Ill-Defined Problem Sets: A Discussion
After re-reading and thinking through the practical application of the complex problems a commander must deal with on the ground, I chose four exercises for discussion. I have either dealt with directly or been involved with each type of problem set, and there is no immediate solution. Additionally, from what I've read in past literature, there is not much guidance towards these issues. The intent is for council members to explain how they would deal with each problem. If there is interest, I will explain my solutions down the road.
Examples:
1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.
Further explained...
1. Corrupt governance...As introduced by MarcT
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
Let me take an example of this. Let's suppose that a critical "problem" in gaining support for an HN government centres around a local perception held by the populace that the governor of the area is "corrupt" (in quotes to indicate a level of corruption beyond the culturally accepted limit). Let us further suppose, for the sake of this example, that that condition is true. Gaining the support of the local populace for the HN "government" will be increasingly difficult as the depredations of the local governor go on unchecked. The local governor is, in effect, one of the greatest recruiting tools for the insurgents in the area. How are you going to define the problem in a manner that would allow a local (foreign) commander to "solve" it?
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
The majority of literature suggests that one should bypass or ignore these areas during the initial clearance phases. I used to agree; however, after my last tour working mostly in these types of areas, I found the secondary and tertiary effects to be overwhelming towards the greater goal of resurrecting governance and building support for the host nation. For example, if the enemy ventures on a coercion campaign of beheadings, they are likely to kill the key sheiks, religious leaders, and other spheres of influence. Furthermore, the educated middle class typically chooses to flee. What is left is a headless society. So what do you do? If you attack early on into an enemy's stronghold, then you will likely take high casualties. If you wait, then the society could be significantly traumatized and take years or generations to mend.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
If you're counterparts are part of the problem (i.e. Shias seeking revenge towards Sunnis or vice-versa), then your actions are extremely limited and there may be a negative reaction for every action you take (one step foward and two steps back). What do you do?
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.
So, you've successfully neutralized the local insurgency in your AO. Good work. Now, you're dealing with tribal issues dating back for centuries. The security you've facilitated is temporary and mostly based on the fact that you and your men are the baddest sheiks on the block. Now, what do you do?
I hope these are helpful, and I look foward to y'alls discussion:D
v/r
Mike
Which roles should we play ?
Mike,
Great sequence of four questions, but which of the following four roles should we play:
1. Political officer of the incumbant goverenment, focused on the Political Struggle.
2. Military officer of the incumbant goverenment, focused on the Military Struggle.
3. Political officer of the assisting goverenment, focused on the Political Struggle.
4. Military officer of the assisting goverenment, focused on the Military Struggle.
How one deals with a problem could differ significantly based on Where am I ? and What am I ?
So, is this really a 16-sided exercise set ?
Regards
Mike
Disagreement over concept and plans for corrpution control/eradication
Mike:
In Afghanistan and Pakistan,where in years past I lived and served, the practice of "backshees" [my phonetic spelling???] is that all, everyone, gets pay offs and kick backs for and from whatever they do vocationally.
This said, and it is true, how do you or we differentiate between everyday grassroots corruption and high level corruption, which corruption is true on all sides, the non-Taliban governance officials as well as the Taliban?
More critique, disagreement, whatever on this topic could be helpful to one and all as the advertised effort to clean up corruption to me seems highly unlikely to be achievable due to these folks hundreds of years of precedent of instutitionalized corruption, corruption as defined by a Westerner, job security and old age pension set asides as defined by locals over there from bottom to top.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
After re-reading and thinking through the practical application of the complex problems a commander must deal with on the ground, I chose four exercises for discussion. I have either dealt with directly or been involved with each type of problem set, and there is no immediate solution. Additionally, from what I've read in past literature, there is not much guidance towards these issues. The intent is for council members to explain how they would deal with each problem. If there is interest, I will explain my solutions down the road.
Examples:
1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.
Further explained...
