Yeeeee!!!!!! Haaaaaw!!!!!!
It is about damn time somebody said this is what we need to do!!!! He must have read the manual on Physical Security that is the real Center of Gravity.
PRC must be the main effort
PRC measures are intended to separate the population from the insurgents, or the insurgents from the population (there is a difference in my opinion), or both, and the "the" key to PRC is providing effective security to the populace. If you can't protect them, you can't effectively influence them. Speaking as if I was an Iraqi citizen (out of complete ignorance) my loyalty doesn't go to the U.S. military tribe because they build a well or a school in my village, but to the tribe that will kill my family if I don't comply with their wishes. Now if the U.S. military could protect my family 24/7, and still build those wells and schools, it would a completely different story.
I am not sure how to categorize PRC, but at this moment I'm going to call it a line of operation (LOO). A LOO that must be the main effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, as it should have been in any COIN, Stability and Support Operations, Peace Enforcement (Haiti, Liberia, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.), or the majority of other irregular warfare or 4GW environments we find ourselves in, and yet there is a serious dearth of information in our military manuals (please prove me wrong) on how to implement PRC. All I have found to date are short annexes or a couple of paragraphs in various military publications, which is definitely not enough to develop an effective training program. I fully realize that PRC is situation specific and there cannot be a cookie cutter approach, but we can do better than this. Perhaps this is what we have failed miserably at it, especially protecting the local population? Worse, if we’re not successful at PRC, all the others fail, because it their success depends on successful PRC. If there is a center of gravity in this war, then this may be it (those who have read my previous posts will notice a change of attitude here), and it transcends tactical through strategic.
We obviously need more troops to do this, but it isn't just man power, we need troops well trained in PRC. The worst thing we could do is put a bunch of poorly trained and ill disciplined U.S. troops amongst the Iraqi population where every misstep will be exploited successfully by our foes. Well trained in what? Obviously cultural awareness is critical along with some language skills, and then a heavy dose of PRC skills. Again how do we train for it? How important is this mission? In my opinion if we get it right we have a good chance at victory, if we don't we can't win.
CPT Holzbach I admire your muddy boots, common sense perspective, and would appreciate it if you (and others) would please read my request for information on population and resource control (PRC) measures under request for information category (note, my actual post is now the 5th one down) and comment on it as you see fit.
P.S. Slapout, thanks for the tip, I'll get a copy of the physcial security manual this week.
Bill
Why not wish for a time machine?
If we're wishing for the impossible, wish for a time machine -- go back and fix the mistakes of the past four years.
Without a time machine, little on this thread seems relevant or possible.
Some wars are decided on the field of battle, others at home due to exhaustion, bankruptcy, or loss of support for the war. We look to be headed for the last of these.
If the war had strong support in the US, why would this deployment of troops to Baghdad produce results different than those of the past 3 years? We still lack local intel sources and reliable translators -- both of which were so important for the Brits in Malaysia.
How do we "clear" Baghdad without good intel?
Tactically, we fighting an enemy that has developed the use of stand-off weapons to an extent not seen since the Mongols. Without good intel, our troops ride just thru the streets -- more targets.
Last, if we could "clear" Baghadad what would we clear it for? Are their Iraq troops willing to fight and die for their nation, as Union soldiers did during the Civil War?
This is different role for an Army than fighting to defend their homes from a foreign invader. It requires a spirit and loyalty that appears quite rare in Iraq, and that we know of no way to provide.
How many intel assets do we have over there?
They are obvious by their absence.
The first year -- perhaps 11/03 - 11/04 -- we (both inside and outside) were guessing about even the basic elements and characteristics of the Iraq War. After three years, the general outlines of the war have become clear.
Esp. illuminating have been our big "wins" in Fallujah and Tal Afar, allowing comparison of Iraq vs. the long history of similar wars, from the Boer to Malaysia.
... the hordes are at our walls.
These are all hard issues, far beyond the scope of anything suitable for a blog. Also, they are important issues wrapped in fog -- so that many views are reasonable and can be well supported.
I disagree with you on most of these points (but could easily be wrong). As I have written, we're in great danger -- but mostly from our own arrogance, hubris, and suicidal economic policies. For more on that see …
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_enemies.htm
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_fore...2006_part2.htm
Re: intel & ROE’s
I suspect -- based mostly on history and news accounts, not a reliable base -- that our intel assets in Iraq are grossly inadequate to our need. In Malaysia the Brits had a century to develop familiarity with the people, and build intel sources. We've had at most 3 years, assuming we started fast (which I doubt).
The ROE debate has been hashed over in Iraq and almost every previous colonial war. The loser -- the colonial power -- ratchets up the ROE's. It never works. It's a sign of failed strategic and tactical thinking, in my opinion.
The French fought the Hundred Years War using outdated doctrines. Three great defeats on battlefield, almost carbon copies of each other, monuments to human stubbornness and inability to change.
