Counterinsurgency Education Request
Would appreciate any thoughts on the following RFI from a Marine:
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... I've done a good deal of COIN study and a little practical application in Iraq. As I was thinking through how to design a regimental HQ's PME program for an upcoming deployment, it became clear to me that I have no idea how to teach COIN.
I can teach TTP's (VCP, counter IED, etc.), but HQ's personnel above the company don't really do TTP's except as personal protective measures while traveling about. We can also train COC battle drills, but using MERC Chat to pass word of a TIC or downed aircraft isn't COIN either. We need to do these types of events, but what I am aiming at for this project is education rather than training.
Power point classes that I've seen are also only marginally useful. Because each situation is so different, there are few enduring principles that always apply. Slides with LOO's and pillars are so abstract that I don't think Marines internalize much from them.
I think reading is the key, but that reading needs to be reinforced by action to generate vicarious experience. Therefore I want to explore some sort of case study method which allows us to analyze situations in their historical context and then use that experience to reach some group synthesis about how to do COIN at the Regt. Level. My hope was that there were some ready made games out there that could be used as a training tool to facilitate this. For instance, read a book about Algeria. Play a game about Algeria. Something along those lines. I am open to any ideas that anyone may have.
Thanks in advance...
Navy: Let's Play "Sim Iraq"
From Wired
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The Navy, it turns out, has a "Sim Iraq" in mind, too. A literal one. The service has issued a call for a developers to build "a highly interactive, PC-based Human, Social and Culture Behavioral Modeling (HSCB) simulation tool to support training for military planners for handling insurgencies, small wars, and/or emergent conflicts."
On the 'evil' of simplicity and other soapbox issues...
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Originally Posted by
Cavguy
Not necessairly disagreeing with you, but what short books matching the above themes (and simplicity) would you recommend instead?
Galula and Trinquier are oft mentioned because they are short, practical, and still mostly relevant.
I can think of a few insightful more recent articles, but no books with a digestable tactical/operational summary of approaching COIN.
Niel,
I am wondering why the need or fascination we all seem to have for 'short' and 'simplicity'. There is simply no correlation between the fact that these attributes make a text more digestable to 'average' folks and the utility, accuracy, validity and worth of the thoughts that the texts contain.
Someone shared an excellent powerpoint presentation with me yesterday that contained a prescient quote from LTGEN (UK) Graeme Lamb whilst in Baghdad in the middle of last year:
“The reality is that what we about here in Iraq is multidimensional, and it cannot be simplified if none of it fits easily into in nice neat terms. Any search for the neat and tidy allows those who don’t really understand it, even in the simplest terms, to get us into dangerous situations ”
To my mind this precisely highlights the problem with 'short and simple'. These problems are anything but 'short and simple' and reductionism to make them such is a flawed idea. You end up with the perception of understanding, but actually have something quite different, which is dangerous. No one has ever promised that COIN is intellectually egalitarian. Nor that it can be 'dumbed down' to suit the Army training system's resolute belief that it could even train monkeys to write Shakespeare if only given enough typewriters and time...
I share some of Steve's concerns with many of the so called 'cold war' texts, but not because of their age. After all, Callwell and Gwynne are far older, but still have considerable utility in aiding understanding in many areas.
My concern, and with Galula in particular, is that simple advice is taken way out of the context it was derived and them slavishly applied at levels and in places where it clearly has little or no practical utility.
Time and time again I have seen people take simple blandishments, derived from observations of a finite tactical level problem over one year in a specific AO (with unique culture, terrain, political history etc), and try and extrapolate meaning at the high operational and low strategic end of the present conflict spectrum. It is ludicrous and it simply does not work. Yes, Galula can offer some pointers to a company commander owning a piece of dirt at the tactical level. But I believe he has very little of practical use beyond motherhood statements after that.
In order to address our current set of problems (particulalry within the ITO), I believe that is well past time for people to look beyond the deification of Saint Robert. It is time to seek wider readings from people who have actually engaged in dealing with issues akin to our current problem set. And this must mean at levels other than the tactical. As an example Robert Kromer is one who springs to mind off the top of my head. (NB, I am not sanctioning / endorsing everything that Kromer wrote, merely pointing out that he worked at a level of the Vietnam war more akin to where most of our current problems lie).
