FM 3-0 (Operations) Roll Out
It looks like the updated FM 3-0, Operations, will be released at the end of February 2008. Some of the areas in the manual with major changes include:
- Operational Concept
- Stability Operations Construct
- Information Operations Construct
- Warfighting Functions
- Spectrum of Conflict
- Defeat and Stability Mechanisms
- Joint Interdependence
- The Operational Environment
- Modular Forces
Chapter 3 of the new FM 3-0 describes the Operational Concept:
“The Army’s operational concept is the core of its doctrine. It must be uniformly known and understood within the Service...”
- Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent Joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.
- They employ synchronized action – lethal and nonlethal – proportional to the mission, and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment.
- Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.
The manual will have a combination of "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" concepts --
While this doctrine may be evolutionary, its impact on the force and the application of the doctrine will be revolutionary.
Some aspects are evolutionary (strategic context, operational environment, full spectrum operations, command and control, etc.).
Other aspects are revolutionary (stability operations co-equal with offense and defense, emphasis on information engagement, requirements for leaders to be competent with both lethal and non-lethal (soft power) applications of combat power).
It should be an interesting read...
You have to remember, Wilf, we have a dangerous
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
I'll confessed to being intrigued with how they will interrelate all these headings in a way that creates a coherent and useful doctrine. EG: What is the difference between a "Construct" and a "Mechanism". I understand the semantic difference, but am very curious to see how it pans out.
(and I mean a very dangerous in the true sense of the word) penchant for picking up jazzy and essentially meaningless terms from the MBA community -- to our lasting detriment. :D
We taught them most of what we knew and had learned from WW II and now we get to buy it back (literally through really expensive contracts and consultancies) from them. Embarrassing.
Final FM 3-0 approved - Rewrite of Chpt 7
There was a rewrite of chpt 7. The following description was sent to me on v. 9.
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Version 9 essentially relegates the G7 (FA 30) to message management focused on influencing local audiences (primarily
non-combatants). The primary focus of that being the "linking" of actions to messages, by means of COMCAM, DSPD and Strategic Communications themes, messages, products and activities in order to maintain consistency in both deeds and words. PSYOP, although an integrating responsibility of the G7 Information Engagement Section, is first and foremost focused on the enemy, adversary and other combatant forces in addition to foreign audiences and is conducted in order to "influence" select targets and audiences. The remainder of traditional IO is distributed across the staff with the majority of tasks assigned to the G-/S-3. Overall integration / synchronization responsibility remains the job of the chief of staff executed through the operations officer by means of other coordinating staff officers and functional cells. The processes and techniques that will be required to ensure IO is fully coordinated across the staff are in effect TBD as FM 3.0 defers the more detailed discussions as to exactly how IO is integrated, coordinated and executed to FM 3-13 to sort through.
If you are interested and work in the Puzzle Palace, I can show you a copy.
I have Chpt 7, FM 3-0 Information Superiority
I have it uploaded to AKO. Not sure how to have all you AKO/DKO users view it.
Generally muddling along...
Dr. Jack said:
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"I believe this is addressed in the introduction to FM 3-0 -- that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground. This is one of the lessons of the past seven years..."
Good. However, that's been a tenet for the US Army for the over 50 years I've been intimately familiar with it -- correct me if I'm wrong but my impression is it's been ignored pretty much in the last 40 or so and that increasingly as time went on. Hopefully we'll reverse the trend.
Another question is why on earth is the idea that subordinates must be trusted to act flexibly and adapt to the situation on the ground can be touted as a lesson of the past seven years when we have over 200 years of US Army history that show that and far more knowledge of the issue on a worldwide and historical basis. I always found it interesting that I was more trusted as a young Marine Corporal responsible for 12 lives in Korea or as and Acting Sergeant at Fort Campbell in the mid 50s than I was years later as a fairly senior DAC responsible for an 80 plus bod staff section with no risk to life...
WM said several very correct things, one of which was this:
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"Actually Ken, I think it is more correct to say there will always be too many generals because they are too interested in doing the work that should be left to their captains, lieutenants and senior NCOs."
That is too true, numbers matter. The Army has essentially held on to the number of Generals with which it ended WW II for over 60 years. There are too many for the size of the force and that's what causes them to micromanage (along with a skewed philosophy). Smart aggressive guys will find something to do. Too many Sergeant Majors, too :D
Can't argue with much of that but this is the
critical part...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
. . .
...Lack of a culture change can show indecisiveness and lack of a commitment. Clearly doctrine has a role to play in this, but not by itself – the human factor requires implementation. In many ways I think the latter is harder then the former – everybody who reads it (because of its nature) will pick and choose based on how they perceive the world.
