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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned - Military Advisor Support
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Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned - Military Advisor Support
MCCLL access now requires a CAC card. Now I'm cut off too. Damn. :mad:
Once again, the need for information security is kicking our ass. I'm all for ensuring that sensitive FOUO information is secured, but I rarely have the time during a normal workday to rummage through the MCLL site, and would prefer to do so from my home office.
Just another example of fighting with one hand tied behind our back.
Does anyone have a "Ranger handbookish" version of an advisor handbook? JCISFA is going to take lead on this and wanted to see if there's anything floating around the FID/Advisor community right now. Thanks!
Sully
I think Tom is doing something similar along those lines with CALL.
There's this on the SWJ library:
Military Assistance and Training Advisory Course (MATA) Handbook for Vietnam - US Army Special Warfare School Handbook, January 1966.
Reference material for the military advisor in Vietnam. Reflects doctrine as taught at the Special Warfare School in the 1960's and early '70's. The handbook was prepared for use in the MATA courses of instruction and served as a ready reference for advisors in Vietnam.
There's also the more current FOUO MNF-I COIN handbook, published in May 06. It's not really an "Advisor Handbook", but it does have sections specifically targeted to those in advisory positions. If you don't have it, PM me with a .mil address and I'll get it to you.
Sully,
CALL did one in early 2006 and is doing another right now. I am doing a companion newsletter. the Kilcullen 28 articles project is part of it along with a long piece I wrote on Experience and Cultural Understanding. Rob Thornton and RTK wrote individual articles. I pulled your article and interview from OP 18/19. I would also welcome your help on the Kilcullen 28 project. I just sent that to you and an outline for the newsletter.
Best
Tom
Sully,
Let em go through what I have here in DC with me. If you want any feedback on what I learned in 2005 at MNSTC-I, I can provide some stuff. I have been compiling some FID stuff.
Jim
P.S. Sully, have you seen the latest and greatest version of the SAMS reading list yet?
Jimbo
Your assistance in the Advisor Team newsletter would be most welcome.
Tom
Tom,
No problem, I would be honored to help. It will be a welcome change from the inter-agency project that I am currently banging my head against a wall trying to get stuff done.
OP18 and OP19 could be interesting.
Thanks for the feedback all. OPs 18 and 19 along with the MATA handbook are part of the JCISFA CD we hand out/take with us as part of our takeaway package. Right now there is some discussion about a short tasker for creating an Advisor Handbook (think Ranger Handbook format) and I wanted to see if the community has anything already established. We are working with Fort Riley, Phoenix Academy in Iraq and some organizations to gather the materials to get this knocked out. Thanks for the advice.
Jimbo, that's a big negative. I've been knocking things off the current reading list since I figure things won't change that much. Plus I found out I'm doing the KSU piece so my list may be different (or more!) than the standard reading list.
Sully,
Shoot me a PM with some contact info, I need to bounce something off of you tomorrow. What is the KSU thing??? Hell, Sully, I am even looking for the old reading list. Thanks.
Jim
Latest at the SWJ Blog - It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps by LTC John Nagl.
Quote:
In the linked paper I argue that, just as the new realities of warfare demanded the creation of the Special Forces in the 1960's, winning the Long War will require that the Army develop a standing Advisor Corps. It has been informed by the experience of many advisors with service in Iraq and Afghanistan, and may prove of some interest to the Small Wars Journal / Small Wars Council community of interest.
"Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps" was published by the Center for a New American Security.
The most important military component of the Long War will not be the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our allies to fight with us. After describing the many complicated, interrelated, and simultaneous tasks that must be conducted to defeat an insurgency, the new Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes “Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.” Indeed, it has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to win for them…
Once again, Colonel Nagl offers an eloquent and persuasive piece on Long War requirements. Hopefully it will engender some meaningful discussion, not just a lot of head nodding.
With that in mind, I have problems with a tactically organized force structure being tasked to provide both "Title 10" type support while simultaneously being responsible for operations on the ground. Can the corps commander fulfill his force provider duties while deployed as an advisor to a minister of defense?
On the blog post, Rob Thornton offers the additional insight for including other JIIM players in the mix. This is also critical. Even if you limit the military involvement to advising security forces, that is still best done by full spectrum joint forces, augmented by civilian experts from other agencies. IMHO.
In the Army it exists: It is called the AC/RC units that are set up to advise the ARNG. There has been heistatnce by the Army to deply regular Army AC/RC brigades and battalions to support the training mission. This has been done in limited numbers. What you have is a sturcture as brigade ready to cover down on an entire division. The upside is that when the unit isn't deployed, it is working with the ARNG. Working with the ARNG involves bringing expertise and recent TTP's to to training focused on tactical and administrative requirements. Granted the cultural and language differences are not close to being the same, but it still is enough to "keep your mind right". As far as JIIM, it is going to be 5 years at best beffore anything on the civilian side catches up in the capacity that we would like to see, and that is best case involving the upcoming election not screwing up needed legislation to make this happen.
Hey Old Eagle, Jimbo,
Jimbo are you saying the AC/RC example is a good pattern for hashing out Title 10 turf? Or are you saying that AC/RC is the way to go for advising foreign security forces? It sounds like both.
