, is determining what the Commander with total responsibility sees and acts upon. That is not good, in fact it is bad -- and your idea of semi-autonomous staff would make that far worse.Investigate merrily. Let us know your outcome. Let us know if that belief changes after you're involved in your first fire fight... :DQuote:
...As far as one making 'better' decisions than the other, I'm not entirely sure. I'll have to investigate it some more, though I will state that my assumption has been (and continues to be) that it's good to seek a 'best' solution as opposed to a 'sufficient' solution; I will further caveat that by stating I understand that it's not always possible or desirable to find the 'best' solution when constraints compel sufficiency (the implied questions being: what constraints; their origins/causes? real or perceived? imposed/self-created? etc). Is it a "fact"? I think that's an open debate.
You may assume that a 'best' solution is preferred. That does raise the question; what if your opponent opts for a 'sufficient' solution while you are trying for a 'best?'. Do recall we are not conducting an experiment or producing a product (where in both cases I agree your rationale would or might apply) -- rather we are fighting, probably fighting an opponent who is far less bureaucratic then we are and thus more flexible and generally quicker.
You now have the luxury to presume that is an open debate. Can you take that risk as a staff officer where lives will be at stake?I believe you'll find that not only is there a knot between the two but also that the echelon involved significantly impacts how much time is spent planning and how much in facilitating, i.e. at Bn, it's almost all facilitating, Bde and Div are a mix -- and the composition of that mix is influenced by the Commander as well as other factors...Quote:
For discussion purposes, I'd like to detach the staff's planning and facilitating responsibilities. A knot is tied between the two, I understand, but I'd like to talk about the former before addressing the latter.
Only at echelons above reality (Corps and higher -- and so named for a very good reason...) does planning get more time and effort than facilitating.
I'm also curious about the prospect of having a discussion that is divorced from reality. What is gained by that; theory is fine but in the end, a practical product should result; else one is doing a lot of wheel spinning.Let me give you some unsolicited advice based on over 40 years of staff experience in peace and war. When you get to be a senior officer and inherit a staff, if there is a plans cell or section -- disband it. Totally. Kill it before it hurts you or gets some of your troops killed.Quote:
In that regard, I think a semi-autonomous staff focused on/addressing/otherwise conducting planning would be in a greater position to conduct continuous planning... the staff could build a continuous stream of action; adding and detaching activities and tasks to a central timeline....
'Planners' operate in isolation and rarely have any responsibility for the chaos their products produce. Their products produce chaos because they almost invariably suppress reality to make the plan 'work.' You've probably heard the old saw "No plan survives its first contact with the enemy." That's why. Planners 'assume' too many things to make their plan look good on paper.
If you want truly successful plans that will work, split your ops shop in two, an 'A' and a 'B' section; one operates while the other plans -- and when a 'B' Section plan is implemented, 'B' Section becomes the operational cell, no exceptions, with responsibility for implementation and thus a stake in the success of their plan.
Your idea of a semi-autonomous staff takes an entity that already has limited responsibility for its actions and moves it yet further away from any responsibility. Do you really want to do that? If your answer is that you can require them to do well, consider the fact that it is virtually illegal to own a pistol in Chicago yet about 100 murders with pistols were committed there last year. Unenforceable laws and regulations don't mean much, harsh reality and direct accountability do mean something.
You're also confronted with the fact that a continuous stream of action will seldom be required and that in combat, you do not set the timeline -- not ever. In fact, you rarely set it anywhere. Thus your 'planners' have a lot of down time...DOPMA is a part of the problem; the main problem is that HRC justifies its existence and manpower by performing personnel actions. Those include PCS, promotions and career progression factors. Thus, they want to move people every two to three years and, given the intense competition for promotion to LTC and above, every Officer has to insure he or she does all the right things. Those factors combine to insure a 30% turnover in most units most years -- in combat, staff turnover can easily reach 100% in less than a year.Quote:
What is the cause or reasoning for the continual reassignment? Another poster mentioned DOPMA -- is the 'up or out' process a significant contributing factor in your opinion?
