Watching the IDF (catch all)
Quote:
Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs
Jerusalem Viewpoints
No. 514 8 Adar 5764 / 1 March 2004
ISRAEL'S SECURITY DOCTRINE AND
THE TRAP OF "LIMITED CONFLICT"
Colonel (Res.) Yehuda Wegman
The many classic examples of low-intensity conflict - in Indo-China, Malaya, Algeria, Cuba, and Northern Ireland - are irrelevant to the case of Israel. Not a single citizen in Britain, France, or the United States had his daily routine in his native country disrupted as a result of the low-intensity combat conducted by his country's army on a foreign battlefield.
The guerilla and terror actions in Vietnam, Algeria, Ireland, Rhodesia, and other places were not directed against the very existence of the rival nation and its army.
Something about the Western response to a strike on its population centers can be learned from the American reaction to 9/11, with its military operation directed at the heart of Afghanistan as the sender of terror. In this case, the doctrine of limited conflict was cast aside, as the "strong" side under attack undertook to summarily obliterate the "weak" attacker in accordance with the laws of war.
I have a few questions that I'd like more expert knowledge on.
1. Does classic counterinsurgency doctrine apply in the case of Israel?
2. What do you think of Israel's current strategy, is it working or not?
3. What mistakes are Israel making?
I'd only like short answers, but if you want to expand then feel free.
Thanks
Hearts and minds of bigots
Israel is not going to be able to get a hearts and minds campaign going among the Palestinians. They are a people whose minds have been poisoned on a combination of religious bigotry and ethnic hatred, fortified by a real estate worshipping death cult mentality. This makes the classic counterinsurgency strategy unavailable. Israel has responded by attempting to isolate rather than work with the Palestinians in recent years.
Prospects for an agreement are remote because the Palestinians have nothing to offer the Israelis. The Palestinian Authority can't offer peace for land, becuase it can't deliver peace. It cannot or will not control those who want to explode around Israelis.
While the Israeli economy has suffered from the conflict, the Palestinian's economy has cratered into a true begger status where its "goverment" is scrambing to find donors to pay its police. That is not too surprising when hate and victimization appear to be their main commerce. One reason why this status exist if the 50 plus years of dependency on charity from the UN and others, which has subsidized their war against Israel. Without the subsidies they would have been forced to create a real economy with real jobs instead of haveing a fourth of the male population employed by the "security forces." Can you imagine the size of the US military and police force of a fourth of our population was so employed?
Israel and the Palestinians
I think there are some major differences. I would first note that the million or so Palestinians who live in Israel as oppose to the territories, rarely explode and kill Israelis. The Israelis target people who are hostile threats while the Palestinians target non combatants. That they cannot tell the difference suggest that they are blinded by their bigotry and strike out at "the other." indiscriminately. The Hamas death cult is clearly an organization of bigots. When faced with that kind of hostility it would not be surprising that the Israelis would hold them in low regard, just as we held the Japanese and Germans in low regard during World War II, but it cannot be argued that we were on the same moral plane with our enemies.
Israel's Security Doctrine
For what it's worth, Israel's security doctrine appears to call for:
1) Physical separation from Gaza and the West Bank. This is a recent phenomenon, but one that has been fairly effective in reducing internal attacks.
2) Negotiation with various Palestinian entities. This has proceeded largely without results, as we are all aware.
3) Gradual displacement of the Palestinian civilian population. A controversial strategy - not officially pursued by the government at this time. Frequently undertaken by rogue Israeli citizens, with various governments cracking down or turning a blind eye depending upon the current political climate.
4) Retaliation. Not merely military, Israel frequently closes off whole towns to outside access for days at a time. Israel also controls a large portion of the Palestinian Authority budget and other "levers." Certain air strikes and other kinetic operations have been used for this purpose.
5) Limited kinetic operations. "Targeted killings," raids and other operations designed to attack armed enemies directly.
6) Intensive internal security measures. Israel has armed guards posted at shopping malls, along with the world's toughest airport security. A wide aray of checkpoints control movement and commerce throughout the West Bank and Gaza, as well.