I've seen one AC/RC unit deploy as MiTTs - 2nd IA DIV MiTT down to the BN level - we replaced them. They had some real challenges as they tried to figure out what was different from the methodology they used working with USARNG units and Iraqis. I think the gap may be too far to bridge and have them do both missions good enough.
I think the value of what LTC Nagl puts forward is that it is a "more" dedicated capability that balances creating units that do nothing but advisory work and hyper specialized with taskings that reach down in to MTO&E and TDA units where their primary missions are compromised. To me it asks the very important question of "How important is the training & use of host nation forces to reduce our global requirements in maintaining stability?" We need to decide that. Much like the Inter-Agency debate, and the debate over conventional war systems aquisitions, the problems we face now are going to influence how we spend our nickel. What is the best way to use the force structure increase? Is it just more BCTs which allow us to slow OPTEMPO for deploying BCTs in Iraq, or do we see the need for more BCTs to do more with in other places, and then we wind up with the same OPTEMPO? It becomes the proverbial self-licking ice cream cone.
The other side of the coin - that I think LTC Nagl is advocating is using those force structure gains as a more dedicated Combat Multiplier - both in the sense of developing Host Nation Security Forces, but also in the sense of what those soldiers bring to the MTO&E and TDA units when they return and are sent out into the Force. While LTC Nagle cites Iraq and Afghanistan for use of the Advisory course, but I think we need them beyond. This could become a core compentency and I don't know if adding it to the MTO&E units METL is a good idea. I'd have to go back, but what I'd like to see is a long enough tour in the advisory core to do perhaps a focused train up on the georgrpahical location they will be working before they deploy for a year. This might require a 2 year tour.
I understand that JIIM cooperation on any real scale is probably a ways out - I know you have been working it, but how much would it cost in reources to establish an HSOC (Home Station Operations Command) in say Riley or wherever home might be that is staffed by either Inter-Agency onesies and twosies or even contractors with Inter-Agency experience to work the connections back to OGAs, Regional CMDs and Embassies? How about some OGA experienced contractors who deploy with the HQs to work LNO issues on the ground? We're not talking about building Host Nation (DIE) capacity yet, we're talking about connectors and wheel grease.
For the Title 10 stuff - I thnk once they deploy they work for the Regional CDR or his designated CDR - you can't have unity of command any other way.
Hopefully will resolve the Inter-Agency piece fully without another 9/11, but I don't know. I guess you can tell what is really important to somebody based on how they spend their money. I guess that is what we're asking, what is really important?
Regards Rob
Perhaps someone can chime in on why Special Forces units in the Gan were more concerned about direct action missions, and not these missions, which to me seem to fall under FID, which is a SF core competency...?
Ski, I'd say its a question of having enough SOF, and how expensive it is to grow SOF capabilities that are more then just numbers. Our SOF are executing a growing number of DA missions that require time and effort to train and plan, but are also so important (HVT) that to increase the margin of success we have assigned them to a SOF unit. FID/Advisory missions also take resources and are also growing. We can't grow SOF fast enough or big enough with enough QA/QC to ensure we get relevant SOF capabilities so you are left with having conventional forces doing parts pieces to make up the delta, or not doing the missions at all - its a tough choice. A SOF soldier is a huge investment - a very worthwhile one, but a big investment if we are talking about people. Having said that, it would seem a lot more jobs feel more like "special" or "irregular" and less like "conventional".
On that note, I'd point out that serving as an advisor offers a pretty good investment strategy. All the qualities that are emphasized as leadership traits, and the skill sets we say we need such innovation, mental agility, flexibility, etc. are cultivated on advisory duty. It was on par with CMD as both the most professionally rewarding and professionally influencing assignment I've had. It fundamentally altered the way I view training, equipping, and fighting because it afforded me another perspective of the enemy I had not had. It also offered me immersion in another culture under fire - important I think since we fight mostly away games. The benefits of having as many soldiers afforded this opportunity I think cannot be overstated, as they rotate back into the force they will bring the experience of how indigenous security forces deal with problems from a long term perspective vs. a CF unit rotation. This is critical to understanding long term reasons for conflict and identifying and solving potential problems we might create prior to them having an adverse effect on operations. It also helps unit CDRs understand when something is really an operational problem vs. an operational condition. Further it forges ties at the grass roots which will pay off long after an advisor leaves for home.
Hi Rob and Ski--
Rob certainly has a part of the story but there is more to it.
Part 1: SF, since its founding, has not less than 3 esthos, based on the dominant mission of particular groups. 10th SFG was founded to conduct UW behind Soviet lines in ways similar to the Jedburg and other OSS/SOE teams in WWII. Training partisans was their thing. 5th SFG made its name in Vietnam where it conducted mucho direct action (DA) missions. The high point of its history was the Son Tay Raid - DA all the way. 7th SFG focused largely on LATAM and the FID mission; it was highly successful in El Salvador. All the other groups fall somewhere in between dpending on their peacetime and wartime experience. My sense is that 3rd Group is pretty close to 7th based on discussions with them during Operation Uphold Democracy. In any event, SF reflects many of the divisions within the regular forces on the best way to fight COIN. Obviously, it is far more complex but I really suspect that Group ethos is reflected in the degree to which particular SF Groups are more enemy or population centric in Kilcullen's approach/
Part 2: During Vietnam the JFK Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC) ran a military advisors course called MATA. At the same time, MI had a well received program for Foreign Area Specialists (FAS). General Sam Wilson, an intel guy and SF who commanded JFKSWC noticed that FAS and MATA each had 3 components, two of which were common to both programs - language and in-country training. FAS had a masters degree as its third element while MATA had the advisors course. In Wilson's mind the masters program would be good for advisors and the advisors course would be good for the intel types. So he combined the programs as FAO with the important caveat that either the masters or advisors (now FAO) course could be waived without prejudice. This workded pretty well until 1986 when General Bill Odom (any relation Tom?) made a play to bring FAO under MI. He didn't get it but the enhanced FAO program dropped the FAO course making it practically the same as the old FAS program. The result - along with OPM 21 - was to take the non-SF community out of the advisor business almost completely.
