Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?
The 8 December edition of Newsweek Magazine - Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory? - Andrew J. Bacevich
Quote:
In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to pursue the wrong mission. Sending more troops to the region, as incoming president Barack Obama and others have suggested we should, will only turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will be a sinkhole, consuming resources neither the US military nor the US government can afford to waste.
Hmm, yes and no, I think...
I'm inclined to agree with John, I rarely agree with Bacevich but do to an extent concur with this analysis. I agree that infusing a large number of additional troops is not wise and I agree that we need a definition -- not of victory, there will be no victory -- but of our aim in that nation and in the region.
I do disagree with the Bacevich statement that
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"No country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security—today and for the foreseeable future—than Pakistan."
Hyperbole, I believe. Further, he ends
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"Rather than sending more troops to the region, the new American president should start withdrawing them and devise a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan."
Not smart and seemingly in contradiction to his concern for Pakistan as a threat.
Withdraw precipitously and leave a vacuum in the region? Bad plan. We don't need to devise a realistic and affordable strategy for Afghanistan. We do need to determine what precisely is the US and NATO goal in Afghanistan. From that, a logical operational plan will flow. We do not need to spend the next 20 or 30 years there trying to obtain the mirage of an effective government and a happy productive nation but too rapid a withdrawal would be unwise.
Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.
These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...
Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.
Ken, a sound general principle, but then ?
Quote:
(from Warden's
webpage)
One of these Cardinal Rules especially important to follow in geopolitical strategy development is Execute Good Enough Plans. The near universal tendency is to try for perfect plans and perfect Future Pictures; as nice as it might be to realize a perfect Future Picture, the likelihood of doing so is vanishing small while the cost will almost certainly be prohibitive.
The devil really seems to be in the details of the "good enough plan" - and how one gets there.
COL Warden's plan ends up with this:
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This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.
Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted.
If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions.
All my principles are sound...
I agree with Warden in that first quote.
There is no devil in the detail of what constitutes a good enough plan; that's easy -- what's hard is convincing the risk averse to implement the plan instead of improving it until its too late or totally flummoxed... :mad:
The first quote from Warden contradicts his second quoted item. If he really believes
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"an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation."
that's worrisome because such an agreement (1) Wuldn't be worth the paper on which it was printed; (2) Could not be enforced by an Afghan government no matter how well meaning; (3) Could not be easily verified (he obviously has not been to Afghanistan and moved about on the ground a great deal); and (4) Deviance couldn't be addressed at all well; payments are good -- for the other, what strategic targets within the nation? Ludicrous. I say contradicts because that plan doesn't meet the 'good enough' test.
JMM said:
Quote:
"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."
Hopefully you said that in jest. 'Iron Clad' agreements mean nothing in the ME or South Asia. You can't enforce them and they know it. They will tell you what you wish to hear and do what they wish to do; the two will only rarely coincide.
Quote:
"If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions."
I wouldn't even bet on that. The area is too volatile and the religion is chameleon like in its ability to adapt and twist.
One cannot look at Afghanistan with western norms in mind and expect to achieve success.
There was a time when we could have insisted and they (they being not necessarily Afghanistan but most nations) would have complied but 58 years of conducting 'limited war's and not adapting our Armed forces to changing norms and times has shown the world that we can be safely defied. that cannot be undone. It can be rectified to an extent and if we're smart, we'll do that but I'm not too hopeful. I'm afraid Colonel Warden and too many still serving senior folks are living in the past. Sorta sad when someone older than all of 'em says that... :(
Not only said in jest, Ken; but
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JMM said:
Quote:
"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."
Hopefully you said that in jest.
with a couple of layers of irony and sarcasm.
Thanks Slap, for the "kind" words.
