Deterrence of Irregular Threats
(Moved here from another thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=7935&page=2 as the author has brought IMHO a new theme for discussion)
A couple points to consider that may help:
First, GWOT is not COIN; and really isn't GWOT either. We know that, yet struggle to devise a smarter approach the new range of security challenges we face today.
When President Bush left office he stated as his one metric of success that "we have not been attacked." Two comments on that:
1. A very poor metric of success, as one's opponents have their own agenda and schedules for how they pursue their ends, and if no attacks are necessary, why launch them and risk messing with success? So I don't credit it much as to our larger effectiveness in the GWOT. It may or may not mean our efforts are working.
2. HOWEVER: It does clearly indicate that the Commander in Chief saw the primary purpose of the GWOT campaign under his watch as one of Deterring such terrorist attacks from happening again.
This got me thinking, as I have been discussing Deterrence with a broader conventional community and attempting to highlight some of the new challenges in deterrence today than back in the good old days when all we had to worry about was MAD.
If our current campaign is primarily about deterrence (this is what militaries do in times of peace); and it is not really GWOT, then what is it? The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.
Many diverse organizations will employ terrorism as a tactic, and all require unique approaches. Weak(er) states; failed states (like Somalia); Quasi-state actors (like Hezbollah), non-state actors (like AQ), nationalist insurgencies (LET, MILF, etc etc etc), and the odd dissident individual (such as Mr. McVeigh). To lump them by their tacics leads to a dangerous conflation that contributes to approaches that are as likely to provoke some groups as they are to deter others. But by focusing on deterrence it forces one to break down the problem set and conduct a more sophisticated analysis and to better balance potential cost/benefit analysis by each category and major actors within those categories to various courses of deterrence or engagement that we plan to set out upon.
It also allows for a much more positive narrative that our allies and own non-DOD agencies can much more readily get on board with.
Now, before the "kill them all" gang gets too fired up, yes, any good deterrence campaign incorporates a balanced and appropriate LOO directed at bringing to justice those needing the same. Most will be in a court of the own HN; others will simply wake up knowing they are dead, yet wondering where all the virgins are. Such things are best done in low key fashion as a capable and certain supporting effort to a much larger and holistic campaign of deterrence.
Deterrence of Irregular Threats: Spain?
Quote:
(From Robert Jones)The concept that I am playing with is to shift it from a campaign focused (in name) on countering terrorism to one focused on Deterrence of Irregular Threats.
I wonder if the Spanish people and state are thinking along such lines with the apparent return of ETA, with two attacks on a Guardia Civil barracks in Burgos: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8173727.stm and a device that killed two Guardia Civil on Majorca: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8176601.stm . Note the BBC referred to five ETA leaders had been arrested this year and IIRC extensive co-operation with France: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7732678.stm. Spain has seen the campaign against ETA use a variety of methods, including mass public demonstrations.
Deterrence of Irregular Threats - a new thread there?
davidbfpo
1 Attachment(s)
Some initial thoughts for consideration
No powerpoint ranger, but here is an attempt to visualize the problem; and a first cut at defining these characters.
Non-Nuke States: (Canada, Japan, etc)
Sovereign States that do not possess nuclear weapons
Primary Goal: Promote Nationalist goals without burden of Nuke status, but necessarily somewhat subjugated to a Nuke State protector.
Sanctuary: State status and protective treaties with Nuke State(s)
Nuke States: (Russia, Israel, etc)
Sovereign States that possess, or are believed to possess, nuclear weapons
Primary Goal: Promote Nationalist goals without excessive interference by Nuke States
Sanctuary: State status and threat of nuclear retaliation
Failed State: (Somalia, Yemen, etc)
Semi-Sovereign State that has reverted to tribalism or control by a Quasi or Non-State Actor
Primary Goal: Survival
Sanctuary: Lack of recognized state bodies and willingness to operate outside of accepted state system
Quasi-State Actor: (Hezbollah, Hamas, etc)
Organizations that have a direct link to the legitimacy of a sovereign state, but that also maintain operations outside that status
Primary Goal: Nationalist; with links to legitimacy but operating primarily outside the system of states
Sanctuary: Mix of State Status and Non-state Status played to maximize both
Non-State Actor: (Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, etc)
Organizations with no linkage to any legitimacy derived from a sovereign state, but that operate in state-like ways to conduct UW
Primary Goal: Regional or Global; effect change for some distinct cause
Sanctuary: Non-state status enhanced by supportive populaces experiencing conditions of poor governance and the borders of the states those populaces live within; or protection of a sympathetic state’s borders and sovereign status
Insurgent Populaces: (FARC, NPA, LTTE, etc)
Organizations made up of citizens of a state to wage a nationalist insurgent movement (Revolutionary, Separatist or Resistance)
Primary goal: Nationalist, address poor governance at home, create a separate state, or defeat an invader
Sanctuary: non-state status and a supportive populace experiencing conditions of poor governance
Disgruntled Individuals: (Kaczynski, McVeigh, etc)
Disgruntled individuals who believe so strongly about some cause that they are motivated to conduct acts of terror
Primary goal: Personal; draw attention to their agenda / cause
Sanctuary: Laws of their respective states until such time as they violate the same
This a commonly held position.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I'm getting a little lost here. How is deterrence different from suppression? - suppression, meaning a failure to act through fear of harm.
In order to deter, you merely have to present a credible and lethal threat (capability plus an intent). The perception of that threat means the other side is either suppressed from action or not.
What am I missing here?
I think it comes up short. How do I make a quasi-state actor like Hezbollah "fear" me if I have constrained myself by granting them an artificial sanctuary based upon their status? Do I violate the soveriegnty of Lebannon to do so? To what potential provocation of other actors? Do I punish the populace of Lebanon? Again, to what potential provocation of others?
This recalculation of the deterrent and provocative effect across the spectrum is the essence, in my mind of shaping more holistic and effective schemes of both deterrence, but also COAs of responses.
How does one deter a non-state like AQ? Do I violate the soverignty of the state they take sanctuary within to attack AQ? Do I attack the state? Do I attack the members whereever I might find them? Again, to what second and third order effects of provocation across this expanded list of actors?
Old think of simply making the cost exceed the benefit for one particular actor or category of actor falls far short these days.
Similarly how does one deter an insurgent Saudi populace that perceives that they must first break the protective support of the US Govt to their own before they can achieve change at home? Fire missiles into their homes in Mecca? In this case I believe these groups are best deterred indirectly by addressing the perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy over their government at a minimum, and by also enabling evolution of better governance in these important states where we do have critical national interests that require our presence.
I don't have the answers, but do believe that the old model is dangerously lacking for the current environment.
Yes, but are you squeezing a balloon?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Like Japan in WW2? Osama Bin Laden puts lot of money and effort into staying alive. If an entire terrorist organisation wants to be suicide bombers, it is a very temporary threat. War is politics. Politics requires someone to be alive at the end.
Clausewitian Trinity? People, Leadership, and military? There's always something to squeeze.
CvC only has one oar in the water in today's environment. A good solid oar, but incomplete all the same; so don't pull on it too hard or you'll just go around and around.
So you squeeze Hezbollah good and hard by invading the sovereign country of Lebanon and waging war among their populace. Perhaps you have deterred Hezbollah, but who have you outraged and provoked in the process? Where did the air go when you squeezed that balloon?
When our media and government refuse to recognize Hezbollah as part of the Lebanese government we in effect grant them a sanctuary of status. In this category, where an organization chooses to play this game, I think a good first step is to officially recognize them as part of the state. Strike "LH" from our diplomatic lexicon and simply say "The Hezbollah party of Lebanon," or better yet "Lebanon." Then make it very clear to all that when Hezbollah acts so does the state of Lebanon. Take them out of their quasi-state status and place them into a full state status. Now our state tools work. If the government or populace thinks that is unfair, well then they need to police their own problem; and if they can't then it is proven true by their inability to do so.
This is just one category though, and again, all must be viewed holistically and relative provocation and deterrence effects must be wargamed across the spectrum when considering COAs.
AQ is a non-state, quite different than a quasi-state
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
Everyone knows the state of Lebanon cannot control HA or "police their own problem." They do not have that capability, so how can our "state tools" work in that case?
Should we use that logic for the AQAM sanctuary in Pakistan, despite the fact that we know Pakistan is incapable of controlling its territory?
The distinctions between these groups is critical. This is arguably the greatest failing of the GWOT approach is that it conflated threats by lumping them all under a terrorist banner by judging them by their tactics and their affiliations rather than by their true natures and individual goals.
AQ does not claim to be part of Pakistan; they just take advantange of the sanctuary of a poorly governed populace and a legal border.
We have trampled down the border to go after them, but what effect that on the populace? Any less poorly governed or likely to lend sanctuary? No, the opposite, in fact.
A "quasi-state" is not equal to a "non-state," is not equal to an "insurgency".
We talk about "separating the insurgent from the populace," yet we cannot even differentiate effectively between the various groups employing "terrorist" tactics.
If we are to deter, we must first understand and and respect the differences.
Oh, and if the master cannot control the servant, then who really is the master after all?? This actually supports my case. If lebanon cannot control LH, the LH is in fact Lebanon.
One cannont ignore the present any more than they can the past
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the
assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the
"Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.
Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?
Every generation talks about the challenges of raising teenagers....I get it. Some things don't change much.
However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.
I focus on the strategic effect, as this shapes the course of nations
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
With respect, I think that statement needs to be held to rigour.
The basics of the Platoon attack have not changed since 1919, but yes a Platoon Commander can now call and adjust Corps level artillery fires - but that's really a "so what" issue. It's not hard to understand.
The same man can use a hand thrown or ground crawling UAV to do the same - so what?
The tactical level is not and has not become more complex. If so how?
The biggest problem I have is teaching people the limitations of all the new toys. EG: 28 knot surface wind, and most hand thrown UAV's will fly, etc etc etc.
No argument that most tactics produce very similar results at the tactical level; though just as the rifled musket forced modification of tactics to take into account a formation receiving 6-10 aimed volleys as it closed with the enemy vice the 1-2 they had received over the few hundred years preceding; so to do many advances like UAVs, guided munitions, etc; shape tactics today. But that is not what I am talking about at all.
What i am talking about is the strategic effect expected based on historical experience from COIN tactics simply is far less likely to be achieved due to the enhanced communications tools available to populaces (and therefore insurgents) everywhere.
This is the essence of the AQ phenom. The ability of a non-state to act like a State to conduct UW across many states while protected by the sanctuary of their status of not being a state, so having no state-based vulnerabilities that can be either targeted or deterred in a classic sense.
The strategic environment has changed incredibly; both because the artificial construct of the Cold War polarity that all of our policies and international organizations are based upon no longer exists; because that in it self also served as a catalyst for those oppressed by it to seek the opportunity to achieve change; and because the information tools that are fueling globalization have empowered these organizations to be more effective, more resilient, and longer reaching, than ever before.
The fact that it still only takes one bullet to kill one man is immaterial and moot to this discussion.
In this forum I do not seek approval, only thoughtful discourse.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
So are you actually just telling me that you think things have changed and you are having difficulty understanding what and how, or are you excusing successive US/NATO Administrations for strategic dissonance, and corporate stupidity?
Sorry Bob, I just don't see the big deal. I was far more worried when I faced 3 Shock Army and 48 nukes targeted on the 1 BR Corps area. The world is a lot safer today, and I understand it a lot better. In many ways, today military action is far less decisive and thus the world is more predictable.
Maybe there is merit in finding all sorts of new problems, but it's not a path I wish to walk.
So all positions are welcome and helpful. Seriously. I'd far rather debate a wise man with whom I disagree, than to talk to a sycophant who nods dutifully at my every syllable.
However, I will say that while your position is both quite rationale and widely held among those who shape policy; I also believe such thinking is dangerous and will ultimately facilitate the very things we fear the most.
But I have no path to take, as there have not been that many who have gone before me to make one on this particular journey. That's ok, I enjoy a little intellectual exploration and am happy to provide the sweat and bear the scars that come with breaking new trail...
Like most explorers, I may not find what I seek, but in the course of the journey I will learn much of value.
Yes. But still with a focus on the pursuit of our National Interests
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
BW,
I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:
1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.
2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.
3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.
So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.
At the end of the day, the US is still the most powerful nation in the world, with all of the associated benefits, duties, and responsibilities associated with that status.
We just need to recognize that the favorable status quo that emerged from the Cold War was a snapshot in time, and that the world is ever changing; and that we too must embrace change in order to remain relevant.
Part of this change is to embrace a broader perspective on deterrence; and to recognize that we must be more sensitive of where our interests conflict with the interests of others in our pursuit of them; and such a perspective will allow us to be not just safer, but more effective as well.
not at all. Fear is healthy. It just isn't everything
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Entropy
Well, then I think our difference is definitional and ISTM you are attempting to redefine deterrence to remove the "fear" component. Fear is a pretty well-established part of deterrence and, as I suggested upthread, if you remove fear then it's no longer deterrence but something else. At least for most people. Just a suggestion, but you might want to look at changing your terminology.
Nations have much to lose, so fear works. Those with little to lose, perhaps not so much. Again, balance our approach, not abandon it.