Dutch state liable for three Srebrenica deaths
Wonderful news:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23986063
I certainly hope this opens the way for billions of dollars in payouts to those betrayed by the Dutch (excuses for) soldiers... beyond just these three.
From a military POV I am more interested in what action was taken against the commander, his officers and men after this incident. It is at times like these that one laments the fact that capital punishment has gone out of fashion in Europe.
This incident further illustrates the problem with hastily cobbled together UN forces comprising of poorly trained, poorly equipped, unwarlike (and as in this case) cowardly excuses for soldiers who will surrender at the drop of a hat.
Lt. Col. (Dutchbat) Thom Karremans
Ah Mark,
In answer to your question:
Quote:
From a military POV I am more interested in what action was taken against the commander, his officers and men after this incident. It is at times like these that one laments the fact that capital punishment has gone out of fashion in Europe.
I hope you're not in too serious a mood:
Quote:
Following negotiations between UN and Bosnian Serbs, on Friday, July 21st, 1995, lieutenant-colonel Karremans and Dutch UN soldiers were allowed to leave Srebrenica. On the farewell, Colonel Karremans accepted gifts from General Mladić, smiled, shook his hand and departed. Shortly after his return to The Netherlands Karremans was promoted to full colonel.
Wiki bio of Karremans. In 2010, a complaint was filed by Bosnian Muslims vs Karremans et al, Aangifte genocide tegen Karremans (I expect you handle Dutch better than I).
I ran into this story last nite.
Regards
Mike
1 Attachment(s)
The Morals and Ethics of Surrender
Mark,
First, some "book" keeping. You suggested Moran's book a long time ago. I've read it twice and some sections more. It doesn't address surrender issues as I recall (it has no index).
William Miller has been at Michigan Law since 1985 (well after my time). It appears that a lot of his Yale Law polish has been dented. Perhaps enough so that he might even be ready for primetime at Michigan Tech. In any event, I've ordered used hardcovers of his The Mystery of Courage and Eye for an Eye - basically for shipping costs.
The last book deals with:
Quote:
Analyzing the law of the talion--an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth--literally, William Ian Miller presents an original meditation on the concept of "pay back". Miller's unique theory of justice offers redemption via retaliation. It espouses the view that revenge is a highly structured phenomenon that requires a deep commitment to balance in order to get even in a strict but fair manner. As a result, we find that much of what is assumed to be justice, honor and respect is just a way of providing a means of balancing or measuring valuations.
I'll see how well it matches my own construct of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.
The present topic would be simpler if surrender were not an option - as in the Camerone and Iwo Jima traditions; or, in the tradition of Ulzana's Raid (1.5 hrs).
Somehow, that movie (IMO: 5 stars) was made without political correctness - not exaulting either the Cavalry or the Indians; but portraying all as human beings. From Wiki:
Quote:
Set in 1880s Arizona, it portrays a brutal raid by Chiricahua Apaches against European settlers. The bleak and nihilistic tone showing U.S. troops chasing an elusive but murderous enemy has been seen as allegorical to the United States participation in the Vietnam War.
In the movie, Ulzana dies. In reality, his band of 10 killed 38 and lost 1 - he and the rest survived, Hiking Apacheria - Searching for Ulzana.
However, surrender today is an option - whether admitted as such or euphemisized as "deemed captured".
The official Code of Conduct (DODI 1300.21, January 8, 2001 (pp.11-12) is attached as a pdf, is quite sparse, and includes some lawyerly weasel words - which I think detract from the code's force.
The basic thrust of the Code is that voluntary surrender is always dishonorable, but one may view himself as being "captured" - which is not dishononable. Here's the Explanation:
Quote:
E2.2.2.1.1. Surrender is the willful act of members of the Armed Force turning themselves over to enemy forces when not required by utmost necessity or extremity. Surrender is always dishonorable and never allowed. When there is no chance for meaningful resistance, evasion is impossible, and further fighting would lead to their death with no significant loss to the enemy, members of Armed Forces should view themselves as "captured" against their will versus a circumstance that is seen as voluntarily "surrendering." They must remember that the capture was dictated by the futility of the situation and overwhelming enemy strengths. In this case, capture is not dishonorable.
Guidance for a unit commander is even sparser, and limited to this:
Quote:
IF IN COMMAND, I WILL NEVER SURRENDER THE MEMBERS OF MY COMMAND WHILE THEY STILL HAVE THE MEANS TO RESIST.
...
E2.2.2.1.2. The responsibility and authority of a commander never extends to the surrender of command, even if isolated, cut off, or surrounded, while the unit has a reasonable power to resist, break out, or evade to rejoin friendly forces.
I couldn't find a great deal written about the morals and ethics of surrendering. The best formal piece I found (a 192 page monograph) is 1989 Klimow, Surrender - A Soldier's Legal, Ethical, and Moral Obligations; With Philippine Case Study (C&GSC, 192 pp.). The Battling Bastards of Bataan webpages have a number of in-depth pieces on Bataan and the Death Marches.
The introduction sums up the problem - the issues are not something that people want to confront:
Quote:
Surrender presupposes defeat, and because of this disparaging implication, it is easily ignored as a subject in the military. Any instruction or training regarding surrender or capitulation is likely to encompass only the actions American service members must take when capturing enemy combatants. The prospect of American surrender, particularly of whole units, is all but unthinkable.
American soldiers are hardened against surrender through discipline and training which fosters a military ethic of fighting the enemy as long as there is a means to resist. Even after the physical means to resist are exhausted -ammunition is depleted and the enemy has surrounded friendly forces -service men are expected to attempt escape and evasion rather than capitulation. The United States military ethic recognizes surrender as a viable option only when further resistance would be suicidal. Revulsion to the act of surrender is perhaps superseded only by American society's desire to preserve the lives of its sons and daughters in uniform.