The Bergen piece is a good one. But, after reading it, I still don't know what his desired end state is and, therefore, I don't know whether achieving the objectives he lays out will do that. i don't see anything I really disagree with regarding his COA, but I am not sure what resources are required to carry them out. (Perhaps, that is asking too much of a short article.:))
As I said, I don't know if what he proposes will achieve the overarching goal since I don't know what his end state is. I also don't know from what is given if the resources he hints at are sufficient or can be made availble in sufficient quantities. Finally, I don't know if the cost is too high - oneexample for the Afghans is the cost of reducing the drug trade even by the methods Bergen advocates.
Cheers
JohnT
John and Eden are both correct IMO. Unfortunately, so is Entropy.
Entropy says:
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"...our current response to that challenge (nation-building to create a democratic central state authority that is friendly to the US and can control its own territory) is unlikely to succeed for a whole host of reasons."
John mentioned that Peter Bergen did not posit an end state while Eden lays out the Bergen prescriptions quite accurately and ends with what anyone concerned about Afghanistan should be considering:
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"Anyway, all of these suggestions seem reasonable. But remember the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long." (emphasis added / kw)
Note that he correctly says "...for the foreseeable future..." How long will that be? More importantly, my fear is that too many are unaware of or deliberately eliding the almost certain fact that Eden mentioned and I highlighted...
Victory is the wrong word to use
We might try to substitute "success," but I'm not sure that this much better. We would only be defining that success from our own frame of reference. As Eden notes in the following quote, either process is unlikely to yield much of a long term solution.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Eden
. . . the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long.
A long term solution is a solution that is freely adopted by the conglomeration of folks that make up Afghanistan, not one that is forced down their throats by a bunch of do-gooder Westerners. If the US/NATO coalition can do things to help the local denizens achieve their goals, then that is what should be the way ahead for the coalition. If not, then the coalition troops need to redeploy to home station. I suspect we have overstayed our welcome. We have already done about as much as we can to show the "terrorists" that we can kick butt when we want and need to. All we now show them is that we are not as good at some other things (like nation building). The longer we stay, the more we will show them how small is the wardrobe of clothes that the emperor has for wear.
Separate point about the comments on airpower discussion below:
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Originally Posted by
Eden
8. End coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.
Frankly, I don't think we execute many strikes that have a 'high probability of killing civilians'. The problem is, air strikes are the only way we have of attacking some of these folks. Minus air strikes, you have to go in with ground troops, and pulling off a surprise strike with ground troops is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and requires a lot more ground troops. Oh, and by the way, it doesn't always reduce the number of civilian casualties.
Airstrikes, the "easier wrong", are not the only way we have to attack. They are the only way we have to do so without putting too many of our own troops at risk. Maybe we ought to take the "harder right" of putting our forces (rather than the non-combatant locals) at risk and force our decision makers to see what it really costs to go do "nation-building" in oddball places. That might readjust the Washington bureaucrats' sight picture enough to make them rethink such adventures in the future.
(Yes, Ken, I know that is a forlorn wish. :()
I question whether the Bergen first goal
was really necessary as stated and further question whether that goal could ever be achieved by anyone other than Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.
However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me. :cool:
I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.
Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done and my perception is still that the US -- and NATO -- have no agreed answer to that question. As someone said, involving NATO was a political master stroke which precipitated a strategic and operational mess.
They need to implement John T's planning cycle... :G
Ken, I suspected I would have OPSEC problems ..
with the young chimps after you sold me the Erector Set Bridge. Yup, one of them has gone missiing; and taken my playbook with him. I suspect he has avoided our winter snows and has gone south to Florida.
Why else would you write this ?
Quote:
I strongly believe a response to the attack was called for and that Afghanistan correctly was and should have been the area selected for that initial response. I also believe that another response was due the ME for years of provocations.
However, I do not agree that we thus had an obligation to 'fix' Afghanistan or the ME -- I have significant doubt that we or anyone else outside those regions can do that. That doubt does not trouble me.
I guess it all goes back to the alleged Powell to Bush so-called Pottery Barn rule, "You break it, you own it." As has been since pointed out, Pottery Barn has no such rule. Neither do Nations. Bush decided that Powell's doctrine was inapplicable; he should have also decided that his rule was equally unnecessary.
Unfortunately, they didn't ask me and we are where we are. The question now is what is to be done ....