Israel's strategy is limited by a number of "non military" considerations. First of all, the West Bank is home to a population of 2.5 million Palestinians (per the CIA World Factbook). It would take 50,000 soldiers in formed combat units to provide the "optimal" ratio of 1 soldier per 50 civilians. This would be just under 1% of Israel's population - for the US to field an equivalent force would require 2.5 million soldiers. Given the existing bad blood and mistrust on both sides (without taking a moral stand either way, simply noting that there are hard feelings here) this would be a very long and difficult operation, involving many casualties on all sides. Israel cannot support such a move economically. Their citizenry will not permit the many casualties that would result. Tel Aviv's unstable, coalition driven governments likely couldn't affect either situation. Additionally, intesnive international scrutiny would be brought to bear. Finally, Israel's neighbors are all Arab countries who would be seriously threatened by such a military expansion, regardless of the motives. In addition to state sponsorship of Palestinian factions, the governments of Lebannon and Syria are both sufficiently corrupt and/or weak that independent actors within those nations would supply considerable outside help.
Given that confluence of factors, a "traditional" counter insurgency will not be sustainable. That is not to say that it would not be effective. Both Israelis and Palestinians are human beings - war is a part of the human condition. Regardless of the brutality, uncivilized tactics or sheer emotion on all sides - the principles of war apply without consideration of the merits of the parties.
So that leaves an interesting question: what can Israel do? I believe the most effective course of action for Tel Aviv is continued withdrawal from occupied portions of the West Bank, and a continuing effort to shore up on or another Palestinian faction. Not only as a fighting force, but as an agency that can deliver governmental services, health and welfare to the Palestinian people with pride and dignity. Such a group does not exist as such, but it might draw considerable support. Given time, it could displace the armed factions in terms of popular legitimacy and ultimately be in a position to negotiate a mutually beneficial relationship with Tel Aviv.
On the Issue of Palestinians in Israel and Demographics
Quote:
Ingathering
Ilan Pappe on the Israeli election and the 'demographic problem'
From left to right, the manifestos of all the Zionist parties during the recent Israeli election campaign contained policies which they claimed would counter the ‘demographic problem’ posed by the Palestinian presence in Israel. Ariel Sharon proposed the pull-out from Gaza as the best solution to it; the leaders of the Labour Party endorsed the wall because they believed it was the best way of limiting the number of Palestinians inside Israel. Extra-parliamentary groups, too, such as the Geneva Accord movement, Peace Now, the Council for Peace and Security, Ami Ayalon’s Census group and the Mizrachi Democratic Rainbow all claim to know how to tackle it.
Apart from the ten members of the Palestinian parties and two eccentric Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox Jews, all the members of the new Knesset (there are 120 in all) arrived promising that their magic formulae would solve the ‘demographic problem’. The means varied from reducing Israeli control over the Occupied Territories – in fact, the plans put forward by Labour, Kadima, Shas (the Sephardic Orthodox party) and Gil (the pensioners’ party) would involve Israeli withdrawal from only 50 per cent of these territories – to more drastic action. Right-wing parties such as Yisrael Beytenu, the Russian ethnic party of Avigdor Liberman, and the religious parties argued for a voluntary transfer of Palestinians to the West Bank. In short, the Zionist answer is to reduce the problem either by giving up territory or by shrinking the ‘problematic’ population group.
None of this is new. The population problem was identified as the major obstacle in the way of Zionist fulfilment in the late 19th century, and David Ben-Gurion said in December 1947 that ‘there can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60 per cent.’ Israel, he warned on the same occasion, would have to deal with this ‘severe’ problem with ‘a new approach’. The following year, ethnic cleansing meant that the number of Palestinians dropped below 20 per cent of the Jewish state’s overall population (in the area allocated to Israel by the UN plus the area it occupied in 1948, the Palestinians would originally have made up around 60 per cent of the population). Interestingly, but not surprisingly, in December 2003 Binyamin Netanyahu recycled Ben-Gurion’s magic number – the undesirable 60 per cent. ‘If the Arabs in Israel form 40 per cent of the population,’ Netanyahu said, ‘this is the end of the Jewish state.’ ‘But 20 per cent is also a problem,’ he added. ‘If the relationship with these 20 per cent is problematic, the state is entitled to employ extreme measures.’ He did not elaborate.
The extract above is from an article by, Ilan Pappe, a senior lecturer at the University of Haifa was in this months London Book Review. You can see it at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n08/papp01_.html
Best
Tom
Air Veterans Remember Reactor Raid
10 June The Australian - Air Veterans Remember Reactor Raid by Abraham Rabinovich.
For a news article this piece provides a fairly detailed account of the IDF's 1981 raid on the nuclear reactor in Baghdad, Iraq.
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The pilots were told to prepare for the longest combat mission they had ever flown -- about 1000km to target - but they were not told what the target was or where.
Afterwards, using a string to measure the distance on a map scale, they placed one end on their air base and swivelled the other end in a 360 degree arc. There was little more than desert and sea for most of the arc but to the east the string rested right on Baghdad. There was only one target in that area worth an act of war.