This monograph seems to me a very good study of the issues generally and in the Bataan-Corregidor context specifically. Singapore and Percival would seem similar - perhaps, a morals and ethics study has been done on that ?
This seems a start on the surrender issue for those of us that haven't had to deal with it in real life. The Bosnia hostage situations may have involved added factors; although the P.I. did involve hostages, both military and civilian.
Does anyone here at SWC have personal experience in deciding whether or not to surrender, especially on the unit commander level ?
Regards
Mike
What you mean "We", kimosavee ?
Quote:
from JMA
We may be starting to talk at cross purposes.
http://goodcomics.comicbookresources...Magazine38.jpg
Besides, like the embattled captain on the bridge, "I have not yet begun to talk." :D
Seriously, I don't see the "cross purposes" - nor, to this point, any crossed verbal swords.
I see your primary thrust as:
Quote:
A good defensive position can be defended by determined troops against impossible odds. ... I am looking more at the trigger in the mind of the commander or soldier that leads to a surrender decision.
I take the following as received wisdom - from the 1989 (original) version of the USMC's basic manual, Warfighting (and retained in later editions):
Quote:
Chapter 1. THE NATURE OF WAR
...
"Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held."
-A. A. Vandegrift
Alexander Vandegrift was a military visionary. In 1909, as a 22-year old 2nd Lt., he wrote "Aviation, the Cavalry of the Future".
What am I missing ?
Regards
Mike
Some thoughts are forming ...
but, need some "tweaking" to even start considering your questions:
Quote:
So what happened here? What about his character was missed? Can modern officer and soldier selection select out for this?
"here" and "his" being Singapore and Percival; "there" (my word) being the Canal (and Chosin) and Puller.
Put another way, what made the 1st Marine Division special ? Answer: nothing; they were just Marines. ;)
Regards
Mike
"... so it is far more than a blue beret ..."
I agree with the title tidbit, as stated, but I'm thrown by the reference to "UN mission". Korea was "UN", in the sense that Harry Truman used the UNSC resolutions as jus ad bellum; but command over the "UN" forces was US - including the South Koreans. Did Mark or I cite another UN mission involving the USMC ?
Regards
Mike
Back to Moran's sentry ...
and Mark's questions:
Quote:
So what happened here? What about his character was missed? Can modern officer and soldier selection select out for this?
From Moran, Anatomy of Courage, "Moods", chap 4, pp.37-38
Quote:
A sentry is faced suddenly by a large body of the enemy, his lowest instinct of self-preservation acts, but before any movement of flight can take place the instinct for the preservation of the race has intervened and barred the way to self-indulgence. The voice of duty tells him that his own safety must be subordinated to that of the army of which he is a member. And this voice of the herd is backed by threats of physical and moral penalties.
Moran goes on to Mark's quote:
Quote:
"In the presence of danger man often finds salvation in action. To dull emotion he must do something; to remain immobile, to stagnate in mind or body, is to surrender without terms."
Moran goes on to cite Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (1921)(Wiki). Today, hundreds of works are along the same lines (though using different vocabulary).
We have two important concepts here (in Moran's words): "instinct of self-preservation" and "instinct for the preservation of the race".
I'd suggest that both "instincts" are controlled by genetics and environment in the given individual - to different degrees.
Let's take firstly the "instinct for self-preservation" - freeze, flight, fight. I listed "freeze" first because I think it might be material to surrenders. If a person does not know what to do in a bad situation, that person is likely to freeze, especially if flight is foreclosed. If a person does know what to do in a bad situation, that person is likely to do what has to be done.
So, how much training did Percival, Wainwright, Karremans, etc., have in making the choice between death and surrender ? Did they "freeze" in the headlights - and then make their choices based on a distorted view of the tactical situation, or for emotional "humanitarian" reasons ?
That last question takes us into the "instinct for the preservation of the race", which underlies our human abilities to cooperate, be altruistic and humanitarian - with and to those persons we consider to be "us". In the case of Percival and Wainwright, they were definitely concerned with all the bad things that could happen to their troops and civilians - if they did not surrender.
So, was William Hull, who surrendered Detroit to the British in 1812 because he was afraid of what the Indians would do to his troops and settlers (Wiki). He was court-martialed, sentenced to be shot, but pardoned by President Monroe. He then wrote a book giving all of his reasons for why he should not have been prosecuted, much less convicted. Hint: Hull was a lawyer, a political appointee and very filled with self-deception.
These references are online, but involve more reading than they are currently worth. Hull, William (1824), Memoirs of the Campaign of the North Western army of the United States, A.D. 1812, Boston: True & Greene, OCLC 11571681 (digital version contains both this document and Forbes' Report of the Trial); and Forbes, James G. (1814), Report of the Trial of Brig. General William Hull, Commanding the North-Western Army of the United States, New York: Eastburn, Kirk, OCLC 4781638.
It has been said of Percival on the eve of his surrender (link):
Quote:
Percival realised that his only options were to fight to the death or surrender.
Prior to that, had he considered that some day he might be faced with those options ?
Regards
Mike
PS: Does someone have the Dutchbat report online in English ?
Siege of Jerusalem - 1187; How to Negotiate
This is a snip from a post in another thread, edited to emphasize that event's negotiations which led to a reasonably happy outcome. We are dealing with real hardball here, which will be something we will see more and more IF warfare becomes more savage in the future (as I think it will).