Which is a long round-about way to say that I agree with you.
----------------------
Now, you (and everyone else) can disagree with me on a few thoughts I have:
1. Primary focus on Afghanistan is misplaced because it is only part of the "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem; and part of Afghanistan (the old Northern Alliance region) is not part of that problem.
2. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is a trans-national (cross borders) problem. More Pashtuns live in Pakistan than in Afghanistan - as do more AQ since Tora Bora.
3. This problem is totally out of the book so far as "standard" COIN is concerned. The "book" there thinks in terms of a Host Nation (singular), which is assisted by another Nation (US) to control the sea in which the bad guys swim.
4. The analogous Host Nation in this case is Pashtunistan, which does not exist as we normally think of a nation state. It is not, in reality, anything close to a monolith. It is something akin to medieval France before the Crown consolidated, with multiple power centers. In Afghanistan, Mr. Karzai resembles the early kings of France who were surrounded by a ring of "castle keepers" protective against foreign invasiion, but many of whom were as or more powerful than the king. In Pashtunistan, there is not even that semblence of a central power structure other than the Taliban.
5. In formal nation-state terms, we have two Host Nations, Afghanistan and Pakistan, neither of which controls the sea in which we are interested. Application of the COIN "book", to the extent it can be applied here, would require both HNs to open the trans-national Pashtun region to us to perform COIN operations (assuming only for purposes of discussion, that we should be doing that); and also join in that effort with us.
6. While Afghanistan-Pakistan resembles Vietnam in its cross-border aspects (infiltration, etc.), it is quite different in most other respects. In Vietnam, the enemy was North Vietnam (the VC being the unconventional portion of the NVA, which also could be unconventional as suited); the Host Nation being South Vietnam; and we being caught between fighting an unconventional war on one hand and a conventional war on the other hand - a debate that still continues today.
7. The multiple Host Nation issue was avoided in Vietnam by the political decisions between 1958-1962 to remove Laos and Cambodia from our equation (they were not, of course, removed from Giap's equation). The 1964 election settled the issue of an aggressive roll-back strategy against North Vietnam and its "neutral" satellites Laos and Cambodia. What might be similar in Afghanistan-Pakistan is the existence of political constraints (albeit different from those in Vietnam), which could make a nullity of any comprehensive strategic plan before it gets on the ground.
8. Have there been counter-insurgency situations involving multiple Host Nations, where the target population (here, the Pashtuns) lived in both Host Nations and were a substantial population (here 42 million) ? My mind is presently blank on any such precedent.
9. The "AQ among the Pashtuns" problem is compounded by the existence of AQ-linked and AQ-leaning groups thoughout Pakistan, which like Afghanistan is very much a composite nation (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and "Paki-Pashtunistan" being its major component parts).
10. Can anything resembling the COIN "book" help in this situation; or will application of what might well be sound COIN principles elsewhere cause us to take our eyes off the ball ? The ball here being the nightmare that AQ will obtain access to Pakistan's nuclear devices.
Agree with both the above.
JMM, I could quibble aout a comma here and there but essentially, I think you're correct. I'd only add that Afghanistan is not and has never been a COIN fight; there are insurgent aspects but it's far more complex than that and that it also consists of unconventional and conventional fights.
Sapperfitz 82 is on track I think. Right now our ratio is pretty favorable; one can never tell when such a ratio tips the opponents into a "We aren't getting anywhere with this..." mode. Some die hards will not tip but the majority may. Effectively, what he suggests is what we're doing. It lacks finesse but that doesn't mean it won't work. The flip side of that is how long the Congress and taxpayers will put up with us doing just what he suggests (and how long can the Army sustain it and at what rate).
The worst thing we could do is apply Iraqi lessons learned to Afghanistan; very different theaters, people, processes and potentials...
What's a word for 'theater' that starts with a 'p?' :D
React to contact is not a strategy
Quote:
Originally Posted by
sapperfitz82
But what if the end state is not a functioning state? What if the end state is a safe place to kill AQ in, preferably far from our shores and interests?
