Aviation in COIN (merged thread)
The SWJ received this RFI via e-mail:
Hello ... I'm a reporter for Flight International magazine. I am travelling next week to Central Air Forces Command at Shaw AFB to interview the planning staff charged with standing-up the new Iraqi Air Force. I'm told they have been given swift marching orders to complete job. At the moment I'm looking for experts who can assist me with background on the needs of an air force with a primarily counter-insurgency mission. Please let me know if you or others you know would be able to help me out. Thank you,
Stephen Trimble
East Coast Editor
Americas Bureau
Flight International
I directed him to contact Dr. Wray Johnson (COL USA Ret.& SpecOps Aviator). Dr. Johnson is currently a professor at the USMC Command and Staff College and a co-author of Airpower in Small Wars. I also told him I would post his RFI here for any additional leads / expertise the SWC might provide.
Pentagon Boosts COIN Air Missions
16 March USA Today - Pentagon Boosts Number of U.S. Air Missions by Steven Komarow.
Quote:
Persistent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are prompting the Pentagon to rely more heavily on warplanes and air transports to attack the enemy and move troops and supplies.
The increase in airstrikes is most dramatic in Afghanistan, where they nearly doubled to 157 last year, compared with 86 in 2004. In Iraq, strikes increased 7% from 285 to 306, with a surge before the December national elections...
That's “an admission that U.S. and coalition ground forces, three years into the war, can't make movement on the ground safe,” said Andrew Bacevich, a professor of international relations at Boston University.
While the air power helps, “the war is going to be decided on the ground,” said Bacevich, a Vietnam War veteran...
Air power will stay strong in Iraq even if the Pentagon proceeds with plans to reduce ground forces, said Air Force Secretary Michael Wynn. The Air Force is taking over security at Balad, a major air base north of Baghdad, he said.
As U.S. ground troops hand security over to local forces, U.S. and allied aircraft will back them with airstrikes. But the military is cautious about who will call for the strikes. It worries that warring factions could try to use U.S. air power against their internal rivals...
Book Review: Airpower in Small Wars
Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists
by James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson
Reviewed by LTC Lester W. Grau, USA (Retired), Military Review, Nov/Dec 2004
Despite catchy phrases like "surgical strike" and "precision bombing," airpower remains a blunt instrument in unconventional and small wars. Air strikes against guerrillas fail when guerrillas cannot be precisely located. Bombing civilians in retaliation (or error) is ineffective and counterproductive. The pre- World War II aviation concept of "air control," in which aviation occupies and controls a small country by airpower alone, is clearly outmoded and wrong. What then is the role of airpower in small wars?
James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson have a clear vision of this role and have written extensively on air and ground power. Corum is a reserve army officer and a distinguished historian and professor at the U.S. Air Force (USAF) School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Wray R. Johnson is a retired USAF colonel who spent a career in special operations and is now professor at the U.S. Marine Corps University.
Airpower has been a player in small wars and counterinsurgencies since French aviators bombed Moroccan rebels in 1913. Sometimes airpower has been a key player; at other times, it has promised much more than it could deliver. In the case of French Indochina, airpower's failure to deliver as planned at Dien Bien Phu lost the war for the French. Air Power in Small Wars, the first comprehensive history of the subject, analyzes numerous conflicts with guerrillas, bandits, rebels, and terrorists in colonial wars, police actions, counterinsurgencies, and expeditions.
The book's pre-World War II section describes General John J. Pershing's expedition into Mexico; U.S. Marine Corps expeditions into the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua; British Colonial expeditions in Somaliland, Aden, Transjordan, Iraq, and the Northwest Frontier Province of India; Spanish Colonial expeditions in Spanish Morroco; French Colonial expeditions in French Morocco and Syria; and Italian Colonial expeditions in Libya and Eritrea.
The post-World War II section includes the Greek Civil War; the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign; the French Colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria; the British Colonial wars in Malaya, South Arabia, and Oman; the war in South Vietnam; southern African insurgencies in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Rhodesia and Malawi; Latin American insurgencies in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Columbia; the Egyptian expedition in Yemen; the Soviet War in Afghanistan; and the Israeli excursion in southern Lebanon. While it is an ambitious undertaking, it succeeds.
Among the book's key findings are that in small wars, the political and economic instruments are often more important than the military instrument. Reconnaissance and transport are usually the most important and effective aviation missions in guerrilla war. Airpower's ground attack role becomes more important as the war turns conventional. Aviation high-tech and low-tech systems might play an important role in small wars. Joint operations are essential for the effective use of airpower. Small wars are long and intelligence-intensive. Training for major wars does not translate into readiness for small wars.