Best, Rob
(emphasis added / kw)
Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?
You know my take on that one - but I'll take the opportunity to talk about it
Hey Ken,
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Does it not then become incumbent upon the system to pick and choose those who perceive the world in a way that will, instead of actively if in some cases unintentionally stifling initiative and trust, foster the attributes?
I think the first thing that must be emphasized is that the system - is a form of bureaucracy - if allowed to crank along by itself it will be left to operate a average performance - see a hole, fill a hole - miss a hole, miss the next hole, etc.
It is leadership that animates the machine in such a way that we improve ourselves vs. settling for mediocrity. You can't just build this machine and walk away - you have to constantly be engaged with it - because our machine is built out of real life people who have ups and downs, good days and bad ones, different levels of understanding, different capabilities, etc.
So while the doctrine can provide the framework and the justification - its application, implementation and success are commensurate to the quality of those who employ it. It takes me back to my personal preference for the descriptive aspects - but we can't afford a one size fits all approach.
Best, Rob
We can agree on all that, Rob. Good points.
I'll continue to await the awakening...:(
Turn in your Green Eyeshade
We have different outlooks...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
...
When you have competing requirements - mass based and competency based - and I think we do - where do you draw the line?
For competency, every time. Given, say, a ~750 man Infantry Battalion, I'd rather be 300 people short with good ones than be 300 over with mediocre ones. No question.
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Since we don't get to say...
I don't and should not, I'm out of it. You aren't -- your say should be heard.
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... There is also no guarantee that those we "select" will stick around - this makes for a potential leadership vacuum....
Vacuums get filled. I've seen more than one SSG run a platoon quite well, more than one new 2LT take over a Company and even a couple of CPTs run Bns. Best Div Cdr I ever saw was a BG
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...they might be a good PL - but never make a good CO CDR, BN CDR, or BDE CDR, or the same qualities that made them good at any of those jobs might limit them as a GO.
True but that's the case now and will always be a human factor.
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I guess what I'm getting at is that even identification is going to be subjective
True but that's the case now and will always be a human factor. :D
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...particularly in the conditions associated when we have unpopular long wars
I've never seen a popular war. We, as a nation, do not do long wars at all well and they should be rigorously avoided --and they can be...
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However, sometimes the actions you do (or wish you’d done) don’t make sense until after the fact – if you can articulate them in a manner where others can benefit, I’m all for that too.
Cushman did that. He never actually admitted an error -- Generals rarely do (which is a whole different thread...;) ) but his later writings were pretty good.
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As you say, this is where education, training and also doctrine come in – the latter being a kind of common language (or in some ways may the analogy of the “Rosetta Stone” is better?) through which we can communicate and operate – in its better form(s) it allows for initiative at all levels.
Therein lies the problem and, I think, our disconnect; no slam or snark at you or anyone, just a statement of fact as I see it: It allows for initiative at all levels. Most folks in the Army and Marines will agree with you however I submit that it should demand initiative at all levels. Initiative and competence can replace mass in far more situations than most realize.
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Ref. the up stream – maybe its less the message, and more the solidification of past cultures?
It is that, little question.
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In this case we are trying to change the culture from both the inside (inside the Army), and by the changes in conditions on the outside – be it our civilian leadership, the wars we are waging, the greater American Society and Culture, and some of the independent with their own agendas – think tanks, etc. This is interesting because just because you have multiple “engines” for change – they can be (and I’d argue at least in some cases are – working against each other.
Totally true. Unfortunately. The civil / military relationship is pretty much change resistant however, that civilian leadership is generally amenable to what the Armed forces agree they need to do so it is not necessarily and adverse factor. Congress is another and far more difficult issue and its ability to stifle change is immense. The Armed Forces have been, are now and probably always will be a reflection of society (and the Millenium generation is looking to be pretty intolerant of BS and incompetence. Oughta be interesting... :wry:); the attention paid the Think Tanks by the Armed Forces should be significantly diminished in my opinion. However, I acknowledge that's unlikely as long as we are as over cautious as we are.
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Fortunately, I think we (the Army) are largely OK in many areas – but we need to acknowledge that at our core level we are capable of doing more then many (including ourselves) often give us credit for. While we must inform folks of our limitations, we must also do a better job of evaluating and articulating our real capabilities – the foundation of capabilities are people and leadership.
Agreed -- totally.