The two sources I chose are primarily Arab sources contemporary to the event: the settlement between Saladin and Balian ibn Barzan in 1187 to allow the "Franks" and other Christians to leave the city - and for some Christians to stay. See, Univ. of Michigan Crusades Package - Saladin Takes Jerusalem (p.46 pdf); and Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, "Some Medieval Accounts of Salah al-Din's Recovery of Jerusalem (Al-Quds)" (Fordham link).
From Saladin Takes Jerusalem:
Quote:
This account is from Ibn al-Athir after the battles for Jerusalem.
...
Then Balian ibn Barzan asked for safe conduct for himself so that he might appear before Saladin to discuss developments. Consent was given, and he presented himself and once again began asking for a general amnesty in return for surrender. The Sultan still refused his requests and entreaties to show mercy. Finally, despairing of this approach, Balian said:
Quote:
'Know, O Sultan, that there are very many of us in this city, God alone knows how many. At the moment we are fighting half-heartedly in the hope of saving our lives, hoping to be spared by you as you have spared others; this is because of the nature of horror of death and our love for life. But if we see that death is inevitable, then by God we shall kill our children and our wives, burn our possessions, so as not to leave you with a dinar or a drachma or a single man or woman to enslave. When this is done, we shall pull down the Sanctuary of the Rock and the Masjid al-Aqsa and the other sacred places, slaughtering the Muslim prisoners we hold - 5,000 of them - and killling every horse and animal we possess. Then we shall come out to fight you like men fighting for their lives, when each man, before he falls dead, kills his equals; we shall die with honour, or win a noble victory!'
How to negotiate a surrender when defending a hopeless position - bravado or bluff, and probably bravery, which led to:
Quote:
Then Saladin took council with his advisors,all of whom were in favor of granting the assurances requested by the Franks, without forcing them to take extreme measures whose outcome could not be foreseen. 'Let us consider them as being already our prisoners,' they said, 'and allow them to ransom themselves on terms agreed between us.' The Sultan agreed to give the Franks assurances of safety on the understanding that each man, rich and poor alike, should pay ten dinar, children of both sexes two dinar and women five dinar. All who paid this sum within forty days should go free, and those who had not paid at the end of the time should be enslaved. Balian ibn Barzan offered 30,000 dinar as ransom for the poor, which was accepted, and the city surrendered on Friday 27 rajab/2 October 1187, a memorable day on which the Muslim flags were hoisted over the walls of Jerusalem. ...
According to al-Qadi al-Fadil, Balian ibn Barzan also "offered a tribute in an amount that even the most covetous could not have hoped for." Balian had a large military force (mostly Turcopoles, to whom he as a Turcopole leader was personally committed), with their dependents and retainers, whose ransoms were based on "each man ... ten dinar, children of both sexes two dinar and women five dinar."
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...th_century.jpg
Absent a negotiated surrender, these Turcopoles were dead meat if the city were stormed. Thus, all around, a reasonable result was reached via a pragmatic approach avoiding the complexities of religious theologies.
A similar approach was taken with respect to the native Christians of Jerusalem;
Turning to the Recovery of Jerusalem source:
Quote:
The Fate of the Native Christians
'Imad al-Din indicates that, after paying their ransom, the native Christians requested Salah al-Din's permission to remain in their quarters in safety. Salah al-Din granted their request, provided that they paid the poll tax (jizya). Some members of the Armenian community also asked to stay in the city and were allowed to do so, provided that they also paid the tax. Many of the poor from both groups were exempted. Rich Christians bought much of the property of the departing Latins, as has been mentioned above. Salah al-Din allowed them to pray freely in their churches, and he handed over control of Christian affairs to the Byzantine patriarch.
'Imad al-Din notes that at first Salah al-Din ordered the closure of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Its future was discussed, and some even advised that it should be demolished in order to sever completely the attachment of the Christians to Jerusalem. However, a majority of the Muslims rejected the idea. They argued that demolishing the church would not help, for it would not prevent Christians from visiting it. According to 'Imad al-Din:
"Those who come to visit it come to worship at the location of the cross and the sepulchre rather than at the building itself. Christians will never stop making pilgrimages to this location, even if it has been totally uprooted."
Those who spoke in favour of preserving the Church of the Holy Sepulchre even suggested that when the Caliph 'Umar conquered Jerusalem, he confirmed the right of Christians to the church and gave no orders to demolish the building.
So, in this case, hardball negotiations by the besieged worked.
But, if Salidin had called Balian ibn Barzan's bet, Balian would have had to do the following:
Quote:
... we shall kill our children and our wives, burn our possessions, so as not to leave you with a dinar or a drachma or a single man or woman to enslave. When this is done, we shall pull down the Sanctuary of the Rock and the Masjid al-Aqsa and the other sacred places, slaughtering the Muslim prisoners we hold - 5,000 of them - and killling every horse and animal we possess.
and then finish with a banzai charge.
Would Balian have done so? Saladin thought so; and they had met in many battles and both were well known to each other. I'm not following the Kingdom of Heaven script, which is utter bull$hit; but a lot of my own digging (reflecting prior diggings by others) on this heroic Middle Eastern figure. I credit the Arab account of the meeting as accurate; and that Balian (an Assyrian-Armenian name) would have done "it" - a Masada.
Did Percival and Wainwright even consider what Balian threatened ? Would any reader consider doing that ? Are "Masadas" a thing of the past ?
Next, I'll look at sieges ca. 1200-1700, where the 1187 Jerusalem siege stands as a good result for the besieged.