What does that do to your planning process... ;)
Thanks for the input everyone. I'm going to work out the mechanics of it all through the weekend; I'll return with some workable material to restart this give and take (more like you giving and me taking ;) ) process. I appreciate the insights, suggestions, and recommended readings.
Note to Ron and Ken: I e-mailed the paper you requested.
leave the Army and Marine Corps due to having been assigned as a Support Platoon Leader or the S4...Quote:
Originally Posted by patmc
I hate to say it, S4 was a great time for me in combat as far as staff jobs went - think Don Rickles' character in "Kelly's Heroes" (well, not that bad). ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Then again, I was working for an absolutely spectacular BN CO and XO, whom I would have been happy working for in any capacity.
S4 CAN be fun.
Just to add context, because of "queues" for command I took command relatively late, spending 3.5 years on staff before command and 8 months after (stop-loss). While it sucked, for those 3.5 years I was a S3A, S4, and S1 at BN and BDE, and an AST Commander in Kosovo. I learned how a BCT worked, and how to get things done. I watched other CO's do well and poorly, learning from their mistakes. When I took command I KNEW how to run a company inside of that BCT, and get what I needed/wanted. If I hadn't have had that staff time I doubt I would have been nearly as effective. So it isn't all bad. In fact, the S4 time paid huge dividends in command as I learned to work the system to get everything we needed. My company never wanted for anything, and I was able to train my XO as well.
I was blessed with serving under good officers during most of my staff time as well, which made it much more bearable. But it isn't all bad.
That said, nothing beats a command position.
er... worse??? :DQuote:
Originally Posted by Cavguy
That does make a big difference...Quote:
Then again, I was working for an absolutely spectacular BN CO and XO, whom I would have been happy working for in any capacity.
I've known a few who made it that, biggest problem I've seen with the jobs were bad, overenthusiatic Bn / Bde XOs.Quote:
S4 CAN be fun.
True, I've always found a pony in there somewhere... :cool:Quote:
I was blessed with serving under good officers during most of my staff time as well, which made it much more bearable. But it isn't all bad.
Just for the record, I was made S4 because I did so well as the HHB XO / BN Ammo Officer aka the de facto Support PL. Also, my S4 NCOIC broke his pelvis a month before I took over, and was then out for several months. Airborne! I was quite happy when he came back.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
And for Cavguy's comments. Sir, I agree with you, and recommend to all my buddies that if they are going to take command in a unit, S4 is actually the best job because you learn all the systems and contacts. Otherwise,draw a pistol and 1 round from the arms room.
Staff is a definate learning experience, and the people were great, but the actual work was rarely fun.
Ken White:Back some years ago this was the case. I cannot speak for what is taught now. If I was a betting man MDMP has probably been replaced by PowerPoint 101. When I attended BNCOC the class was horrendous, I rewrote the class. I had the luxury of having just come off staff and had great teachers. The S3 made it a requirement that NCOs were involved in the MDMP process (I still thank him to this day for it). He insisted that when conducting COA development each planning cell had an NCO in it to keep the officers level headed. We tried to get him to let the NCOs do our own but he'd never bite, think he was afraid we'd out plan them. It's actually kinda funny in hindsight, MDMP is something you do all the time, you just never knew that it was what you were doing.Quote:
The MDMP should be taught at BNCOC and at OBC.
One of the biggest issues I've seen over the years regarding staff personnel is why soldiers are put on staff. I have seen two approaches. The first approach is least preferred IMO, when the tasker goes to the companies to provide someone for staff no one wants to get rid of their "stud", so they send the less desirables. So instead of this guys realm of influence being contain it has just been greatly widend. This happens more than not on the NCO level. The second approach I have witnessed is the staff being "handpicked". I learned early on, if you want to be successful surround yourself with good people. IMO staff should be your "studs". It may be painful at first to have them gone but the benefits will be a hundred fold in the end.