This is an important book and, hopefully, one on which ground power and airpower advocates can agree. Insurgencies, expeditions, and other small wars might occupy the attention of the U.S. Armed Forces in the near term. The time to prepare is now, and getting the air and ground component to work together harmoniously is part of that preparation. This book should be a basic component of that preparation and of that harmony.
How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency
Hi Jesse !
I've been Army all my life, so don't take this to heart if you are/were AF :cool:
Going to the Air War College's site can be amusing (for the Army types):
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-lesn.htm
But better yet, Air & Space Power's Spring 06 Journal hits home:
"The Air Force's Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency"
Quote:
CONSIDERING THAT THE U.S. military has extensive experience
in using airpower against insurgents, and that the United States
will almost certainly be involved in fighting insurgents and terrorists
and will no doubt assist other nations in their own fights
against irregular opponents in the future, the lack of attention in military
colleges and in doctrine regarding this subject is scandalous. The U.S. Air
Force in particular, has tended to ignore and downplay air operations in
small wars in its education system and in its doctrine.”
more here on page 27:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...pr06/spr06.pdf
Quote:
To a large extent, the Air Force has ignored insurgency as much as possible,
preferring to think of it as little more than a small version of conventional war.
Regards, Stan
Perhaps Old Eagle is right, better late than never !
Counter-insurgency aircraft plans gain momentum in Defense Dept.
I found this, unattributed, at BCKS COIN forum
Development of sensor packages could aid Pentagon's plans for dedicated COIN air fleet
A shift in Defense Dept. focus and the development of advanced airborne sensor packages just might provide the U.S. military with a platform that has eluded the Pentagon for decades--a dedicated aircraft fleet mix especially designed and deployed for counter-insurgency operations.
Terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and insurgent battles abroad have reawakened Pentagon interest in developing a dedicated counter-insurgency operations (COIN) fleet and capability. Aviation counter-insurgency experts and would-be COIN contractors have been gravitating to the Pentagon to brief officers of the need, capabilities and potential requirements for such aircraft.
The Rand Corp. recently completed an unclassified report, "COIN Aircraft Systems for the USAF and Friendly States Facing Insurgencies," this summer as part of the organization's Project Air Force. Rand notes that there will be a need for such a capability for some time to come. "Insurgencies are likely to be an enduring feature of the international security environment."
Rand also says USAF is using aircraft designed for other needs for COIN missions, but that aircraft specifically geared for such needs would be better.
The Air Force historically has modified high-tech jet fighters or bombers for COIN operations instead of investing in a counter-insurgency fleet, which would consist mostly of transport planes or lower, slower-flying turboprop aircraft for fixed-wing needs. Jets can be used for limited COIN work, while it would be difficult if not impossible to do the reverse.
The Air Force also has been loath to rob its fighter or bomber accounts for what it considers "fringe" work, such as counter-insurgency operations.
Now, some say the anticipated need for COIN fleets is greater.
And growing capability of precision munitions and other sensor packages is making it possible to develop more-effective COIN fleets.
"With sensor packages, that's where we could be able to do it," said Wray Johnson, a former Air Force special forces colonel who helped develop counter-insurgency operations. Johnson teaches at the U.S. Marine Corps College in Quantico, Va.
He also is the co-author of the 2003 book Air Power in Small Wars, Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, which is on the USMC commandant's supplemental reading list, intended for majors and lieutenant colonels deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan.
High-flying, fast jets would be at a disadvantage for COIN work, which requires more loiter time, often closer to the ground. Jets are also expensive to operate and maintain, and the Pentagon and Congress are looking for ways to cut costs.
A turbofan light attack-trainer such as Argentina's AT-63 Pampa would have a flyaway cost of about $11 million, the Rand report says; a utility plane, even less. Utility planes could provide more cost-effective transportation than other airlifters such as C-130Js, according to Rand.
"Many in Congress may question the wisdom of future Air Force budgets unless they include investments that clearly contribute to fighting non-state actors," says Christopher Bolkcom, aviation expert for the Congressional Research Service.
To prove they're not simply modifying legacy platforms, the services are jointly developing programs for new aircraft to meet needs they say reflect the growing counter-insurgency requirements. One of these is the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA), a tactical airlifter meant for austere environments that can't be accommodated by current fleets.
But some of those programs have failed to get off the ground.
