Winning the War in Afghanistan
Winning the War in Afghanistan
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This paper offers a plan for victory that builds on classic COIN--the oil spot or ink spot strategy--customized to address the unique challenges of the Afghan area of operations (AO).
I agree with the ink spot strategy. Make sense if you have enough troops and enough resources, and another 10-15 years.
EG, if the UK is serious about Helmand, it needs to deploy a Division of about 3 Brigades. The need is for about 16-20,000 men plus the attendant support. ... so 24 Apaches makes more sense than 6-8.
The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.
I think anyone who uses the word 'victory' with respect to
a COIN or Stability Operation is either deluded or not thinking clearly. Lacking a scorched earth, there will be no victory. Since we are not going to play G.Khan, the best that can be hoped for is an acceptable outcome. I have seen no evidence the US has yet determined what such an out come might be in its view. There is even less evidence that there is a consensus in Afghanistan that can provide an Afghan view of what such an out come might be.
As Eden has said several times, I suspect the Afghan view is a loose, sort of Federal national government that can preclude foreign interference and control the war lord factor -- other than , it will leave people alone.
That doesn't accord well with western thought.
Bob's World says:
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This then needs to be balanced in the larger global context of what the U.S. wants to redefine its role as in this new, post-Cold War, post-Bushesque GWOT, globalized world.
Two thoughts -- it's a Post Clinton-Bushesque world. One led to the other as sure as day leads to night.
Secondly, good plan -- however, given that this is the USA, my bet is that (a) It will not happen in the sense you wish; (b) the sheer number of players that will wade in on what that role might be will preclude any except a poor compromise solution being proffered; (c) as soon as that new role is determined by said poor compromise, there will be a concerted and successful effort, domestically and internationally to change it.
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...This will give us the context to know how much to ask of our allies, to better understand who are allies and enemies really are these days (applying old logic to that analysis is leading us to dangerous conclusions IMHO)...
Ask and ye will not receive -- other than from a very few and that will be reduced in supply and come with caveats. We have no allies, other than temporary accommodations. I'm unsure why people cannot accept and understand that. Our size, wealth, global power projection capability and selfishness all conspire to insure we can be respected (but are not now to the extent possible and desirable due to misuse of our power and flawed domestic choices) but we are not going to be liked, not at all. Nor are we going to have any allies other than those who see their own temporary advantage in allying with us. They will be fickle. OTOH, we have a slew of enemies and are likely to have more.
None of that is meant to be gloomy; it's cool. Been that way in the world ever since I first went overseas in 1947; hasn't changed much in the intervening years and is unlikely to change in the future -- until we go into real and major decline. Then the Jackals and Hyenas will appear, the latter laughing... ;)
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... What the Generals and the Policy wanks need to do is get out of our tactical commander's lanes and start doing the hard work of sorting out the big picture in their own. Afterall, that's what they get paid to do.
True, hopefully the will not waste time trying to develop a national strategy for a nation with a short attention span.
Agree with the first thought. Not so much the rest...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Perhaps a broad "Pashto zone" that encompasses their traditional tribal homeland as a "border" instead of a thin line so comforting to us?
Dual citizenship for all within, and governed with a system rooted in their historic tribalism?
Since you use the word 'within' that raises the question; does this "Pashto zone" have a border?
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What about the Taliban you ask? Those guys work for the government of Pakistan, I suspect they will drop their papers and quit that arrangement if given a better option.
Actually, I didn't ask -- and I strongly question the validity of your last two statements and ask, if they are true, what is your better option?
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What about AQ you ask? I suspect if we made the PNG of AQ as the condition precedent for such an arrangement they would be out on their little Arab backsides within a week. Sanctuary lies within a poorly governed populace, take away the poor governance and the sanctuary goes with it.
Good plan -- with what, if anything, do you propose to replace the poor governance?
You continually tell us what is wrong but I've seen few concrete solutions that can realistically be expected to be applied, surely you have some specific and achievable fixes that we can use to start toward if not reach this nirvana of a 'new America' that returns to its original values.
I don't disagree with anything you wrote.