The fact is that we can lose this war at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, but we can only 'win' it at the strategic (think back to the apocryphal story with the Vietnamese General cited by Summers). I do not have any sense that we are in danger of 'losing' the tactical fight anytime soon- particularly given the learning and improvement over the last three years. From what I have seen and learnt in theatre Galula's utility starts to wane considerably as we move up to where we must win - the high operational and strategic. Time then to start looking at other people, perhaps like Liddell-Hart and Beaufre as starters (and even Chainsaw Bob on how to get CMO happening at high levels..).
Regarding contemporary writings, I tend to agree with the posts previously. I have not yet seen the new edited work by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian , I have one on order and have some hope that it might be step in the right direction. Steve Metz's SSI monograph last year also springs to mind- I thought it was a good contribution.
I am increasingly thinking that many are sitting around waiting for someone else to 'do something'. I put myself somewhat in this category at the moment. The situation will only change when one of us finds the time (and courage perhaps) to go out there and try and write a book.
In the mean time we can all continue to amuse ourselves with journal articles and anodyne powerpoint presentations at conferences replete with dubious analogies....
regards,
Mark
errata regarding the errata...
:o
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Originally Posted by
Mark O'Neill
Guys, re: my typing dyslexia in the previous post, please read '"Kormer" for "Kromer" :o
Mark
OK, I give up, one of those days I guess.. lets try 'Komer'....
I've been pondering this for a couple of hours
and that's usually dangerous... :wry:
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Heck it is Friday morning, so I'll kick the hornets nest once again. I can't speak for the person who made the request, but it seems he/she is getting at that gray area between education and training. Sort of like how do you implement strategy at the tactical level. Education being stragetic and training being tactical. The staff is in the middle, they have to know how to fuse both. Our operational level doctrine is outstanding for conventional warfighting, but one could make an argument that our staffs are not ideally task organized or trained to command and control COIN. We're great at responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc., but I think we still fall short in the area of translating COIN strategic ideas into operational level plans that effect tactical operations.
Is that not a function of the facts that COIN IS the Operational level when and where implemented and, far more importantly and less arguably -- the fact that we doctrinally, educationally and training wise virtually ignored COIN and ID for almost 30 years?
Did not that neglect extend at least in part to SF who looked at, er, uh, other missions, while admittedly keeping a finger or two in the COIN / ID water?
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The simple fix, but big Army will do Cheetah flips is to put Special Forces in charge, with big Army in support. SF can form an irregular or unconventional Joint/Interagency/Combined Task Force, and provide operational guidance to the supporting units. This will allow big Army to focus primarily on conventional warfighting skills, but still make significant contributions to the COIN fight without changing their staff structure significantly.
Aside from the rather enjoyable contemplation of seeing portly Generals doing cheetah flips, I may see some practical problems.
Philosophy impeded practice. I've been retired retired for 13 years; a lot can change. However, from 1960 until 1995, there was a constant tension within SF and at the Center between proponents of emphasis on DA vs. UW vs. ID. My belief is that SOCOM has exacerbated those tensions. If that is true, then it is a potentially disruptive effect your recommendation confronts.
Size. Not everyone is equipped to be SF, only so many will have the requisite psychological profile and be able to adapt to alien cultures and languages. As currently constituted, SF could capably deal with the SEA missions as they are structured and with Afghanistan -- that is true as is OR using your approach. I submit SF isn't large enough to do those and add Iraq, or, really, to do Iraq on it's own. Obviously that's tour length and a few other things dependent but on balance, I don't think there's enough SF to do what you suggest in the current circumstances.
Increasing the size. You could do that. Having been there a long time ago in a galaxy far away when that happened, I wouldn't recommend it. Not at all...
Focus. One of the strengths of SF is the regional or area focus and specialization. More than one anecdote would seem to indicate that SF elements operating in an unfamiliar environment are just as prone to errors as are conventional units. If regional orientation is a strength, that further limits the ability to provide an adequate sized force for the C2 effort required.