1. Corrupt governance...As introduced by MarcT
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
The majority of literature suggests that one should bypass or ignore these areas during the initial clearance phases. I used to agree; however, after my last tour working mostly in these types of areas, I found the secondary and tertiary effects to be overwhelming towards the greater goal of resurrecting governance and building support for the host nation. For example, if the enemy ventures on a coercion campaign of beheadings, they are likely to kill the key sheiks, religious leaders, and other spheres of influence. Furthermore, the educated middle class typically chooses to flee. What is left is a headless society. So what do you do? If you attack early on into an enemy's stronghold, then you will likely take high casualties. If you wait, then the society could be significantly traumatized and take years or generations to mend.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
If you're counterparts are part of the problem (i.e. Shias seeking revenge towards Sunnis or vice-versa), then your actions are extremely limited and there may be a negative reaction for every action you take (one step foward and two steps back). What do you do?
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.
So, you've successfully neutralized the local insurgency in your AO. Good work. Now, you're dealing with tribal issues dating back for centuries. The security you've facilitated is temporary and mostly based on the fact that you and your men are the baddest sheiks on the block. Now, what do you do?
I hope these are helpful, and I look foward to y'alls discussion:D
v/r
Mike
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.
Really good problem-sets, Mike.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
So, you've successfully neutralized the local insurgency in your AO. Good work. Now, you're dealing with tribal issues dating back for centuries. The security you've facilitated is temporary and mostly based on the fact that you and your men are the baddest sheiks on the block. Now, what do you do?
Okay, very rough stab at the simplest one.
First, assume that you cannot resolve / reconcile the grievances.
Second, assume that there is some cultural recognized and accepted form of reconciliation and resolution.
Third, ask what it is.
Or, in other words, and to modify a core US Army meme - "Ask, don't tell" :D!
Why is this simple?
(NB: I didn't say "easy" ;))
All cultures have some form of reconciliation mechanism which involves the use or threat of violence and some form of ritualized pattern of action / event to stop violence. Sometimes there are multiple ritualized event sequences fighting for cultural dominance.
Because these conflict / grievance resolution forms vary significantly from culture to culture (and often within cultures), you need to find one or two that match with the vast majority of the current players, whether or not they match with your perception of how to do it. This latter point is the key - you cannot impose a solution on "them", they have to evolve one that meets your minimal requirements. This can lead to some pretty strange mechanisms (e.g. cricket games were used in the Trobriands as a substitute for raid / counter-raid, i.e. clan feud, events).
Now comes the truly hard part: once you have worked with them to establish a local solution, you have to sell it on three fronts:
- MNF forces have to be convinced that it will "work";
- Local groups have to agree to enforce it; and
- The HN government has to at least officially tolerate it.
Cheers,
Marc
Corruption and governance
Quote:
Originally Posted by
George L. Singleton
Mike:
In Afghanistan and Pakistan,where in years past I lived and served, the practice of "backshees" [my phonetic spelling???] is that all, everyone, gets pay offs and kick backs for and from whatever they do vocationally.
This said, and it is true, how do you or we differentiate between everyday grassroots corruption and high level corruption, which corruption is true on all sides, the non-Taliban governance officials as well as the Taliban?
More critique, disagreement, whatever on this topic could be helpful to one and all as the advertised effort to clean up corruption to me seems highly unlikely to be achievable due to these folks hundreds of years of precedent of instutitionalized corruption, corruption as defined by a Westerner, job security and old age pension set asides as defined by locals over there from bottom to top.
George,
It took four tours to the Middle East to absorb what you are saying and comprehend the true limits of my own abilities as a ground force commander. My initial questions were intentionally weighted to encourage response and debate amoung other members of the council. I'm pretty sure that I'm not the only one that has been in such a dilemma:o.
With that said, on the ground level, when one is supposed to "control" their environment while working within the constraints of indigenous culture, to include bribery, pay-offs, kick-backs, and simple corruption, I would suspect that a commander must determine an appropriate acceptable level.
When the local government surpasses the norm, actions must be taken. For example, in Diyala, Iraq (circa 2006-2007) Iraqi Army and local police units were being used by the elected government to cleanse the Sunni populace. Simultaneously, the Sunnis sided with al Qaeda as to check the government. Both sides were wrong- they were embattled in a civil war.
We were simply trying to maintain the peace.
