Below is a link to Gen Dunlap's latest article regarding AF culture.
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...gseptoct07.pdf
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Below is a link to Gen Dunlap's latest article regarding AF culture.
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...gseptoct07.pdf
This will come in handy for a piece I'm working on about the Air Force's foundation myth. Thanks for the link!
I'm getting a sinking feeling that I've just done something wrong.:) Be nice.
Actually, it provides a fine window for how the Air Force views itself, which ties directly back to the foundation myth. I could pick the piece apart, but that's not really the point right now. Dunlap is cheerleading, which is often what he does. It's been a characteristic of semi-official Air Force writing going back to the late 1940s (and of course other services do it as well...:)).
His use of LeMay as someone who questioned authority is interesting, especially given LeMay's penchant for crushing those who disagreed with him or deviated from established SAC policy. His comment on AF officers doing most of the fighting is also somewhat disingenuous, because within the AF structure pilots HAVE to be officers.
I'll stop now....but it is a very interesting piece for those who want to see how the Air Force sees itself.:)
It's pretty much correct in my opinion and observation. He hits two critical points; first that there has been no attack from the air on US ground forces since 1950 and that the Air force has pretty much done its job while taking care of its people and without getting too wrapped around the axle about Martinetish foolishness...
Far more importantly, he writes this:
(emphasis added /kw)Quote:
"Airmen may also not read FMFM 3-24’s slogan of “learn and adapt” as the unqualified good the manual touts it to be. While “adaptability” is certainly an important military virtue, when we juxtapose it with “learn,” it strikes Airmen as too defensive and reactive. To Airmen, this sounds a lot like absorbing the first blow and then bending to the enemy by trying to figure out how to fight him on his terms (just do so “better”). That is not the Air Force “way.” In air warfare, the first blow can be fatal to relatively fragile aircraft. This makes Airmen extremely offensive-minded, and they are more inclined to take an “anticipate and shape” approach than a “learn and adapt” process. An Airman likes to seize the initiative and force the adversary to fight on his terms—terms in which he believes his superior technology and training will give him the advantage."
I've been complaining about that for many years. We as an Army tend to be entirely too reactive; we react well, ususally but the mindset is too frequently to react...
Good article if a trifle defensive. The sad thing is that our excessive parochialism caused him to write it...
There's more than enough parochialism to go around, IMO. And don't get me started about the "no air attack on US ground forces" straw man....;)
The Air Force has, IMO, been fortunate in that it has been able to more or less pick and choose its wars since Vietnam (where, as Dunlap fails to mention, they learned slowly and quickly forgot much of what they learned once the shooting stopped...until the TAC generals gained ascendancy in the 1980s and later). Their op tempo overall has been lower (with the notable exception of certain airframes and communities...tankers, AWACs, and A-10s spring immediately to mind, but there are others that were constantly drawn on as well), which gives them more time to consider the ideal conflict and develop systems for that conflict.
This is an area where we may have to agree to disagree, Ken. I found it most useful as an institutional expression of what the Air Force believes it is, where it's been, and where it's going.
I agree with much of what Outcast had to say about Dunlap's piece. I think that Dunlap provides an accurate and explanatory piece of how airmen view the world. One might not agree with that view but it is their view nevertheless and Dunlap should be lauded for providing us with it in a clear and understandable form. I say this as a historian who has written very criticaly about airmen and airpower since its inception.
air attacks on US ground forces" 'strawman.'
As for the rest of your comment, all true. So what? I'm not sure with what you're disagreeing. I made three statements, the foregoing air attacks; that the US Army is in fact too often in the reactive mode; and that it's sad that he felt the need to write what is, effectively an apologia and a defensive (as I noted) attempt to establish a philosophy.
What is the specific disagreement?
Ken,
The main reason I tend to consider the "no air attacks on ground forces since 1950" to be something of a straw man is that we've very rarely engaged an opponent (Gulf War I aside) that had any real capability TO attack our forces from the air, or a reason to do so if they possessed the capability. The limited air capability North Vietnam had could have been defeated by either Navy or Marine air (and in fact the Navy had a higher kill ratio during the Vietnam War and proved much quicker to adapt to NVAF tactics), although the objectives of NVN didn't really call for them to use ANY air power. Deterrence during the Cold War was very much a team effort so all services get a fair share of the credit there (along with occasionally very astute political leadership). The Balkans is something of a unique case, and the AF did very well there. It was a joint effort as well, with Navy air and NATO assets taking part. I'm not knocking the achievements of the AF, but I do think that some statements need to be taken with a grain of salt.
As for the disagreement, I'd say it stems more from the implication that Dunlap's piece represents something new (in terms of a defense of the AF viewpoint). It's not really new...in fact his tone is more of a throwback to the sort of pieces that came out in the 1950s regarding AF capabilities. As an institution (not as individuals) the AF isn't necessarily proactive; I'd say they spend more time (at the higher levels, mind, and in a form of projected "group vision") trying to craft a dreamstate of war. They (again a collective "they" that refers more to the vocal air power advocates) view warfare as a total activity, with nothing off limits or out of bounds. Politics do not frame conflict so much as they obstruct it and air power's decisive capability. Dunlap isn't establishing a policy at all; he's giving a current voice to a mindset that's been active in one form or another (and in a very consistent shape) since the birth of the Army Air Service.
Perhaps we aren't disagreeing that much....but there is a certain throwback dreamstate to Dunlap's piece that I find interesting.
