SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1)
In an effort to rope the other three threads together (Fundamentals of SFA, Plan, Train and Organize for SFA, SFA as an Individual Capability) I thought it’d be useful to start a thread on SFA as part of a campaign design where the objectives require a level of sustainable indigenous security capability and capacity in support of broader policy objectives.
I wanted to use an excerpt from Ralph Peter’s interview with GEN Petraeus because it gets to the issue of SFA as a developmental activity, and raises some significant issues with respect to campaign objectives and developmental timelines. I believe this idea supports the use of “design” in laying out the SFA LOE (Line of Effort), or LLOO (Logical Line of Effort) in Joint speak.
New York Post -May 19, 2009, Pg. 23 titled “Worried Warrior - Gen. Petraeus on US strategy”, by Ralph Peters
Quote:
Quote:
Post: As the commander of the US Central Command, you're the big-picture "strategy guy." Could you give readers a clear statement of our mission in Afghanistan?
Petraeus: The mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda and other transnational extremists. That's what it had become before the operations conducted in the wake of 9/11. Al Qaeda wants to carry out further attacks on the US and our allies, and we need to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks.
Quote:
Post: Can we get there from here?
Petraeus: We can, but it won't be easy. To accomplish our mission, we and our coalition and Afghan partners need to reverse the decline in security; develop Afghan forces that can shoulder the burden of security in their country over time; help establish governance that wins local support -- which means incorporating some traditional structures, and support the improvement of basic services for the Afghan people. This will be hard, but the mission's critical. As we used to say about Iraq: Hard is not hopeless.
While the objective of denying sanctuary to transnational extremists as a broad end lends itself to flexibility with respect to ways and means, Ralph Peter’s follow up question provides GEN Petraeus the opportunity to issue what sounds like CDR’s guidance on both ways and means – this is not new, but is illustrative for this thread.
I first had the opportunity to begin experimenting with design for SFA last year after I was exposed to it in UQ 2008 – it was then referred to as the Operational Design Process, which had been derived from Systemic Operational Design. We had a brief thread on it here. Later in 2008 I was given an opportunity to experiment with it again when JCISFA supported OSD PA&E SAC on the IW study and a Building Security Capacity excursion. While we were unable to do a full blown design due to resource constraints (to include my having a better knowledge of design), we were able to do a functional design that focused on determining requirements in light of conditions and objectives, and designing an operational approach.
Even with a reduced design process, the operational approach and requirements to enable that approach indicated a significant investment by the USG to achieve the policy objective, further it indicated that as conditions changed, and objectives were modified, so to the required capabilities would have to change.
Later we looked at other case studies and applied the design methodology to other experiments and have made similar results. To achieve policy ends in the types of scenarios where there is an obvious security vacuum of significant scale, where we have an interest to see it through, and where the enabling campaign objective is contingent on the ability of the foreign security force partner to generate, employ and sustain sufficient capability and capacity, requires a timeline that extends beyond the shelf life of any one president and probably multiple congresses. This could be in response to what has become an intolerable set of conditions for one or more parties just short of conflict or it could post conflict (not necessarily post U.S. conflict). I did not include the types of shaping activities which might mitigate or preclude conflict for two reasons; 1) there has not been allot of effort looking into that on the main stream experimentation side (we could do better here); 2) If things are A-OK and going our way, then scale is usually not the issue, and what passes for normal is usually good enough. This does not address the issue that often we miss or ignore when conditions change and require more or less effort, and then find ourselves facing the best of some bad choices.
If by using design we were able to identify what the requirements were for a given foreign security force that would support the overarching policy objective we could then walk the operational stepping stones backwards using the fundamentals of SFA. The SFA assessment methodology can be used to determine where the organizational gaps are in the FSF formations. The Operational Environment Assessment can be used to consider how the conditions affect the development and requirements of the FSF. The Institutional Assessment can be used to consider what DOTMLPF-P actions are required to make the FSF capable of generating, employing and sustaining itself. The operational framework can now be established because you have an understanding of what the FSF must be capable and have the capacity to do to support the policy end, and you have an understanding of where you believe them to be in terms of their development.
