Strategic Communication: A Tool for Asymmetric Warfare
Strategic Communication: A Tool for Asymmetric Warfare by Emily Goldman at the SWJ Blog.
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Strategic communication is a vital activity for supporting our military operations and national interest. Information can affect attitudes, and ultimately behavior. It is one of the most important tools we have to shape the battlefield months and years in advance. It is indispensable now for fighting adversaries who employ non-traditional and asymmetric means. It can be effective in shaping memories of the past as well as planning for the future.
Communication can be a strategic weapon of mass influence to assure allies and dissuade and deter adversaries. It can give non-state actors state-like power to affect world events. Our adversaries are using communication and information very adeptly to do just that.
There are many unknowns about the future, but we know our adversaries will challenge us in the realm of ideas and information. They are doing so now. They are doing it effectively. We have not yet risen to the challenge. Strategy dictates that you play to your strengths and exploit the enemy’s weaknesses. Our enemies know where we are strong and where we are weak. The question is, “Do we know where we are falling short and are we committed and able to adapt to the challenge?”
Currently, OSD, DOS, USAID, the Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands are developing strategic communication plans across a range of functional issues and regional areas because of the importance of the “contest of ideas” in many of the battles we face today. Strategic communication can be a cost-effective way to operate along the continuum from persuasion to coercion...
Emily Goldman is a Strategic Communication Advisor in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State. Previously, she served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), Support to Public Diplomacy. She is an Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Davis.
SC is a lot harder than it sounds
While I agree with the vast majority of her assertions, the challenge we're faced with is that unless there is a single coordinating body that has tasking authority over those action agents in the SC business, this is really just intellectual masturbation. Unfortunately, the NSC under the current administration is only a coordinating body, and does not have directive authority over the various govt agencies. Unless that changes, we will continue to show SC successes based on informal "dope deals" between individuals rather than as a matter of policy. Even if the NSC did have directive authority, any public official can call a press conference and derail a carefully coordinated SC effort.
It would be nice if all USG agencies worked off the same sheet of music, toed the party line, got on the same page, blah blah (similar cooperative metaphors).... but our system of government is deliberately built to encourage internal dissent and debate. Unfortunately, our internal debate is wide open to external parties, presenting the (accurate) impression that there's no coherent USG policy on ANY issue.
Regards,
Rockbridge
DOD and IO as defense issue
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Originally Posted by
St. Christopher
I would submit to you that DOD is the absolute wrong place to headquarter a strategic information/influence/communication organization.
But then, so is the State Department.
St. Christopher,
Why do you feel this way? I know there is some criticism about the fact that the DOD might lose some credibility if it were viewed as engaging it propaganda type operations. However, it is already doing these types of operations Joint Psychological Operations Support Element. Also, it is going on unofficially everyday in press releases and other types of media engagements. The problem is that there so many core competencies within the DOD that contribute, explicitly or implicitly, to IO, and they have all their own agendas. Would it not be better to acknowledge this situation and create a strategic level DOD office to coordinate the activities? If the so called GWOT is a true ideological confrontation that is critical to national security, shouldn't IO fall under the auspices of the DOD? Look forward to your comments!
IO: Task Organization for Developong a Grand Strategy
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Originally Posted by
Adrian
Yes the military is involved in a lot (not all) of covert ops, but my point was that not all covert ops - and not all national security affairs in general - are under control of the Department of Defense. If, for example, the economic aspects of national security (Treasury freezing the assets of terror sponsors, for example) aren't under DoD, why should IO be under DoD just for the reason that it's national security?
Good point! The difference is that the military does not have any core competencies that deal with economic aspects of national security, at least not that I am aware of. On the other hand, the military already has a lot of core competencies actively engaged in IO: PAO, Psychological Operations, OPSEC, etc. Now, the official party line is that the military does not do STRATCOM, but the lines between tactical and strategic IO is so blurry that I think it is time to relook the issue. Also, I am not suggesting that the DOD should be the only agency doing IO. DOS will always have a significant role to play, and they would necessarily need to work with any DOD organization. If the USIA were established, I could see an IO triumvirate composed of the USIA, DOS, and my proposed DOD organization. Using your example, it would be like the FBI, CIA, and NSA working together on intelligence.