Not Homburg; the guy I refer to loved neither Soldiers nor Marines and he was a BG in the Air Force advocating a unilateral air campaign to drive Saddam from Kuwait....Quote:
Providing support to U.S. troops on the ground is relentlessly imprinted on Airmen. As General Hal Hornburg, one of the Air Force’s most distinguished combat veterans and the former commander of the Air Combat Command, put it, “If you don’t love Soldiers, you have no place in my Air Force.”
I would agree with both of you (Ken and Steve) that this is an interesting piece, providing a window in to the collective mind of the Air Force. I would point out there is a bit of offensive-defensiveness in this; I mean really, an Air Force General feels compelled to explain the Air Force to us ground pounders? I have to wonder how would an Army general be perceived if he penned a similar piece explaining the Army to the Air Force.
In relation to what Steve discusses about the Air Force belief system I find it quite revealing to look at what issues he feels compelled to explain. As I would expect, he certainly explains a view of airpower centered on lethal technology--as delivered by the pilots. The central focus of that lethality is destroying the enemy; he never seems to connect that focus with his continued concerns that FM 3-24 is somehow not lethal enough. Curiously he then feels compelled to explain that airmen are warriors, too, even when they don't fly.
It is also instructive to reflect on those subjects not explained. As a FAO in Africa, I loved airlift. It could be a trying experience but when you needed lots of stuff really fast--no one can beat the US Air Force. Yet this article seems to miss that one. As an intelligence officer looking for Iraqi tank divisions in 1990, I truly missed the SR71. Air breathing intelligence collectors are wonderful things. All the services have come along way since 1990 with regards to UAVs and such. In fact there is a major furr ball in progress right now on the UAV control issue, one not discussed in this piece.
best
Tom
Steve, this is an interesting comment:
Rather than assume I understand what you are saying, could you elaborate please?Quote:
They (again a collective "they" that refers more to the vocal air power advocates) view warfare as a total activity, with nothing off limits or out of bounds.
Tom,
You might be surprised how little some AF people understand the Army or Marines. Perhaps some sort of explanation of those cultures might be beneficial to those airmen moving into a joint environment. They are distinctly different. I had a hell of a time with some issues when I first came in the AF. I saw everything through a Marine Corps lense because it is what I knew. The egalitarian example he provides is a prime example. Another is the differences in NCOs, which has been discussed on some other thread.Quote:
I mean really, an Air Force General feels compelled to explain the Air Force to us ground pounders?
No not at all surprised and that was my point; I expect that reception to such an explanation of Army culture would be disinterest if not hostility. I agree 100% that such an explanation service cultural would benefit any service member regardless of service entering a joint environment--it is after all much like COIN :D.Quote:
You might be surprised how little some AF people understand the Army or Marines. Perhaps some sort of explanation of those cultures might be beneficial to those airmen moving into a joint environment. They are distinctly different. I had a hell of a time with some issues when I first came in the AF. I saw everything through a Marine Corps lense because it is what I knew. The egalitarian example he provides is a prime example. Another is the differences in NCOs, which has been discussed on some other thread.
I have worked in an AF-centric environment and I --like you--definitely had to adjust. The NCO cultures are excellent examples, one that applies to all the services, the closest being the Marines and the Army.
Best
Tom
I disagreed with the founding of the USAF in 1947, still do. It is a service in search of a mission. I watched USAF CAS in Korea in 50 and 52 -- the Marines and the Navy, in that order, did it far better. Watched it again several other places including SEA in 61, 66 and 68 -- same result as Korea. My middle son with Army DS/DS, two Afghan and one Iraqi tours says that's still true. Strategic bombing is a factually proven waste in virtually all respects. Warden's theories are IMO incorrect. The USAF has a bad tendency to over centralize; a big war will cure them of that foolishness. "Shock and Awe" (2003) was a ridiculous term that should never have seen daylight. The USAF has no business at all in taking over the UAVs of the other services, that would be a terrible mistake. The AF has done better with CAS since the A-10 arrived but those guys are way, way too trigger happy
In short; Air power has its uses but is vastly overrated as a war winner and the AF has some problems. :(
The fact that there have been few credible threats since 1950 is irrelevant; for whatever reason the USAF with a great deal of Navy and Marine help has owned the skies. Not the least of advantages in that is that the other services have been able to spend slightly less on AD than they might have in the absence of that control. The far more significant impact is that the other services have had far more freedom of maneuver. I submit that the Balkans were a side show and that the USAF did NOT do very well at all in Kosovo. As to selecting wars in which to participate and speaking of Kosovo, IIRC, the Army got M1A1s and AH-64s to the theater -- but, very selectively, not into the country 'til after things were chilled... :wry:
I did not represent Dunlaps piece as something new nor did I assess it as even attempting to establish a policy of any sort, it is, as I said initially, a piece of defensive writing; it is simply another regurgitation of AF self justification. That does not mean that he makes no valid points in the process and I merely mentioned four of them (the taking care of the troops bit is so obvious as to not need repetition). I see little sense in discarding anyone's valid premises because I disagree with the intent or the validity of the total contribution.
Tom is correct in noting the absence of the UAV stupidity and that the AF has never provided the priority merited to airlift and its airlift fleet. Given the Eagle Claw debacle and technology since available, there is no reason we should not have a 3K NM STOVL aircraft (among others).