And, then, along came Iraq and Afghanistan....
Cheers
JohnT
Hey Ski,
I left something out in answering your question. The advisory mission in Iraq is a little different then the tradional FID mission assigned to ODAs. I think our idea of what FID is has morphed from say building an indigenous capability in say OEF 1 or maybe as a guerilla force that compliments U.S. forces operating in the area to one of building a force capable of functioning independently and indefinately to meet host nation security needs. Jedburgh could shed allot of light on the changing role of FID, if in fact there is one.
However, look at the advisory team composition changes as proposed by LTC Nagl:
Advisor Team Composition
Team Leader
Team NCOIC
Team Adjutant
S1 NCOIC
Team Intelligence Offi cer
Team Intel Sergeant
Team Intel Specialist
Team Ops Offi cer
Team Ops Sergeant
Team Logistics Offi cer
Team Logistics Sergeant
Team Medical Offi cer
Team Medical Sergeant
Team Light Wheel Mechanic
Infantry Squad (Personal Security
Detachment/Infantry Trainers)
Total Strength: 25
It is different from an ODA. This composition has a heavy influence on developing the staff capabilities that sustain, synchronize and focus combat operations.
Below is an excerpt from the JP on FID
From Joint Publication 3-07.1
Joint Tactics, Techniques,
and Procedures for
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
Commensurate with US policy goals, the focus of all US foreign
internal defense (FID) efforts is to support the host nation’s
(HN’s) program of internal defense and development (IDAD).
These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by emphasizing
the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of
society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely
to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these
needs should prescribe the principal focus of US efforts. The
United States will generally employ a mix of diplomatic,
economic, informational, and military instruments of national
power in support of these objectives. Military assistance is often
necessary in order to provide the secure environment for the
above efforts to become effective.
Regards, Rob
Wow John, I just got smarter:) I was writing while you were posting. I did not know the history behind it - seems like we always manage to short sheet ourselves. Regards, Rob
The 5th started out doing quite a bit of advising work for the CIA (if memory serves) with the Montagnards in Vietnam and earlier in Laos with some of the elements there. It was after Operation Switchback in 1965 that they got more into DA, but that was due to pressure from the Army at large who saw the CIDG program (and others) as a quick source for light infantry and not a local defense force as originally envisioned by the CIA (and most likely the 5th Group as well). And, of course, once SOG got ramped up (and the Greek programs run directly by the 5th Group) they got hauled heavily into DA and never looked back.
Steve and Rob--
As Rob says, "I've [just] learned something.":) Again, there is nearly always more to the story. That said, why do we keep having to learn the same lessons over and over?:mad:
Rob, look at John's proposal: it is an adaptation of an ODA (which in turn was an adaptation of an OSS/SOE concept. These things need to be adapted because one size does NOT fit all. Still, a good idea is one that can be modified to fit different circumstances.
Cheers
JohnT
I was embedded as a journalist with a Marine MiTT advisor team near Habbaniyah, Iraq in 2006 and was shocked by the lack of logistical support for the team and the slapdash nature of their preparation. They were the best group of Marines I'd ever seen in operation but they were desperately short of gear and support. Nagl's concept should be adopted asap.
Thanks for the info.
I still believe that SF - not SOF - but SF, should be used to train indiginous forces as a primary mission.
The DA stuff should be left to the Rangers, MARSOC and other black SOF elements. If we need more DA capabilities, it seems to this treadhead that it would be easier to grow them (what is the difference between these SOF elements and the Marine Raiders/Army Rangers of WWII?) then Special Forces capabilities, which are admittedly much more difficult to grow.
It's very interesting to see the history behind how DA has been incorporated into the SF Groups...but I wonder if it really the way it should be.
Then again, no one asked my opinion! LOL!
Just finished working a long project on advisors and thanks to guys on here it will soon be out. But in the course of that effort, I had an in-depth conversation with a senior officer who was a key player in the MiTT effort in Iraq. We agreed that yes this is an SF mission but SF is not built on the scale necessary to get the job done. As for RC components taking on the mission, they just do not have the correct tools for the job. They are structured to train conventional reserve units in conventional tactics and they share the same culture. And culture is bar none the key consideration in whether one of these advisory efforts works or fails. I see the need for an advisor functional area like FAO that adds a greater manpower pool to those available for such duties--AND THEN REWARDS THEM FOR IT. Forgive the caps but without rewards, this goes no where beyond the ever growing stack of good idea PPT presentations.
Best
Tom
Spot on. However, the effort has to be HUGE, based on the magnitude of the mission. Not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but many other locations now and in the future.
Good luck.
I'd like to see what your presentation looks like. Maybe a PM?
