Techcentricity and todays Armed Forces
Although it is often bantered about throughout other threads it does seem like the differing approaches as to what part and how heavily technology should or shouldn't be used in military contexts is a matter of much concern too many. So in order to start the ball rolling I submit the following.
If it ain't broke don't fix it. If its broke then ANYthing which might help to fix it should be at a minimum considered. Technology is found in every facet of western existance today and as such cannot and will not be left out of most if not almost all newer processes and/or procedures. The fact that so often price is overly high would seem to be more a problem of competetive markets and presidence than necessarily the cost itself.
As with any product anything produced will come with its own service requirements and as such costs go up. But i would ask if thats really the concern of most. Probably not. It seems like more often than not the concern is that things which need not be difficult would be made more so by the technological shifts. Or that overdependance on a given tool might all in all take away from abilities that otherwise would be considered mandatory. Training suffers because the puter does this, this, and this, so all I have to do is this.ETC
How about we take it more in the context of automobiles.
A-B in ???? min
Horse and carriage
Model T
BMW
They do the same thing, serve the same purposes but in a much more proficient, effective manner, and generally speaking for about the same relative prices.
Do I think Technology is over depended on most definately.
I do think it would be nice though if we could spend more time explaining exactly when, and in what areas, and why or why not.
Now hiding under my desk awaiting incoming.
(Maybe Ill get lucky and theyll use the reg kind which will blow up before it gets all the way down to me;))
I'm part of the problem..
shown by my suggestion of alternate technology centered alternatives to Co/Bat UAVs. Training and unit structure are the other two big alternatives to the UAV answer. Infantry spends a lot of time on "move into contact" drills, "react to ambush" drills and defensive positions (i.e. range cards and clear fire zones) and very little on how to gather and process information. The infantry is a great tool for intelligence gathering and the skill should not be limited to "scouts". Hopefully somebody else on this board understands what I am trying to say and can write it more coherently.
Reed
Tech is tech and people are people.
Melding the two for productivity is the problem. Anecdote alert! The army was just getting to the point that a letter with typos could be sent with a couple of pen corrections to not waste time on retyping when the Word Processor hit. Immediatetly, pen corrections were no longer acceptable because "It's in the computer..." Two hundred years of progress destroyed by technology... :wry:
The integration of technology is in part driven by who ever's in charge of the issue at the time; if he or she sees a piece of technology as a solution to a problem (real or perceived), then we buy and try to figure out how to make it work. Others may not see the problem in the same way...
My beef is not with the technology or the integration of it into warfighting, I'm all for that, the more the better. Rather it is with the drive to pursue technological solutions to training shortfalls. Simple example; GPS meant that map use and land navigation no longer need be taught. Yes, that's a massive overstatement made to drill the point home but on a lesser level, it effectively occurred initially -- then it was realized that was not a good idea. My contention is that the cognitive skill of maps and navigation are not that easy to teach (unless you do it right, which we do not always do...), that the institutional teachers didn't get great pass rates and thus the system looked for a solution. Voila -- GPS. Fortunately, we figured out it wasn't the perfect answer but we continually strive to replace training time with an equipment fix.
We buy a lot of stuff then try to figure out how to use it...
Nah, you're part of the solution...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
reed11b
shown by my suggestion of alternate technology centered alternatives to Co/Bat UAVs. Training and unit structure are the other two big alternatives to the UAV answer. Infantry spends a lot of time on "move into contact" drills, "react to ambush" drills and defensive positions (i.e. range cards and clear fire zones) and very little on how to gather and process information. The infantry is a great tool for intelligence gathering and the skill should not be limited to "scouts". Hopefully somebody else on this board understands what I am trying to say and can write it more coherently.
Reed
Can't do it more coherently, that's more than coherent enough -- but I can add that the Grunt and front line Tanker and FO/FIST are the best combat intel tools around -- yet, people nowadays are almost universally ignored for a technological solution.
Years ago, my son was in a LRS unit in Germany; on a Reforger exercise he and his team spotted a bunch of OpFor Leopards and reported them. The Corps G2 said "Nay, not so -- the satellite doesn't show them." Heated argument ensued. Fred Franks opted to go with the grunts (over many objections) and plopped a Lance in on the tracks. Umpires called it a major kill. So the Good guys won -- but it could just as easily have gone the other way. Tech is good. Absolute faith in it is bad.