All that said, I agree with your second and last paragraphs. I'd also add that my complaint about parochialism is all service -- but in many ways, the USAF is the worst offender in that aspect. Witness their intransigence at the formation of a unified medical command... :cool:
Regards,
Ken
Sure. What I refer to here is what I have taken over the years from the writing of air power theorists as well as some of the semi-official AF writing about Vietnam and Korea. My take is that they in essence view warfare as a zero-sum exercise: you are either at war or you are not. If you are at war, you should be able to use all weapons and methods at your disposal to defeat your opponent. You see strains of this in most discussion of Korea and Vietnam, where complaints are raised about (with Korea) not being able to attack bases in China or (in Vietnam) not bombing Hanoi soon enough or with enough severity. Political limitations are viewed with hostility - as shackles on the true effectiveness of air power - and not as a common feature in warfare (since war stems from politics in many if not all cases). If the population is part of the production system, they should be subject to attack. The same goes for political centers and the like. LeMay was a vocal advocate of this, but there have been others. You bomb power plants to cut off power to the populace, hit the Red River dikes (a VN example) to flood out food production areas, and so on.
You see strains of this in Warden's air campaign theory, although he does tone down the rhetoric. But even there you can see an attempt to shape warfare to the air power-centric doctrine and not adapting the doctrine to the political situation as dictated by national policy. One of the main points of this doctrine is maximum force (weapons, systems, etc.) delivered to vital points (as many as possible) as quickly as possible. Under such a mindset problems quickly become a question of what weapon to use and in what quantity, not if weapons should be used at all.
This ignores the contributions of lift (mentioned by Tom and I know you've talked about it as well, John), real-time recon like the SR-71 provided, and other functions. Dunlap mentions the Misty FACs, but he also fails to mention that they were marginalized by the AF when they were operating and have only recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest and semi-official approval. He also doesn't mention the number of times the AF has tried to retire or transfer the A-10 or other systems that don't really fit into the high-speed, lots of bombs on target mission that the total activity vision of warfare calls for.
Probably because I simply was not looking for it, I failed to see evidence of this statement. But then I came across this article this morning:
http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=21646
Of particular interest is this quote:
I'm not quite sure how to take this. I've reread it several times to try and gleen a different read, but it just seems like he's calling for a sort of total war -- kill them all and let God sort this out. I'm flabbergasted. Even in COIN there is a need for putting steel on target and even being relentless in doing it, but surely it shouldn't be the rule. Like I said, maybe I'm misreading but, especially in today's globalized and liberalized society, we can't take a butcher and burn approach to COIN.Quote:
The doctrine defines irregular warfare as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations."
But Peck cautioned this was not necessarily the same as a battle for hearts and minds.
"It doesn't have to be kinder and gentler," he said, citing the Viet Cong, who he charged had "won influence over the population how? Not by going in and immunizing the kids and building schools. Â… They'd go in and they'd grab a couple of the tribal elders and hang them."
That being said, there is a statement that I believe does make sense.
I don't buy into the argument that we should make ourselves available as target simply to adhere to some machismo version of fighting because the failure to do so taints our image in the eyes of our adversary. Who cares? Killing your enemy without being killed has been the goal since the beginning of time. We have simply developed better ways to do it. Within the confines of the laws of war, I completely agree that we should not engage in a "fair" fight if we can gain some sort of advantage.Quote:
The storyline that "They are afraid to fight us face-to-face but not to bomb us from the air and kill our women and children" is "a good recruiting tool for the enemy," he said.
"I don't even know how to respond to that," said Peck, when a reporter put Richards' views to him.
"I take great pride in the fact that we can do these things without putting our forces at risk -- to me that's the goal. We don't want to fight a fair fight."
Also, I'm not sure that this is a great recruiting tool anyway (the failure to fight aspect; civilian casualties will always play a role in recruiting). I guess it's possible that some may join the insurgency solely for this reason, but I doubt the numbers are significant. In their minds they have plenty of other reasons for joining. However, once engaged in the fight against the US, wouldn't the enemy become frustrated at their inability to kill US military personnel? I would think so.
The argument is about legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Who has it? And who gets it? There is no machismo attached to fighting in ways that help secure that legitimacy. Peck again uses "hearts and minds" as a red herring, implying that we are trying to love our enemy to death. We and our host nation allies try to convince the population that we are legitimate and the insurgents are not.Quote:
I don't buy into the argument that we should make ourselves available as target simply to adhere to some machismo version of fighting because the failure to do so taints our image in the eyes of our adversary. Who cares?
best
Tom
I first noticed the trend when reading about Air Force involvement in Vietnam. I came across it again when reading about Korea. There was a constant "airpower could have won everything if we had been allowed to do it our way" thread, which usually translated into bombing everything that moved (and most things that didn't). There's often a disconnect between the theory and its application in a world where political constraints are ALWAYS a part of military operations.
In terms of the failing to fight consideration, I don't think it's a recruiting tool as much as it is an IO consideration in many areas and with some cultures. By failing to put people on the ground, you can appear to be afraid of the insurgents, giving them a sense of legitimacy they might not have otherwise. You also deprive yourself of invaluable COIN intelligence: being able to SEE and HEAR the people. Sensors are great, but they just don't substitute for the impressions that can be formed on the ground.
Peck's VC example is nothing short of ludicrous. Intimidation has always been a part of insurgent operations, but most COIN attempts to "pay them back in their own coin" have been total failures. Part of successful COIN is being able to offer real alternatives to the insurgents, not a choice between who's going to shoot you in the back of the head.