Regards
Mike
Sieges 1200-1700; Selecting Siege Commanders
Lauro Martines, Furies: War in Europe, 1450-1700 (2013; kindle @ $12.64)
I've mentioned buying this book in another thread; I've finished reading it; and it's worth the buy for this topic - and the topic of "savage warfare" in general. I hate to say it, but IMO we are going to see more and more "armies of locusts" - especially in some parts of the world (Africa, to be blunt).
This snip of a "Furies" book review is accurate:
Quote:
Unlucky were civilians of early modern Europe in the path of an army on the march or in a city under siege. No safer were soldiers, more apt to die from disease and starvation than battle. Vignettes of horror from the era’s maelstroms, grandly titled the Thirty Years’ War or the Dutch Revolt, abound in Martines’ treatment, which tries to raise ethical questions about panoramas of war. ... Mars’ royal sponsors failed to render promised pay and supplies. To square accounts, their generals instead let soldiers pillage the countryside and sack cities, examples Martines draws from eyewitnesses to plunder, arson, and killing.
This is an excellent book on foraging and pillaging (where "no quarter" prevailed and surrender was not an option) and sieges.
Unlike sieges after 1700 (perhaps a bit earlier in some places), the sieges of this era (1200-1700) were sordid affairs. Non-combatants and "expended" combatants were often sacrificed so that the besiegee or the besieger could carry on. A standard besiegee tactic was to expel its "useless" citizens from the fortress; the besieger would then drive them back to the fortress walls, where they usually starved to death. Some surrenders were eventually negotiated (similar to that negotiated between Saladin and Balian ibn Barzan). But, in the absence of a negotiated surrender, the rules of "no quarter" and sack generally applied.
Western Europe was a center of fortress development (China and India were also centers). They may have influenced the Mongols to forego a campaign to conquer Western Europe. Pow, Deep Ditches and Well-built Walls: A Reappraisal of the Mongol Withdrawal from Europe in 1242 (2012; 150 pp. thesis).
Fortresses, however, are subject to two rules: (1) The Three Little Pigs and the Big Bad Wolf Rule (bad design, construction, planning and logistics lose big time); and (2) The Trapped Little Pigs Rule (“[T]hen they [the Mongols] have got their little pigs shut up in their sty.”). Of course, if the "little pigs" happen to be Puller's Marines, they might not stay shut up in their sty - and, so, their retrograde assault out of Chosin.
That brings us to the issue of tradition, personnel selection and training - as to which, I'll say just a little bit and then exit stage left.
As to selection (for "surrender" situation commanders), I'll start with John Twiggs Myers. He was placed in at least one "surrounded" situation and didn't blink an eye. He "appeared" in two Hollywood movies, both scripted as "surrounded" situations: In the historical epic 55 Days at Peking, Charlton Heston portrayed the fictional Marine "Major Matt Lewis", commanding the American Legation Guard in Peking during the Boxer Rebellion. In The Wind and the Lion, the fictional Captain Jerome (played by Steve Kanaly) "expanded" Myers' historical role, commanding the Marines dispatched to Tangier during the Perdicaris incident. Myers had a whale of a Marine career and his actual exploits in Peking and Tangiers were real enough; but not romantic enough for Hollywood (or, were they ;)).
Myers was a USNA grad and one of the "Famous Fifty", a group of 50 USNA grads (ca.1880-1900) who elected Marine commissions. They included five Corps commandants and a gaggle of generals and colonels; e.g., Wendell Cushing Neville and John A. Lejeune. On the other hand, Littleton "Tony" Waller and Smedley Butler enlisted in the Corps after prep school.
The lesson I glean from this bunch is that the "where from" is far less important than the "what stuff" is in the person - in a word, "character" (and that, including a few "characters" doesn't hurt either :)).
Regards
Mike
Re: Ulen...; and Outstanding Questions
I agree with this:
Quote:
The bansai attack was IMHO a non-threat, being forced to storm the city may have caused even more KIA on the Arabic side.
Consider the Japanese non-banzai defense of Iwo Jima, which cost our Marines 26,000 casualties, vs early Japanese island defenses where banzai attacks were employed.
However, in Balian's case (if his bet would have been called), and if he and his soldiers had executed "Masada" (agreed, the real threat):
Quote:
... we shall kill our children and our wives, burn our possessions, so as not to leave you with a dinar or a drachma or a single man or woman to enslave. When this is done, we shall pull down the Sanctuary of the Rock and the Masjid al-Aqsa and the other sacred places, slaughtering the Muslim prisoners we hold - 5,000 of them - and killling every horse and animal we possess.
they wouldn't have had much to live for anyway (families and possessions gone); and, while defense of a fortified position would have been more "successful" body-countwise, going out in a blaze of glory probably counted more for them than an enhanced body-count.
At least that is what the Arab historian said Balian said:
Quote:
Then we shall come out to fight you like men fighting for their lives, when each man, before he falls dead, kills his equals; we shall die with honour, or win a noble victory!
In any event, if unconditional surrender is rejected, there are two options I see in my viewscreen: (1) the banzai charge from an objectively hopeless position (numerous examples); and (2) defense of the fortified position without hope of winning (e.g., Iwo Jima and the Alamo). Add all others you think of.
A banzai charge which is a "forlorn hope" (the charge allowing some to escape the pocket) is a different issue. Here's an example from earlier in the Crusades (circa the time of Balian's grandfather); ref., History of Outremer -The Kingdom of Jerusalem, 6.Second Battle of Ramleh (2011; this is a totally online 15-week course, all you need free for anyone interested):
Quote:
Surely one reason why they stayed was that Baldwin believed the force advancing from Egypt was a small force, only a reconnaissance. Baldwin decided to destroy it with only his cavalry. Stephen of Blois was hesitant and argued for a more thorough scouting report, but given his earlier acts of cowardice, no one listened to him.