I suppose that is what makes these examples interesting- Americans intervening in internal affairs trying to provide a least-bad solution.
I'm not sure if this applies to Afghanistan, but my intuition tells me that many of the issues in Afghan are Mullah Omar v/s Harmad Karzai.
With that, I'll wait for y'alls response.
v/r
Mike
Boss, what do you want me to do now?
I've struggled during the past two years to accurately describe our small portion during the "Surge." I'm finally starting to tell the story....This is the beginning of my entrance into the realm of wicked, irregular, or undefined problems..... Telling this tale has been extremely difficult for me.
I hope others will continue to share their experiences and answer the first set of questions so that we can all learn a bit...
v/r
Mike
Boss, what do you want me to do now?
Late May 2007, Zaganiyah, Diyala River Valley, Iraq
We watched the video over and over again. Today should have been a day of relief. After sixty days of siege, fighting through twelve attacks a day, sorting through hundreds of deep-buried improved explosive devices (DBIEDs), houses rigged to blow (HBIEDs), and suicide bombers, our persistance paid off. Last night, we killed the primary bomb-maker in the Diyala River Valley.
Intuitively, we knew violence would go down. The enemy's ability to disrupt or block the roads would be severly hampered by this kill. Soon, I could reopen the only ground line of commucation (LOC) leading back to the outside world. We would no longer have to rely solely on air assets for mobility and resupply. I would continue to put the squeeze on Ali Latif al Zuharie, the regional al Qaeda leader of this end of the Diyala River Valley. Killing his sole bomb-maker is the equivilent of taking out his star quarterback.
The siege was working. Continued pressure on the remaining insurgents would result in their destruction, surrender, or eggressing into safer areas. My area of operations was quickly becoming a non-safe area for those that continued to rebel or revolt violently from the elected government. The Islamic State of Iraq would soon dissolve from this area. Reading off the COIN playbook, I would begin restoring local indigenious security, essential services, governance, resettling displaced families, and arbitrating tribal, clan, and family reconciliation.
Today should have been a good day, but my boss and I sat transfixed at the images playing out on the computer screen. Frame by frame, I pointed out terrain features verifying the location. LTC Poppas, my squadron commander, would take a copy back to show the Brigade and Division Commanders. They would offer assets, support, and guidance, but at the end of the day, I would be responsible for determine the appropriate course of action and execution.
I thought that I had seen it all, but for some reason, during this deployment, every time you solved one problem, two more popped up. The situation became messier, more confusing, and more wicked every time I pulled back a layer of the onion. During the Thunder Runs, I sped through the Republican Guards last stand brilliantly firing tank rounds and machine gun fire to dissolve any resistance. This time, we fought through the trenches in Turki Village throwing grenades back and forth to neutralize an al Qaeda training camp. We fought through villages abadoned from al Qaeda's ethnic cleansing. We dealt with regular war, irregular war, and everything in between. I thought that I had seen it all, but it all hit home when we watched this video.
Maybe I observed too many deaths. Maybe I lost too many of my own men. Maybe not.
During this time in Iraq, everyone became numb to death. I remember back in 2003 when we first saw the beheadings of Daniel Pearl. I felt sick, but now, the beheading videos seemed normal. This time was different.
After we killed the bomb-maker, during the sensitive site exploitation, we uncovered numerous videos of his accomplishments. First, we found the pornography. Pornography may seem a paradox to your purist beliefs of al Qaeda, but he was no Islamist. Honestly, in my four tours, I've only met three true Muslims. This man was a former Ba'athest explosive expert under Saddam currently working for the highest bidder. We watched hours of him and his wife on tape trying to emulate the sexual exploits of Pamela Anderson's epic ventures. So much for the purity of the Jihad. Next, we found the attacks overrunning the Zaganiyah security forces from 10 November 2006- ten days to the day when Alpha troop left Zag. Finally, we watch the video. This video was different.
It started with the capture of one of our local Iraqi Army brothers. He was a Shia from Kharnabhat, an adjacent town trapped in a zero-sum perpetual feud with the Sunnis from Zaganiyah. The soldier was beaten and drug into the town's square: the cemetary 100 meters from my current patrol base. The entire town of Zaganiyah crowded the area to watch the spectacle. Protected by a black mask covering his face, Ali Latif al Zuharie served as the prosecutor, judge, and jury.