In the article, GEN Dunlap saysAll the way back to the Iliad, close combat is considered valient and couragous, and stand-off weapon users (then archers, now airmen) were considered lacking in martial virtue. Note that 'couragous' literally means 'having heart' and 'virtue' comes from vir, Latin for man so means manliness. So, stand-off weapons make the user heartless and unmanly...Quote:
Airmen shamelessly seek to destroy adversaries with as little risk to themselves... as possible.
Pretty archaic attitude from folks whose basic weapon has a maximum effective range of 500m against point targets and 800m against area targets (M16A2).
I think the central, unspoken issue is that most air force folks do not display the degree of respect for folks who go into close combat that ground forces feel is their due. And possibly, the air force folks are doing this to compensate for their own questions about their virtue when compared to us knuckle-dragging ground pounders.
In the current conflict, we are seeing a similar pattern to early Viet Nam. If the enemy has no strategic infrastructure to bomb, strategic bombing can continue 24-7 without effect. I would argue (as an Army guy) that precision munitions were one of the two things missing from the Douhet/Mitchell vision of air power (the other being information operations) to minimize collateral damage that turns into an IO victory for the opponent. In other words, were are closer now to the capabilities required for strat air to carry the day than ever before, but strat air requires an opponent who has an infrastructure that can be targeted with bombs. The bad guys in Iraq don't have big IED factories, they have dozens of home workshops, they don't have electric power plants discrete from the friendly power plants, their comm system might be a guy on a scooter who looks just like every other scooter in the city from 30,000 ft. In this circumstance, airpower is the big fire base in the sky, with someone on the ground as the forward observer, not an independant, autonomous fleet of airmachines envisioned by Douhet.
Perhaps the following link would be useful to you.
http://www.truesilence.com/psychological-projection.htm
This is very much a Western myth of warfare, and ignores the experiences and cultures of the various nomadic/semi-nomadic horse tribes of Central Asia....not to mention the whole longbowmen myth. However, it can also tie into the fighter pilot "kill tally" idea and their own arguments about prowess (and lack thereof) with their bomber pilot brethren.
It's also worth remembering that the Romans trained their soldiers to use sword AND the pilum, which was a missile weapon and a central part of their tactics through at least the early Empire period. One of the key parts of the Byzantine military was the heavily-armored horse archer. I suspect the "unmanly" part may have crept in during the romanticism of the Medieval period....
Romans threw the pilia, which had soft, hollow heads, first. The soft head embedded the spear into an opponent's shield. The shaft then distorted, pulling the opponent's shield downward as well. Thereby, the enemy was uncovered and made easy prey as the Roman legionnaires closed to use the gladius, the heavy short sword, which was designed as a stabbing rather than a slashing weapon.
The Romans had no compunction about using their allies as archers and slingers to soften up their opponebnts first. Roman's didn't use these weapons themselve primarily because they didn't know how. Why waste time learning how to use them if you have allies available who are better at this than you--sort of like the US Army using Native American scouts during the frontier conflicts of the 1800s.
I think Steve is partly correct about the the unmanly aspect of "indirect fire" weapons/long distance engagements creeping in during the Middle Ages--it was, I believe, a hallmark of the Germannic "barbarians'" style of fighting to engage in one-on-one combat rather than long distance "missile" exchanges. Thes folks became the martial leadership of Western Europe as Rome was supplanted and brought the values of their heritage with them. One proved one's fitness to lead through succeeding in a direct challenge of arms with an incumbent (AKA duel), not by killing the incumbent at a distance with a sling or bowshot. BTW, unlike steel swords, slings and bows were relatively cheap to make, becoming, therefore, the weapons of the hoi polloi, not the elite.
The first "Western" example of disdain for archers/missile weapons that I could find is the Greek hoplite disregard for such "lightly" armed troops. Aeschylus specifies arrows as "barbarian" weapons in The Persians, Euripides calls them "coward's weapons" in The Madness of Heracles, and both Thucydides and Herodotus note Spartan disdain for "spindle"-like arrows as effeminate. This despite, of course, numerous examples of the slaughter of hoplites by light-armed troops - i.e. the Athenian invasion of Aetolia, the Spartan surrender at Sphacteria to Athenian rowers, etc.
Like the men-at-arms' hatred for archers and crossbowmen in medieval Europe, this downgrading of the effectiveness of projectile weapons was largely class-based. Rights, social regard, and also responsibilities were based on economic prosperity. Athenians below a certain property threshold could vote but not hold office. Above such qualifications came the perquisites of both eligibility for religious office, political office, and also the legal obligation to serve as hoplites. A hoplite panoply of hoplon-style shield and thrusting spear could be afforded at lower costs, but was still far more expensive than a bow and arrows or light javelins.
Thus by purchasing the comparably expensive hoplite armor, shield, and weapons, a Greek declared himself a substantial member of his society, a social equal or near-equal with the wealthier legally-obligated hoplites who formed the elite of society. Naturally this required the casting of aspersion on the impoverished men who showed up to the levy with nothing but javelins, bows, or just a sling. Thus the idea that fighting with such was cowardly, unmanly, or even unethical.
LawVol, re: psychological projection- oh, as long as everyone agrees that this knife cuts both ways :) Both sides are flawed, but... the Air Force culture is based on a premise that pilots are a precious commodity, have to treated with kid gloves, and and are above worldly matters. It goes back to the Army Air Corps decision to commission people and train them as pilots rather than take trained officers and teach them to fly. On the other hand, the Army tends to over react, forgetting or ignorant that AF pilots treat their own support officer with as little respect, and that air power is a critical edge in any operation. At the end of the day, we need to put this adolescent silliness to one side and do our jobs. And at the muddy boots level, it isn't perfect, but it is pretty good, it is just these darned GOs.