They should have. The Egyptian army in fact was twice as large as the previous one. Baldwin and his army of about five hundred knights rode out over the hills. Coming over a particular rise, they saw the entire army in front of them. There was no possibility of escape, for the Egyptian cavalry was already cutting off retreat. The knights charged into the heart of the enemy.
This time the Egyptians held. Most of the knights were killed. A few managed to escape toward Jaffa, but the king was not among them. Baldwin, along with those unlucky Crusaders who had survived Anatolia, broke free and made it as far as Ramleh, taking refuge in the single tower there. The Egyptians immediately surrounded them, but night fell and saved them for the moment. During the night, Baldwin escaped. A few others managed it as well, each leaving separately. One of them, Gothman of Brussels, made it to Jerusalem, where he told the citizens to resist because the king still lived.
At dawn the Egyptians advanced on those who held out in the little fortification at Ramleh. They piled wood around the fortress and set it on fire. Rather than burn to death, those inside formed up for a final charge. Led by Conrad, constable of the kingdom, they plunged into the Egyptian army. Most died, including Stephen of Blois. The Constable was captured and sent with about a hundred other captives to Egypt.
There, we have two banzai charges. The first allowed some to escape. The second was more in the nature of Camerone, where the enemy allowed some banzai chargers to survive. The uncaptured survivors, namely King Baldwin, reformed a Crusader army with some success in stabilizing the kingdom's borders.
Stephen de Blois is an interesting figure. He was a craven coward at the earlier Siege of Antioch, where he was a "rope dancer" - escaping down a rope to safety in the countryside and eventually return to Europe. There, he sustained the continuous scorn of his wife, a daughter of William the Conqueror; until, not being able to take it anymore, he set off on the next crusade. Their understanding was that he would not return.
Questions to be answered by viewers other than JMM.
Quote:
So, was Stephen's cowardice at Antioch redeemed by his courage at Ramleh ? And, was his charge at Ramleh really "courage" given his personal motive to redeem cowardice ?
They add to the other questions asked so far:
Does anyone here at SWC have personal experience in deciding whether or not to surrender, especially on the unit commander level ?
So what happened here [at Singapore]? What about his [Percival's] character was missed ? Can modern officer and soldier selection select out for this ?
Put another way, what made the 1st Marine Division special [on the Canal and at Chosin] ?
Would the Dutch commander, plus his command, have taken a different decision minus the blue beret ?
Did Percival and Wainwright even consider what Balian threatened ?
Would any reader consider doing that ?
Are "Masadas" a thing of the past ?
What were the options to unconditional surrender (the only option that Yama$hita said he'd accept) that should have been considered at Singapore and at Bataan-Corregidor before meeting with Yama$hita ?
What was (were) General Wainwright's [or Parcival's] bargaining chip(s) ?
What is the difference between a soldier and a warrior ?
If a difference, how will each perform in a "surrounded" situation and why ?
Hopefully, I've summed up all the questions asked from this thread's start to date.
Over three weeks, there's been 1500 views - what are the viewers' opinions on these questions ?
Regards
Mike
Passing the Mongol Wheel Test
Ulen...
Glad you found the thesis interesting. It certainly added to my Mongol references. My interest in the Mongols goes back to the ancient days when I was a boy in the early 1950s. It was greatly focused by SWC conversations with Ken White. Subotai was one in Ken White's short-list of generals who deserved close study. Thus, my more recent interest in Subotai; and eventually my realization that the Mongols were really part of "Gian Gentile's army" (conventional, well-regulated, professional). They were scarcely the semi-barbarian horde envisioned even by such as Carl von Clausewitz (On War, p & h trans.; 7 tiny refs to "Tartars").
IMO: The Mongols were a very professional and conventionally organized armed force, particularly as compared to the Eastern European rabbles they met and defeated. They had well developed rules of strategy and tactics, and perhaps the greatest operational soldier, Subotai. As British officers were shaped by the Etonian fields, Mongol officers were shaped by the Great Hunts - practice makes perfect. Gabriel, Genghis Khan's Greatest General: Subotai the Valiant (2006).
For a fictional (based on history) account of the misfortune of a young Mongol officer to be kept frozen in grade for a combat faux pas, see Rutherfurd, Russka (mass paperback, 1991), chap. 3 "The Tatar", the "bad report" at p.154. They also had a well developed sense of their own systematic and moral theologies; e.g., Eliade, Shamanism (1964).
In tune with that, they developed a set of rules for war, spanning jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum. Gabriel's Subotai has a general summary of siegecraft and surrender policies (pp.39-42); and, for individual events, discussions in the four chapters (ch. 3-6) dealing with regional campaigns. Gabriel argues that Russian and Polish fortifications and cities presented no great challenge to the Mongols; but that Germany's castles and cities (and I'd add its mountains and forests) would have been a far harder nut to crack (pp.119-120).
Subotai lived out his days on the Danube, in close proximity to his son Uriangkatai and grandson Achu who were officers in the Golden Horde of Batu. In 1257, Uriangkatai led an army against the Kingdom of Annam; and took and pillaged Hanoi in December. (Gabriel, Subotai, p.136, nn.22-24). I'd not be an LBJ snark, if I didn't note here that Uriangkatai's concept was not based on "graduated response". In any event, it was not distance or lack of mobility that led to the Mongols stopping at the Eastern Danube.