Given that most folks believe that this is not the kind of war that will end with a white flag and UBL handing over his scimitar, perhaps the best end-state is the one where we attrit them.
Seen from this perspective, the current war is working well. Our kill to casualty ratio is astronomical, the lasting negative affect of our strategy is confined to the countries we are in and the immediate surroundings, and we can exert pressure in the region from these bases (Astan and Iraq).
If this is the strategy, perhaps we should remove the DoS from the region entirely and just call it what it is. If AQ wants to fight, meet us in Astan, Iraq, where ever, and may the best man win.
It worked so well in Iraq (from this point of view) that they quit (apparently).
This is all just a WAG, but it makes me feel a little better about the guys at the top to think of it this way.
Playing global whack-a-mole is not the path to success. If we focus on one area then AQ central would shift their support to another franchise (i.e. AQ in the Mahgreb, Horn of Africa, etc.)
We follow because the govt will continue to react to contact. The govt and the population's attention will shift once the stories of growing AQ (or whoever's) influence in Whereisthatastan. In the end we further AQ's narrative because we come off as the bully.
Maybe I give to much credit to the enemy, but why would they fight when they can live to fight another day and further their message.
I agree with your subject line but I don't think that's what he meant.
I think he meant that, rightly or wrongly, we are in Afghanistan and Iraq whacking moles. We're doing that pretty well. We are not doing other things well in either place but we're doing okay on the whacking, the ratio is good so let's just keep whacking there.
He's aware, as are most of us here, that our efforts in the other areas you name and in many different parts of the world are better planned and executed than in those two theaters so I think he's just suggesting that we're doing okay if not great and we can keep doing that until someone comes up with a better idea.
A lot of folks here have said the same thing you said, "React to contact is not a strategy."
They have suggested that we should be initiating contacts instead of reacting. I agree but see three reasons why we aren't doing that.
First; we have not developed the equipment and transport mechanisms to allow stealthy ingress and egress even though the need has been known since 1979. I believe we have purposely not done that to preclude our initiating contact and the senior leadership in DoD (and Congress) has for many years tacitly supported that. Not an accusation of malfeasance, just of excess caution.
Secondly, we are trying to expand our SOF. I have no doubt that great pain will be taken to avoid dilution of quality. Having been around for the last big expansion, I also have no doubt that those efforts will not succeed and that quality will drop and this will offer further reasons for us to not initiate contact. Again, an excess of caution, not criminality.
Thirdly we have become a risk averse and litigation prone society; this has produced armed forces that are quite risk averse and very attuned to the legal niceties. I believe this and our very unwieldy bureaucracy will preclude our initiation of contact and keep us in the reactive mode.
So. What's your proposal to fix this, stop reacting to contacts -- and what's a coherent strategy?
1 Attachment(s)
Pashtuns - A Cross-Border People
I've always loved maps, since geography helps reality sense. This one (a clip and shoop from the OP article here) illustrates why a multi-HN approach has to be employed in dealing with the Pashtuns- if we do COIN by the "book", which doesn't quite cover this situation, anyway. So, why do it by the "book" ?
The old Northern Alliance region is fairly secure as a base of operations. What if the yellow-outlined Pashtun area were regarded as an ungoverned area (not part of any sovereignty) ? - like the white spaces on old 19th and 18th century maps.
What ? - heresy on the part of a lawyer trained in modern I Law and its obligatory nation-state concept. You have to admit that it would change the outlook, even viewed from the standpoint of the Operational Law Manual.
Anyway, this map is food for thinking. If there were no legal constraints (we simply "deem" them away - hell, it's a hypothetical), what would you do in the Pashtun area ?
You might also consider what the Paki-ISI did when it approached that area from the other side of its border. The ISI had advantages we do not have - one, same religion; two, many of them were Pashtuns.
1 Attachment(s)
Pakistan - A Composite Nation
Why Pakistanis should be nervous is the story of this map.