C2 capability. SF is unique and has great capabilities in its designed area of expertise but the nuts and bolts of war at the operational level -- which I very strongly contend is precisely what COIN is in the country involved -- on stuff like "...responding to a troops in contact, medevac, pushing supplies out, etc." they'd be a bit out of their element and thus, the big army force they were trying to provide elegant and informed C2 for would, by default own the tempo.
At the risk of drawing ire and fire from you, UBoat, ODB and others, I have to point out that a conventional Infantry Battalion can be trained to do much -- not all -- of what SF can and would do in a COIN fight. Conversely, I do not believe SF can expand without significant loss of quality to do what a slew of those Infantry Battalions can do. I'd also ask while this grand COIN fight is going on, who would be working the missions that SF has that those Infantry Battalions cannot or should not be trained to do...
All that said, there's a valid case for integration of SF Officers and NCOs on the staffs of COIN or ID involved units -- and vice versa...
Getting the Drift ... Again
After writing/thinking out loud in my last post in this conversation, I began to remember a short text from my Officer's Basic Course. It took me a couple of hours, but I finally came up with the example of E.D. Swinton's The Defence of Duffer's Drift. Seven tactical scenarios with lessons delivered in the form of seven dreams by "LT Backsight Forethought," written after Swinton served in the Second Boer War (1899-1902).
Here it is on the Internet:
http://regimentalrogue.tripod.com/du...fers_Drift.htm
Has anyone seen anything like this--short on words, big on concepts, and that encourages readers to engage the material in an atypical manner--applied to the COIN context?
Meet me at the tavern in Jisr al Doreaa
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Originally Posted by
Maximus
Not sure if you have CAC access. If yes, The Defense of Jisr al Doreaa located here:
https://combinedarmscenter.army.mil/..._Al_Doreaa.pdf is exactly what you've requested. In my opinion, a brilliant piece of work that serves as a great learning tool for tactical level leaders in wars of insurgency.
Semper Fi,
Scott
Steel on target, thanks! I look forward to passing this reference to users throughout my organization.
And, while I'm still trying to figure out the SWJ interface--where's the button to electronically send you a virtual beer?
SF education and training
Ken,
A lot of us have been having frank discussions about conventional and SF (not SOF, but SF) roles in COIN. Others are simply talking past one another reinforcing the party line, which is less than helpful.
Since we both have more years in SF than most CPTs have on this planet (although during different eras) it worth discussing the education and training that separates us from conventional forces.
First, we have a selection process that weeds out the weak and undesirable and those who really don't want to be in our organization. Quite simply we have the finest construction material available to form a great organization. Many of these fine Soldiers come from the conventional ranks, but the difference is we weed out the weak links.
Then we put them through a qualification course second to done that last well over a year where they are educated and trained on their MOS technical skills, tactical skills, common combat skills, language, culture, and unconventional warfare is sprinkled throughout the course (this is key, because we engrain a different mindset in our Soldiers). The conventional army can't, nor should they even try to replicate that.
Then the new green beret is assigned to ODA where he gains operational experience and receives advanced training (both individual and team) for whatever mission set(s) his detachment has under the mentorship of a very experienced Team Sgt and Warrant Officer. Most of our Soldiers, not all, are career Soldiers, so this process is a life long training/education experience. The Marines nor the Army will never replicate it, but they'll spend a lot of money trying.
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there was a constant tension within SF and at the Center between proponents of emphasis on DA vs. UW vs. ID. My belief is that SOCOM has exacerbated those tensions. If that is true, then it is a potentially disruptive effect your recommendation confronts.
That conflict continues, and while it is frustrating when we swing too heavy to one side or the other, the reality is they are complementary. Experienced SF operators can either work through, by and with other nations forces as trainers, or they can combat advise them as they are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. If they did not have the warrior skills engrained in them through DA training, then they would be hard pressed to be viable combat advisors (look at the difference between an ad hoc MiTT and an ODA). Our men don't join SF to be in the peace corps, where they talk to little old ladies in their native tongues about the price of tomatoes. If they couldn't be warriors, they would leave the force. We signed up to be warriors, diplomats and teachers.
Coventional forces, neither Army nor Marines, or task organized or trained to do this, nor they come close to having the depth of experience to lead these operations. My point about having SF lead irregular warfare missions, doesn't mean they have to deploy a large headquarters forward, not with the C4I we have now, but to provide operational direction/guidance. BCTs will still C2 themselves, but the strategy they support will come from gray beard SF types in some type of headquarters that is joint and interagency in CONUS (with a forward element) that is uniquely organized and trained to C2 irregular warfare missions.