What will the umbrella organization look like?
This seems like a Dept of State mission in some ways and a military mission in others. ??? Civil affairs work with Agricultural, Police, engineering, educational, medical , business and financing etc expertise required depending upon situation faced locally. Long term 5-10 yr + assignments.
I finally had a chance to read all of John's monograph. It is, as always, thought provoking and imaginative. As I noted in an earlier post, the advisor team is an adaptation of an SFODA, OSS?SOE Jedburghs and Ops Groups. I have no real quarrel with its size or general composition - I'd probably add a commo specialist in trade for something else. And, like SF, I'd work hard to see that team members were cross trained.
I do have several concerns at the higher levels of command. First, combat advisors are not solely and Army function. Marines, sailors, airmen all act as advisors. The guys from other services all made major contibutions to the MILGP El Salvador advisory effort and two of the three advisors who died in El Sal were from the Navy and the AF. So, perhaps, the advisor corps should be a joint activity.
I also think that much of the expertise - especially the institutionalized expertise - is found in the sOF community. FID is an SF mission but there are not enough SF to do it all, as John points out. Thus, I think that proponency for the advisor corps ought to be in USSOCOM - perhaps delegated to SF Command - and the organizational structure built around a sub-unified command concept. This would both give it joint capabilities and an education/training structure where the expertise - including basic language - resides.
For the army, then combat advisor would be a specialty with all the promotion opportunities that John recommends.
Don't know if it has been mentioned before but inside MARSOC is the FMTU-foriegn military training unit. The structure is based on SF, the missions are designed for operating everywhere except Afghanistan and Iraq, I think they are conventionally minded currently but the structure and trainingcould be shifted. Unfortunately I don't know that much about them, it is too new to have any real history.
Hello
I have read the article. I personally think it is a good idea. I have a few questions (feel free ignore them if they are pointless).
1) Would the Corps deploy with all 3 divisions or would they have 1 division at a time deployed?
2) Where are the people who speak the native language going to come from and how would they fit into the structure? (ie this would vary depending one where the Corps was deployed)
3) Does anyone think if this works a reconstruction corps would be a good idea? (for winning hearts and minds and for construction).
4) Do you think a smaller model (brigade or battalion size) could work for smaller countries? (im thinking the Anglo-Sphere).
I really enjoyed the article!
I think what we are discussing is really just the Military or Security Force aspects of what might be a larger effort. In itself that is a very large question and a departure of magnitude. Consider that LTC Nagle is advocating using at least part of the force increase to sustain an Advisory Corps, while maintaining fill levels of the BCTs. This is a big idea in and of itself.Quote:
This seems like a Dept of State mission in some ways and a military mission in others. ??? Civil affairs work with Agricultural, Police, engineering, educational, medical , business and financing etc expertise required depending upon situation faced locally. Long term 5-10 yr + assignments.
Security (derived from some flavor) is a pre-condition to stability, There is nothing to say that the Army Advisory Corps could not become a component of a DIME effort, but it does not have to fulfill (nor is it organized to) the other DIE advisory functions. Even if you assigned it to them it is unlikely they could meet the requirements of advising in areas they are untrained to, or un-trainable to - ex. agriculture engineering, etc. That does not mean you could plug those into the COCOM, or under the umbrella of the COCOM's designated hitter. I do think there are certain functions that can benefit from being Joint, and inter-agency, but to do so makes the manning issue harder since the other services and agencies may not be getting the backfills required to maintain the parent organizations needed to meet their other missions.
If we are talking outside of known points (Iraq and Afghanistan) I think the first thing might be to do a macro assessment on the state we are assisting to determine what needs work to bring about sustained stability and then tailor the advisory assistance package to meet those needs. The assessment could be done by the diplomatic mission since they have the on the ground long term relationship and the resident DIME expertise to do so (if lacking they could request augmentation to do the assessment), then sent up to have it approved. The parts of the package could then generated and sent out in an advisory TF sort of package with a clear CoC that kept it headed in the right direction.
Our (the Military's) first step should be in determining how we are going to meet the request. Will it be from an established organization with the capability to train, equip and organize for success? Or will it be on an ad-hoc basis that tasks and is seen as temporary? I think the difference is between swimming and treading water. I think it largely depends on if we believe that we are going to be advising the host nation forces of failed, failing or reborn states to help them regain or sustain security and stability in order to prevent groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and AQ from establishing sanctuaries and recruiting grounds for further terrorist activities, and subversion that leads to instability.
If we believe that this is as critical a mission as almost any other then we might expend the effort, if we believe that more BCTs can do the job as well by either tasking for personnel and equipment, or by adding to their METL, then we will probably go that way.
The level of importance we place on the means to achieve the ends will determine how we spend the money. We need to ensure that however the additonal troop increase is used, it helps the military (in this case largely the Army - within the context of the article) meet the strategic policy goals set forth by the U.S. Government
There is another issue here and that is: would the Army really be willing to create an advisor corps on its own? The Army has gotten rid of Rangers and almost did SF in until El Sal came along and saved it. What would have happened without Cohen-Nunn, SO-LIC, and USSOCOM under GEN Jim Lindsey, I shudder to think about. And the costs of the "enhanced" FAO program have been significant resulting in less advisor capability than before "enhancement."