"In the case of the Army, the JCA program will probably falter for lack of money early in its execution, especially given Air Force resistance to buying anything other than C-130s," the Lexington Institute's Loren Thompson says. He notes that other COIN aircraft could meet similar fates.
"In the case of the Special Ops Command, it's hard to understand why an organization already buying the C-130, the V-22 tiltrotor and the next-generation combat search-and-rescue helicopter also needs a twin-engine turboprop. It sounds like special operators are 'overkilling' the short-hop airlift mission while neglecting more pressing needs."
Others disagree, saying the current aircraft don't meet COIN needs.
Johnson says, "What we need is something rugged, reliable, survivable and multi-dimensional."
While the Air Force has often directed its focus and funding on fighters and strike aircraft, COIN operations take on more indirect roles--intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), transportation, air ambulance, psychological operations, communications and providing cover for convoys and other ground operations.
Some COIN-type aircraft and missions include propeller-driven or jet trainers for light attack, helicopters, utility and armed unmanned aerial vehicles, Rand notes.
Aircraft that have proven effective in COIN operations include OV-10s, A-37s, T-37s, AC-47 gunships, UH-60s, C-123 transports and such newer entries as Embraer Tucanos.
EVEN SUCH SMALL planes as turboprop civilian transports, including the Spanish CASA C-212, Pilatus Porter, Cessna 17 or Piper Arrow, have proved useful.
Many of these are analyzed in the Rand report, which also notes conceptual designs, like that of Idaho-based Stavatti Aerospace Machete.
Resembling a black shortened F-15, the Machete will be able to handle strike, ISR and other missions, says Stavatti Aerospace Chairman/CEO Christopher Beskar.
The plan is to build on many of the capabilities of the A-10 or even the old A-1 Skyraiders, Beskar said on Aug. 16. But the aircraft also is incorporating modern sensor packages and construction standards. The plane is made of only about 12% traditional aluminum, while a third of it is titanium, Beskar said. "It's built to have a lot more survivability."
After two years of briefings with Pentagon, Air Force and Rand officials, Beskar has altered the Machete design to better address COIN requirements for more cannon firepower, ISR capability and a more rugged aircraft.
Another indication of what the Air Force may require was the proposal requests issued this spring for an Iraqi counter-insurgency ISR aircraft that can also be tasked for communications work.
WHILE KEEPING an eye on the possible U.S. or American-backed markets, Stavatti has its sights elsewhere.
"[We're] export oriented," Beskar said, noting Colombia, Chile and other Latin American countries, which are looking to replace aging A-37s or OV-10s, are promising.
Latin America, with its history of insurgencies and drug-trafficking battles, provides the perfect backdrop for COIN airframes. The same type of aircraft that's been successful for battling drug traffickers--mobile, quick, persistent--would be effective against insurgents.
Johnson agrees the Latin American market would be a target-rich environment for COIN aircraft. But he argues the only way U.S. allies will buy into COIN fleets is if the Pentagon does first.
Stavatti Aerospace says its Machete concept, which resembles a black shortened F-15, can handle strike, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and other missions important to the COIN initiative.
~~~~~~~~
By Michael Fabey, Washington
The Ghost of General Gavin
We already have them or used to anyway. They were originally going to be part pf the Air Cavalry Division as conceived by General Gavin but was finally stripped out. The SLAR side ways looking radar was the father of JSTARS. I think the new AF COIN manual will have a lot of General Gavin's and Billy Mitchell's ideas in it. Here is a link with pics and back round data. http://www.armyav.org/board_ov-1b.htm
COIN, Interdiction, and CAS
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Ask Tom what an EC-130 could have done to mitigate the genocide in Rwanda. The hate/kill message was propagated primarily from one radio station.
Lift is almost always the biggest shortfall when it comes to AF support for this ground pounder.
For COIN we have sufficient fire support, I would like to hear more ideas on non-lethal fire support that the AF could provide. We won't hear it from their generals, nor will see it on their budget proposals, unless they intend to put it there to get Congressional support, then shift it to bombers and fighters later.
To answer: tremendous effect. I spent hours on the phone in Goma--after the genocide was supposedly over (it was not in the French zone) and aside from beating the drum for water distrubution I raised the IO war repeatedly. And we never got it right--or better said we could never get across just how critical it was.