The SFA developmental tasks of Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise can then be aligned and adjusted to accomplish those intermediate FSF developmental objectives in support of the end. This is important because as the conditions and the objectives take shape the requirements will follow, and the requirements tell us what capabilities must be generated. This allows us to consider the demand signal in light of the needs of the operational requirements, and allows us to adapt our force generation processes in a proactive manner vs. a reactive one (provided the force employer is conducting continuous assessments and communicating that implications back to force generator).
SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 2)
If what GEN Petraeus articulated to Ralph Peters ref. Afghanistan were translated into a language of strategy (Slap, I concede there are more ways to look at it) it might look like this - end = deny sanctuary to X-national extremists, ways = Afghan Security Capability and Capacity, means = OTERA (SFA as a force employment concept). The LOE timeline would have to be laid out, but it would seem to be significant – although it may vary in terms of level of effort. I think design when applied this way may provide the level of understanding in terms of requirements and capabilities to guide policy, and help us align the broader generating force with the operating force. In addition to being more effective, I also think it would be more efficient as identifying capability requirements early keeps us more proactive then reactive, and as such would support keeping the numbers of individual augmentees much lower – which since they are largely drawn from the generating force would reduce the risk in that area, and keep our force generation systems operating at a higher level of output. This would support balance through flexibility.
As a follow on, and to a point John Fishel made on the SFA as an individual capability thread, it would also allow us to look at what capabilities are required outside of DoD. In example - if the objective requires a greater capacity of FSF then the partner is currently able to generate, employ and/or sustain what are the contingent developmental objectives that must occur outside the SFA LOEand who should do accomplish them? Looking forward, this may allow the USG to adjust its polices, authorities, programs and priorities to meet those capability requirements and as such avoid risk to the other policy ends it must consider.
SAMS at Fort Leavenworth is the home of design, and CAC has now mainstreamed design into Army doctrine. At JCISFA we are looking at how to incorporate design into our SFA planning documents and tools.
Best, Rob
A threat-centric approach only delays the inevitable
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
If what GEN Petraeus articulated to Ralph Peters ref. Afghanistan were translated into a language of strategy (Slap, I concede there are more ways to look at it) it might look like this - end = deny sanctuary to X-national extremists, ways = Afghan Security Capability and Capacity, means = OTERA (SFA as a force employment concept).
This better than most gets to what is probably the biggest rock in my craw about SFA: It is premised on this VERY VERY flawed equation being true.
If you have defined the problem incorrectly, no matter how terrific your answer is to flawed analysis, you will have to be very lucky indeed for it to achieve your intended effect.
This is a very Threat-Centric perspective. Build the capacity of host nation security forces to (presumably physically) deny sanctuary to extremists and you win. I can't think of a single historic example of where this has achieved more than just a temporal effect. One has to address underlying causes of such populace-based conflict in order to achieve an enduring effect. Security is a supporting effort.
I would offer as a far more effective strategic equation: End ="Good"* Afghan Governance free from perceptions of US legitimacy = vastly reduced US footprint with complete subjugation of remaining US military operations being in support of Afghan security forces = focus on development of afghan governance as main effort with at least a half of foreign assistance to that end coming from (hold your breath - )Iran.
Key is to understand that "good governance" as used by me does not mean "effective" on some objective measurement of services, but subjectively how the populace feels about the governance. Populaces will rise up in insurgency when they perceive a major problem that they also perceive that they have not legimate means to resolve. So, success does not come from massive efforts to "fix" governance and battalions of "metrics" gathers; instead it comes from addressing perceptions, polling populaces to understand and facilitate host nation efforts to address their concerns, and ensuring that reliable mechanisms to address grievances exist.
One can graph out every single populace's relationship with its respecitve government on a simple x-y graph; with "violence" on the y-axis and "poor governance" on the x-axis. Most would plot in a big scatter in the lower left hand corner, but trending upward on the violence scale as one moves outward on the poor governance scale. To take a country like afghanistan and simply suppress the insurgent without addressing the conditions of poor governance merely artifically moves it staight down on the y-axis without moving back on the x-axis. Once that artificial suppression is removed (take Yugoslavia, for example) the violence will rapidly shoot straight back up to a high level.