This is what brings me to the idea of SF proponency - JFKSWC has the training skills - and a sub-unified command of SOCOM. Many of the ideas John proposed derive from the old Security Assistance Force concept and its development as a FID Augmentation Force (FIDAF) concept. Putting this together with a PRT and a JFC with JTFs makes some sense to me.
John,
Spot on. I thought about it, but decided I'd edge around it indirectly. Service cultures are not known to make big departures - it has to do with not getting it too far wrong, even if it means giving up something that might get it right. To get LTC Nagl's proposal (and the logical extensions of it) taken seriously, will require us to decide what is really important to us in terms of capabiliites that match not only existing requirements, but deciding on which future requirements are most likely. You have to measure what you get by investing in more of the known quantities, vs. the semi-experimental. A couple of bonuses to an organization such as an Advisory Corp would be its utility, Inter-Agency flexibility, potential as a combat multiplier, the rotational commitment (i.e. its not a either-or seperate branch, but rather a new skill set) and that the mission strengthens the skills of the individual in ways that will benefit MTO&E & TDA units - there are somethings you cannot build any other way in as condensed a period as when you immerse someone.
Hi Rob--
I hope that nobody is mistaking my point - you certainly are not - for I do believe that John Nagl's proposal has merit. I just don't think that the Army as an institution will buy it and I believe that an advisor corps is inherently a joint organization. Moreover, USSOCOM, in its Title 10 institutional role, seems to be the ideal vehicle to raise, train, and equip the advsor corps force. SOCOM, in that role, also has the clout to force the services to support with manpower and common equipment. It was, in part, I believe the power that USSOCOM wielded that provided the impetus for the creation of SF branch. (I could be wrong on this but it seems a logical deduction for a partial explanation.)
The sub-unified command proposal that I made in the previous post would be crafted from Nagl's structure with modifications to fit both the joint nature of the beast and the input of both the SOF and conventional communities. It is a really interesting prospect and 20k is not all that many troops.
Cheers
JohnT
Hey John,
yep, I knew where you were headed. The good thing about SOCOM is they seem more flexible in their mainstream thinking. However unless you are talking about ear-marking increases for an Advisory Corps you'd probably get resentment and foot dragging, especially if we're talking about putting them under a different service HQs (well in that they get their own budget anyway). That would really spark resistance and probably raise more civil-military tension.
I would like to see Joint, it would provide a base of skills sets that we cannot provide. I would like to see Inter-Agency for the same reason. I think that may have to be more of an external decision though, since its unlikely that any of the services are going to want to pony up (historically), particularly one that sees itself as giving up the lionshare of people. If the U.S. were to pursue that, then it might be a reasonable idea to just go ahead and look at Trufioun's proposal and make a new entity with all the capabilities we'd mentioned. The downside we'd mentioned before (starting from scratch can be awfully hard), but the up side would be allowing the services to preserve their lanes, and their people (right after a few had been lifted), and the new organization would have its own budget, you can design it from the ground up with civil-military functions, and it walks in with a semi-clean slate. Expensive up front though, very expensive - plus ugly $$$$ fights on the Hill - plus you would not gaurentee Joint, or Inter-Agency - just another 3 letter agency/organization.
I go back to the need to define the problem as one that is not going away, but will expand (?), gain consensus about a solution, and then provide some clear guidance about who provides what to whom for how long, etc. There needs to be (and there may already be) a dialogue between the ends, ways and means legs of the stool. It may be for the reasons that we discussed that SOCOM is the way to go, but it would be a big rock in their rucksack, and some of the other services would probably see themselves as losing needed resources to fulfill their missions.
For simplicity's sake, I can see an argument for LTC Nagl's pitch "as is" because there is not allot of wake to it since the Army gets its folks back and benefits. I'd also say they are currently fielding the bulk of the numbers (not proportionally, just sheer numbers) because they have the mass to absorb it (even though its a tasker to many units). It may also be easier given the exposure of senior leaders to OIF and OEF to understand and implement a big step like this, without requiring direction from the Hill, but rather an OK - in the Title 10 wiggle room. I don't think they'd get as much pushback from the other services since this is a resource intensive proposal. It also has what I see as a huge benefit of increasing the skill set and maturity of the individual soldiers as they rotate through. The loss however is the other BCTs form the increase.
If we start doing the math of how much it will take to form, equip, train & sustain the additional BCTs vs. the value raised by doing I think we'll have the stuff decisions are made from. I think there is a solid argument that an Army Advisory Corps would be a very efficient and effective way to meet important current and emerging needs, increase the proficiency of the force through individual experience and training, and be able to focus limited monies to reset the existing BCTs with their equipment. The mission benefits because it is institutionalized and becomes a part of professional development, the MTO&E & TDAs win because they have predictability and focus. In those regards it also sounds pretty safe as a way not to get our capabilities sturcture too far wrong.
Rob--
I appreciate your argument and if the Army would buy in, I'd support it. My problem is that, without a major change in the players in key decision roles, I don't see it happening. Just too much for the institutional Army. The changes required to make it happen would be GEN Petraeus and those who think like him as CSA, VCSA, TRADOC Cdr, CAC Cdr, FORSCOM Cdr, etc and people who think like them succeeding them for at least a decade. Then, there are the legitimate claims of the conventional force Army that would have to be balanced.