Conventional forces are capable of doing much of what we do, but at a cost. If they're serious they'll have to rape their units of their best Offices and NCOs, which will have an undesired second order effect. Seems to be we have managed to overly complicate things, when we have side lined the force that is uniquely trained for this and that our tax payers have paid for to a key supporting role.
See Ken walk. See Ken walk where
Angels fear to tread...
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Ken,
A lot of us have been having frank discussions about conventional and SF (not SOF, but SF) roles in COIN. Others are simply talking past one another reinforcing the party line, which is less than helpful.
True, people will get parochial. We all do to one degree or another even though it's generally unhelpful to our own position. The key is to catch ones self and interject reality, I think.
Thoughts on the nest few paragraphs of yours follow pretty much in order. True on the selection process. The process gets rid of a lot of weak links but it will never get rid of all of them and I'd caution that the law of supply and demand does seem to get satisfied. Having wandered into the fold before there was a Training Group and having watched it form and do its thing for a while, I agree with you on the depth of training -- I would point out, however, that I'm not advocating nor do I see any need for conventional units involved in COIN (or multi spectrum capable units) to even try to replicate that training. They just need to adapt a small part of it that is pertinent. That was done with conventional units destined to deploy to Viet Nam in the early days and the first few units over there did learn and did perform well (in spite of MACV). COIN is not rocket science; I agree with Gian -- it isn't even the graduate level of war; it's merely more precise management of effects than is required in conventional combat (Yeah, I know that's simplistic but you get my point -- even if many will miss it. :wry:).
The Marines and the Army are not, I do not think, trying to replicate SF training -- they are trying to adapt those SF techniques that are pertinent and achievable in an Infantry Battalion construct to their purposes. It is my view that should be encouraged, not discouraged. Imitation is the most sincere form of flattery and all that -- plus, the object is to get the job done regardless of who gets credit I always thought...
I still have an aversion to the word Warrior applied to what should be competent, trained and self disciplined Soldiers but I don't disagree with your point. That doesn't address the fact that the dichotomy between DA / UW / ID is in high places -- I know the Teams can cope -- and that affects missions and employment (and perhaps aids in a perception of sidelining...).
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Coventional forces, neither Army nor Marines, or task organized or trained to do this, nor they come close to having the depth of experience to lead these operations...
I agree but would suggest that adequate training to do an acceptable job -- I'll take a 75% solution in a second; perfection is a myth -- is possible and much is already being done in that vein; the issue is whether to embed it in the system or not. Further, I'm not sure I agree that the depth of experience is now lacking (again, in adequate as opposed to bountiful amounts) -- admitting that it probably was a year or more ago. Time will tell on that score, I think.
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My point about having SF lead irregular warfare missions, doesn't mean they have to deploy a large headquarters forward, not with the C4I we have now, but to provide operational direction/guidance. BCTs will still C2 themselves, but the strategy they support will come from gray beard SF types in some type of headquarters that is joint and interagency in CONUS (with a forward element) that is uniquely organized and trained to C2 irregular warfare missions.
I totally agree with that, thus my suggestion that both sides -- and they are opposing sides in the perennial battle for $$$ and spaces, most unfortunately and needlessly -- should swap folks on their staffs.
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Conventional forces are capable of doing much of what we do, but at a cost. If they're serious they'll have to rape their units of their best Offices and NCOs, which will have an undesired second order effect. Seems to be we have managed to overly complicate things, when we have side lined the force that is uniquely trained for this and that our tax payers have paid for to a key supporting role.
Raping units of best Officers and NCO to create special purpose units is absolutely the wrong thing to do. The entire unit just needs a little additional training to more effectively operate in the COIN mode. Again, we aren't talking rocket science here. The BCTs are modular by design so that CA, PsyOps, MI -- what have you -- can be tacked on easily, If we improve initial entry training, officer and enlisted (and we REALLY need to do that to inculcate a thorough knowledge of the basics) then a little added unit training will create a reasonably competent COIN force of adequate size (note that point...) to reliably cover an AOR. You guys are doing great stuff where you are; the 'Stan is different and Iraq is different yet. Again, I'm afraid raw numbers are going to impact the goal of letting SF do it all in some places at some times; METT-TC and such...