As an interesting side note:
from a recent Gallup poll conducted in Afghanistan:
Single Greatest Problem for Afghans today (open-ended answers):
1. The Economy (41%)
2. Unemployment (16%)
3. Security (12%)
4. Rising and high living costs since international community presence (8.5%)
Lack of Leadership Alternatives:
Most Trusted Person in Afghanistan:
1. Karzai (25%)
2. No one (22%)
3. Ramazan Bashardost (7%)
4. Younus Qanoni (7%)
5. Ali Ahmad Jalali (6%)
Most desirable election outcome:
Who should be in charge of Afghanistan?:
1. New government (53%)
2. Foreign Forces NATO/ISAF (26%)
3. Present Government (10%)
4. Other (5%)
5. Clerics (1%)
6. Taliban (1%)
Importance and Popularity of Iran
How important for Afghanistan is a strong relationship with ____ country?
1. Iran (59%)
2. US (50%)
3. India & Pakistan (both on 45%)
Which country do you feel closest to? (open-ended answers):
- 41% of all responses put Iran as most admired country
- 62% have family connections in Iran
- 35% of Afghans would move to Iran as their first-choice destination
Role of the Taliban:
Is the Taliban having a negative effect on the country?
- Yes: 78%
Is Pakistan supporting the Taliban?
- Yes: 53%
US approval Rating:
- Even Split: 48% approve ; 48% disapprove
Good post, Marc. While I agree in part with Bob and with you,
One thought might bear a deeper look...
I agree generally with your three post-Crimean things but strongly believe that in the US the threat need not be that credible for most; the ability to hurt us is subject to many vagaries; and -- define 'hurt.'
We don't categorize that easily. I know many that would subscribe totally to your descriptions; I know as many or quite probably more who don't need those things. We're a rather belligerent crew for the most part...
That said, there's no question in my mind that domestic politics drive our wars nor is there any question that the recent ones have seen what you say postulated or used by the whoever was in charge (to one degree or another and even if very flakily for the last few Presidents...). So I agree that's been the method here -- I just do not agree that, for the US, going to war absolutely requires those things.
Bob's world asks a good question:
Quote:
"Remember when the use of military force by the US was a rare and very big deal?"
His answer is also good -- most American do not remember such a time.
This probably is not a good place for my anti Goldwater-Nichols rant...
No matter where you are at, that is where you are - Buckaroo Banzai
Marc said:
Quote:
First off, a great discussion even if it's not exactly what Rob was hoping for .
I've always thought the thread must go where the thread goes - and that it is not a bad thing. Most of the time the discussions circle around because there was some point in the initial posts that sparked the wandering. Its kind of like collective cogitating:D - its healthy.
Ken made a point that has been on my mind of late - how long before we can't remember when we were not at war? We're fast approaching a decade of war - the pursuit of policy by other means does not lend itself well to being labled as "contingency operations abroad"
The SECDEF and the CJCS (and many other senior leaders) have made it a point to attempt to shape expectations in public speech by saying both we've got a significant way to go in both Iraq and particularly Afghanistan, that we should expect things to get harder in Afghansitan now that we are significantly investing more in the outcome, and that due to global conditions and our interests we will likely see more conflict on the horizon. I'm not sure that their efforts have really sunk in - anywhere.
With respect to SFA (which is one of the things I'm get paid to think about), what does this mean? I've been reading the thread started by Capt Diaz on supporting the development of an Iraqi Marine Corps (although perhaps with a more limited mission than our own) and I'm thinking - there is a significant capability that may have less to do with COIN and more with respect to protecting Iraqi interests in the Gulf, and possibly even protecting their interests abroad against piracy. Certainly the conventional capabilities that are brought to the Iraqi military with F-16s and M1s, while both have been useful in COIN, are also of great value beyond COIN (I think any good FW MR platform and MBT would indicate this). These efforts also don't absolve us from current SFA efforts in building IA, IP, NP and other ISF to combat their internal threats (and those who sponsor and support them) - I submit we'll be there in significant capacity for some time, although increasingly on the terms of the HN govt.