What's the scoop on the CTCC?
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Originally Posted by
Jedburgh
15 Nov 07 testimony before the HASC Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on
Strategic Communications and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism:
Duncan MacInnes, Principal Dpty Coordinator of the Bureau of International Information Programs, DoS
The CTCC is intended to be a small, collaborative, interagency resource with a daily mission of providing the intellectual leadership necessary for countering terrorist ideology and extremist propaganda through coordinated messages.
We need a Domestic Digital Outreach Team.
Been to Fort Meade lately ?
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Originally Posted by
Penta
This may, or may not, be related to the fact that the NSA's existence was classified til...1975 or so, no?
Been to Fort Meade lately ? If so, which side of the highway did you visit ?
Little has changed since 75 and rightfully so !
Strategic Communications and Economic Warfare
While we discuss military or political control of a strategic communications system, I think we should not lose sight of the private, commercial aspect of strategic communications:
MTV in the Middle East
While the writer of the blog perceives the necessary decrease in human flesh and other aspects of MTV programming as hypocritical, what I see is the underground communication of a message through a commercial entity.
While I wrote this piece: The Hidden War - Send them Levis as a mixed discussion on economic warfare and "the message", I believe it reflects an idea that we should always keep in mind: our private, commercial entities represent one of our strongest and most capable sources of "the message". Privately funded.
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The media does not talk about it as part of the war because they don't understand it either. They think of war like most people think of war: explosions, soldiers, bullets, wounded and dead. In this case, in the war you don't know exists, the wounded and dying are idealogues and ideologies. The weapons are wallets, credit cards and cash. The Bullets are western products through which western ideas are infiltrated into states, societies and cultures. The Atomic Bomb is the interglobal communications networks represented by cell phones, internet and satellite dishes.
I posited the theory that, along with some basic economic pressures and military, the USSR collapsed with the final weight of the black market. Not just because it took money out of the state run economy and placed it in the hands of individuals, but because the products themselves were the message. Levis, pepsi and Michael Jackson (at the time). Music. Red, white and blue cans, and quintessentially American culture in a pair of jeans.
It's the message of freedom, democracy and capitalism. The thing that the Al Qaida/Qutb ideologues fear the most. And it arrives via satellite dish on MTV.
DipNote makes a poor subsitute for an OWI
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Originally Posted by
MountainRunner
First, we have Domestic Digital Outreach, and you mentioned in a later post State's
DipNote. This is run under PA and not PD and therefore aimed at you and me. Second, let's now forget the President's Press Secretary and all of her/his resources, DoD's Outreach (passive and active), and all the other public affairs / public relations units in the rest of USG. (Don't forget DoA's, among others, video press releases while you're at it.)
Back when we declared wars we had Office of Strategic Services Morale Operations providing products to make the enemy despair and an Office of War Information providing products to make the Americans persevere. Many people think we could really use products like the OWI produced, and since .gov/.mil can't/won't, volunteer counterpropagandists/cheerleaders attempt it.
All the other public affairs / public relations units do not address national will, nor, realistically, can they.
I don't consider Perino and Rumsfeld public affairs / public relations units
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Originally Posted by
MountainRunner
Are you seriously suggesting the President's Press Secretary is not about influencing the national will? Rumsfeld's press briefings were not about influencing will?
Obviously the President and his political operatives will attempt to make the best use of the bully pulpit they can. Rumsfeld's press briefings were definitely about influencing will. The InterAgency and service PA/PR units are less about bolstering the will of the American people to support the war and more about bolstering the will of Congress to fund the organizations they represent. They really can't get too boisterous in their cheer-leading for fear of offending powerful purse-string holders who seek to undermine support for the war.
Civil servants and career military officers usually attempt to maintain at least a facade of non-partisan professionalism and can't be the people overtly cheer-leading for a war half their political masters oppose. The struggle over bolstering or undermining national will is an internal political one. Approval ratings = freedom of action.