"For crimes against humanity, for disobeying Allah and supporting the infidel backed government, this man is sentenced to death." demanded Ali Latif.
"Allah Achbar, Allah Achbar (God is Great, God is Great)," the crowd cheered.
Ali Latif presented his sword and beheaded the soldier, and the crowd succombed in ecstacy declaring how great god was as the soldier's head flopped to the ground.
I stopped the video. I could no longer take watching my neighbors engage in such tragedy. I knew these people. I spent time with them. I drank tea and smoked cigarettes with them. I cried and laughed with them. I thought I knew them. I no longer knew anything.
"Boss, what do you want me to do now" I asked my squadron commander.
"Mike, I don't know." he replied.
It was the first time that I ever found LTC Andrew Poppas indecisive.
You sure don't give the easy questions do you
A,B,C,Z :confused:
Honestly the truth is you may find few aside from the august (said old guys:D) who feel even marginally up to the task of giving you the type of directions which you would go in the given areas. It's rather difficult to truly face the tasks we (the American people) have asked you guys to undertake although perhaps that's the point. If we're not ready to accept and give greater consideration to the facts as they may well be on the ground before you are sent in then there will likely be quite a few important questions which have to be answered on the ground at a much higher price than might have been otherwise.
So for now I like others will wait to absorb the wisdom of others in helping to direct you down the path and hopefully learn quite a bit in the process.
ps: in reference to your last post
Did you confront any of those you recognized from the video and when(if) they answered was there a notable shame or was it more like someone talking about a dream they had?
On Anthropologists and things
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
I've seen grad students sent to mental institutions trying to "never upset anyone" and worrying about the "inherent power imbalance between the ethnographer and the informant" :wry:.
Agreed and, BTW, that holds for doing good ethnographies as well. Even though our (Anthropologists) mission is to write ethnographies, never say never is a damn good motto for us, too, and too few use it
Yup. I've seen wanna-be ethnographers (some with tenure) go into areas and tell the locals what they "should" be doing. Thankfully, I've never had to work under any of these twits, but they are there. Most cultures recognize everything that we would call a "relationship" (there actually aren't that many different forms), even though they rate them differently. Sounds like you tagged into one that they recognized pretty well.
Hi Marc,
In grad school, I was fascinated by the subject of anthropology, but I always thought it a bit presumptious that one could believe that they could penetrate a society without making waves:confused:.
It reminds me of all the times that we had embedded reporters within our unit. Guys would put on all their tricked out "kits" around the photographers and pose hoping to get the "GI Joe" photo-shot. I imagine that it is the same for villagers when an anthropologist comes to town. Some will posture, others will exaggerate....In the end, the visitor becomes a bit of amusement outside their normal day to day life.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
Sounds like my wife's version of conflict resolution :D! So, the key, then, lies in the arbitrator position. It sounds like you put yourself in the place of the arbitrator in a way they weren't expecting.
Good analogy. I only wish that dealing with wives was as simple as dealing with tribal sheiks. At least the locals are from earth. Women are from Venus:D
Best,
Mike
Another wicked problem...
Hi Marc,
For the most part, I agreed with your last comments, specifically on our pre-conditioned values, beliefs, and norms that we all must learn to relax when dealing with a foreign indigenous population. I find myself constantly struggling to remember that normal for me is not normal for others. I will take issue with one and use a current example to try and articulate.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
One of the more intriguing things, I find at any rate, about "ill-defined problem sets" or "wicked problems", is that a large part of their definition as classes comes from the perceptions and assumptions of those defining them. For example, some of these "problems" are only "problems" because they do not fall neatly within "traditional" disciplinary boundaries, while others are only "problems" because of the definers epistemological stance. Other times, they are only "problems" because of the actions taken by the definers.
I'd like to return, for a moment, to Mike's original four "problems" and pull them apart from this angle:
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
The scenario Mike set out is a nasty one but, again, it is making some axiomatic assumptions that may be invalid. First off, in many of the current AOs, the "traditional" structures have already been under attack for a long time. A second possibility is that the "traditional" structures have morphed in an adaptive format to mimic the insurgent structures.