Yeah, air power saves a lot of U.S. lives (even more than are lost in air to ground fratricides), but air power has yet to go it alone successfully (and will never be able to go it alone in COIN).
Steve & WM, re: the Roman model - I find a lot of value in examples from Roman history (some things to copy, others to avoid). The absence of a open rivalry between different catagories of Roman soldier (as opposed to the levies from the provinces as mentioned earlier) might be significant. A legion commander had artillery (catapults), cavalry, infantry, and various support elements. From what I read (a while back now) I never got a sense of rivalries even between the line infantry and cavalry (pervasive since the Renaissance, but I would suspect older). They were Romans, and it was them against the world. Maybe I missed something, but this state seems desireable. Combined combat power is greater than the sum of the parts, and this petty sniping really doesn't serve U.S. interests.
Re: Medieval stand-off weapons - Did the Welsh archers in their three centuries of insurgency against the English influence antipathy between close combatants and ranged weapon users?
For the most part the Air Force has a habit of eating their young. Too much administration BS for the average airman to want to stick around past one enlistment. What would be the point. They have always lagged in promotion and excelled in training. This leads to unnecessary turnover.
You may find this surprising but my direct experience with Air Force officers was not very good. First off, they were mostly O-1 FAC pilots on an RF-4 air base. Put yourself in their place waiting in line with an antiquated Cessna bathtub with a prop in front and back Thinking back....don't put yourself in their place. In the field most were "wait a minute lieutenants" because we were always having to wait on them for one thing or another. On the ground they were completely lost, even with a compass and map, and didn't have basic coordination to look at a stop watch and a map while transmitting and listening at the same time. There were some that were good but that is all. They were out of shape and had no intention of running with us every morning. I guess you can say I didn't like them. The exception to my rule was the A-10 pilots. I enjoyed working with them but I rarely met them face-to-face. They flew out of different air base to a mutual range we used for practicing. That goes for other attack aircraft pilots I worked with as well as Army battalion commanders.
Now, the talk about LeMay. LeMay was a good commander because he was a sociopathic mass killer at the right time and place in history with God on his side. He did what he had to do and he did it well. He also ate his young.
As a Marine Aviator, I have a somewhat unique perspective of the Air Force and it's culture. On the whole when it comes to the Air-to-Air mission, the Air Force is thorougly well trained and professional in what it does. I think when it comes to the direct strike role the Air Force is quite good as well. However, when it comes to integrating with ground forces (as CAS requires)the Air Force generally isn't willing to go to the lengths that we Marine Aviators do. For instance in one fight I was involved in, F-16s showed up with no charts, GRGs, or even basic knowledge of the battleground beneath them and then openly complained on the radio when we were getting most of the drops. :rolleyes:
From a historical prospective, the Air Force is indeed wedded to technology and has been since its infancy. In the European theater, the 8th Air Force dogmatically stuck to its belief in unescorted bomber mission, even in the face of extreme casuaties. It did this because many of the Air Force leadership played a roll in the development of the doctrine in the 1930s.
In Nam rumors always went around that the Air Force had secret swimming pools only for Air Force personnel. they had a wonderful PX at Danang and when the NVA blew it up with 122s, we almost broke down and wept. We didn't see many of them but my buddy Curt summed it up best when he said, "they sure are shiny guys, I bet none of them stink". We sort of admired them and rumors spread fast and easy about them, that they had steak to eat on a regular basis was another popular one. It was taken for granted that they had thick mattresses with clean linen to sleep on and we never held it against them.
The fundamental problem with the Air Force isn't so much its preoccupation with high-techology or its focus on the pilot's point of view, or numbers of systems, but its doctine, or rather ideology. The founding (and continually evolving) myth of the Air Force derives from the Doctrine of "Victory Through Air Power", but as anyone can read for themselves, from Douhet to Warden to Dunlap's piece (not that I'd necessarily rank Dunlap up with either of those two theorists), that "Doctrine" is really more of an Ideology masquerading as a doctine and is seeking its fulfillment in History (and like Marxists, they're going to be waiting forever).
This ideology, like any other, requires selective use (or abuse) of history to try to prove its truth and efficacy and ultimate, inevitable triumph. Just as Ken said about the Air Force, "It's a servive in search of a mission". I'm not totally convinced, but he may be right that creating an Air Force independent of the Army was a mistake. Both the Navy and the Marines have their own "Air Forces", and while not perfect, I don't hear very many people saying that the Air Force is better than either of them (except the Air Force themselves).
As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop. You can't make the local population feel safe with you and trust you when your flyboys just can't see why they shouldn't be turned loose to take out villages, houses, power plants, and water works with PGMs just because that's where the enemy is (and thus has to be "destroyed" with all the violence available at hand), while you're trying to move amongst the same people whose houses are getting it and who don't have safe water or electricity (if they're used to having it) because the Air Force bombed the utilities.
Not true. At the risk of quoting you out of context, the USAF is over their strategic mindset of WWII. Reagan's Rapid Deployment Force, which is the little sister of today's Special Operations, put an end to that nonsense once and for all. Also, their own technology put an end to the bull in a china shop. Most actual real-time USAF missions in regard to small wars, on the ground or in the air, are Special Ops in nature. Nevertheless, the argument of victory through air power was made obsolete by Billy Mitchell. Air power during the Gulf War saved numerous lives. In that campaign, air power was the decisive denominator. Also, many Airmen today are earning, sometimes posthumously, the same commendations as Army grunts. Most people have a stereotyped image of the USAF. The USAF is much more complicated and diversified than most people think.Quote:
As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop.