For me as a boots on the ground guy in Africa--it was airlift. And Special Ops airlift and collection assets were in second place. It was largely the same in the 1960s--although much was made of "COIN" ground attack aircraft (T-28s, T-6s, and A26s) in the Congo in 1964. Those were used as straight interdiction and limited CAS assets--there was no "COIN" as we know it in the Congo then. We--the US, Belgians, mercenaries, and the Congolese--beat the Simbas into submission or extinction. And a key tool was air support.
Even as recently as Somalia--airpower advocates get confused about what is COIN and what is straight interdiction and CAS. AC130s were most definitely needed in Mog; we were not doing "COIN". We were seeking to beat the warlords into submission and we went in like we were doing a simple support operation. TF Ranger was not winning hearts and minds. Even in the support operation we were not trying to win hearts and minds--we were trying to make sure the Somali warlords knew we would seriously hurt them if they tried to disrupt the feeding.
One of the key indicators that the French intent behind Op Turquoise in Rwanda was less "humanitarian" than advertised was their dispatch of Jaguar ground attack aircraft to the AO. How Jaguars were going to stop genocide remains unanswered.
Tom
UAS great for USA..problematic for partner nation
Quote:
Originally Posted by
120mm
imho, the armed UAS like the Predator has all the drawbacks of the Tomahawk, LGB and LGMs do: You're "guessing" that the truck are the bad guys and not a truck full of women and kids.
I'm not a big air support fan in COIN, but there is some utility in a small, manned and armed COIN aircraft. The kind that can slow down to 100 kts and go "eye-ball to eye-ball" with the target.
It also "personalizes" taking out the bad guys to a point the can understand and respect. Which takes away from the image that US soldiers are cowards who hide behind their technology and only win because they cheat. Which takes away one more I/O advantage for the bad guys.
Having said that, the UAS is a great intel "tool", and armed UAS would have a terrific role in taking on high profile threat in a higher intensity environment.
While I think UAS (i.e. Predators) are great for a US military-involved COIN fight, remember that most partner nations do not usually have the ability to operate, support, and employ technically advanced unmanned systems. In a resource constrained environment, would you rather buy a UAS system OR buy a cheaper manned option and, with the left over money, pay your monthly salaries to your military? :)
Operating under the notion that, in the end, the partner nation will either win or lose the fight and the US is just an enabler, pushing UAS on a partner nation may just cause more problems. I think the better answer, and the one being pursued right now in Iraq, is to use manned ISR platforms like a King Air/Cessna 337/Caravan for the host nation...its easier and cheaper to employ over the long term. While UAS do offer amazing persistance, they creat HUGE problems with air space control, maintenance, communication bandwith, etc. Just one Airman's thoughts....
Your conventional mindsets are showing!
When I saw the subject line for this thread I naively thought I was going to see a discussion of the venerable O2-B and its use as a platform for launching leaflets and loudspeaker messages (yes, that's right) at insurgents. Perhaps some talk of the C-130 flying broadcast transmitters.
BUT NO!
The entire thread dealt with steel-on-target, Widow-makers, A-37s etc.
Gentlemen, your conventional orientations are showing!
And it has always been this way. When I was involved in PSYOP campaigns in Central America, a crusty old Air Force officer once confessed about the way he remembered the difference between the O2-A and the O2-B (the PSYOP version). "A is for attack, B is for Bull####."
This is why we don't do very well in this kind of conflict. We claim to understand that it is all about hearts and minds, but the organizational DNA is so biased toward "steel-on-target", that that is what we ALWAYS end up doing. Even here in SWJ.
Infantry And CAS Pilots Bonding For Effect
120mm. I found this article in Air Chronicles. It is a story about the bond between Infantry and CAS. I wasn't sure where to put this so if it should be moved to another thread it is ok with me. The link to article is posted below.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...c/allison.html
My COIN A/C capability wishlist
If I could have it my way, the following would be essential to any aircraft's capabilities.
- All-aspect FLIR camera with display
- All-aspect optical camera(s)
- Hard points for rockets, leaflet pods, and cannon pod(s). I think a cannon around 20mm in size could produce greater anti-material/personnel effects than a gun slinging 14.5mm or less. It comes at a price in weight and ammo capacity, but point detonating 20mm rounds can be very effective
- VHF retrans capability
- UHF capability
- Blue Force Tracker connectivity, with scaleability to incorporate the descendants of BFT
- A jump seat to allow a commander or OpsO to go aloft on that occasion when he needs to see the battlespace with the eyeball
EDITED TO ADD:
- A laser designator/range finder
After doing a little digging around, I found a design proposal to outfit a OV-10 Bronco with a recoilless rifle at one point in time. What a hoot that would have been to let off!