For a start from scratch approach to work, I think that, like Goldwater-Nichols, it would have to be imposed on the military services by the Congress. And I don't see any Barry Goldwaters, Sam Nunns, Bill Cohens, et. al. in any positions of Congressional leadership. The current Democrats won't buy in because they suffer from the Vietnam/Iraq syndrome in spades as do the current Republicans to only a slightly lesser extent
So, where does that leave us? Looking for a home and incremental development of the advisor capability in ways that will institutionalize it.
On that cheery note....:cool:
JohnT
Hey John,
I just wanted us to lay out all the challenges so it would not remain just a really cool theoretical "what if we" sort of idea. I think we have pretty well done that & thanks for taking us there.
I think you have raised the best question though - Do we have the strategic leadership required to be both diagnostic and prognositic in our approach to problem solving?
History would point out that without strategic leadership in our GOs/Flags, Congress and President we run the risk of passing on truly innovative thinking (designed to redirect resources in meaningful ways that solve the correct problems) whereas a lack of strategic leadership can often focus on the reasons why we should preserve the status quo (rice bowls, etc.) and continue to apply reources in the same ways toward the same ends. Strategic Leadership is the catalyst by which challenge our original assumptions, assessments and make course corrections to put us out in front.
Must be lunch:D
regards, Rob
I think Nagel is on the right track, but I for one have not been impressed with the Army’s and Marine’s approach to training and advising programs to date. For the most part, although there are exceptions, their performance has been substandard. Any approach we develop must be based on the force we have, not the force we which we had. For example:
1. We have very few strategic corporals (or equivalents) in our ranks.
2. Our soldiers/marines come from an technologically advanced society, that makes it much harder for the kids today to emphasize with their developing nation counterparts.
3. Our soldiers/marines today also come from such an extremely liberal society that we’re an aberration to much of the developing world, which is clinging hard to its traditional values (some argue the reason for the current fight), which makes it very difficult for our soldiers to understand cultural norms in developing nations.
I think the secret to making Nagel’s proposal work is selection and training. The only unit remaining that has the professional culture, doctrine, selection process, and training to support developing capable foreign trainers and advisors is the Army's Special Forces, but they have limitations based on their size and other missions, so it is necessary to assume that the conventional army should be able perform the training and advisory role.
I think that would be a fair assumption if:
1. Soldiers and Marines were specially selected for this mission.
2. Then they were trained and equipped to do the mission (not some shake and bake program)
3. They had a supporting chain of command focused on this mission (which we do)
I have seen it too many times where young conventional soldiers and marines working with foreign troops become quickly frustrated, because their training didn’t prepare them for what to expect, or simply they were the wrong person to put in that position. They end up accusing the local soldiers of being stupid because they don't speak English, can't shoot their weapons well, and they have no maintenance systems or skills, etc. Not only does the training fall way short of expectations, we end up creating a bad impression of Americans in the eyes of the soldiers being trained, yet these same American kids will perform adequately soldiers with their American peers, because they're a culturally integrated package operating trained to perform that role. It isn’t the kid that failed, rather we failed to prepare the kid to execute the mission.
Assuming the Army would support Nagel’s proposal I think the key to success is personnel selection. While the Special Forces assessment process works well, it is much too rigorous for what we're attempting to build (we need a lot of soldiers and marines not an elite few), because we would end up weeding out several potentially great advisors who may not have the athletic ability or mental/physical toughness to be an unconventional warrior behind enemy lines. The key is identifying what we’re looking for, and then determining how to assess for it. It will probably be based more personality based than physical skills.
Then we have to develop a training program. This sounds easy, but if you look at much our training has evolved in recent years, you’ll realize it is a big leap to all the sudden being placed in some north African nation with a battalion of poorly equipped troops, no designated training ranges, etc. You need guys and gals that can solve problems, and work in far less than ideal conditions.
I don’t think the Army will raise to the occasion, and they’ll fight hard to avoid forming an advisor unit, so we need an interim measure in the short run, and I think that answer may be providing a cadre of training and advisor leaders, who probably for the most part would hail from the senior ranks of Special Forces Officers, Warrant Officers and NCOs. They would work through, by, and with designated conventional forces as the leaders for their advisor units. For this to work, they would have to be placed in key leadership positions.
Another option, perhaps cheaper and more effective is going back to contractors. I worked with MPRI at my side more than once, and my experience was very positive. This gives our nation the capability to rapidly surge and contract the size of the advisory force as needed, based on the threat.
Just some thoughts on the way ahead.
Bill, great points
There is also something said to providing these teams with the mechanisms for obtaining resources. This would be a much larger scale then the previous efforts. We're talking about both self sustaining resources, and resources provided to the HN rather for training or fighting.Quote:
Then we have to develop a training program. This sounds easy, but if you look at much our training has evolved in recent years, you’ll realize it is a big leap to all the sudden being placed in some north African nation with a battalion of poorly equipped troops, no designated training ranges, etc. You need guys and gals that can solve problems, and work in far less than ideal conditions.
One of the problems we had on the MiTT was the $$$ assigned to us by quantity and type were for conventional units living on a FOB (TIF and OMA), not a TT living on a remote site embedded with its HN unit. While we had access to PRC funds, the approval process was convoluted and as such untimely. TTs are not resourced the way ODAs were. We wound up having to either scavage through the CF FOB dump (you'd be surprised what you can find and carry out with a Kraz 7.5t), or going and making a case to the MSC who was forced to weigh those priorities against his units. The MSC often came through, but he had to make some hard choices and that ate up time.