Recently, on the eve of the 25th anniversary of the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor, a group of Israeli pilots gathered in Tel Aviv to reminisce about the operation that denied Saddam Hussein a nuclear weapon and would, for some of the pilots, make everything that happened in their lives afterwards an anticlimax...
"Star Wars" agency helps Israel on rocket threat
JDW's "Israel's New Model Army?"
This article was published in Jane's Defence Weekly 11.10.2006. Here is download link to that scanned article.
http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=3514170
Israel Army to Resume Guerrilla Training
13 November Associated Press - Israel Army to Resume Guerrilla Training by Mark Lavie.
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The Israeli military will restore its guerrilla warfare training center following its experience fighting Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, using a distinctly modern method - paintball.
During the 34-day war last summer, Hezbollah guerrillas exacted a heavy toll against the Israelis with ambushes, mortars and anti-tank missiles. While not admitting that lack of guerrilla training was a factor in its shortcomings, the Israeli military is planning to restart the program, according to the current issue of the soldiers' weekly, Bamahaneh.
The Israeli military closed down its guerrilla warfare training facility at the Elyakim base in Israel's north after Israeli forces pulled out of Lebanon in 2000, following an 18-year guerrilla war against Hezbollah.
The military has been harshly criticized for the way it handled the latest fighting in Lebanon, and many soldiers, especially reservists, complained their equipment and training were inadequate.
Soldiers will learn camouflage techniques, navigation by GPS satellite systems, construction of hidden outposts and other skills, Bamahaneh said, and they will test their newly won abilities in paintball maneuvers...
Not sure why the use of paintball. While I have not been part of an urban training program for 7 years, I was impressed with the then state of art simunitions - especially the colored ones that could quickly identify fratricide incidents. You also got a significant reduction in "John Wayne" tactics than you did with MILES - simunitions at least hurt a bit when you got hit.
On Edit: I am assuming the AP actually means paintballs rather than labeling whatever the IDF may be using as such...
Soldiers respond to pain, not a MILES beeping me thinks
Pain tends to teach us a leason far sooner than a beep or or the CO barking. Growing up in Northern PA and having been shot by a PO'd farmer with rock salt brings back some fond memories. Paintball at least smarts and still gets the job done far cheaper than OUR MILES. Yeah, a lazer is far more accurate and faster than a paintball. Bring back those basic training days when a M2HB was fired over your head to really appreciate just how fast 3000 FPS is and what it really means when the DS says you never hear the round that kills you.
This bit of advice has served me well. Still alive, albeit a little bid of a pain in the ass at times. Right Tom ?
Regards, Stan
Frozen Calf Turds and BB Guns
When a hard frost would set in, we played this game as kids where one brother would hide behind some boards leaned against a shed and the rest of us would gather frozen calf turds to use a projectiles. The kid beind the boards had a safe zone about 20' away on each side of the boards and he was fair game in between either safe zone once he sprinted out and away from the board shield. When we switched to using BB guns in warmer weather, we would seldom leave the security of the board shield and sprint for a safe zone. Risk was much higher in 'real war' even though we would cup a hand on the side of the head shielding the eyes. I think the same applies to paint balls - risks and moves will be taken that wouldn't be in real combat.
Did Israel hack into Syrian air defense system?
This post suggest that may very well have happened.
Quote:
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The technology allows users to invade communications networks, see what enemy sensors see and even take over as systems administrator so sensors can be manipulated into positions so that approaching aircraft can’t be seen, they say. The process involves locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control.
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Meanwhile the Russians who supplied the air defense system to Syria and sold a similar one to Iran are furiously trying to figure out what happened.
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Israeli CT & COIN (merged thread)
Moderator's Note
This thread is the result of merged a small number of threads; it was originally about IDF COIN and now has included CT. There are other threads on the wider Middle East conflict and smaller matters (ends).
The attached article was submitted by a former IDF Lt who led an IDF Arab platoon and provides his perspective on Arab culture.
External impact of IDF COIN?
Having watched the transfer of knowledge from Northern Ireland to the mainland UK, for the police primarily, it is interesting to note the similar process from Israel - primarily I suspect from the IDF, not other bodies.
In the UK context and in the public domain is the methods around what we called Op Kratos, the response to suspected suicide bombers and the preparation to shoot to kill. Which came to the fore with the mistaken shooting of the Brazilian Mr Menendez shooting in London, July 2005.
There have been comments elsewhere on the IDF strategy or tactic of eliminating leaders and its adoption beyond Israel.
davidbfpo