As to sidelining, I'm certainly not suggesting that or anything close to it. Nor do I think anyone in power is trying to do that. I would suggest that in some cases and some theaters over emphasis on DA has effectively sidelined some -- not all -- SF elements...
Quantity vs. quality, integration, and unity of command
Bill, Ken, and ODB,
Some of the things that stand out in your posts include quantity vs. quality, integration, and unity of command.
As phase IV of the war has dragged on we have moved from Divisions and Groups doing their own thing in their own AO to a tighter unity of command with a deeper focus upon synchronized COIN ops. This is a good thing and was overdue. Integration of DOS, USAID, and others into COIN & DOD or vice versa is still a work in progress although the cooperation between two of the lead gentlemen (DOD & DOS) on the ground is the best that I have seen to date. This does not mean however that we have reached a 'go' status on interagency, or ac/rc/arng/usn/usaf/sf/sof cooperation. If we transplanted this low level of cooperation that we currently see into a CAT or ODA it would not fly, and indeed there would be some behind the dumpster counseling until all concerned understood how things were going to work.
Some of the reasons that I see for the bickering is that all concerned have spent much time studying their piece of the elephant and are convinced that in a life-threatening situation their knowledge of their piece of the elephant will keep them and theirs alive. Reflecting upon our return upon investment during '03-'06 brings this attitude into question.
Our successes in this war are due to the fact that all of the team members are finally getting together on the field (at the same time) and having to work together to describe the elephant. This needs to continue and we can use basic team psychology to improve things. Too steal from my one of friends in my solt class 'ability comes before rank and nobody wants to be the weak link in the chain'.
Like it or lump it, there are more regular ac folks than irregular rc/arng/sf/sof/dos/usaid/oga folks. So for me, bottom line is we take what we got, everybody gets on the same page, everbody gets some f-ing unity of command going, and most importantly we win this sob. I for one do not want to have my kids downrange trying to fix what we have started.
My 0.02c,
Steve
It's all about relationships....
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I have found it interesting in conventional forces unwillingness to train with SF and SFs unwillingness as well. On installations where both are stationed we should be taking advantage of each other. Simple think an ODA using an infantry battalion as its indig force for a few weeks of training. The experiences both would gain. Additionally in a perfect world many of these units that are stationed together would be deployed in the same AO simultaneously. The working relationship and capabilities would be a sight to see IMO.
Somebody, somewhere is trying to make the SF/CF integration/interoperability piece work. Case in point: prior to my last IZ deployment my ODA went to JRTC (mid-2006). Before we got there we were swamped with SOF/Conventional integration/interoperability checklists, how-to's, and common operational picture stuff. Upon arriving Ft Polk we were linked with a conventional Cav unit and told that they would be deploying to and owning the same battlespace for our deployment. In short, somebody got it right...train with the guys you're going to fight next to. We had an outstanding JRTC rotation....most of the integration/interoperability stuff was sensible, relative and workable.
Of course, the good idea fairy fell off the wagon (again) and the happily ever after never happended. The Cav unit was re-directed to another location in-country and we ended up working with a BN of the 82nd instead. Luckily, they had mature leadership and a cross-pollenated staff (former SOF experience) that enabled us to build a lasting rapport that supported a successful combat rotation.
There are some SF/CF horror stories to come out of OIF/OEF and I actually lived through a couple of them. And, as in all cases, it comes down to leadership. Pedantic, bull-headed, SOF-hating conventional 0-6's almost always trump immature and inexperienced ODA commanders.
But then I'm just running off at the keyboard...
True. Also been my observation
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Originally Posted by
Vic Bout
... And, as in all cases, it comes down to leadership. Pedantic, bull-headed, SOF-hating conventional 0-6's almost always trump immature and inexperienced ODA commanders.
that hardheaded big Army hating Double Decade guys can push immature and inexperienced ODA commanders to places they probably shouldn't go.
There's plenty of fault on both sides. That said, I was glad to read the first part of your comment; good to know it can and is being done right.