Depending on what is actually going in, your tactics should vary. For example, going in to an insurgent stronghold with low troop counts and insufficient logistics will undermine your entire campaign (take a look at the British in Helmand in 2006 for an example). Go back to the basic political power dynamics operating in the culture and use that as your guide.
For example, if the insurgents are holding power by using beheadings, then they are drawing on two sources of legitimacy - strength and, if Muslim, some interpretation of Sha'ria law. In Afghanistan at any rate, this would indicate that the "traditional" balance between the sheiks and the mullahs has been vectored strongly in the mullahs favour. This type of enemy enclave is, actually, a good one to first isolte / beseige (for its value as an IO example) and then take down with a ready made civil admin plan after the kinetic attack.
If, however, the enclave is controlled by an "insurgent" group that is mimicing insurgent structures, then this could indicate the potential for a political rapproachement. Again, using Afghanistan as an example, we always have to keep in mind that "the Taliban" are, actually, a co-alition of differing groups, some of which could well be incorpated into the central government.
My example was harsh, but that is the environment that the military must work in. As much as we wish to allow the society to work issues out own their own, the military must make jugement calls as to what is acceptable. The following example may show a striking contrast in the roles of the military and the anthropologists. Back in Diyala circa 2006, AQI was cutting locals hands off for mixing male and female vegetables. Here is what the boys on the ground are dealing with today.
Taliban threaten to chop off voters' fingers in Afghan election
Ben Farmer
The Guardian
Quote:
Insurgents in southern Afghanistan told locals that fingers found bearing the indelible ink used to mark voters would be removed.
"We will know those who cast a vote from the ink, and his finger will be cut off," a commander warned villagers in the south of the country, the New York Times reported.
The Taliban ruling council led by Mullah Omar has called on Afghans to boycott the election, described them as an American sham and told its fighters to block roads to polling stations.
The new threat of mutilation appeared to rule out hopes that lower level Taliban leaders would call a temporary ceasefire to allow the vote to proceed without violence.
To the rational western actor, we would assume that the Taliban would simply allow the people to vote. If the Taliban won, then we would be in a difficult conundrum. Instead, the Taliban is using another measure of coersion to control the populace through fear.
Just another example of what the boys are dealing with.
v/r
Mike
Thank you for saying that
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Tactical problems are always hard, regardless of the type of warfare one is engaged in. This is the hard fact of the life of the combat soldier.
Doubly frustrating is that nagging question that is also always there, regardless of the form of combat, of if your hard efforts and sacrifice have in any way contributed to the ultimate "good" that brought you to this harsh place to begin with. Sadly, far too often, history shows that often effort and lives are squandered on efforts that contribute little to that ultimate success.
So, as to Mike's questions:
1. Corrupt governance.
2. Interdicting in denied areas, shadow govt's, or enemy safehavens.
3. Coping with corrupt police or army counter-parts.
4. Reconciling greivances on the tribal level.
The bigger and more important question is not how does one take on these difficult tactical challenges, but rather are these really the challenges that must be taken on at all.
I have opinions that I will share on all of these, but figured I'd see what others had to offer first.
It has been a constant frustration to me how often we fail to follow the adage know yourself before trying to know the enemy.
Put more bluntly can anyone point to any given society ours included within which all of 4 of those don't exist in some form.
And more importantly how they are addressed differently not only in different nations but even in different cities/towns/etc.
If we can accept at the reality of their existence and as they exist in a much more familiar form thus the reasons for various approaches will be easier to actually understand; then maybe we can ask the more important questions like why, where, and how to address them somewhere else.
-Ron
Lines of Operations (LOO)...I couldn't resist
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I'd actually make it even simpler.
1. Find the enemy - to kill/capture.
2. Do not cause harm to the population, or allow them to be harmed, by others.
Ferdinand Foch's "Core Functions" basically still apply - Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit - and Striking can be an arrest and Exploitation can be having a meeting the local head man, or digging him a well.
Wilf, for the American Army, my suggestions are a bit unconventional...Your views are simply subversive or rebelious:D.
The typical view would state that one must maneuver along these lines of operation:
- Security
- Essential Services
- Tribal/Political Leadership engagement
- Security Force Development/Training
These views are simply too constrained and ambigious for me.
v/r
Mike
Pop Centric Strategy can be a dangerous idea
Contrary to my statement above, I believe we have to focus on the populace, because a mobilized populace is a powerful weapon. Thus the softer side of irregular warfare where we focus on providing basic needs, hope for a better tomorrow, education, and an alternative narrative to the enemy among other activities is critically important, and perhaps even decisive over time. I think most of us agree on this point to varying degrees.
This is why I think Secretary Gate's push for a whole of government approach (team effort) is the basis of enabling the strategy. A promising sign that we're perhaps moving in this direction (ever so slowly) is that the State Department was recently given several million dollars to take lead on the counter propaganda war in Afghanistan. The military role in irregular warfare is not "the strategy", but simply one leg in the total effort, and its role in this soft zone should largely be focused on providing security and logistics to enable the other legs (do gooders) to their work.
The problem since 9/11 is that the military was implementing the entire strategy by itself. Sort of like putting a football team in the field that only has an offense team. They know the principles of defense, but they're not very good at it. This has forced the military to play positions on the team that they were not prepared for, and now it has become the norm. Of course the danger is we're weakening our offense team by making them play defense. Not until recently have we seen a concerted interagency effort to get into the fight and better enable a holistic strategy, but I suspect we're still a long ways off from getting it right.
Our senior military and many junior leaders in the field are focused on building schools, improving the economy, and taking a stab at good goverance (good luck on that one), because they know it needs to be done and no one else has been picking up the ball and running with it. Now that the team is "begining" to get flushed out with the appropriate interagency players we may need to reassess what the military should be focused.
I think Mike F. took a good first stab at it with:
Quote:
1. Control the Physical Terrain.
2. Control the Populace.
3. Conduct Intelligence Collection.
At a minimum I would add:
4. Provide security and logistics support to the do gooders.
5. Conduct offensive operations against the enemy.
6. Help build host nation security force capacity.
I know there are multiple schools of thought on what comes first in the counterinsurgency chicken or the egg argument, but I'm in the school who believes you have to establish security for the populace before you can develop their economy and establish good governance (if a government can't protect its people, then it is a stretch to claim they're providing good governance).
I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.
During 2003-2005 in Iraq, as many have stated, we conducted drive by COIN, by executing nightly raids to go after suspected insurgent leaders, and then we turn the populace back over to insurgent control. Since we were only focused on offensive operations, rather than providing security to the populace, this strategy proved ineffective and of course led to resentment of our forces in many cases. It wasn't until the surge (in some locations prior to the surge) that the military adjusted its military strategy and pushed out into the streets to protect the populace which had telling results (however, the results are only temporary without the right team coming in once security is established to start fixing the other problems). Since we had even less forces in Afghanistan (a much larger country), we obviously left a lot of terrain under the control of the enemy. In short, we didn't execute the military portion of the strategy very effectively. The military can't blame the interagency for failure to follow the basics of military strategy of taking and holding physical and human terrain. Instead we pursued some network targeting "theory" that continues to fail us. The network targeting theory would be a great supporting effort to a real clear and hold strategy (which would result in more dead insurgents), but it is no way to win this this fight.
I guess I would need at least one example to be convinced of this
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
I disagree with Bob W's assumption that the people are fighting for good governance and if we provide it we will take the wind out of their sails (as I understand the argument). The enemy we are fighting today is not fighting against a dictator, they are fighting against good governance. They want to be in charge to facilitate their criminal activity, or impose a stone age political system based on an extreme interpretation of their religion. We won't win these die hards over with good governance, rather we must win the people over to gather the intelligence on who these folks are and where they're at so we can kill them, if we don't remove the cancer we will not win.
First I must make clear that I am not an advocate for CNAS-brand "Population-centric" engagement that is all about controlling the population and attempting to buy them off by producing "effective" governmental services free from corruption, etc.