Whatever the Mongols did (call it what you will) was driven by military and/or political considerations. The command decisions appear to have been largely left to the judgment of the commander on the scene. Thus, the rules tended to be flexible. However, if the siege commander accepted a surrender, that did not mean that those surrendering would not be killed. E.g., as to jus post bellum, we read such as "All males taller than the axle of a wagon are put to death". See, Massacres.
It's well to keep in mind that the Mongols operated with relatively small forces (they only appeared to be overwhelmingly large to the credulous, such as Saint Carl); they operated over very long and remote lines of supply and communication; and the people they conquered (like the Mongols themselves) very much accepted the law of talion - and hence could not be trusted. Thus, I tend to accept the answer of the "Massacres" author as the better reasoning behind the Mongols' policies:
Quote:
When Genghis Khan attempts the conquest of the world (1209), the Mongol population numbers between 400 000 and 600 000 inhabitants, among which 200 000 are warriors. Together, all the countries targeted for conquest can muster a global population of more than 200 millions inhabitants (which is then 400 times the total number of inhabitants in Mongolia). The Mongols are a tiny minority and their army is almost always outnumbered when facing the various enemies on countless battlefields.
The fact that their enemies are much more numerous triggers an inferiority complex among the Mongols, and the panic fear that their armies may be drowned some day in the multitude of the conquered populations. The only solution to make these conquered populations less dangerous, would be to decrease their numbers; and the only way to achieve that would be to massacre an important part of each of them.
...
If one asks: why all those massacres?, the only answer that comes to mind is military necessity. The coming of the Mongol horsemen was generally not followed by rebellion (except in the Khwarezm and especially the Khorassan), because the revolts were crushed beforehand by a terror without precedent. Such massacres, when 98% of the population of certain regions is exterminated, leave a lasting impression. When only 2% of the population is left alive, terror works and the survivors have no inclination to revolt anymore.
Furthermore, during a military campaign, depopulation is sometimes the most convenient means of securing the rear. There is no need to leave behind an occupation army in a depopulated land. The great novelty is to be able to control a territory without ever having to occupy it.
Partisan war against the occupier is impossible. You cannot harass the occupier, then there is no occupation. This kind of remote control (the Mongol armies are stationed far away from the rare conquered cities that have been left intact) renders all modern techniques of urban guerrilla warfare or jungle warfare completely inefficient against the Mongols.
What would David Kilcullen say to the last paragraph ?
Regards
Mike
Ken: HT for the Battle of Alesia
Is it this Youtube, Battle of Alesia (42 min) - commentary by Richard Gabriel (author of Subutai; and many other military books and articles), inter alia.
The scene re: famine and sending out the women and children, etc. - starts after 23:30.
Regards
Mike
What People Expect and Measure.
Thanks to Ken and JMA:
Quote:
Ken
Very interesting stuff and a far cry from what the American public currently expects.
JMA (quoting Andrew Thompson)
'If blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers show up in your town or village and offer to protect you, run. Or else get weapons. Your lives are worth so much less than theirs.'
which led me to look for a siege I vaguely recalled (Chateau-Gaillard); and to find Thompson's article (JMA's link doesn't work for me). They led me to think a bit more about what I bolded in what Ken and Thompson said.
First to Chateau-Gaillard, which has many references; here are two. Wiki -The Siege of Chateau Gaillard:
Quote:
The local population sought refuge in the castle to escape the French soldiers who ravaged the town. The castle was well supplied for a siege, but the extra mouths to feed rapidly diminished them; between 1,400 and 2,200 non-combatants were allowed inside, increasing the number of people in the castle at least five-fold. In an effort to alleviate the pressure on the castle's supplies, Roger de Lacy, the castellan, evicted 500 civilians; this first group was allowed to pass through the French lines unhindered, and a second group of similar size did the same a few days later. Philip was not present, and when he learned of the safe passage of the civilians, he forbade further people being released from the castle. The idea was to keep as many people within Chteau Gaillard to drain its resources.
Roger de Lacy evicted the remaining civilians from the castle, at least 400 people, and possibly as many as 1,200. The group was not allowed through, and the French opened fire on the civilians. They turned back to the castle for safety, but found the gates locked. They sought refuge at the base of the castle walls for three months; over the winter, more than half their number died from exposure and starvation. Philip arrived at Chteau Gaillard in February 1204, and ordered that the survivors should be fed and released. Such treatment of civilians in sieges was not uncommon, and such scenes were repeated much later at the sieges of Calais in 1346 and Rouen in 14181419, both in the Hundred Years' War.
Pennell, Highways and byways in Normandy (1900), "Chateau-Gaillard", p.27-31, goes into the misery suffered by the civilians caught between the armies; and that Philip's act of mercy occured only after he personally met with some of the starving civilians who begged him to show mercy.
Pennell also describes how the castle was captured and adds to the Wiki:
Quote:
Wiki
With supplies running low Roger de Lacy and his garrison of 20 knights and 120 other soldiers surrendered to the French army, bringing to an end the siege on 6 March 1204.
Pennell, p.31
In the days when iron protected against iron, it took a good deal of fighting to kill a man, and it is said that only four men fell in this last encounter. Philippe Auguste rewarded Roger de Lacy for his courage by giving him liberty. The English garrison marched out of the castle, and the golden fleurs-de-lys floated over the proud donjon. Chateau-Gaillard had fallen, and with it Normandy was lost to England.
The distinction made by the French in the treatment of Chateau-Gaillard civilians, vs its knight and soldiers, was a "we-they" distinction based on class and status. The common "we-they" distinctions based on e.g., race, ethnicity, geographic distance ("out of sight, out of mind") certainly did not apply. In fact, the civilians (from an area on the Ile de France - Normandie border) were more closely related to the French army than to the English Chateau-Gaillard garrison.