Let's not try to beat their record. 4GW is here, and the old methods no longer work. Radical change is necessary. Are we up to the challenge?
a look at some of our options in Iraq (fyi)
These overlap with those discussed in Kagan's proposal.
part 1 (only the first page is relevant here, as an overview))
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq...006_part_I.htm
Part 2 -- options for Iraq
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq...06_part_II.htm
Part 3 -- more options
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/fabius_iraq...6_part_III.htm
Part 4 -- my proposal, coming soon.
The Belmont Club Update...
Here is The Belmont Club post US Strategy in Iraq for 2007? Welcome to all the visitors from the Belmont Club and Pajamas Media - feel free to jump in here or on other Council threads...
Quote:
A informed reader believes the eventual shape of the President's future plan in Iraq is taking shape. Pointing to informed speculation at Small Wars Journal, he thinks it is likely that there will be a "shift in mission" in Iraq, emphasizing a security solution over a political one: changing "our focus from training Iraqi soldiers to securing the Iraqi population and containing the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it must become the first priority," as the AEI study he quotes puts it. A lot of readers may say, 'finally the US is going to kick ass', but the informed reader notes the plan will also require a greater effort on the American part, in particular an extension of tours of duty. He also has reservations about whether the non-military capabilities of the United States are up to the task of the followup to combat. In earlier correspondence the reader noted the Belmont Club talking about mobilizing the nation to fight the information and political warfare -- the levee en masse -- or, as the reader put it, to redress the fact that "the rest of the elements of national power are not present on the battlefield in ways that they should be". The military may be able to clear, but what does the rest of the US government to for an encore? The quotable parts of his email are given below and I hope it will spark discussion among other readers.
Quote:
I noted this post at The Small Wars Journal with interest a couple of weeks ago. Since then, every couple of days there has been a news story leading me to believe that the plan developed by General Keane and Fred Kagan at AEI is the one that the President is going to adopt and announce in January.
Some of these signs: statements by Bush at a press conference before Christmas; a dramatic increase in op-eds by Kagan in nearly every major newspaper, including some British ones; stories in outlets such as the NYT alluding to possible force increases; Gates' well-publicized trip to Iraq, with the ostensible conclusion that larger forces are needed; and now, Joe Lieberman's op-ed in the Washington Post (which is linked on Instapundit), calling for a larger force.
I encourage you all to follow the links to the AEI plan and read it -- it's a ppt presentation and in classic Pentagon course-of-action style -- indicating that it has been wargamed by military officers, not just academics or civilians such as the ISG.
I don't have time to blog about this, but these are my thoughts:
a) the plan calls for a surge in forces, but what is less publicized is the manner in which this surge will be sustained: by increasing the rotation time of Marine units from 7 to 12 months and Army units from 12-15 months. I wonder if this detail is the reason why the President is waiting until after Christmas to announce. Anyway, this jives with what I am hearing from several sources on the need for longer rotations for Marine units, due to the nature of counterinsurgencies and the length of time required to build trusted local networks.
b) the plan calls for what is a shift in mission: from a priority of training Iraqi forces to a priority of providing a secure environment for the people. This might get lost in the coverage, which will dwell upon the increase in forces -- along with cries of "escalation" a la Vietnam. But it is a very important shift. The coming year might see some new battles possibly on the scale of that of Fallujah in 2004, but this time in both Baghdad and Ramadi. This is a guess though and is not crystal clear in the plan -- the battles could also be smaller in scale, given the strengths of Iraqi forces in some areas.
c) finally, I feel the plan is not detailed enough when destructing reconstruction: the "build" part of "clear, hold, and build." There needs to be a dramatic decentralization of funding, a renewed commitment to the CERP program; full staffing of provincial reconstruction teams; and the USAID and State Dept need to become expeditionary and fully staffed virtually overnight -- there's no reason why USAID personnel shouldn't be asked to work at the company level. My thoughts here are not enough. I'm not a reconstruction expert. But several Marine officer friends have noted this problem. Robert Kaplan did so as well in an Atlantic piece not long ago. Basically, the rest of the elements of national power are not present on the battlefield in the ways that they should be.
I could be way off the mark: Bush might propose something completely different. But I'm calling this one: he's going with the AEI plan, perhaps with some modifications.
Having a good plan is one thing, but the enemy also gets to vote in its execution. He will kick back. As in the past, the enemy can be expected to emphasize political and propaganda countermeasures against any new US initiative. If the US shifts the mission to emphasize security, expect a plethera of articles to emerge decrying extended tours of duty, revealing more atrocity stories, etc. In general, expect a full-court press in both the political and media areas to blunt any new strategy. Washington DC will be part of Iraq battlefield...
H/T to Wretchard at The Belmont Club - check out the post - 57 comments so far...