Understanding our wartime experiences...
When I came across Karl Marlantes' book 'What it is like to go to war' in a bookstore I was thrilled to find a discussion on how Marlantes - a Vietnam veteran - was trying to come to terms with his war experiences (both on a personal and a broader level).
I was looking for a more recent equivalent of the earlier seminal work of Lord Moran 'The Anatomy of Courage' covering his WW1 experiences. Marlantes' work does not rank alongside Moran's work but its valuable nevertheless in that it is written by one who has experienced actual warfare - was awarded the Navy Cross - even if for only a year.
A study of both Moran's and Marlantes' works - in tandem - would, I believe, benefit those who have been exposed to combat to try to 'make sense of it all'... and help those who have not to understand the effect this most horrific pursuit of man has on the soldiers themselves through the accounts of people who have personally 'been there'.
The work of those who have written about the effects of war but not personally experienced it - such as Keegan, Holmes, Bourke, Beevor, even Grossman and others - have their place. There are no doubt other works by those who have experienced combat and written about it - J Glenn Gray, James R Mcdonough, Tim O'Brein, Philip Caputo, Michael Herr, etc - which no doubt will also contribute to a greater understanding.
Marlantes and Moran focus specifically on the effect of war on the participants.
Marlantes' first chapter - The Temple of Mars - displays perhaps the American tendency to over analyze a situation and maybe find something which may not be there - reminds of Shay's book 'Achillies in Vietnam' where he compares 'the soldiers of Homer's "Iliad" with Vietnam veterans' - and therefore is more of a distraction than IMHO a valuable contribution. I will skip it... but others who read it differently may choose otherwise.
Chapter two - Killing - deals with what has been discussed in a thread here:
How soldiers deal with the job of killing. Some may wish to reopen discussion on this aspect.
As I commented in the other thread: "I am involved with a compilation of narratives by individuals who served in my regiment during my little war." Here is an extract from one account from the oral history project:
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... Literally the minute we hit the ground the $hit hit the fan. All hell broke loose and a long and fierce fire fight took place. I experienced just about everything a soldier could expect to face in a lifetime in the army. There were airstrikes that nearly hit us, a terrorist threw and hit me with an empty AK magazine, two of my friends Kevin and Kim were seriously injured and flown out, and I had my first kill. I have never forgotten that moment….18 years old and I took another human beings life. Raised as a Catholic this had a severe impact on me. The worst was to come. At the end of the day we had to retrace our movements and collect all the bodies and drag them to a pick up point. The sight of the fatal injuries were horrific, limbs shattered, huge holes everywhere, exposed internal organs and brains oozing and falling adrift from the bodies. The yellow fat, the flies and the stench of death was gut retching. No training could have prepared me for this... "
To him it was the aftermath that got to him. What he probably misses is that his training prepared him to kill - which he did without hesitation - and while the first significant exposure to combat is traumatic to many this kid found himself as one of two FNGs in my troop where the older troopies probably told him/the two of them ... 'that was f***-all, just you wait'. There are a lot of head games played at that level the effect of which officers and NCOs need to monitor.
Of course the junior troopies get to move the dead around ... the older troopies just go through the pockets to see if there is any cash ;)
Kids learn in spite of poor teachers; good units can transcend poor support...
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Originally Posted by
JMA
The problem of the US was that the initial (production line) training was very basic and that of replacements was even less. This was a significant problem it itself.
Was and is -- we have gotten no smarter... :mad:
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Big difference in approach to that of the US.
Sadly, our approach is driven by a personnel system that is designed and operated to serve itself and its operators. It does a very poor job of supporting the Army. :rolleyes:
It simply wants to produce Round Pegs, small Round Pegs, that will fit in any hole regardless of the size or shape that is an optimum fit for the hole in question. It is not solely the fault of the Personnel folks; the Army leadership and, more importantly, the Congress support, even demand, that approach. Sad...:mad:
It is noteworthy that two of the most successful Divisions in the US Army in World War II, the 3d Infantry and the 82d Airborne both ordinarily refused to accept any replacements other than Privates and Second Lieutenants, both ran excellent training programs all through the war and both were great at promoting from within -- the 82d often declined even 2LTs. There were other good Divisions -- the 88th comes to mind, pure wartime raise and fill with a large number of draftees but they generally excelled because they had exceptionally talented Commanders, not because the 'system' was designed to properly support them.
True on the 82d having more 'down' time.
Hoiwever, training during combat is important and several Divisions other than the 3d were good at it. Most of the Armored Divisions did it. The 1st Mar Div in Korea had an excellent combat training, and NCO training program once the line stabilized and they were rigorous in sending people to those programs.
As you note, in Viet Nam it was far more discretionary at unit level. The 1st Bde of the 101st as a Separate Brigade in 1965-67 had in-country training and an NCO course also. It can be done -- should be done -- and good units will do it in spite of the impediments or lack of an overarching system plan.