In fact, I strongly agree with virtually all of it. However, (he said, clearing throat), Uhhmm, are we being realistic in what we both agree would be beneficial. Seems to me:
Your first two paragraphs are not only beneficial but easily achievable -- we really ought to get started on both those things. Today.
The issues of not pressing Pakistan and local satisfaction with governance -- regardless of international desires or 'standards' are possible. Difficult but possible. The biggest problem with both would be, I think, getting the consensus required. That said, we should certainly try.
However, with respect to not using NATO, recognition of the fact that borders are really becoming passe, the Pashto zone and the "legitimacy" issue, I suspect we can wish but are unlikely to see in our lifetimes. Unfortunately -- because those three and a half are quite important. The good news is that they are not necessary for the other issues to be pursued.
You're of course correct about borders and wars. The British and the French have much to answer for in that respect. I suppose they can be forgiven to an extent as they just did what seemed right at the time but those fault lines they built have been problematic for many years -- and likely will be in the future...:(
Thanks for the considered response; I'm old and retarded, all I can do is say Attaboy and agree -- you can push for those things as policies and I'm sure you are doing that. I wish you success.
But I still don't think we can truly do a national strategy... :D
Two good finds, Surferbeetle..
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Originally Posted by
Surferbeetle
That one in particular has some timeless truths that are too often forgotten. National interests trump all sorts of enmity or friendliness -- and righteousness...
On Leadership Strategies...
From this weeks Economist: There was a lawyer, an engineer and a politician...
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Why do different countries favour different professions? And why are some professions so well represented in politics? To find out, The Economist trawled through a sample of almost 5,000 politicians in “International Who’s Who”, a reference book, to examine their backgrounds.
As a side bar the term hydraulic empire might be of interest as well.
The reason for going to war ...
should determine the course of action taken in the war; subject to morphing during that course of action (which may lose the thread of the initial reason) - my perception.
I don't see any problem in admitting the following as the reason for going to war in Astan (and for DAs in Pakistan) ...
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from Wilf
After 911 99% of the US population wanted vengeance. That needs to be admitted.
since that is what I believed in 2001 and still do.
Finel's article attacks the logic of the syllogism laid out below - albeit getting somewhat tied up in comparing the simplicity of using airliners as cruise missiles with the complexity of using IEDs on a large scale (Wilf's AO on both; not mine).
Here is the syllogism:
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We were, after all, attacked on 9/11 by al Qaeda which at the time was operating with impunity under the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Given that history, allowing the Taliban to reestablish itself in Afghanistan seems self-evidently unacceptable.
Not necessarily. The real question to be asked is whether Taliban support of AQ was necessary to the 9/11 plot, or whether it was simply convenient. The bottom line of Finel's article is that it was not necessary, but convenient (e.g., from a BBC link by David today, the Afghan camps were very convenient).
Moving then to the question of revenge - payback to AQ, which in its simplest form involves killing the people involved in 9/11 (the lower echelon spared us that problem). If you do not accept revenge-payback as a valid reason to make war on these folks, then you have a different perception from me - many do.
In applying the formula "find, fix and kill AQ" (end goal)[*], the question to be asked is whether a military occupation (and nation-building) is a necessary component of obtaining payback, or whether that course of action is likely to be inconvenient for realization of that end goal. Again, answering that question is not my AO - legally, almost any course of action will stand scrutiny.
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[*] This formula is not suggested as the end-all, be-all solution to preventing future acts of "terrorism" (or, expressed another way, acts of violence by Transnational Violent Non-State Actors). It is simply the logical formula to have our revenge (or in more legalistic terms, our retribution).
I always get nervous when Generals say things like this:
"As long as we have the patience to stay they can never defeat us."