This event, like many others, illustrates what that time's public expected - and what lives in that era were "worth" more than others. Here, "worth" is not an accounting item, but is the relative concern (along a spectrum) that a person has for the lives of people at the given Chateau-Gaillard or Srebreneca.
The Thompson situation expands the facts and issues to the present - and raises added issues, starting with How many more must die before Kofi quits? Former UN human rights lawyer Kenneth Cain says the secretary-general could finally redeem himself by saving lives - after years of lethal passivity (by Kenneth Cain, The Observer, 3 April 2005):
Quote:
... Next to these tributes [to the Rwandan slain] is another installation - a reproduction of the infamous fax by the UN Force Commander, General Romeo Dallaire, imploring the then head of UN peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, for authority to defend Rwandan civilians - many of whom had taken refuge in UN compounds under implicit and sometimes explicit promises of protection.
Here, too, is Annan's faxed response - ordering Dallaire to defend only the UN's image of impartiality, forbidding him to protect desperate civilians waiting to die. Next, it details the withdrawal of UN troops, even while blood flowed and the assassins reigned, leaving 800,000 Rwandans to their fate.
...
I am co-author of a book critical of Annan's peacekeeping legacy, "Emergency Sex (and Other Desperate Measures): True Stories from a War Zone." My co-author, Dr Andrew Thomson, penned a line that drove the UN leadership to fire him. Lamenting UN negligence in failing Bosnian Muslims whom it had promised to protect in its 'safe area' of Srebrenica - where 8,000 men were slaughtered - Thomson wrote: 'If blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers show up in your town or village and offer to protect you, run. Or else get weapons. Your lives are worth so much less than theirs.'
Let me be clear about myself. My level of concern is very graduated and very much based on geographic distance. You all know what I think about interventions in Eurasia and Africa; and that I'm no fan of the UN. That being said, if one decides to intervene, one intervenes with both feet well planted; and provides all that is required to execute both non-violent and violent actions.
The Cain-Thompson book was cited in this report, Promote Freedom or Protect Oppressors: The Choice at the UN Review Summit (by John Bercow MP and Victoria Roberts; September 2005)
Quote:
pp.28,29-30
Humanitarian Intervention
As part of their obligation under the responsibility to protect, states must be willing to take action to protect human rights. There is a continuum of action from using mediation to sanctions to the use of force. In order to increase the prospect of action being taken to suppress the violation of human rights, the UN should accept the proposed five principles to judge whether intervention should go ahead. They are seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and balance of consequences.
...
Member states must be willing to make peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations most effective. One of the most powerful arguments against humanitarian intervention is that intervention often seems to do more harm than good. Traditionally peacekeepers have lacked the mandate, resources and military might to carry out their mission. The international community must be willing to invest in training, logistics and hardware for their missions.
What is more, the developed world must be willing to send in its troops. Dr Andrew Thompson, in his book on UN peacekeeping, wrote If blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers show up in your town or village and offer to protect you, run. Or else get weapons. Your lives are worth so much less than theirs. States must accept that there will be casualties in any enforcement effort. The notion of peaceful peacekeeping is a contradiction in terms. As in any military operation, the goals of the mission must dictate the actions taken. It is quite wrong for states to prioritise the safety of the troops over and above the safety of the civilians they are supposed to protect.
This report (on a whole it sounds like Susan Rice and Samatha Power to me) simply has too much "humanitarian intervention", "responsibility to protect", etc. for me to swallow. But, I fully agree that, if an international or regional organization, a state or group of states, decides to intervene, it can't do it half-heartedly. On the other hand, I'd be a damn liar if I said what Bercow says:
Quote:
It is quite wrong for states to prioritise the safety of the troops over and above the safety of the civilians they are supposed to protect.
I (figuratively sitting here on my a$$ and, as a US citizen, sending our troops to bad places and into worse situations) will always prioritize the lives of American troops over the lives of remote peoples. That's the way I am; and that's one more reason why I'm a reluctant intervenor.
I also realize that executing a mission may require troops to sacrifice themselves - a "forlorn hope" attack; letting people take pot shots at you (as on the Mexican border); or being killed to protect people that are totally remote from you. That is the point made by Carl and it's valid:
Quote:
In the movie Go Tell The Spartans the last scene or two depicts guys doing the right thing regardless. The only people I ever heard of doing something almost exactly similar were some Frenchman in Indochina. They ran an irregular force of mountain tribesman and gave them their personal word that they would stick by. When the French pulled out those guys didn't. They stayed and they died.
The French and Indochinese dying together in North Vietnam were from Roger Trinquier's special operations group. That story was a tragedy. The fictional "Go Tell The Spartans" (Wiki) is a great film.
Regards
Mike
Coming back to the issue of surrender...
Found this gem in Keegan's: Face of Battle http://goo.gl/Mfsmb9
Battle of the Somme:
Quote:
By 4 p.m. Captain Sparks recognized that his tiny force, now under attack by thirteen German infantry companies from three different regiments, was about to go under. He sent the following message back across no-man’s-land: ‘I am faced with this position. I have collected all bombs and [cartridges] from casualties. Every one has been used. I am faced with three alternatives: (a) to stay here with such of my men as are alive and be killed, (b) to surrender to the enemy, (c) to withdraw such of my men as I can. Either of these first two alternatives is distasteful to me. I propose to adopt the latter.’ Using discarded German rifles and ammunition, he and four N.C.O.s made a final stand in the German front trench while the other survivors escaped into no-man’s-land. There most of them, including Sparks, hid until darkness fell and allowed them to regain the British lines. During the day, the London Scottish, which had numbered 856 at dawn, had been reduced by death or wounds to 266.