Wars fought fairly nearly right -- and others...
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Originally Posted by
JMA
How long were these formations in theatre in which war?
Both were in North Africa, Sicily / Italy and then northwest Europe in WW II. The 3d Infantry Division was there from Nov 42 until Feb 46, the 82d from May 43 until Jan 46.Thanks for the link. Interesting article, I had not seen it before. It is IMO quite accurate, if anything it understates the damage done by that policy though it does seem to have caught all of them. It was indeed the most flawed personnel policy ever -- and note, we're now rotating units instead of people, so we did learn a little in Viet Nam. Very little. Steve is essentially correct in that the 6 month Officer rotations were for ticket punching purposes though it was as the article saed justified by saying it gave more 'combat experience.' I could never figure how bei8ng the Exchange Officer in Da Nang was combat experience...
One size cannot fit all...
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Originally Posted by
JMA
SO we agree that deployments should be by unit... but for how long and what size units (by brigade or by battalion)?
Combat wise, I'd say Bns -- but the personnel and training systems and organizations would have to be re-tooled to support that. Right now we're really structured and organized to do it by Division but have actually gone to a by-Brigade model, creating in effect a hybrid -- and not totally satisfactory -- situation.
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Then do we agree that the formation/unit's stateside base provides the replacements?
I don't think it must the unit's home station; a central replacement system works well enough.
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Some interesting stuff there.
It is that and brings to mind a thought. As a result of that WW II experience and the concomitant major combat induced personnel turnover and the psychiatric casualty effect we also had a one year individual tour effort in Korea. However, there were four significant differences. In my order of importance they were:
1. In Korea, most of the Officers above Lieutenant (and even many of them) and almost all NCOs above Sergeant had WW II experience and most also engaged in constant mentoring and training of subordinates. That included newly arriving units and most individual replacements through the end of the war. Not only was the experience factor lacking in Viet Nam, there was all too often a strange drop in mentoring and in unit training...
2 There was no six-month rotation of Officers to 'broadening assignments.'
3. There was no Infusion program. This program, so far as I know, was a Viet Nam era aberration that was designed to place 'experienced ' soldiers, NCOs and Officers in newly arriving units during the 1966-67 buildup of forces. It entailed taking some all rank persons in varying percentages from units in country and assigning them to newly arrived units to provide a leavening of experience and to insure the entire unit did not rotate at tour end as a body. At the same time, taking some newly arriving units and assigning them to units already in-country (assuring that the new guys would be labeled as FNG at best...). Unfortunately, there was IMO little coherence to who came and / or went where; no 'sister' or affiliated unit -- it was done on an individual basis and the swaps were NOT always rank / job for same rank / job. It was not a well designed plan and it was also poorly implemented in an unduly bureaucratic mode. As you can envision, it created major havoc in units. I believe that program did far more damage than the six month rotation of Officers. It also I think was the most significant reason for the lack of mentoring / in unit training. What it obviously did was destroy unit cohesion at a critical time and the knock on effects continued after the build up period. ... :mad:
4. The Korean 'experience' of rotation, replacement and combat performance essentially lasted from July 1950 through July 1953, thus there were effectively only three 'rotations' (though there were actually more due to far higher early casualties as compared to other, later wars). Further, by July 1951 an effective stalemate existed and the war of movement ceased to be replaced by the tedium but still dangerous though relatively stabilized trench warfare effort -- two very different wars in one, In any event, the short span insured the deleterious effects of time did not evince themselves as they did in Viet Nam. Whether the system would have continued to work reasonably well cannot be known. My guess is it would have been at least slightly superior to that of Viet Nam due to the first three reasons above.
So we did learn a little and have since wisely opted for unit rotations. :wry:
To return to your earlier query on tour length, I'd personally opt for indefinite and aim for 18-36 months, type and intensity of combat defined. However, I doubt most democratic legislatures would support that and I think a year is a marginally acceptable compromise -- with the caveat that it be done a whole lot smarter than we did it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Return to the same area of operations should have been the norm but it was deliberately avoided to prove the 'modular' concept would work -- and for other obscure reasons (like too much work for Planners who also rotated at year or so intervals and thus had no memory of what came before...)
I also believe that type of combat makes a major difference in how units are rotated and employed. In a COIN / FID effort, unit stability and continuity are important, casualties will be generally lower and leaving the unit in place and rotating people (in line with some of your suggestions) can be done -- if the legislatures do not interfere too badly. In higher intensity conflict OTOH, a major war of movement against a peer, that continuity is not necessary and the frequent rotation of units in and out of combat can lessen the psychiatric casualty problem; replacements can be received, training undertaken and rest obtained.
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As to the last quote I do realise that casualty rates as mentioned are no longer the norm so that argument probably falls away.
Yes but casualty rates are very much a function of each individual war and the current "norm" can be quickly replaced by one that approaches Viet Nam -- or Korea, even WW II.
No easy answers...