Grunts can provide more and better info than any satellite -- or UAV/UGV.
You're correct in that we do not train that aspect nearly as well as we should (and that we waste a lot of time teaching esoteric BS...). Nor do we train the Officers and the Intel types on the value that 11B can offer...
Good point; excellent point in fact.
Couldn't agree more. Thank god for switches on radios.
'Nother LRS tale. They decided to issue digital cameras so that the guys could take pictures while on missions and uplink them to the CP. Amazing how many of those things got damaged on parachute jumps until they decided to not pursue the idea...:D
If we let the tech guys run the Army
A few years ago I was at Ft. Benning for a conference, during my stay I was introduced to the Land Warrior system. At that point in time the system ran off two 5590 batteries (the big radio batteries). I immediately started thinking the logistical nightmare. Three squads x nine men each = 27, add seven man weapons squad 27+7=34, plus PL, PSG, and RTO 34+3=37. 37 personnel times 2 batteries each 74 batteries for one platoon. How in the world would we support these things logistically? I told the proponent immediately it wasn't going to work, who thought of this thing? I got some seriously evil looks but my point was made. What truely saddens me about this is a couple of months ago watching a show about the latest and greatest with all the little robots and UAVs I wonder when are we going to learn our lesson. If I was still in the Infantry I would now be losing shooters to be robot operators, UAV operators and who knows what else.
Instead of making soldiers physically stronger we look to technology for answers. Can anyone say exoskeleton?
I have to wonder if those much higher up have become such arm chair quaterbacks that they no longer trust those on the ground. Treat someone a certain way long enough and they start to become that. If soldiers are taught from the beginning to make the right decisions, think through things, and give the ability to do so, they will be prepared to make decisions on the ground. Many of you who have read my posts before know I am a strong advocate of the basics. If I can do it with nothing then when I have technology to assist me I can do it that much better.
Finally we have to come up with a way to recycle (for lack of a better word) our technology. As smaller, better equipment replace generation 1, 2 or whatever we have to have a system in place to turn in the older equipment. Prime example is the PVS-4, I tried for years to get them turned in and off the books, in order to do this we had to have every single component, but the components were no longer in the system for us to order, more red tape.
Tech, Tools and the Fight
Truth in Lending Alert - I am now a tech developer for the DoD. I was also an 11C who could use the plotting board faster than our best Mortar Ballistic Computer
What we found in developing systems for the end users in Iraq and Afghanistan was the many systems developers built in a silo and a vacuum. We found that many folks were working to develop systems which met very specific needs and individually did a poor job of working with the other systems in the battlespace. C2 systems not communicating with Intel. Log systems not communicating in real time with other Log systems. Conversely, development in a vacuum delivers the battery scenario above, where the soldier has to take out ammo to carry batteries.
This is made worse by the "drive-by" fielding. I was sitting in a TOC with a Brigade at JRTC talking with their S-6. He pointed to a box in the corner, and explained that some a--hole pulled up in a pick up truck and said "sign here". It was a "new system" and they would be trained "soon". And so it sat there three days later. I don't know if they ever packed it for war.
However, in looking down the road, the systems developers and the program managers seem to have really turned a corner in the past two years. PM Battle Command who develop many of the C2 systems really seem to get it in general. They are focused on delivering quality which meets the needs of the targeted audiences (from the ground trooper to the commanding general.)
I do see the challenge in the coming years being transition of mindsets. The tools that are forecasted, if they come to fruition, will create a shift in behavior. For example, if the platoon sergeant on the ground doesn't have to spend his time chasing down personnel status reports, and the company commander doesn't have to worry about his maintenance status because it is populated "automagically", then our warriors can spend more time on other "more important" things, like rehearsals, marksmanship, land nav, and family time.
If our warfighters fail or refuse to use the tools provided, then the issue is inadequate information to be of value to anyone. Again, anecdote alert (x 2)
- I was talking with someone about uparmored HMMWVs when this was a huge issue a few years ago (the fact that the front lines didn't have enough.) The word I got was that somewhere in the Pentagon G-4 there was parking lot of M1114's ready for deployment, but the reports from Iraq were so inconsistent with regard to property book accounting, that nobody knew where to ship them. A huge disconnect between company command and echelons above reality.