Take that and consider how an effort that sends lots of teams to remote locations across the globe and you start to see the fiscal authority these teams are going to need. You could say we'll move stuff by TRANSCOM all the time, but that only gets you so far - probably not enough lift unless you constrain yourself to certain regions with the required infrastructure. You could go commercial, but even that is only going to get you so far in many cases. You can purchase locally, but that raises some interesting issues such as contracting and all the headaches that go with it. This also points to the need of a study that considers the logistical impacts of adopting this in the robust manner we are discussing - certainly the LOG & C2 makes it a Joint issue.
The organization is going to have to be built and resourced with that in mind. Part of it comes with selecting agile thinkers who can solve problems in ways that match their conditions. Part of it comes with the parent organization understanding that this is not a side show or distraction, but requires a great deal of authority commensurate to its responsibility.
The beauty in this from an operational perspective would be an in place organization to provide insights back to mainstream Army or the SOF community for related operations.
To set this up right requires acknowledgement that this is a critical part of GWOT and should be resourced in all areas accordingly. This requires a departure from the way we like to see ourselves and our role on the battlefield. Advisory work done right is hard and its requires as good as leadership and people as any other job on the battlefield. It also requires resourcing more in line with an ODA then a rifle company. Nobody should have any illusions, we'd be putting these teams into austere conditions where they will face disease, sub-standard living conditions, sub-standard (by FOB standards) Force Protection, threats & isolation, and a host of other threats main stream Army does not usually have to deal with as KBR usually either beats us there or arrives as soon as the $$$ is allocated. These teams will have to be comfortable living with each other and immersed in foreign cultures without either going crazy, jeopardizing the mission or both. They will have to be able to move between the conventional and the unconventional with relative ease.
The upside is we circulate through the force team members who are not only technically and tactically proficient, but emotionally tough problem solvers who can lead under the most challenging of conditions. To me this is more akin to a revolution then any NCW type application - we would be challenging the conventional mindset we have cherished as a model of success for so long.
Also from Bill
We need to ask ourselves what type of training is required to ensure success for a mission like this with all of its austereness, and unpredictability. We need to ask how long it will take, and based on the demands for teams, how much throughput must we generate?Quote:
I have seen it too many times where young conventional soldiers and marines working with foreign troops become quickly frustrated, because their training didn’t prepare them for what to expect, or simply they were the wrong person to put in that position. They end up accusing the local soldiers of being stupid because they don't speak English, can't shoot their weapons well, and they have no maintenance systems or skills, etc. Not only does the training fall way short of expectations, we end up creating a bad impression of Americans in the eyes of the soldiers being trained, yet these same American kids will perform adequately soldiers with their American peers, because they're a culturally integrated package operating trained to perform that role. It isn’t the kid that failed, rather we failed to prepare the kid to execute the mission.
I think a good starting place is SFAS & Q-Course models vs. say a Ranger School approach. I'm not sure it needs to be an exact template, but it does need to consider the approach it uses to build moral strength and resolve in individuals while also building an understanding of what a small team is and how important each individual on that small team is. Then have a portion of the training that takes the skill set that individual already has and modifies it to working on a small team that is going out to build and advise larger HN organizations. No, we probably should not be trying to build SFers - if it were that easy to get that quality in the required quantity, we'd probably already done it. Its not. So what we need is something to transform mindsets of conventional soldiers used to operating in mainstream Army organizations into an unconventional mindset of the type required to succeed on a small team with little access to the things we take for granted in the conventional one. We're talking mental & spiritual over physical. We want guys who believe in their decisions and will take initiative on big issues, but are still well grounded enough to move back and forth. The benefit would be you only have to attend this part of the training once in your career, after that all you'd show up for is the team building events and the events which prepare you either for a new role on the team, or the focused training to prepare you for the area you will operate in.
I'd say a cadre at the course probably made up of PMCs with advisory or SF backgrounds would probably be the most cost effective way to do it with ARSOF so busy. The S3 of the school could be either a contractor or green suiter with the same background. The S3 would fall up under a BDE (Adv Training BDE) charged with a training, but the green suit BDE CDR would report to the green suit Advisory Corps CDR.
Rob,
Great points, and I didn't want to touch the systems yet, but you're absolutely correct. If we don't have pots of money and authorities for these guys, they won't be set up for success. Additionally they would have to get a priority mission status with TRANSCOM, or be given enough money to do it via contract air. Having worked a number of projects with the State Department, they have cracked the code for using contract air/sea to move military equipment. However, as we have all been stating, this is a complete break with the current Army culture. That is why I reluctantly think contractors might be the better option, at least in the short term. The Army will do studies on this for 10 years, then come up with a solution that would have worked 10 years ago:)
Hey Bill, I hear you, but I think we'd be hurting ourselves
That is the appeal of using contractors in roles you might ought to be using green suiters - it makes it appear as though you don't have to make any tough choices or changes, just .ppt deep ones. In truth you cede a great deal of authority and preserve organizational aspects that probably need to change - and you become more resistant to change. With PMCs you also basically lease without an option to own - and before long you get physically and psychologically addicted to the PMC option.Quote:
That is why I reluctantly think contractors might be the better option, at least in the short term. The Army will do studies on this for 10 years, then come up with a solution that would have worked 10 years ago
In this case of going with PMCs there'd be a huge employment opportunity for green suiters - many of them would be the very talent you hoped to preserve in the uniformed services. I would not be surprised to see attractive presentations from the PMCs on how they can do this better for less, I only hope before we buy into a Vegas show, we consider that the price is much heftier then just the cover charge.