In Afghanistan the USG and the Afghan leadership recently estimated that they needed double the number of indigenous secuirty forces...The number of what was it 400K was significant, however think about what those numbers mean in Afghanistan in particular where the conditions (many of the cultural ones that Marc outlined & just the sheer geography of the place) are not necessarily going to facillitate moving the FSF to become competent, confident, committed, and capable. I submit this will feel like an enduring effort and may well extend beyond the current administration, even if there is a second term. Ken is right, the influence of domestic politics, or a reaction to some new crisis could change that, however just consider it.
For a member joining the US military right now who intends to make it a 20 year event, 1/2 of their shelf life will be spent at war. Several more national security strategies may be written at war, several QDRs will pass at war - already our "futures" experimentation can not escape the influence of our current fight, and I suppose the list goes on about things that will happen at war. I've not included the other events that may occur as a result of terrorism - that being the use or threat of violence to influence a political outcome vs. a man made disaster which would seem to divorce it from the influence of politics. I've not included the many other reasons wrt fear, honor and interests which might require the use of military force or forces to secure an end - I've really just covered a couple of the major efforts under way - I did not talk about HOA or OEF-P or the countless number of other things that are capturing our attention
If there is a chance that through use of design we can better identify the correct problem, consider the range of possible outcomes, capture the requirements and align our DOTMLPF policies and programs to be more effective, perhaps we can: better support the operational commanders; reduce risk to the policy objective; and through effectiveness we can reduce risk to those Title 10 functions (man, equip, etc.) we are seeing stressed form almost a decade of war with no designated hour in which we will not be at war.
This really is a good discussion, regardless of where it goes - and as I've said in other places its through the tension of discourse we really learn.
Best, Rob
"The Cause" and "Causation" are very separate animals
Quote:
Originally Posted by
slapout9
Well sh..t,where do I start. Bob's World, What causes the cause? A person, and a person always has a motive. Until you understand that you can not prepare a Strategy to succeed. Not only that but you must have a good counter-motive to gain support for your side of things. So your objective should be to de-motivate the insurgency population(focus on their leadership). From there you can look for opportunities and select your methods. And Security Force Operations would have to play a big part in that in order to allow some type of civilized transition.
Ok, what do I mean by that? I think one good example lies within the American Revolution. Arguably one could state that "The Cause" was independence from England.
But what caused this diverse collection of colonies to unite to this common and dangerous end? Certainly there were motivating factors, such as the works of Thomas Paine, or the events in the Massachusetts Colony. But before that, what factors of causation were at work that allowed such words and actions to move a collection of individual people, and individual colonies to move as a body to throw off British rule?
I believe there are many sources of causation. One major one in this case was the simple fact that British citizens who lived in England looked down upon British citizens who lived in the colonies as somehow inferior. From what I have read this was taken as (if anyone would have even thought to ask) "of course they are inferior!" in England. But in the colonies, be it a man of means, education, and accomplishment like George Washington, denied admission to the British Regular Army due to his "status"; or a simple farmer, owning and working a plot of land that may well have qualified him for some minor title back in England; saw this as an outrage. And upon such festering sores of causation fell the cold slaps of motivation. And an insurgency is born. First of words, and then of works.
England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.
But then, Kings don't do that, do they. Wouldn't be proper.
Back after a couple of days of insanity...
Hi Folks,
Sorry for the delay in responding, but the past couple od days have been nuts!
Rob, I think you're right that the Hessians where not SFA per se, although if I remember correctly (the book I got this from years ago isn't available), they were involved in some training or, at least, cadre activities for Loyalist militia units.
Bob's World made an interesting point:
Quote:
England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.
Just as a matter of historical fact, the King couldn't do this.... at least in practice; this was a matter for Parliament. On the issue of 2nd (or 3rd!) class citizens, you are pretty much correct, but I'm not sure how important that actually was. A ket emotional motivator, surely, but a primary cause? Hmmm, I don't think so. BTW, the reason why I say that is that there is the rather complex example of Quebec not revolting during that time.