That is absolutely true. One example is at Maxwell AFB where they doing some of the most advanced R&D on negotiation and human influence operations that I have ever seen. They also have and are doing some very sophisticated R&D on less lethal and non-lethal weapons.
But you also have to remember the institutional "face" of the Air Force...which remains victory through air power (although space power and dominance of cyberspace have both been added to the formula).
I don't deny that there is some very interesting research going on within Big Blue, or that there are pockets and individuals that are looking beyond the basic framework...but when was the last time you saw someone with equal (or higher) rank come out with an article contradicting or arguing with what Dunlap and others have written? The public face remains very much the same.
Every large organization is complicated and diverse. That's the nature of a large organization. But if you look at the official writings, the tone set by those in authority, you'll still find the old mantra. The Air Force as an organization (not as individuals) has been dragged into other roles (sometimes kicking and screaming), but the larger whole still struggles to get back to that familiar "high ground" of air power.
No matter what some might think, this isn't Air Force bashing. It's recognizing the reality of the ORGANIZATION as a whole, not the parts within that organization. As far as the organization being "over" the Second World War....I'd have to disagree. The terms have changed, but many within the senior leadership still look for victory through technology and preferably air power. Not all the individuals are like that. There are some great thinkers within the AF...many who are willing and eager to think outside the conventional borders and come up with new roles and ways of doing business. But they are all too often silenced or ignored.
We may see changes in the next 10 years or so...as the next generation of officers (including many who've come into the AF from other services) rise in rank. But I have yet to be convinced that the ORGANIZATION as a whole has changed. Some parts, yes, and there are some interesting steps being taken. But those parts have yet to impact the whole in a major way.
And it's not just the AF. Look at the tug of war within the Army regarding COIN and 3-24. I tend to single out the AF because as an organization they have been the most consistent at shutting out current events in favor of the war they'd like to fight (one could make an argument for the Navy as well in this category).
And Norfolk, I'd also propose that the AF ideology springs from both technology and pilots/aircraft. In many ways you can't discuss one without bringing in the other. And with reference to CAS, one of the former Chiefs of Staff (McPeak) argued toward the end of his tenure that CAS should be given back to the Army, with them and the Marines given primacy for the mission.
Very much agreed Steve, and as far as AF ideology deriving from both pilots/aircraft and technology, I agree very much as well, it's just that with my political philosopher's schooling, I may be biased to look for the qualititative rather than the quantitative, and trip over the stone blocks as I search for the fortifications.
Both Culpeper and Slapout9 are correct to the extent that the Air Force is very a diverse organization, but how many Air Observers, CCT's, PJ's, SOF Crewmen, etc., make Chief of Staff? For that matter, how many rise to 3- or 4-star flag ranks; not too many. Most of the 3- and 4-stars are fighter, bomber, materiel, even intelligence types. A few strategic airlift transport types make their way to the upper levels on the stairway to the stars. By and large the guys who make it to the top (and in charge of doctrine) are those thinking in terms of the Big One, and those fighting small wars or unconventional ones amount to their (elite) cupbearers at most. This certainly doesn't detract from the vital and gutsy work that the PJ's, the CCT's, the SOF Aircrew, and the Air Observers do; but it very much testifies to their being marginalized at the top.
Culpeper (and Slapout too, being an ex-jumper himself about the time RDF was formed) are completely correct in that the Air Force was compelled to field a serious and reliable strategic airlift capability to take the Army's light divisions wherever they needed to go (especially if that destination was the Middle East) - no more Lebanon 1958's, where the Army's Airborne Divisions (STRAC) couldn't get there and tried to send front-line troops from Germany because the Air Force couldn't live up to its committments for adequate strategic airlift to get them there; that really burned the Army in general and the Airborne in particular, especially when Ike had to send in the Marines to do the job. But even now, the Air Force can't do much more than airlift a single light division (which is still more than anyone else) and keep it supplied for a month or so; the rest of XVIII Airborne Corps has to either cool their heels or board ships just like the Heavy Divisions.
But in its institutional heart of hearts, the Air Force remains essentially unchanged. Unrestricted, Total War theory remains the core of its doctrine. The Five Rings Theory remains unpurged from Air Force doctrine and teaching, and that theory is less than 20 years' old (well past WWII, Korea, and even surviving the Cold War). It's somewhat ironic that Fielded Military Forces is the outermost, and therefore the least essential, ring to be targeted by Air Power. Targetting the Population remains a tier above this, and targeting the Infrastructure (which we did in Iraq in 1991, Kosovo/Serbia in 1998, and Iraq again in 2003), and the destruction or damage which was inflicted on said in 2003 is dogging SSO ops in Iraq 4 years later - Iraqis are very ticked that their water and electricity is spotty at times, or even most of the time. Above that of course you get to Systems Essentials and finally the Leadership.