The major groups (Punjabis, 44.68% of the population; Pashtuns, 15.42%; Sindhis, 14.1%) amount to almost 3/4 of the total population. The two other major groups (another 15+%) are largely in the Sindh.
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from Wiki -
Seraiki
The Seraiki or Multani people are an ethnic group from the south-eastern areas of Pakistan, especially in the area of the former princely state of Bahawalpur and the districts of Sukkur, Larkana, Dadu, Sehwan, Sanghar, Nawabshah, Hyderabad, Sindh, Mirpurkhas, Multan, Rajanpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, MuzafarGarh, Layyah, Bhakkar, Mianwali, Dera Ismail Khan, Karachi. A significant number of Seraikis also reside in India, with most concentrated in the state of Punjab, Maharashtra and Gujarat. The Seraikis maintain that they have a separate language and culture, but their language is often viewed as a dialect of Sindhi or Punjabi. While the majority of Seraikis follow Islam, a few also follow Hinduism and Sikhism.
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from Wiki -
Muhajir
Muhajir is a diverse term used to describe the Muslim refugees who migrated to Pakistan after the independence in 1947. Traditionally meaning the Muslim refugees who migrated from regions other than the Punjab state of India at the time of Pakistan's independence, in recent years, the term has come to include refugees who've arrived from Burma, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and Iran but for all intents, when the term Muhajir is used, it generally refers to the Muslim refugees from British India.
The term Muhajir itself is now gradually being replaced by the more politically acceptable term "Urdu Speaker" or "Urdu" because of its connotations. Even though 'Urdu speaking' term is still not the correct term to identify a group of people since many of these people claim Middle Eastern, Turkish, Afghan and Indian decent. Many can trace their family roots to the Middle East and Central Asia prior to migration to North and Central South Asia. Many of these claims cannot be verified. The one uniting factor for the people regardless of their origin/race is that their mother tongue is Urdu.
......
The majority of people who migrated after the independence were settled in the port city of Karachi in southern Sindh and in the cities of Hyderabad, Sukkur, Nawabshah and Mirpurkhas.
As well as the above, many Urdu-speakers settled in the cities of Punjab mainly in Lahore, Multan, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi
Today, in Pakistan, 7.6% of the population, or around 12 million citizens identify themselves as 'Urdu-Speaking'. Of this number around 8 Million reside in Sindh and around 4 million reside in Punjab and Islamabad.
You can see why the ISI concentrated on turning Afghanistan into a buffer, finally using the Taliban as the vehicle. Their scheme worked fine, except for 9/11.
There have been so many good thoughts planted in this thread, I have to sit back and think about all of this.
PS: sapperfitz82 - you are preaching to this choir on the following:
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Our judicial system does not currently inspire confidence on the counterterror front.
The last few months of "pounding the War Crimes beat" are fully in agreement with you. Of the three options (convert, contain or kill), only the last seems applicable to hardcore AQ. Others may differ.
Defining the enemy and endstate.
Gian Gentile's op-ed is being discussed here, but his comment below seems relevant here.
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from Gentile article
There are other ways to define the problem, or center of gravity, in Afghanistan. If the "enemy" there is defined as Al Qaeda, then perhaps other policy, strategy and operational options might be considered. In this different conceptual formulation, perhaps a substantial American combat presence on the ground might not be necessary and instead the "enemy" might be dealt with by other means of military power, rather than large numbers of conventional combat forces trying to win hearts and minds.
Food for thought.
Haggling over the details
While the second part of your statement quoted above is correct, the first part is a supposition. I would agree that it is a logical one but one cannot know where a tipping point is for another. Afghans are far more pragmatic than many...
--Exactly, they can chose not to fight. Which is not victory for us or defeat for them. That is what makes this stuff so interesting.
Having said that, I believe if you'll review this thread and others -- always a good idea before jumping in -- on the topic you'll see that both Sapperfitz and I have previously complained of a lack of an achievable goal in Afghanistan and have done so on numerous occasions.