- In speaking with an ORSA Major for a major division, she informed me that her experience on reporting data was two fold - British soldiers at the lowest level would simply make up answers to questions because they wanted to keep their command happy; US soldiers at the same level would simply ignore the request for information. My point is that because we ask our soldiers for so much info on the digital battlefield, our leadership needs to hone these interrogatives into bite-sized chunks, and then we need to show the ground force the value of their response. Because of these behaviors today however, no one can accurately account for how many small arms attacks we had last month, because so many will go unreported by soldiers at the bottom who are numb to threats taking pot shots.
If we can change behavior and provide tools which really meet the warrior need, we can give them more time to worry about watching their sector, and less time worrying about the last oil change their HMMWV got.
I'm with Entropy on this Issue
I think Entropy is on target with respect to his comments concerning technology. I will only add a little to what he already expresses.
When I was still in the Marine Corps, my Marines and I suffered through this painful process of serving technology, vice technology serving us on numerous occassions.
This misfocus caused warfighting skills to atrophy. Misfocus kills. Misfocus kills because service members in harms way find they do not know how to quickly adapt to a combat environment because the baseline references to operate with an infantryman mindset are lost once people depart from basic training; sustainment training is set aside to follow gadgets and develop new systems when time should be focused on studying the nature of the fight, language training, anthropological and infrastructural studies of the threat environment via the use of sophisticated technologies.
Once service members deploy in theater, they lose access to bandwidth, technologies do not hold up well in indigenous weather/environmental conditions, and I spend more time maintaining the system than reading the enemy. This is ludicrous. Machines should serve me, not the other way around.
This frustration lead me to become an ardent follower of the late Colonel John Boyd when he stated the priority in preparing and execution of war lies in "people, ideas and hardware" in that order.
Warfare is about people. Warfare is about weaponizing time and space; the weaponization of time and space is best prosecuted by those who make the most effective timely decisions utilizing a tool/model known as the "Boyd Cycle" or "OODA LOOP". We need people of all ranks to be able to make rapid/effective decisions in a time of crisis. This requires increased investment in the human mind in the form of language training, cultural training, free play exercises employing technologies and w/out technologies since our adversaries know the U.S. has the technological edge and evade/exploit their gaps. General Van Riper did this in Millenium Challenge 02 and this shut down the tech based exercise. One can read more about it here... http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/ne...0906-iraq1.htm . For those interested in learning how other countries see they can fight us best read "Unrestricted Warfare" via this link... http://www.terrorism.com/documents/T...restricted.pdf
Thank you for making a post regarding this subject and allowing people, like myself, to respond.
Cheers and Semper fi, Bob
And in an effort to get back on track here
What does technology offer and in what context should it be approached.
Strength - Ability to do more, lift more, go further, protect better, maintain strength levels longer
Training - Bring training to areas where it might not normally be available on as large a scale, Reenforcement of basic drills through repetitive actions while conserving the amount of supplies necessary to do so, Develop teambuilding skillsets through interactive training, further develop finite skillsets in more technical arenas, more expansive incorporation of education into training thus hopefully encouraging (how to think vs what to think)
Communication - Ability to facilitate communications and associated operations on a much larger scale and more efficiently, Ability to monitor, disseminate, and discuss areas of consideration more swiftly and with less limitations on who is able to take part.
Speed - Achieve a variety of operations, movements, training, logistics, infrastructure considerations, more mobility in more types of environments.
Intelligence - More information, more digestable or able to be sifted through more quickly, faster recognition of possible actionable intelligence, wider audience through which to filter information for bad leads, simplification of decision making processes( note: not decisions themselves), enable more effective recognition of trends(this is very touchy stuff to those here:wry:)
All of these areas are examples of the thought processes which bring us the technologies we see. Where do the lines need to be drawn on which ones and in what ways they become more counter-productive than productive?
PS: I think EVERYONE is pretty much in agreement that the future cannot be predicted so that can probably be put aside for this particular thread.
Possibilities, Probabilities, Trends, Past is prologue; Great; Prediction better left to the card reader at the circus:D