This is what the institutional Air Force still very much sees as how to fight war. That means air superiority and missiles/bombs on target, the bigger the better, and the more, the merrier, until the enemy utterly collapses under the full force of aerial bombardment. The reason that the Air Force doesn't deliberately target the civilian population (a la WWII and Korea) is that sort of thing just won't be tolerated morally by most of the public or politically by most of the political leadership. Yet the civilian population (and infrastructure even more so) remains a greater priority target in Air Force doctrine than enemy troops on the field (and no new-build CAS aircraft has been built for the AF since 1982, but F-16's designed for tactical air strikes are supposed to replace the A-10, hmmm...:()
This is not at all consistent with the proper conduct of small wars (or unconventional wars) where you're trying to protect the population against the enemy and rebuild their lives, infrastructure, and their trust in someone carrying a gun (or flying a fighter-bomber). Even when honest mistakes are made, and a fighter-bomber takes out someone's village or house or field in error, and killing civilians, all the progress that the troops on the ground may have made with these people is completely undone; in some areas, such incidents have made it impossible to even try to reach out to this people at all. And, for that matter, even General Wars must not be waged as Total Wars; the enemy population, and civilization must be preserved; good Armies instinctively understand this in their bones, as their true mission isn;t the extermination of the enemy, but the preservation of civilization. Total War is a descent into barbarism, or worse.
When the Five Rings Theory (and its ilk) are formally and finally ditched (or extensively revised to remove civilians and civilian infrastructure from targetting and destruction) and the Air Force is led once in a while by PJ's or SOF types, then I think that the Air Force will have really changed, in its institutional heart of hearts, and for the better.
Personally, I think that the Air Force should include the Airborne (I'm going to be shot dawn and hung at sunrise in some Airborne quarters after they read this - especially since I'm a leg), just as the Navy includes the Marines, and then the higher echelons of the Air Force might have more of an interest in, exposure to, and direct involvement with, land warfare in general and small wars in particular. I'd also give the CAS mission (except for the Air Force Airborne) and planes like the A-10 and its Air Observer variant, the excellent OA-10 to the Army; I'd also give (and this is what is just practice anyway) Strategic Air Defence to the Air Force (and let the Army concentrate on tactical and operational AD of Army ground forces).
Aside from the arch heresy of suggesting that Airborne forces should belong to the Air force, you have compounded the felony by suggesting -- nay, saying -- the Marine Corps is 'included' in the Navy. :mad:
Best advice I can give is avoid any patterns in your life style, have your land line telephone disconnected, change your cell phone, take different routes in all your travels... :D
I was under the influence; I didn't know what I was saying; These were statements made under duress; Please spare my life, I have so much to live for...!;)
As for the Marines, I meant that in terms that they are part of the Department of the Navy, not the US Navy proper; and if I may beg your pardon for continuing down this same path with regard to the Air Force and the Airborne, I would suggest (purely hypothetically of course, I'm thinking of Kurt Student and the Luftwaffe Paras here...) the same sort of relationship between the Department of the Air Force and the Airborne; there is no way even a leg like me would ever let the flyboys get their nice, soft, clean, pink hands on the tactical and day-to-day affairs of the Infantry (no 1st Allied Airborne Armies led by flyboys on my watch).
Returning to the matter at hand Ken...Please, PLEASE pardon me and spare my life... I am suffused with the inherent stupidity, arrogance, and inexperience that accompanies youth...I require the wisdom, correction, and firm guidance of my elders...Save me Obi Wan...!
I just realized we went from discussing "airmen" as the title of the thread to the Air Force as a whole.
I am indeed ancient, am long retarded and am almost excessively forgiving of youthful indiscretion such as thine. I long ago stopped trying to impart wisdom to anyone who does not seriously ask for such assistance -- even then, I'm rather careful; people tend to get dicey if your assistance is helpful because you knew something they didn't and if the assist wasn't helpful, they're even more irked. So, I'm not Obi and you're on your own. ;)
You also missed in suggesting I care, you really need to worry about those younger than yourself -- they're the ones who take that stuff really seriously... :D
I'm not so worried about some of them, if they're as young and dumb as me, it's the old and wise that scare me most. A GPMG and a Carl G laid on the driveway, some Claymores and Elsies out back (huh, Elsie mines are banned now - oops,) and a surprise inside waiting for those who make it to my door (two actually, I'll be hunkered down in the back of the beer store across the street when they arrive), and I just might get out of this alive...maybe.;)
Even if they do get to me, I'll still go down as the man who actually got the Air Force guys and the Airborne to come together and agree on something tactical. How often have you heard "Death From Above" and "Airborne!" shouted at the same time - in unison.:wry:
Uh, I'm really getting confused now with this pairing Airborne with USAF. In the late 70s and early 80s I served in the Air Force as a ROMAD. I went to Airborne training at Ft. Benning. My sister squadron was actually stationed at Pope AFB. I guess you can state my squadron was the second string. What I'm getting at is that all the planes I jumped out of were USAF and I was USAF so I don't know what you mean by joining the Airborne with the USAF. Also, PJ and Combat Controllers also go through Airborne training at Ft. Benning as well. The two airmen I went through jump school with went on and completed Air Assault school at Ft. Campbell as well. I think some of you guys have a distorted view on the Air Force. Like how many PJs have become chief of staffs. That is irrelevant. PJs are enlisted personnel. And I'm not just talking about enlisted USAF guys either. Take for example, the C123 that took down a Soviet helicopter by throwing large chains out of the back ramp at night over Loas. Some of you need to get out of the 1940s. The title of the thread refers to understanding airmen. Airmen in USAF company language are enlisted personnel. You are never going to get the 82nd Airborne Division to become a USAF Combat Wing if that is what you are driving at. so, I have heard "Death From Above" and "Airborne" in unison. They are both 82nd and 101st Airborne bravado. I think you're getting confused with "Death on Call". That is a CAS bravado.