Custer? Percival? Not that either of them said that but the arrogant westerner being superior to the inferior types is bad ju-ju, methinks. Never is such an emphatic word... :wry:
Update and talking to the Taliban
What is going on? A short BBC News clip, note interview with ex-Taliban Amabassador to Pakistan at the end, commenting on talking to the Taliban: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8119110.stm
Apologies for those who cannot view.
davidbfpo
It's difficult and the West will leave
A non-Western contact having visited Kabul recently observed that:
a) The war was increasingly difficult and the Taliban could just wait for the Western presence to end;
b) No-one in Kabul, especially Afghans, thought the West would stay and the latest adjustments were an exit strategy. The one exception a Russian whose views was a new US encirclement strategy.
davidbfpo
Follow The Energy,The Money, And The Map?
Have know idea how accurate this is, but very disturbing if true.
http://therealnews.com/t/index.php?o...4&jumival=3511
Hard fight as Taliban stand & fight
Amidst all the media reporting on USMC operations in South Helmand, the link is a BBC report, with five mins video, on the UK operation and note the Taliban are not retreating, whatever firepower is delivered: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8142229.stm
(Apologies if clip will not work).
davidbfpo
Why should I look at Google Images?
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Originally Posted by
Valin
Google Images Pashtunistan...H/T David Kilcullen for introducing to the word.
Your link doesn't work (when you do one, if it isn't automatically underlined, it isn't a link) but I've been there before. One of the Pashtun problems is that I'm not at all sure the Baluchis will go along with some of the depicted versions... :wry:
I was probably aware of Pashtunistan about two years after D. Kilcullen was born. That name was around long before he was, many thing were around long before he was. In any event, I'm still aware of it. My question was "...does this "Pashto zone" have a border?"
A line on a map is not necessarily a border in the sense of a legal, internationally recognized border or even one accepted by many. See 'Kurdistan' (or Baluchistan) for an example of the problems with the construct of Bob's World's 'Pashto Zone' or your (and many others) 'Pushtunistan.' ;)
So my question stands, all alone and broken hearted...
A small tale that spells defeat
On the ground with the Australian / Dutch presence in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, this tale of treachery and confusion rightly illustrates the problem with the campaign, entitled 'Zoom in to this small tale that spells defeat': http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com...cle6684516.ece
davidbfpo
Good link, thanks. The FSB and its predecessors,
the KGB / MVD / NKVD / Agitprop, diligently exploited that line and many others the British and French drew on the map...:(
We're still paying the price for those strokes of a pen but at least we're giving all the KGB retirees a chuckle. :wry:
Or social science ignored and
arms doing as more harm than good...
Lessons from the First Afghan War
Needless to say the First Afghan War was between Imperial India and Afghanistan, wayback in 1842 and with a disasterous retreat from Kabul. Taken from: http://www.britishbattles.com/first-...l-gandamak.htm
The First Afghan War provided the clear lesson to the British authorities that while it may be relatively straightforward to invade Afghanistan it is wholly impracticable to occupy the country or attempt to impose a government not welcomed by the inhabitants. The only result will be
failure and great expense in treasure and lives.
The British Army learnt a number of lessons from this sorry episode. One was that the political officers must not be permitted to predominate over military judgments.
To read more on this war use the link; Imperial India took revenge the next year!
davidbfpo
Maybe history in current Afghan War won't repeat?
David:
Your history is quite good, having served over there in the mid-1960s (Pakistan and side trips to Kabul from our base at Peshawar/Badabur).
It is too early to evaluate the latest strategy and accompanying tactics now being employed in Afghanistan, but I can say from this side of the Pond that use of "pincer" movements in Helmud Province in Afghan while Pak military operates to bottle up fleeing Taliban on their side of the border is current paying great benefits or dividends in enemy KIA.
We are now getting full statistics but my off line info feed from native e-mail correspoondents over there is that we are taking out Taliban, and al Qaida, in the thousands, not the few here and there being reported in the media.
Several thousand more Taliban still over there, much lesser number of al Qaida, but hammering them daily is helping.
The follow on strategy and tactics are being already premature attacked in the Pak media, and by closet Taliban on sites like GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE whose nasty, convoluted, and lying comments reveal how well the war is now going.
I can assure you that some Taliban and Taliban sympathesizers over there, in Europe, Canada and in the US will read this posting, and one or two may even attempt to comment on SWJ. One of two are likely now Registered Users of SWJ.