Where I think there are immediate lessons we can pick up is in the structures of governance; they also become crucial when we look at Upper and Lower Canada in the 19th century and, also, latter on in the other colonies that become Dominions. The evolution of socio-political thinking around governance in the 19th century, at least in Britain and the Empire, is truly fascinating - a model that really fits the currently trendy phrase of "Think Globally, Act Locally".
Part of the reason why I like to go back to the American Revolution / War of Independance is that it is one of the earliest and, in some ways, a prototype for, later revolutionary movements. We can see, at least in seed form, many of the later developments that, strangely enough, we are still struggling with: mass produced, local media (aka cheap printing presses), guerilla warfare, terrorist tactics (on all sides), and perhaps most importantly, the key to winning the conflict - it's centre of gravity - lying outside the theatre of operations (London and, to a lesser extent, Paris - shades of the Cold War!).
So, let me toss out a question.... In terms of SFA/FID operations, how would people classify (or conceive of) the French activities in that war?
Take a step back, take a deep breath ...
have a Bud Light (I'll join you virtually with a Bud high-test) - and reconsider the following statement in terms of the legal relationships (yup, I'm asking you to put on your lawyer's coif and put the green one in an honored position next to the Bud Light):
Quote:
from BW
As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA. If anything it was UW. The American populace broke into two camps: Loyalists and Rebels. He who is the current legitimate government and works with the loyalist populace is conducting FID/SFA. He who is the outsider seeking to influence the revolution to support his own selfish ends is conducting UW. France conducted UW. England conducted FID/SFA.
Consider:
1. Legal relationship between the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists (whose pre-rev governments still existed, albeit with some in exile) - as viewed by the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists.
2. Legal relationship between the French Crown and the Continental Congress (starting with our beloved Declaration of Independence - although you and I have different takes on its present uses; but more importantly, the relationship after the Battle of Saratoga) - as viewed by the French Crown and the Continental Congress.
After some consideration of the above, you should conclude that Ken is closer to the mark than you are. In short, you can have two conflicting, but valid, legal (and political) views driving an armed conflict.
I am in the process of reading (half-way through; and subject to many side-tracks) George O. Trevelyan, The American Revolution (1899; yes, the last year of the 1800s), which presents the Brit legal and political views of that conflict (biased toward the Whigs, e.g., Burke & Fox); as well as the Loyalist and Rebel views. Great insight (IMO).
The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.
A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?
So far (still only half there), Trevelyan suggests that George III and his ministers never got beyond version 1.
BTW: interesting trivia from Trevelyan - did you all know that many of the Brit generals in the Revolutionary War were also MPs ?
This Colonel-ly solidarity has got to cease
or we'll get nothing done... :D
Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what... :wry:
More importantly, as JMM noted:
Quote:
"The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict."
Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.
Until the Department of Defense was created... ;)
"unconventional" describes the stratagem, not the tactics...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
or we'll get nothing done... :D
Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what... :wry:
More importantly, as JMM noted:Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.
Until the Department of Defense was created... ;)
"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."
In other words, the organization conducting UW (the French in the American Revolution with the Rebels, or the British in the American Revolution with the Indians, or the Americans in GWOT with the Northern Alliance, etc) may act VERY conventionally themselves, as may the force they are manipulating to serve their mutual objectives.
The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.
This doesn't look much like UW to me ...
"5.1 France and Great Britain on the Eve of American Independence" - at the end, but it did start that way with Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co (the $2000 suit folks).
But then came Saratoga and French recognition of the new nation-state and its government:
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The Continental Army put Beaumarchais' supplies to good use. The defeat of General Johnny Burgoyne and his army on October 17, 1777, to Horatio Gates at Saratoga, was a major turning point in the American Revolutionary War. It was won by American soldiers, even if 90% of the gunpowder used had been supplied by and paid for by France, and was used in French M 1763-66 pattern (Charleville) muskets, which by then had become standard in the Continental Army. The victory at Saratoga proved to the French that the American rebellion could be sustained with a possibility of success.
News of Burgoyne's capitulation reached Paris in the evening of December 4, 1777; on the 17th Vergennes promised to recognize the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, with or without Spanish support. On January 30, the king authorized the Secrétaire du Conseil d'Etat Conrad Alexandre Gérard to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and a secret Treaty of Alliance on his behalf. On February 6, 1778,Gérard carried out the order and Deane, Franklin, and Lee signed for the United States.
By these treaties, France offered "to maintain … the liberty, sovereignty, and independence" of the United States in case of war between her and Great Britain. France promised to fight on until the independence of the United States was guaranteed in a peace treaty. All the United States had to do in exchange was not "conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained.
Not unlike Astan (USSR 1979- & US 2001-) in these respects: UW > new govt > CW. The last type of warfare turned out rather badly for the Sovs.
And looking back, by the time the French assistance, whether conventional or unconventional, had ended, France had spent livres 1,000,000,000; and was on its way to bankruptcy and the French Revolution (hmm ... similar to the USSR).
Are there some lessons for today ?
Final thought:
Since it is Memorial Day, we might want to remember the French sailors and soldiers, whether conventional or unconventional, who made the difference at Yorktown. All in the same boat together - colonialement. :)
Quote:
(from above link)
From Yorktown's ruins, ranked and still,
Two lines stretch far o'er vale and hill:
Who curbs his steed at head of one?
Hark! The low murmur: WASHINGTON!
Who bends his keen approving glance
Where down the gorgeous line of France
Shine knightly star and plume of snow?
Thou too art victor, ROCHAMBEAU!
John Greenleaf Whittier
PS: Tyrrell, somewhere (in looking at my wife's genealogy), I have William Johnson as part of the Ulster Shane O'Neills (Shane = John). If you have anything on that, drop me a PM. And, BTW, my ancestor Nick (Aubry dit Francoeur) also squared off against Johnson's troops in 1755 - Baron Dieskau's Defeat at Lake George. You won that one; but we took the Windmill.
Wow, thank you so much for that tutorial
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."
Boy, I sure wish I'd learned all that stuff somewhere...:rolleyes:
Quote:
The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.
Given the fact that I did the SF thing probably about the time you were born, good to know things haven't changed in that sphere. :D
I'll yet again point out that the issue to me is who got who to do what dirty work. As Tom says, I was painting that stuff on cave walls long ago -- and I distinctly recall that we in the form of Silas Deane and Ben Franklin conned -er, persuaded, Vergennes to convince a reluctant Louis and even more reluctant French Navy that even though there was a massive risk to France due to an already overburdened treasury the potential of an alliance of France, Spain and the new nation could offset British Naval superiority. An idea we had absolutely no intention of honoring.
So. Using your elastic definition was the UW practitioner France -- or the nascent US??? ;)
I don't know - I think we're mixing missions and concepts of employment
Bob's World wrote:
Quote:
Our problem is we're like a mechanic who fixed an engine using three particular wrenches, they aren't doing the job on a couple of cars that just came into the lot. Someone said "have you tried this new SFA wrench? It looks just like the FID wrench your holding there, but its very different and sure to work." So you get all excited and go back to wrenching away at the engine now with this new tool worked into the mix.
If it comes down to confusing FID with SFA ala wrenches, then I think we're missing the point. Recently some folks came up to participate in a BCBL experiment with the guidance " when someone says SFA you say FID", after we were done they understood that when FID is called for as a mission based on its definition - then call it FID. FID is still a very useful construct.
If we are going to use this analogy, then SFA might better be described as the range of sockets for building sustainable security forces capability and capacities with the missions and authorities as the wrench - and at least with respect to our policy objectives - the USG as the head mechanic. In this analogy - you may or may not own the garage, but you are sure to have to work on many types and makes of vehicles, and under a variety of conditions - as such SFA is about having the right tool(s) available at the right time. FID is still very relevant as a policy tool when the objectives and conditions require it as a mission - as such it might be considered in this analogy as the way the mechanic works on the car, or the end his work supports .
We may just have to agree to disagree - which is OK - ultimately the distinction matters far less then being able to fully meet the operational requirements in this area, and there is more preventing us from doing that then just terminology.
Best, Rob
PS- JMM - good stuff on Laura Secord - I got interested in her after I heard her story. The Canadian perspective on North American military history is one we don't get much of down here.