Actually, Culpeper, these days the term "Airmen" is used by senior leadership in much the same way the Army is trying to use Solider or the USMC uses Marine. That's the language Dunlap is speaking, not airmen in terms of enlisted personnel. You see it in their doctrine as well...though it's not really "caught on" with the rank and file (or those below, say, O-6).
This ain't the 1970s Air Force....well...except for the new service dress coat.....
Ah, I get it now! Like the Army gave everyone a beret.
Hi Norfolk, sorry for the late reply but I actually agree with you about the Airborne and along the same lines as you were thinking (reference German Airborne forces). This concept was kicked around when they first came into being. They were going to be part of the Army Air Corps. Very similar to how the USMC used to be to the Navy.
Strongly disagree about Warden's rings. The main reason the Civillian population is listed in ring 4 is to either be on a No Strike list or to be a psy op or I/O target. If you can ever get a copy of the country X study by the Air Force it explains that in some detail.
I wonder why the Airborne wasn't hived off in 1947 to the Air Force. Maybe it was all those memories of AAF generals at 1st Allied Airborne Army. Yeah, when I look at how effective the Luftwaffe Airborne was (until semi- or untrained ground crews with no planes to service were transferred to the Para Divs), it makes me wonder why the US didn't follow, especially when the Air Force became independent (I sure hope Ken doesn't see this:wry:)
I breath a sigh of relief at your response, slapout. When I take an (uninformed) look at the Five Rings Theory and see stuff like civvie population and infrastructure there, it just brings up all the old imagery of Bomb 'Em Back to the Stone Age. Culpeper may be right then, that some of us may still be stuck in the 1940's (well, maybe a little bit...). And thanks for telling me about the Country X Study - I assume it may accessed at Maxwell.
When I look at the explanation for the five rings in terms of "system attributes," it seems to be a systems construct that entails targeting the entire system and those entities that provide a source of power; any of the five attributes or rings can and should be targeted simultaneously for the greatest effect (by lethal or non-lethal means). Theoretically, there are no caveats on the type of targeting for any particular ring...
Colonel John Warden, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century,” in Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, revised edition, Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E. Grinter, editors (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press) 1998, page 107.
Readers on this thread might also find this article of interest:
Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership in the Army and Air Force in the Winter 2005-06 edition of Parameters.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/P...r/mastroia.htm
Norfolk. You and Slapout are entitled to your erroneous -- heretical, even -- thoughts... ;)
You two might want to ponder the fact that Student was unusual and everyone isn't a Kurt Student; that even as sharp as he was, he had little to do with Eben Emael, possibly the greatest example of an economy of force special operation for many years; that he got shot by his own troopies in Holland; and that, after Crete, the Fallschirmjaeger were simply high skill light infantry; leg light infantry -- declining in skill (and elan) as the war went on and attrition took its toll and fighting under Army commanders...
You might also consider that the US Army really doesn't use its airborne forces at all well * and the Army's supposed to specialize in ground combat -- which is what airborne units do, ground combat -- the aircraft and the T-10s are just delivery efforts; trucks and tailgates, no more...
So if the Army can't use them well on the ground, you'll forgive me if I have little faith in the ability of the Air Force to properly employ them -- and yes, Louis Brereton assists me in that decision, so did William Momyer later and today so does Gregory Trebon... :wry:
* more often than not; there's been an occasional exception, Chief of Staff, Army dependent...
Ken, as ever you are right about how things would turn out in practice, no matter how good the theory or example to the contrary offered. It's a real disappointment to be brought back to earth and have to face the reality that as much as the Airborne may not be realizing its full potential in the Army, the Air Force could hardly be expected to do a better job.:(
I wonder why certain people have wanted to abolish the Marine Corps throughout its history. Now, why on earth would a newly established Air Force in 1947 want to take on the responsibility of training infantry and then look for volunteers to jump out of perfectly good airplanes? Yes, the Germans did have good paratroop divisions structured differently. And they got annillihated during the Battle of Normandy with their enemy's back to to the sea and their supply lines to their own backs. They were great at defending hedgerows. They were not so good on the offensive up against divisions with 80% replacements like the 30th and the 90th. And they certainly were no good with their peers on the other side jumping in amongst their midst: i.e. the 82nd All Americans and the 101st Screaming Eagles. You can't move them to another branch of service and expect the same espirit de corps. The opportunity cost far outweighs any practical reason. Simply putting a beret on any soldier's head doesn't make it so. Mattis explained this type of elitism to his Marines not too long ago and the same applied to the 82nd and the 101st in 1947...Quote:
I wonder why the Airborne wasn't hived off in 1947 to the Air Force.
Quote:
...For the mission's sake, our country's sake, and the sake of the men who carried the Division's colors in past battles — who fought for life and never lost their nerve — carry out your mission and keep your honor clean. Demonstrate to the world that there is 'No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy' than a U.S. Marine.
Dr. Jack, your are 100% correct. Not only that but it was 2 or 3 fridays ago when I was in Col. Warden's office and I heard his defintion of COG. "The switch that will turn the system off with the least amount of destruction because you know you will have to turn it back on when the war is over."
you and I both know they did okay under Luftwaffe command and real good under Army command. Rotterdam was a fair operation, Crete, even though they won, was a disaster for them; they never made another jump. :(
They later occasionally outperformed other Wehrmacht light infantry (but not the Gebirgsjaegers) under Army command in France, Italy and Holland. That decline in performance late in the war was due to putting non-jumpers in the units and just hanging the title on 'em -- an Air Force decision. :D
Hope all's going well. Been there. Fortunately mine worked out okay, she bounced back and is again meaner'n a Water Moccasin... :wry: