Anyone have any opinions on the Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers manual? I'm heading down tomorrow for the workshop on it that Kilcullen is running.
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Anyone have any opinions on the Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers manual? I'm heading down tomorrow for the workshop on it that Kilcullen is running.
I'd suggest is removing the words "defeat" and "victory" -- even though their usage in this pub is basically benign -- totally. Those two words in a modern insurgency can lead to false expectations on the part of politcians and the international public as well as those engaged in the operation and, IMO, their use should be actively discouraged.
Thanks for linking it. Give 'em fits at the workshop. ;)
As a whole, I thought the document was fairly good. However, I am not sure why they tried to separate terrorists and insurgents:
"This objective differentiates insurgents from terrorists, whose objectives do not necessarily include the creation of an alternative governing authority capable of controlling a given area or country."
It seems to me that all terrorists are insurgents but not all insurgents are terrorists. In other words, terrorists fit the mold of an insurgency because they are trying overthrow a government or force it to change specific policies. We all know the debate surrounding the term "terrorism". If I were writing this document, I would not have tried to throw the sentence in their separating terrorists from insurgents. I suspect it is in there for political reasons; it is advantageous to label an entity a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of terrorism.
Also, the whole government approach to COIN planning is very good, but where is the part of the USG that deals with information? According to this document and FM 3-24, information is the glue that holds all the pillars together. Unfortunately, we only give strategic communications partial support through the State Department! If information is really so important, the USG needs to reestablish the USIA or something like it.
Overall, the document is very good. Organizations such as USAID may have more of an impact than a full military division, which is why we should increase their funding. Also, working with IGOs and NGOs is a great way to increase legitimacy for COIN operations!
Very respectfully,
Invictus
Not just that, but our inability to name the enemy. I don't just mean the question of its Islamic nature, but most enemies name their organization and it is one organization. When you are fighting a decentralized enemy whose forces set up separate "armies" under the flag umbrella and call their organization something different, yet the ideology, though the same, is not given a name (like Nazis), it's a little difficult to be specific.Quote:
It seems to me that all terrorists are insurgents but not all insurgents are terrorists. In other words, terrorists fit the mold of an insurgency because they are trying overthrow a government or force it to change specific policies. We all know the debate surrounding the term "terrorism". If I were writing this document, I would not have tried to throw the sentence in their separating terrorists from insurgents. I suspect it is in there for political reasons; it is advantageous to label an entity a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of terrorism.
At the same time, it is important to separate "terrorists" from "insurgents" when you are performing COIN. "Insurgents" are indigenous to the location, have local grievances and can be negotiated with to eventually resolve the situation. "Terrorists" or whatever we want to call the Islamic Fanatics usually have a whole other agenda, don't have anything personal at risk in the location and are, by nature, implacable and impossible to negotiate with.
I assume that is the reason he separated them. He just didn't know what PC name he was supposed to give it or didn't want to for "political reasons".
Hi Kehenry!
Great point on not being able to define the enemy!
Borrowing from Michael Schuerer, I prefer to use the term "Global Islamic Insurgency". I think this best describes the specific threat we face today, though the document Steve posted was meant to deal with insurgencies in general.
Later!
Invictus
There are limits some times to what a military force can accomplish in a counterinsurgency operation; even one armed with the best counterinsurgency doctrine available and a trained counterinsurgency force winning—in all of its domestic political, international, and operational context--may be beyond its means and that should be acknowledged up front in a manual to policy makers on this subject. I imagine that the atmosphere of this conference will be drunk with success from the Surge and the idea that these things are doable if we just get the right doctrine and force on board.
Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.
Finally, I disagree with the straw-man approach under the theory section that poses two theories for Coin: enemy centric and population centric. Coin is more complicated than this binary conception. By rendering counterinsurgency into a population-centric construct the manual removes the enemy from the equation and therefore turns Coin into something it is not. In fact by removing the enemy as the center of focus the manual actually removes the element of friction from war too. So for policy makers who read this manual a series of scientific processes, coordinated through the interagency process, can be applied to secure the population and improve their lives thereby winning their hearts and minds. Coin for policy makers now becomes a relatively simple matter of inter-agency coordination, applied scientific processes across a set of lines of operations.
Beware; we are in the grips of armed social scientists.
Totally agree with the thrust. In regard to the last sentence, I'd hope not on the drunk with success part and surely they won't succumb to believe that's all it takes for success -- and, conversely will acknowledge that these things are doable. Difficult, eminently dislikeable, to be avoided if at all possible but if not, doable.
Also true -- though I'd suggest the reality is even more than just killing and dying. Still your point is valid, that death, destruction and fighting are usually going to be required and the policy makers and deciders need to know and acknowledge that up front. They also need to worst case those effects else they'll make a dumb decision.Quote:
Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.
Agreed. It ain't that easy...Quote:
Finally, I disagree with the straw-man approach under the theory section that poses two theories for Coin: enemy centric and population centric. Coin is more complicated than this binary conception. By rendering counterinsurgency into a population-centric construct the manual removes the enemy from the equation and therefore turns Coin into something it is not. In fact by removing the enemy as the center of focus the manual actually removes the element of friction from war too. So for policy makers who read this manual a series of scientific processes, coordinated through the interagency process, can be applied to secure the population and improve their lives thereby winning their hearts and minds. Coin for policy makers now becomes a relatively simple matter of inter-agency coordination, applied scientific processes across a set of lines of operations.
Heh, true -- and in my observation, have been since the early 60s... :wry:Quote:
Beware; we are in the grips of armed social scientists.
Gentlemen,
Your underlying assumption is that war and politics are two different entities, but they are one and the same. . .always have been. War and politics are inseperable! According to Dr. Colin Gray, "2. The United States has a persisting strategy deficit. Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are muchless successful in fighting in such a way that they secure thestrategic and, hence, political, rewards they seek. The United
States continues to have difficulty regarding war and politics as a unity, with war needing to be permeated by politicalconsiderations." LTC Nagl further makes this point in his book when he says that one of the biggest mistakes we made in Vietnam was not realizing earlier that it was a political endeavor. This is contrary to many who say, "The only reason we lost in 'Nam is because the politicians got involved!" This is what my dad alway says. Anyway, I agree with Dr. Gray and LTC Nagl. It is impossible to separate the two.
Although I do not recomment it to military leaders with thin skin, I have inserted a link to the article:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...les/PUB650.pdf
Very respectfully,
Invictus
and nowhere did I see anything that led me to believe anyone who'd commented questioned the consanguinity of politics and war. Where did you get the idea that anyone did question it?
Gray's comment is true, Nagl's less so. The WH knew it was political (on several counts) from the start; DoD and the JCS not so much; ComUSMACV initially did not but finally woke up, knew it was political but still refused to adapt and tried to fight a land war in Europe in the rice paddies of SE Asia (until Abrams took over). The point being that 'knowing' and doing are two different things --as Gray points out...
FYI, the Gray monograph has been linked here a couple of times and many have read it, I suspect.
Hi Ken!
You are correct! The post did not explicitly say that war and politics are separate entities. This is why I said the assumption of the post was that war and politics are separate. My assertion was based on the quote above. Of course I could be misunderstanding Gian P Gentile's point.
Please elaborate on your comment concerning Vietnam War strategy; I'd love to read your thoughts!
Very respectfully,
Invictus
A Work in Progress
I have only read this article; I am sure he has several other great writings. I was telling Ken that I should have known, considering the audience, that this article had be referenced many times.
By the way, have a great trip tomorrow!!
V/r
Invictus
Colin is always a difficult read, but worth the effort. He makes kind of an interesting counterpoint to Martin van Creveld--both are towering intellects but Colin is very much the strategic traditionalist who believes that traditional state war will again rear its hideous head in the future, while Martin contends that the world has reached the point where conflicts pitting states against nonstate actors will be the dominant if not the only form.
Hi Steve, don't know if this will help but at the Smart Wars workshop our metrics/country assessment were done this way.
1-Assets
2-Attitude(population)
3-Technology
4-Scope
5-Obstacles
6-Momentum
We prepared one for each system we dealt with and they were prepared from the stand point of what we wanted these metrics to look like in the future. In my case it was 8 months out from the start of the Operation. We prepared one for Turkey, The PPK and The International system all designed to look a certain way in the future. By the categories you see that you can make these as brief or as detailed as you want or the situation demands.
Go Army
[QUOTE=invictus0972;31329]Of course i do not believe that war and politics are separate. i am a disciple of the great one, St Carl von Clausewitz. The two are so inexorably mixed that they can not be seperated in whatever kind of war one is fighting.
My point is that clever cliches like "armed politics" make counterinsurgency war, which is still war and at its most basic level is death, violence and fighting, into something that it is not. This is a term that the armed social scientists have thrust upon us and i feel it actually reduces the complexity of Coin to the point where it appears to the uniformed to be a simple process of applying lines of operations and other pop-anthropolgical theories to achieve "victory." To quote Ken White in an earlier posting on this threat, "It ain't that easy."
Too bad our new Coin manual chose to omit St Carl off of its classics reading list. Can anyone explain that???
gian
Sounds like masochism to me... ;)Quote:
Please elaborate on your comment concerning Vietnam War strategy; I'd love to read your thoughts!
Very respectfully,
Invictus
It's all in the books, idealistic WH looks for a way to boost the economy, get the nation out of the doldrums and spread democracy, seizes on Viet Nam as a likely candidate -- and has Eisnehower's treaty as a fall guy for the decision -- and away we go. (Moral: Idealism is dangerous)
Joint Chiefs aren't pleased with the idea so changes are made there and the buildup begins. Paul Harkins was ComUSMACV and tried to get the VC to stand up and fight like men -- and tried to get the south Viet Namese to do the same thing. Little success either way. (Moral: Can't change the culture)
Kennedy is shot, Johnson took over. Johnson was breathtakingly shrewd; he was also a great and crooked politician -- but knew zilch about geo politics (as was true of MacNamara and Rusk wasn't much better off) -- and he decided to cement his reelection by upping the war several notches.
Westmoreland replaced Harkins and used US troops to try to get the VC (who were being chewed up pretty bad by several things and were increasingly replaced by the PAVN, later NVA) to stand and fight. They generally didn't elect to do that, when they did they got whipped (which was why they normally tried to avoid it, d'oh...). The South Viet Namese reaction to that was to hang back to husband strength because they knew we'd leave. (Morals: [1] "Corrupt" does not mean stupid; [2] One can win battles and lose the war)
Long story short; we tried to fight a European style war in the rice paddies from 1962 until late 1968 because of two Euro-centric Generals. When Abrams took over and CORDS got going, the war turned around and was effectively won by 1973. It is very important to note that the final tactical solution was a mix of COIN doctrine plus Armor * and infantry tactical battles suited to the terrain and the enemy both relying on good intel. Unfortunately or fortunately (viewpoint dependent) US domestic politics -- which started the war in the first place -- ended it. :rolleyes:
ERRATA: Apologies to RTK, CavGuy, Ironhorse, Gian and all the other Treadh... er, Tankers and Cavalrymen for omitting Armor above (*). I plead old age; last time I ran the TCPC was in an M41A1C... ;)
NOTE: That is not to say that the politicians 'lost' the war, they did not. Nor did the Media 'lose' it for us; they didn't help but they don't have nearly as much power as they like to think. First there is no lose or win, no 'victory' or 'defeat' in any modern insurgency. Second, a satisfactory outcome was not reached because the Army fought the wrong war; took to long to get its act together though it eventually did but by the time they did, the American people and their elected pols had tired of it. It's far more complicated than that but that's the gist. :(
I can remember standing on the beach at Tuy Hoa in 1966 and saying "We'll be here another 10 years, spend fifty billion and get 100K KIA all to give Uncle Ho 15 airfields." That doesn't mean I was particulalry prescient, a number of Officers and senior NCOs believed along those lines. I was off on the time and the numbers but fortunately, I was too high on everything, particularly the KIA, except the dollars. However, it's the thought that counts...
Two lessons out of Viet Nam appropriate today are; one does not always get to fight the war one wishes to fight, own politicians and the enemy have votes in that. That and be very careful to do your homework BEFORE you decide to commit troops and be very aware that Americans do not care that much about casualties, they expect them in a war and will give you a couple of years but then they want progress or cessation.
On that first point, I'd note that every single war or major operation outside CONUS in which we have engaged since 1945; from the Greek Civil War forward has been one picked by the Politicians we elected and was decidedly not one with which the Armed Forces really wanted to be involved or one for which they were really prepared (we would've flat been prepared for a land war in Europe, though...) Note further that only a few have had satisfactory conclusions.
I think there's a message in there somewhere...
Actually, I always thought that Clausewitz's theory on the interaction of war and politics was applicable to COIN. Not just that war is an extension of politics, though that may be true. But when he wrote:Quote:
Also true -- though I'd suggest the reality is even more than just killing and dying. Still your point is valid, that death, destruction and fighting are usually going to be required and the policy makers and deciders need to know and acknowledge that up front. They also need to worst case those effects else they'll make a dumb decision.Quote:
Quote:
Coin is not “armed politics.” If it were then we would have politicians doing Coin with guns. We don’t. Instead they are conducted by soldiers and marines with guns. A big and important difference that unfortunately clever little cliché’s like “armed politics” helps to cloud and make unclear. In fact the term “armed politics” conceals the reality of Coin which fundamentally is one of death, destruction, and fighting.
On War - Book I, Chpt 1: What is War
In relation to counterinsurgency, I believe that this applies, not just at a strategic national level, but in a very localized micro-level. In each area of operations, war and politics are at a continuous ebb and flow, each taking precedent over the other, each shaping the other as the circumstances warrant. Until, as Clausewitz notes, the political objective diminishes (or is satisfied) for one side or the other or even both together. The need to act or fight is diminished in relationship to the rise of the political solution.Quote:
11.—The political object now reappears.
Here, now, forces itself again into consideration a question which we had laid aside (see No. 2), that is, the political object of the war. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward.
I often think that the argument about which is predominant in counterinsurgency or war is a fallacy that is projected by either proponents' history and occupation. It seems, by nature, fighting men want to fight and believe that is the the decisive factor. Politicians want to politic or negotiate and believe that this is the decisive factor. Neither is apt to see the other as a partner to achieving the ends. Each sees the objective differently. One sees it as "defeating the enemy in combat" (or, as Clausewitz indicates, disarming or destroying the enemy physically) and the other sees it as reaching a political agreement that will satisfy political objectives and end combat. Each sees the other as a hindrance to obtaining their determined objective. Neither sees the other as complimentary.
Clausewitz also noted that war is about conjecture and probabilities, not absolutes. We can apply this to the question of whether combat (fighting) is the appropriate means or politics. There are no set points that determines which is appropriate. It's something we have to determine by weighing the situation. To decide war or combat without weighing the cost, whether in blood, treasure or political fallout, is foolish. To rely solely on politics, without having the means or will to enforce the decision (military) is bound for failure.
With one exception, that Clausewitz also points out: if the enemy is set on combat and attacks us, then the enemy has made his decision and necessarily changes our plans, sometimes against our will. If we are working on political solutions in a localized area and the enemy attacks us, then we are forced to respond with violence. Thus, war or combat coming to the fore. As his actions are countered and diminishes, then the political aspect returns to the fore.
Ebb and flow.
Quote:
26.—They may all be regarded as political acts.
Returning now to the main subject, although it is true that in one kind of war the political element seems almost to disappear, whilst in another kind it occupies a very prominent place, we may still affirm that the one is as political as the other; for if we regard the state policy as the intelligence of the personified state, then amongst all the constellations in the political sky which it has to compute, those must be included which arise when the nature of its relations imposes the necessity of a great war. It is only if we understand by policy not a true appreciation of affairs in general, but the conventional conception of a cautious, subtle, also dishonest craftiness, averse from violence, that the latter kind of war may belong more to policy than the first.
ON War - Book I, Chpt 2: Ends and Means of War
Now, I don't claim to have read the COIN manual front to back, so I can't say for certain that it places politics above combat. But, it would seem, by the reporting on the current implementation of the strategy, that it is both and neither can be considered successful without the other.Quote:
The second way is to select for the object of our enterprises those points at which we can do the enemy most harm. Nothing is easier to conceive than two different directions in which our force may be employed, the first of which is to be preferred if our object is to defeat the enemy's army, while the other is more advantageous if the defeat of the enemy is out of the question. According to the usual mode of speaking we should say that the first is more military, the other more political. But if we take our view from the highest point, both are equally military, and neither the one nor the other can be eligible unless it suits the circumstances of the case.[snip]
These are the circumstances in general connected with the aim which we have to pursue in war; let us now turn to the means.
There is only one single means, it is the Fight. However diversified this may be in form, however widely it may differ from a rough vent of hatred and animosity in a hand-to-hand encounter, whatever number of things may introduce themselves which are not actual fighting, still it is always implied in the conception of war, that all the effects manifested have their roots in the combat. [snip]
Thus, the destruction of the enemy's armed force appears, therefore, always as the superior and more effectual means, to which all others must give way.
But certainly it is only when there is a supposed equality in all other conditions that we can ascribe to the destruction of the enemy's armed force a greater efficacy. It would, therefore, be a great mistake to draw from it the conclusion that a blind dash must always gain the victory over skill and caution. An unskilful attack would lead to the destruction of our own and not of the enemy's force, and therefore is not what is here meant. The superior efficacy belongs not to the means but to the end, and we are only comparing the effect of one realised aim with the other
I think I would agree with you. The phrase "to the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail" is apt. The "extent" is the issue. Obviously, counterinsurgency will contain elements of combat. The problem seems to be whether adherents of Clausewitz choose to jettison his commentary on political objectives and how much effect politics have on war. Or, in this case, counterinsurgency.Quote:
Because counterinsurgency may look like war at the tactical level but it is not at the strategic level. To the extent we elect to treat it like a variant of war, we fail.
Of course, Clausewitz spent limited time on this part of his "theory" because he was ultimately a soldier whose theater was war. It didn't make his commentary on the political aspects less astute or applicable. It does mean that the emphasis should be on this extract of his thesis and supplemented with Mao and others who focus on the balance of the political with combat.
Not because the political aspect is the only "means" to the end of an insurgency. Particularly when that insurgency is extensive and very violent. However, politics are the cause of insurgencies, thus, politics are the final solution. In between combat and politics ebb and flow.
Soldiers are generally and by nature warriors focused on combat as was Clausewitz. They are conditioned for traditional war, to confronting the enemy with violence. Thus, the extent to which politics are emphasized in the education of military leaders and the common soldier is simply an attempt to balance out natural inclinations and previous training in order effectively conduct a counterinsurgency.
Because it is a counterinsurgency against violent insurgents and these counterinsurgencies, for the US, are expeditionary counterinsurgencies in other nations, it requires combat capable forces that can also act as political arbitrators. They must be able make war and negotiate peace at the same time.
Counterinsurgency is the balance of politics and war; the application of law and directed violence. It's yin and yang, feng shui, whatever term of balancing we want to use. It's just that the last weight that is dropped on the scale is always political.
Ken - I really appreciate that post - it shows the value of a military leader who recognizes the need to adapt while preserving most of a full range of options against an enemy who thinks, has options himself, and if possible will take advantage of opportunities presented him; or because he may want it more then you do - might do something we just could not or would not expect (or chose to ignore). I believe our current MNF-I leadership has also done that - while the story would seem to be in the various lines of effort (political, etc.) and that is OK, but there is an awful lot of combat power that has been preserved there for more offensive and defensive operations, and that is at least occasionally needed against an aggressive enemy.
.Quote:
Long story short; we tried to fight a European style war in the rice paddies from 1962 until late 1968 because of two Euro-centric Generals. When Abrams took over and CORDS got going, the war turned around and was effectively won by 1973. It is very important to note that the final tactical solution was a mix of COIN doctrine plus Armor * and infantry tactical battles suited to the terrain and the enemy both relying on good intel. Unfortunately or fortunately (viewpoint dependent) US domestic politics -- which started the war in the first place -- ended it
If we find ourselves in similar situations in the future, its probable that it will also go down in a locale where the neighbors have a surly disposition and have their own objectives in mind - a situation where for whatever reason the unlikely happens. Here we will be best served with agile, adaptive leadership that have the full range of tools (with respect to proportion to the mission at hand) to do something about it.
Here is to balance and consistency combined with the very best leadership we can field!
Best, Rob
Best Regards, Rob
Sorry Steve but i dont buy your answer. I have a much more cynical view as to why the manual left out St Carl from its classic reading list and this was confirmed to me by an individual who was involved in the writing. That the writers (not the busy-body writers but the rock-star types) wanted to bludgeon the conventionally minded, big-battle focussed hard-wired officers (i guess like me) out of the darkness of our cold-war mindset and into the light of Galula-like coin operations. That is why St Carl was removed. In my mind, absurd and inexecusable. How does our army forsake the brilliance and immediate relevance of Clausewitz, in any kind of war, for the pop-theories of the armed social scientists?
Also Steve do you really mean that Coin is not war "at the strategic level?" I wonder if General Patreaus would agree with that statement since he is our strategic general in command in Iraq? I imagine from time to time on Victory Base in Baghdad he has attended memorial ceremonies for dead american service men and women killed in action in Iraq. Hard to believe that he would think that he is not at war.
good luck at your conference.
gian
Well, I was kind of involved in the writing myself and I'm co-authoring a book with the main scribe, Con Crane. The idea that subversives were able to pull a fast one generals Petraeus and Mattis and all of the other flag officers who signed off on the manual is a bit far fetched.
And your second paragraph illustrates the point I just made: that troops are killed does not make something war (although there is similarity at the tactical level). But, the fact that a general rather than a civilian is seen as the primary architect of the counterinsurgency effort shows that the United States cannot fully transcend the idea that counterinsurgency is just a small war. That may be the reason that over the past fifty years, we've brought one out of the four counterinsurgency efforts we were involved in to a successful resolution.
Steve Metz, almost forgot if you have not left yet. Check with Colonel Rod Zastrow Air Force rep at the Army War College. He has a bunch of things from the SMART wars workshop that he was very impressed with that are not being taught anywhere. He has read a lot about Killcullen. You might find some usefull information for discussion at your workshop. Good Luck Slap...from that other Universe.:wry:
If armed insurgency is a form of warfare adopted by a group(s) who cannot openly take on either the ruling government under which it currently exists (perhaps they lack the means), and/or is adopted by an outside state which seeks to foment a change in the balance of its neighbor - then wouldn't "insurgency" still be a considered a manner to wage war to a political end?
I'll agree that inurgency and counter-insurgency require greater political effort - because the means at the disposal of the insurgents are employed toward the de-legitimization of the of the political body to afford an opportunity to emplace its own politics, however - I think it could transition sharply at some point given a change in the means at the disposal of any one side - as such if we are glued to any one view we may miss the transition and the opportunities.
Kilcullen mentioned counter-insurgency to counter war - an interesting point I thought as you are trying to diminish the chances of the insurgents from gaining the politcal power and the means to move from one form of warfare to another.
However - I think we must consider it war, if we are employing warfare to political purpose. This is also another place where I think Clausewitz would fit well because he does discuss this - however I suppose interpretation matters . During this phase - politics may have more weight then armed force in regards to countering the efforts of the insurgents, but it must be backed up with security, and it must be prepared for new variables to be introduced which might change the weighting of the efforts - at the tactical, operational, theater strategic and strategic - there are a number of complex relationships operating in this environment that make it a combination of regional Jenga and Twister.
I'm not quibbling, but I think its a mistake to try and box this in one camp or the other. Consequently we must be prepared to consider the nature of the war from multiple perspectives at every level.
I don't think we can say this is not "war" at the strategic level - if for no other reason because the domestic and iternational audience consider it so for a number of reasons - and that has consequences. Clausewitz was not the first or last to put forward these ideas - as long as people have contemplated politics, people and the use of force they have considered it - but Clausewitz does provide a broad theoretical framework for considering the spectrum of war, its possibilities, causes and the objective and subjective nature of war - as such I read what I want and ignore most lists - I also pick and choose out of doctrine because I believe that while it provides good content - it is still an attempt (however well it is done) to distill art into science so we can all benefit from it in varying degrees.
Best, Rob
Yeah i remember you saying you lived in Millbrook. You are not going to believe this but for the last 2 or 3 years Millbrook has been the fastest growing city in Alabama:eek: you probably would not recongnize it. As for Slapout we are coming right along we now have our own Subway, 2 gas stations, and there is talk of changing the caution light to a real stoplight because of traffic congestion.:wry: Wetumpka is going to have one of the largest casinos in the state on an (Indian reservation).....and then SlapVegas!!!
In regards to Gian's comment about taking Clausewitz off the reading list for this counterinsurgency manual...
Am I wrong, or isn't Clausewitz on the general reading list for officers in the officers manual? And, isn't he still taught at military academies? And on the reading lists given to officers through OCS?
I am not sure that his lack of inclusion is necessarily a lack of endorsement of his general theories. However, I might agree that he was not included on this list because the focus was on counterinsurgency and that it was meant to shape the ideas and tactics used by officers in that regard. Is that "browbeating" combat officers into changing their minds about the role of combat and politics in a counterinsurgency? I suppose you could call it that, but I am unsure why the attempt to reshape strategy and tactics for a given type of war is incorrect or reviled.
On Steve Metz, that is exactly what I was referring to. The question of whether politics or combat takes over all precedence in a counterinsurgency seems out of place when the entire process is to facilitate flexibility in responses to get a resolution.
It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.
So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"
Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?
Some good points all around. I particular, I am really pleased to see so much discussion of semantics :D.
Gian, as you know I disagree with your conclusion that COIN is "war" and, therefore, can be treated as semantically equivalent to all other wars. I do tend to agree with SteveM that it may be "war" at the tactical level, but not at the level of Grand Strategy (Steve, I think Gian does have about about the Strategic level...).
I'll admit that a lot of my disagreement with Gian comes from our differing backgrounds. Personally, I don't see "war" as a first order concept but, rather, as a second order concept. I see "conflict" as a first order concept, with "war" being only a single sub-set of conflict (I also use fuzzy sets for definitions, not crisp sets). Other sub-sets of conflict, to my mind, include economic competition, party politics, symbolic competition (with or without overt "religious" tones), sports, intra-social group conflict (e.g. class, race, ethnicity, religious, etc.), etc.
I tend to view the semantic "hardening" of taxonomies as both a core feature of "culture" and, also, a neurobiological process and both are susceptible to change over time dependent on environment. So. let's take this back to "war" and "politics"....
How do we define politics? I think this is a crucial question that is not being asked here. Rather, the term "politics" is being tossed around as if we all agree on exactly what it is. I don't think that there is agreement and, furthermore, I think the range of assumed meaning is quite broad which is causing a large amount of semantic confusion. To start the ball rolling, I'll give you my own definition of politics as "the ecology of human interaction".
I'll simplify that same definition by quoting something Arnold Scharzenegger wrote about 25 years ago: "Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other." Given that he's been able to remain as Governor of one of the most politically eccentric States in the Union, I rather suspect that his definition - if it is still one that he uses in his present capacities - is eminently practical.
A couple of points. Overall, I think that Gian's message is starting to get through. I have seen a subtle change in Kilcullen's choice of words. He talks more about kinetic operations, killing etc. There is now more emphasis on tactical elements like denying sanctuary, controlling op tempo etc.
I think, however, that the overall COIN message is clear enough that an amateur can understand it. Killing is not strategic, because the insurgents can control their lost rates by running. (As opposed to the first Gulf War where retreat did nothing except change where the Iraqis died.) Insurgents are able to control their loss rate by hiding in the population. The strategy, therefore, is pretty simple.
The strategic objective is to separate insurgents from the population. The strategy is population control. Once the insurgents are separated from the population, you can kill them. (Good luck. Have fun. Don't take any pictures.)
Put more simply, kill them while they hide in the population: lose. Separate them from the population first and then kill them: win.
But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works.
I think that is a pretty good general statement. If we did unpack it further I believe that "politics" encompasses the entire efforts that are not "combat" (ie, shooting, killing, arresting or disrupting the enemy; but would include intelligence gathering and other activities directly linked to carrying out "combat" operations). That would include building government infrastructure, negotiating power sharing, developing economy, reconstructing physical infrastructure and all the other variants of that which do not directly relate to actual "combat".Quote:
"Politics is simply the way that people relate to each other."
I'll repeat the title there: separating the insurgents IS political in nature. Carrots and sticks are political. Negotiating power sharing, whether democratic or other, is political.Quote:
But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works.
Further, I think there is a reason that we separate the "indigent insurgents" from the "global insurgents" and how we deal with them. We don't have to kill all or even a significant portion of the indigent insurgents in order to win the "war". That can still be handled through a mix of political and combat that may reduce casualties on all sides. In a previous thread, we discussed that "local" insurgents have their own agenda and is tied to their local goals and gains. The risk of losing that may result in more political resolutions.
"Global Insurgents", like Al Qaida and their recruits, are working towards a global construct that little cares about the local populations conditions beyond serving their global agenda. they are less likely to negotiate or accept "political" resolutions and are more likely to be or need to be killed off in great numbers in order to result in a secession of combat. Equally, the way we separate them from the "population" may have a different variation than what we do with the "locals".
I was impressed that MarcT finally suggested shifting the discussion to the definition of politics. I also am impressed that the Guvernator has almost the same definition for politics that Aristotle has. (Maybe I'm just easily impressed :wry:) I think a good summary of Aristotle's definition is "a practical body of knowledge that tries to explain how people get along in groups (anything from a family to a polis)." (BTW, I'm not quoting anyone here, just using the quotation marks as a stylistic device to set off my proposed summation of Aristotle's definition.)
Hmmm, I can see why you would cut out combat operations but, on the whole, I would tend to include them. For example, sometimes shooting and killing people is not "war" it is "law enforcement", and sometimes it's just cultural expectation (e.g. blood feuds, honour killings, gang initiations, etc.).
Personally, I tend to draw distinctions between the "formal" institution and the "real" institution - I've found it a very useful distinction that, I believe, has been clouded quite badly in the case of "war" (consider the war on drugs, the war on poverty, etc.). As I mentioned in my earlier post, I tend to use fuzzy sets rather than crisp sets, so I really have no problems with the idea that a singular observed action / event can be part of more than one "term". I would suggest that some level of violence has always been part of politics, even if that violence is only implied.
marct...I know what you're getting at and yes "combat" or "violence" is part of social interaction and thus, can be construed as "political". and, yes, Clausewitz at once makes combat and politics the same while simultaneously making them separate. Probably what confuses people.
however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency.
Nope, I am talking about sets, but using Zadeh's fuzzy set theory where different variables defining the boundary conditions of a set have different membership values for each particular instance. The "sets" become ideal types in the Weberian sense (at least depending on how they are defined). Also, it's not the terms that fall into the sets, although that happens with lower order terms being partial members of upper order terms, but, rather, particular instances or events that fall into an area (basically, a topological manifold).
I agree with you - given your definition of conflict. I would only add that the word that is translated as "politics" is, in German, "politika." That same word in Spanish is "politica" which correctly tranlates to English as BOTH politics and policy. Thus, the classic quote from St. Carl is translated both ways depending on context. Sometimes both words correctly capture the essence at the same time. To wit, language is a slippery devil.:cool:
JohnT
Hi kehenry1,
Probably. I suspect that he looked at it as a change in frequency distribution over time given his use of metaphors and analogs from Newtonian physics. If we take a sliding scale, from "Politics" (defined as non-kinetic human interaction) to "War" (defined as kinetic human interaction), that would make sense.
Agreed - it's one of the reasons why I brought up the issue of defining politics. Hearkening back to that formal-informal distinction, I think we can also look at the range of actions defined as "acceptable" in a formal setting (either through mutual agreement, e.g. the Laws of War or via mutual acceptance without formal agreement, e.g. "collateral damage") vs. those that are not "acceptable" in a formal setting (e.g. non-state actors engaging in "warfare", terrorist tactics, etc.). Again, I would suggest that we are seeing a change over time in the membership function of any given action/event being included in a given term.
One of the reasons why I "pick on" Gian's comments so much (apologies for that - it's not personal at all and I'll be more than happy to buy the first round if/when we can get some f2f time :D), is that his stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging. I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates. You may be right about the separation of violent from non-violent tactics, although I would argue that this is now into the realm of communicating the concept of appropriate tactics for the given environment.
True, however recall that the opponent has a voice in everything and he is generally more agile than will be the COIN force.
Because the Armed forces of the US due to many factors tend to tamp down flexibility until it really becomes vital (in the true sense of the word). We are big, heirarchial, bureaucratic and ritualistic. We undertrain people at all levels but particularly at entry, officer or enlisted. We are overly imbued with protecting the institutions and thus almost allergic to any misjudgment that may embarrass the institutions -- all that works to stifle initiative and flexibility.Quote:
It is a balancing of appropriate force to achieve the ends. Even Clausewitz makes reference to that as you point out.
So, I guess my question is: "why is it hard for the military to do both?"
Is this about inflexible meets flexible? And why doesn't the need to be flexible in conventional war and adjust to the circumstances translate to flexibility in application of force and politics in a counterinsurgency?
The fact that a lot of flexibility and initiative are shown is a credit to the people in the units who develop and operate well in spite of the unintentionally oppressive stifling.
The good news is that when initiative and flexibility become imperative and / or the system has rid itself of peace time soldiering oriented folks-- as in the latter stages of WW II -- we can outflex most. We aren't there yet.
From a later post:
That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.Quote:
"however, I think the issue here is separating "violence" from other tactics in order to re-enforce the idea among the "combat oriented" forces that the "other tactics", ie "politics" or "non-violent", are available and should be used equally or more often to defeat an insurgency."
For a large percentage of the insurgents, other tactics can and should be used; for others, they will be seen as a weakness and will merely embolden those opponents.
I think that a part Gian's concern -- and I know a large concern of mine -- is that that Army, as it is prone to do, will swing the "we don't do counter insurgency" gate too far in the opposite direction and forget that it has to be full spectrum. We have a record of doing that -- and in each gate swing, a little more initiative and flexibility get stifled.
That occurs because the senior leadership sets the course and the mavericks and nay sayers are ruthlessly purged. Thus each gate swing gets a few more free thinkers to disappear.
I suggest that the last quote from you I included above is indicative of how this occurs. It is very easy to grab the fad of the day and decide it is the holy grail. It almost never is and the flexibility you properly advocate and cite as apparently missing gives the ability to look at the latest fad, accept the good -- and not throw out that which is proven necessary and to work. Every insurgency, every war is different.
Most of all, that flexibility requires, in COIN or conventional combat, the ability to rapidly assess and act and to do so without relying on dogma.
Agree wtih you and particularly with your last paragraph:
True dat... ;)Quote:
"But again, I have seen a change in emphasis in COIN doctrine. The objective is population control. Social workers don't control populations. Neither do democratic politicians. As long as you follow the ROE, I don't think any one cares how you control the population. Carrots, sticks, a combination, whatever works."
Don't think it's a change in emphasis as much as it implementing, where appropriate, a doctrine we learned in the 60s and then parked for a few years.
Ken,
Thanks for your thoughts! I love to hear these things from primary sources, those who lived it. I agree with your statements about there not being victory or defeat in insurgency. It seems these terms do not apply. Perhaps success is a better term. EXAMPLE: In Malaysia, the British successfully conducted a counterinsurgency. Maybe this all that can be said on these matters.
In college, I had a seminar on Vietnam, and I came away agreeing with my professor who said that it was an "unwinnable" war. His assertion was that the only path to victory was full mobilization of the military; and, because of our Cold War commitments in Eastern Europe, this was an absolute impossibility. Do you agree?
Very respectfully,
Invictus
You said:
While that is certainly a correct statement in regard to much argumenation, I'd also suggest that there are those who have very flexible views on those "certain terms" but in certain fora elect to not reveal that flexibility and instead take an exceptionally strong position for a variety of reasons not least to impress upon others the urgency of what they're saying with respect to a particular aspect -- and concomitantly force those in disagreement to take an exceptionally or even excessively contrary position and thus reveal weaknesses.Quote:
"...stated views are an almost perfect example of someone who believes that certain terms are absolute and unchanging. I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates."
Been my observation that the truth usually lies in between... :wry:
marct...
Clausewitz's writing style was certainly influenced by the overall style of the day. I'm not afraid to admit that the first time I read him, being non-military, non-19th century, I was left scratching my head going "huh?"Quote:
Probably. I suspect that he looked at it as a change in frequency distribution over time given his use of metaphors and analogs from Newtonian physics.
Kind of like reading Milton's Paradise Lost in the original language. It has a certain rhythm and language that would do the same unless you've been exposed to shakespearian language.
Exactly.Quote:
If we take a sliding scale, from "Politics" (defined as non-kinetic human interaction) to "War" (defined as kinetic human interaction), that would make sense.
I believe that's why I stated in an earlier post that the question of which takes precedence is sometimes related to the person's experience. Combat oriented may focus on the combat while "state" oriented may focus on the non-kinetic, political aspects. Thus, someone has to be able to balance them and figure out when the right time to apply either/or/both is.Quote:
I really don't think this is a case of someone "getting it" or not - just a great illustration of how the human mind operates.
may be true and may also be trying to communicate in the simplest, most recognizable terms. A US infantry man with his "political" experience in the states, probably doesn't associate "politics" with physical violence. Thus, it is meant to translate based on his experiences.Quote:
You may be right about the separation of violent from non-violent tactics, although I would argue that this is now into the realm of communicating the concept of appropriate tactics for the given environment.
Ken..
First, the "used more often" was not to imply "more often than combat". But, as in "more often" than it is. Secondly, I had a long post on the very subject of the "enemy's vote" and Clausewitz's point that the enemy deciding to do violence forcibly changes our actions.Quote:
That statement, while not totally incorrect, implies action that is very much situation and METT-T dependent. There is no one size fits all and in some insurgencies an over emphasis on "non-violence" will have a negative effect. The current situation in Iraq comes to mind. Anyone who thinks that there is not a considerable degree of violence occurring there just isn't paying attention.
The only way to determine which is appropriate is the facts on the ground and evaluated with "probabilities and conjectures". Which, I always though Clausewitz meant "gut instinct" to an extent. You have all the information, now you have to conjure a likely scenario and act on it. there are no "absolutes".
Hi Ken,
I would certainly agree with that observation! Honestly, that's why I was trying to focus my commentary on the "stated" views. Possibly due to my classical education, I'm a great believer in in vino veritas ;) - I would really like to sit down over some beers with Gian, and a whole host of other people here (:D) and just talk.