I am an advocate for Jones-brand "Populace-centric" engagement that is all about understanding the needs of the populace and enabling self-determined governance on their terms while focusing on brokering/enabling positive movement between the populace and their existing government to address conditions of "poor governance" (defined as any issue, real or perceived, that is so important to any substantial segment of a populace so as to drive them to subversion or full insurgency; that they also perceive they have no means to address through legitimate channels).
Poor governance does not require a dictatorship; it merely requires a little bit of governmental arrogance or ignorance mixed with a lack of effective process for a populace to express their discontent. Personally, I think we should focus our effort on enabling good process and communication; but because we have cast these problems as "warfare" we apply military solutions, as WILF wisely points out, the military role is far more about defeating threats and providing security.
At the end of the day, we have overstated this entire problem to the degree that it appears impossible to address. On the Government/Civil side we have created a "population-centric" problem set that we in no way have the capacity to address; and on the population end have conflated the threats into a massive "they are evil and out to get us" monster that we are lashing out at inappropriately in all directions.
Less is more definitely applies.
Remember, the key to good governance is not how well it performs, the key is both how the populace feels about the governance and the degree of certainty they have that they can do something about it short of breaking the law.
As to the US and how we got mixed up in these little soap operas; is due to our degree of interference in these relationships. What I call "establishing an inappropriate degree of legitimacy over the government of others." When a populace perceives that a 3rd party is an obstacle to their achieving good governance at home, they will target that third party to attempt to break that obstacle. So, to reduce the threat at attack to the US and our interests is not to target these nationalist movements, but instead to target this perception that we are an obstacle to good governance.
We chose to make our focus "Defeat AQ"; and may well achieve a tactical success that produces a strategic defeat in the process. Make the focus these perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy instead, and keep our efforts against AQ low-key and IAW the main effort; and we can render AQ irrelevant. If we simply "defeat" them they will be replaced by a smarter and more effective organization that is free from their baggage but primed to run through the hole AQ made for them. That would be a tragedy, simply becasue it is so avoidable.
General Instructions for Interdicting in Denied Areas
The feedback in this thread has allowed me to consolidate and shape some of my thoughts on general guidance for a company commander should approach interdicting into a denied area. Over the next several weeks, I'm going to try and consolidate it into an essay explaining how my troop did it. Below is the outline. It combines some existing COIN principles, a bit of Dr. Gordon McCormick's Mystic Diamond Model, and other advice received from SWJ and other mentors. If you have a moment, take a look at it, and let me know if I've missed anything.
1. DEFINE THE ENVIRONMENT
a. Conduct Covert Infiltration and Reconnaissance
b. Conduct Leadership Engagements
c. Develop hypothesis of current situation
2. CLEAR and SEIGE
a. Establish a Patrol Base
b. Control the Terrain
c. Control the Population
d. Destroy the Counter-State's infrastructure and support networks
e. Disrupt the Counter-State's influence over the population
3. HOLD
a. Transition to Foreign Internal Defense
b. Destroy the Residual Enemy Presence
c. Confront the Sheiks
d. Restore Essential Services
4. BUILD
a. Restore Governance
b. Restore Essential Services
c. Establish a Police or constabulary force
d. Conduct reconciliation
e. Conduct humanitarian assistance
Thanks,
Mike
Yay, Bob's World -- Phrase of the Week!!!
"Effective genocide program!" I love it...
Your point is well made and mentioning the western US (Eastern, too for that matter...) shows that genocide may leave residual problems which as Steve Blair pointed out with respect to earlier Spanish experience, "...didn't do them much good." :eek:
Which is why I pointed out above that 'population control' is not likely at all and in any even if implemented, will not last long -- lacking the Phrase of the Week. :wry:
Bob adds this:
Quote:
"This does not mean cut and run, it means that if we are so set that we have national interests in these places that demand our presence, lets use our influence to enable a relatively controlled evolution of these governments and not simply help them keep their populaces in check."
Truly good statement. More to the point, influence is better than force -- and once you've escalated to the point where you've committed the GPF it is not ever going to be nice or tidy or easy or cheap. Ever...