--Very true, but I can't link to all of your posts ;)
True.Easily said; harder done. You are talking about two eastern nations who have no history of strong government behaving in accordance with strong nation western norms. Not going to happen. You are not going to find a guy -- or even a group of guys -- in either nation that can do what you suggest.
--Government was a poor word choice because it implies a western solution. My "hollow slogan" comment was meant as a criticism of a western approach. My idea is to support what works in the region. If that is cronyism and warlordism, work with what is available. Idealism is a poor strategic foundation.
Thus we seem to be in agreement... :D[/QUOTE]
--Good, now we can solve the next problem:)
PS-evidently I can't figure out the multipe "quote option". Sorry for the ugly post.
I'm unsure who you mean by the 'unspeicified' neighbor
Quote:
Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
Just talking crazy here, but I propose, in general, an effective strategy in regards to narcotics in Afghanistan would be to usurp, rather than destroy, control over the trade. The devil's in the details, of course, and it's probably "unethical", but if the trade could be directed towards an unspecified Afghan neighbor which poses a major risk to US security IOT destablize the regime and the subsequent funds invested in Afghan infrastructure, I'd be willing to consider removing the taboos on the drug trade.
but I can't think of any neighbors that we'd like to see less stable than they are. Quite the contrary, in fact -- and I'm applying that in all directions...
As for usurping the drug trade, apparently you aren't aware of the various loud screams and wails about the mere allegation of drug involvement by the CIA and / or others in South East Asia or Central America during either of those two dust-ups. I can hear the media and Congress now. Much less NATO...
Not to mention the fact that if you were in the drug trade, would you easily let someone interrupt your efforts...
Narcotics in Afghanistan are not a problem -- western agreement on what to do about them is a problem.
So many points, so little time.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
AmericanPride
I'm aware of Iran's drug problem. What I don't think is that it's sufficiently "massive" to warrant the kind of political repression necessary as a catalyst for popular action. Opium is one of the few leverages potentially available to the US in regards to Iran's domestic politics IMO.
No, it's not that massive but it is massive enough. Nor would increasing the size of that problem increase the potential for overthrow of the Mullahs.
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I think the popular election of Ahmadinejad after we more or less alienated Khatami speaks against that assertion to some degree.
Not really. It speaks to the power of Ayatollah Khameini to keep any effective opponent of the ballot and to the power of the Pasdaran to ensure that turnput was low --as it was -- and that votes went where they were supposed to.
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Yeah -- the Iranians don't have a general negative opinion of Americans, but I've heard of few Iranians speaking positively of our policies; especially the ones targetted at Iran itself.
That's because our policies are dumb.
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How many Americans recognize that it's the government and not the people of Iran that's the problem?
Most I talk to and I suspect that's a more eclectic crowd in age, social status and experiences than most. Americans, collectively, aren't nearly as dumb as the media and academy like to think.
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However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles. The consequent degradation of our credibility diminishes the already limited access we have with the Iranian people.
The disconnect between our policies and our 'principles' is in the mind of those who select unrealistic principles IMO.
Just as an idle question, doesn't your concern for our principles sort of clash with your 'proposal?'
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What is the relationship between what you describe as Iranian national traits and the stability of the country (and presumbly its impact on the region)? Some argument could be made that expansionism and aggression are consequences of instability, which I assume is your point.
The cessation of 2.5M barrels per day of oil exports. We would REALLY like China and India to have all the oil they want. The relationship of that to what I said is that they would not want to accept any 'help.' They'd probably resist it and, trust me, we do not want to fight in Iran. I spent two years there ; it's not as bad as Afghanistan terrain wise but it's close; it's over 2.5 times as big and it has twice the population. So we mess up the world oil supply -- which was one thing we were quite careful NOT to do in going into Iraq...
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The terms "absurd" and "shallow" were in reference to the Soviet transition to democracy, not necessarily that the Soviet government made a transition of some kind. My apologies for not being more clear.
Not a problem, I knew what you meant. My point was that such words prejudice your following statement whatever it might be. With respect to the specifics, Russia and Iran are different. Russia is not totally western, there's some of the east in there but it is essentially western in most processes. Iran is totally Eastern, it is not at all western in thought processes.