I'm OK for using PMCs for limited tasks that have either an expiration date until you can grow your own, or because the shelf life and scope of the task are limited, but if you have identified a mission that indicates a major change, you need to grow the capability to sustain it with outsourcing. Advisory functions could quickly become a core competency. It also provides the type of experiences we say are required in our uniformed soldiers for this long war no matter if we are talking on an advisory team or in a conventional unit, the soldiers, sailors and marines responsible for the tactical end of this war require these skills.
I was just going over the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. Here is a fantastic quoute lifted from the Exec Summary on pg. 8
If that is not a mandate for change, then it should not have been included.Quote:
"It remains vital that the United States, our allies and partners face this enemy with a force of intelligent, and culturally attuned professionals. Now is the time to invest in the human capital needed to combat this enemy for the coming decades."
Regards, Rob
Developing a professional national military capable of defending its borders and providing internal security is necessary in the development of a functional state. However, it is a long term program that will take a decade or more in each place it is started. What do you do in the near term to provide security and allow for a political system to development free from disruption from groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan and the former Baathists, AQI, and Shiite militias in Iraq? Relying solely on foreign troops to provide the security and combat the anti-government groups poses problems while employing the new military too quickly can have equally disasterous results such as mass desertions.
There needs to be another option, a way to quickly raise and employ domestic forces to combat insurgents and terrorists and provide security. My inspiration for this idea are the units created by the British such as Queen Victoria's Corps of Guides in India. Basically, these units would consist of local nationals who are NCO'd and officered by American or other coalition advisors and paid and equipped by the coalition nations and fall under the chain of command of coalition leadership. The forces would be raised and centered in the geographic area where each force is recruited from, similar to a militia or national guard. The long term end state of these units is to either integrate them into the host country's professional military or disband them once the new professional military and other security forces are fully functional. Also, there should be a mechanism for volunteers to move from the "intermediate" forces to the professional military if they desire.
I think we are already seeing this half happening now in Anbar and possibly other parts of Iraq where Iraqis are being supplied if they agree to go after AQI. But again, what is happening now appears to be only a 50% solution, there needs to exist an advisory organization for taking control and leading these "intermediate" forces.
If an Advisor Corps is created, it should have the mission of working to develop professional and lasting military organizations. However, the corps should also the ability to lead "intermediate" forces until the professional military of the host nation is ready and able to operate independently from its advisors.
Hi Jon--
Take a look at the USMC Small Wars Manual of 1940 for an American approach to the problem. The difficulty is the disconnect between the trained military.constabulary/security force and the political/governmental capacity of the client state. In what became India, it worked pretty well, not so in what became Pakistan or (for the US, Central America and the Caribbean).
This does not negate the need nor the notion that the intervening power is responsible for developing local security forces. It simply highlights the fact that security is tied directly to governance.
Cheers
JohnT
Hey all,
I wanted to return to the issue of more BCTs vs. an Advisory Corps because I think it is essential to developing force capabilities that meet our current and future needs. Keep in mind, I'm not advocating one over the other (yet), but I am acknowledging that the two take a different approach and offer advantages and disadvantages to addressing our current and future needs.
Attached is a JPG I adopted from a .ppt brief on Joint Systems from the AWC. It goes over the linkages from the NMS to capabilities. However I have deleted the capabilities and replaced it with a question mark to foster the discussion since the capabilities listed were constrained to current force structure. What is left is the NMS' military objectives linkage to the missions and tasks. I also placed Green/Yellow/Red Color Codes over the top reflecting Significant Increases/ Insignificant Increase or Loss/ Significant Loss respectively in terms of capabilities to start the discussion about advantages and disadvantages between BCTs and an Advisory Corps.
This is a first glance assessment of what an Advisory Corps over more BCTs would bring. It does not mean that one done on the BCTs would be exactly the inverse. The context of the missions should be somewhat universal - ex. in the Protect the U.S. its arguable that BCTs provide the structure and response to respond more quickly and effectively then a advisory BN or BDE, however, the TTs might be able to provide Staff liaison and planning functions to facilitate inter agency coord better then a BCT which must also C2 its own lower echelons. Under Prevent Conflict and Surprise attacks its yellow - an Advisory Corps would not be able to deter much - but might be able to improve HN deterrence, however by being on the ground can gather good HUMINT through the HN force lessening the chance of surprise. Some I think are clearly green (others may disagree) , such as eliminating safe havens since a long term persistent presence on the ground can better shape (more effective and efficient) the HN environment then say a BCT rotating through.
I think that if you compare this one with one done on the BCTs it might show that an Advisory Corps and the existing BCTs compliment each other. It might also allow supplementing the exisitng BCTs with SSTRO capabilities that are currently being taken out of hide - ex. more MPs, CA, PsyOps, Medical and other LOG.
What I'd say is any discussion that challenges accepted notions about how we spend our money (in this case - force structure increases) must show how those changes would provide advantages, and what disadvantages we'd gain/lose by doing so.
Thoughts?