Sparks figured it out while personally under fire... not in some remote HQ far from the front line.
I wonder what happened to Capt Sparks? Top man if there ever was one!
He survived that first day of the Somme
Mark,
Gommecourt - The Battle
Quote:
London Scottish - Beset by the 170th Regiment on two flanks the London Scottish now were faced with fresh troops from the 15th Reserve Infantry Regiment attacking down the communication trenches from Rossignol Wood. As they defended their small enclave the senior officer, Maj Francis Lindsay, was shot and killed leaving Capt Sparks of A Company in charge. Faced with the choice of surrender, annihilation or retreat he chose the latter and organised a covering party while the able bodied and lightly wounded were got away into No Man's Land. One of the last to leave, Sparks, took shelter in a shell hole until after dark before returning to the shattered British lines.
and Leadership in Combat: An Historical Appraisal (USMA; pp.244):
Quote:
There most of them, including Sparks, hid until darkness fell and allowed them to regain the British lines. During the day, the London Scottish, which had numbered 856 at dawn, had been reduced by death or wounds to 266.
This last book may be a gem; just found it and haven't read it. BLUF:
Quote:
The OPMS study Group asked the History Department at USMA to study successful combat leadership to identify the trends and characteristics that should be institutionalized in the development of Officers. There were only two restrictions: that the actions studied be in actual combat and that it must clearly involve leadership not management. The characteristics found were indispensible to combat leadership, but not necessarily vital or sufficient to accomplish other essential military tasks.
The USMA Study unit, organized under LTC Kenneth E. Hamburger, examined over 200 American and and foreign examples in all periods. Both succesful and unsuccesful examples were intensively analysed and discussed to sift out desirable, undesirable, and neutral characteristics. In addition, preservice experience, upbringing, education, service record, physical condition, personal temperment and morality, and life following the incident were studied.
There was surprising consistency among successful combat leaders regardless of historical period, country or condition of combat. Early in their lives, the traits that made them successful were discernible in some form and were enhanced, but could not be induced, through experience. In no case did a unit in combat overcome the deficiencies of its leader; in almost all cases the leader overcame startling unit deficiencies and incredible problems in mission definition, enemy physical and moral strength [etc., etc. etc.] ... and his own anxiety.
Regards
Mike
- and, from Peter Hart's book on the Somme, he was H.C. Sparks, who according to the Roll of the Ancients joined the regimental association in 1930, was a founder of the The Glenworple Highlanders, and died 15 Oct 1933.
Another good combat leader from the Somme was Frank Maxwell (the "Brat"), portrayed in The Somme - From Defeat To Victory (Documentary based on Hart's work; 1 hr), starting at 40:00 to end, Tiepval in Sep 1916 - Maxwell was KIA at Ypres in 1917. The Somme's first day is the first 40 min (focus on the Salford Pals).
V's mind through Caesar's words ?
All I know is Caesar:
Quote:
LXXXVIII. ... Vercingetorix, having convened a council the following day, declares, "That he had undertaken that war, not on account of his own exigencies, but on account of the general freedom; and since he must yield to fortune, he offered himself to them for either purpose, whether they should wish to atone to the Romans by his death, or surrender him alive." Ambassadors are sent to Caesar on this subject. He orders their arms to be surrendered, and their chieftains delivered up. He seated himself at the head of the lines in front of the camp, the Gallic chieftains are brought before him. They surrender Vercingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserving the Aedui and Arverni, [to try] if he could gain over, through their influence, their respective states, he distributes one of the remaining captives to each soldier, throughout the entire army, as plunder.
XC.--After making these arrangements, he marches into the [country of the] Aedui, and recovers that state. To this place ambassadors are sent by the Arverni, who promise that they will execute his commands. He demands a great number of hostages. He sends the legions to winter quarters; he restores about twenty thousand captives to the Aedui and Arverni; he orders Titus Labienus to march into the [country of the] Sequani with two legions and the cavalry, and to him he attaches Marcus Sempronius Rutilus; he places Caius Fabius, and Lucius Minucius Basilus, with two legions in the country of the Remi, lest they should sustain any loss from the Bellovaci in their neighbourhood. He sends Caius Antistius Reginus into the [country of the] Ambivareti, Titus Sextius into the territories of the Bituriges, and Caius Caninius Rebilus into those of the Ruteni, with one legion each. He stations Quintus Tullius Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the Aedui at Cabillo and Matisco on the Saone, to procure supplies of corn. He himself determines to winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty days is decreed by the senate at Rome, on learning these successes from Caesar's despatches.
Caesar treated the Aedui and Arverni differently; and that seems to have worked in their home territories.
Regards
Mike
The matter of surrender...
Further to earlier discussions I came across the following book amongst a pile of reduced price books at a local book shop.
Outnumbered Outgunned Undeterred: Twenty Battles Against All Odds
Quote:
Throughout history men and women have fought, endured, and sometimes emerged victorious though the odds were against them. What conditions must exist to enable relatively small or weak forces to challenge and even overcome the strong? Here are twenty historical examples, from 1777 to the present, that reveal both the common themes and the exceptional aspects of those achievements.
It is in fact the other side of the coin but it will contribute to the volume of knowledge on the subject.
Remember and ask questions
An understandably bitter article, not about the Dutch, though they get a mention, 'Srebrenica: the world fails, but never one’s own government' and sub-titled:
Quote:
There are cogent reasons – international, historical and domestic to Britain – why this year's Srebrenica massacre commemorations are different, and beg painful, difficult questions that demand answers.
Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-eur...own-government