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So I suppose again the question becomes: why do you think an unstable Iran would be negative for US policy?
As above.
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What if we included the assumption that Iran could potentially become a cooperative partner to US policy through a successful negotiation of said instability?
We aren't going to do that; though you certainly may. I don't like to deal in assumptions. :wry:
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Again, my apologies. I should have been more clear: I believe US corporate cooperation in Afghan opium could be hidden in contracts; I assumed that said contracts would be in the category of agriculture. I'm not particularly concerned about the categorization; more concerned with how to make US involvement in the proposed policy less (1) transparant and obvious and (2) more acceptable to those elements of our society which have significant sway in our government. Maybe this part of the proposal is unworkable; I don't know. I'm only exploring ways in which to make the plan acceptable to those relevant in the decision-making process. And yes -- I'm assuming our politicians are realists and not idealists.
Some of both -- however, what you propose is I believe a little much for most of them to accept.
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I wasn't born then since I really didn't have anything on my mind whatsoever. :)
That was obvious.
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Since it's apparent we already have widespread involvement in the drug business, I don't see the objections against doing it again if done "right".
Actually it's not apparent; while there was some, it was not as widespread as the media and some in Congress wanted to think. If you don't see any reason not to do what you suggest, you may want to reconsider any oaths you might have to take in the near future.
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By "right", I mean effectively for as long as possible since anything will eventually fail if run long enough. Yeah -- Congress will raise a fuss at some point, some heads will roll, and some other strategy will be found until that is compromised too. Isn't that how politics works anyways?
If you are a heroin user, then I suppose you're entitled to use the word 'right' in any effort that might enable the trade. If you aren't one, that's probably a bad word to use in deference to those it'll harm. The War on Drugs is not working and is a dumb idea but enabling a trade that does as much damage to people and nations is even more dumb.
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True. Got me. I admit mistakenly using "Taliban" as a synonym for "bad guys" in Afghanistan. I include the smugglers, whatever their identity, in the "bad guy" category for the reasons you cited. OK -- so we co-opt the "crooks" and the farmers involved in opium, make a few bucks, and, most importantly IMO, invest all that hard-earned cash in developing infrastructure for "[effective central government]" in a country which never has experienced it. That's my primary concern; I threw in Iran as a second goose egg, but I'm not really concerned where the opium would end up if it does not adversely impact US security interests. :)
So I suppose a rework of the presentation is necessary.
This from the guy who is derisory about "our self-proclaimed political principles." One who states "However wide or real, there is a perceived disconnect between our policies and our principles" then advocates a totally unprincipled effort...
Either mediocre satire or bad taste, not sure which. Both ? ;)
Tilting at windmills is fun but I think I'll go sack out and rest my lance.
Sorry for the delay, got sidetracked looking for windmills
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
As I am reading Gentile, he is contrasting a large force engaged in "hearts and minds" (stability ops, "nation building", whatever) with "other military means". Since he doesn't define the latter term, I guess it's left to our imaginations. My image is mobile light infantry (conventional, special ops and extra-special ops) knowing where it's going and what it will do when it gets there. What did "other military means" mean to you and what capability is missing?
Partly what you said but a couple of other things not for an unclassified discussion. We do not right now have the full capability required in any of those things though all are being developed.
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I read Gentile as focusing on AQ as the "main enemy" in that theatre ... Whom do you see as the opponents ?
The various Taliban groups (there are a number) plus the Heroin smugglers and the many various warlords and tribes who very much do not want a strong central government * and, if we get dumb or too careless, most of the rest of the population who do not like foreigners but, so far, are being nice and polite as is their wont.
* They will be low key and play both ends against the middle but will fight if they feel too much progress is being made.
Gian is right, AQ is the main effort as far as I can tell, I just like to remind folks there's more to it than that. I also strongly suggest that any 'leaning' in Afghanistan is strictly a matter of convenience and is quite temporary unless there is heavy family involvement.