We have met the enemy and
he is us:eek:
Somebody reminded me of that recently when I was complaining about advocates on 2 opposing sides of an issue who wound up working together to try and get something going that really did not solve the problem, lays the ground work for more problems, and muddies the importance of the question we should be asking. Why do we do that I thought - why would we settle for something that not only is not what we were after, but complicates the problem we're trying to solve?
I think it has something to do with human nature - and probably biology. It goes back to the joke about the evolutionary process that has produced modern man - the ones who were too inquisitive got eaten! We are naturally suspicious of others and their ideas to a point where we often work to our own disadvantage. My son told me he wanted $30 for a video game - I told him he could earn it by doing 5 chores for a $1 a piece for 6 weeks. He told me that was too hard - he'd wait 6 months till his Birthday. This is kinda funny I thought, because I'm going to ave him do the chores anyway - the difference is he'd have gotten paid, and I would not have to tell him to do them - same amount of work - but somehow he thought it was easier to wait :confused:
We all point to institutions like HRC, DFAS, OSF, OTC, Congress, IRS etc. as if by abolishing the institutions and the bureaucracy we could solve our problems. We ascribe value to them that may be better ascribed to individual people who work there and the sub cultures that develop around the jobs and functions they do. People are pretty adept at changing hats – I knew a BN XO who could be the world’s most anal fellow in the office, but outside the role – he was not even close to the same person. He simply adopted the personage he needed to be the CDR’s hit man on accountability and maintenance issues – it was an enabler to fulfill his role.
Its also useful to consider why we build institutions, processes, and bureaucracy – there is either a real need, a perceived need, or a desire to attempt to make our lives easier. The last one is kind of interesting because it might mean the genesis of the idea was by someone who believed that regardless how the world really operates – their way is better. The former two though are reasonably altruistic – our desire to make something work better. Like many things though – the original function of the system, process, institution, etc. takes on a life of its own, far beyond the intended purpose. This could be good or bad, but we often take it for granted that it is still a good idea.
Now we may not be able to ascribe its worth in terms that let us consider if it should be abolished, or improved because we don’t really understand how it fits in, and probably don’t understand its original purpose in the first place. We could be talking about an Army system, or the Supreme Court. Even if there is written evidence, people will argue over the context and true intent of something to get their way – regardless of if the outcomes really benefits them or is harmful to them in the long run.
I’d say the tendency to try and create efficiencies is also human nature – it drives pursuit of technology and it is often the criteria by which we evaluate ourselves ad other cultures. The issue of efficiency vs. effectiveness is tough one to crack – even when we know from experience that there are some things that will not coincide – that somethings require blood and hard work to procure and secure, even when we know the sacrifice that was required to do so, even when we know there are people who want to take it way or advantage themselves – we still remain glued to the idea that we can have it both ways. This is why I believe you have to stay involved in these things – you can’t succumb to the delusion that you’ve fixed something – there is always somebody or something following you around unfixing it – or fixing it the way think it should be. If you abolished the Hoffman building, somebody come right behind you and build a new one and call it something else and hire all the same people back.
I think you can influence and inform the process though. We do that right here. The key is in communications that describe the risks and benefits so that we get closer to real solutions. There has to be tension and there must be some disagreements – or the truth gets muddled over and the important pieces don’t stick out – arguing (or even risking War over) should be a clear signal as to what is important.
We may not like the bureaucracy, but it provides a means to an end. Without it, lots of supporting things we take for granted would have to be recreated – and I think it would not be long before the same conditions occur – kinda like when I read the Cushman articles, or any personal accounts that recall events that have the “well, seen this one before” feel to them.
The difference I think is the role leadership plays. Leaders can animate the process, stave off the tide for awhile (or at least protect a few important things). Leaders can keep us from killing the things which are most important and can not be easily rebuilt. Leaders can convince folks with seemingly disparate interests to cooperate. I think I’ve acknowledged to myself that we’re going to go down this road again, its just a matter of time – there are just to many external factors, and as much as we’d like to believe it – events beyond our control will effect our decisions. This is another reason why I think its important to have the discussion about the changing role of the military – why its important that the CAC CDR informed Congress that we are placing importance on Stability Operations in our Capstone Doctrine – whatever else was said – part of the message is that we acknowledge that “you” the civilian control side have the better of the unequal dialogue and as such we must be prepared to do the things to support that – even if you the civilian side don’t know when or where that will be. Now getting our internal culture to acknowledge that is another matter.
Funny how a person can undervalue a well known statement like “we’ve met the enemy and he is us” – maybe it is because we hate to hear truths like that – it makes all we do seem less important – and makes us question the futility of some of our efforts. I hate that duality stuff – it makes my head hurt.
Best Rob