Send Maxwell Vol 8 SWJ magazine
Well if the good MG feels that the FM is too ground centric and not Dr. Strangelove enough, he would really like my article on civilian casualties in COIN. That he would even surface strikes in Somalia as related to COIN shows where he is coming from.
Best
Tom
If you are talking myths...
Hi Steve,
I really couldn't let this one pass ;).
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.
Yup. Sounds like some Anthropologists I could name :rolleyes:.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.
Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).
Marc
GOs as Strategist or Aquisition officers
Does his (MG Dunlap's) view show service culture or service parochialism? I think picking up something Marc's comment hit on is worthwhile:
Quote:
The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs. carriers (or COIN vs. "real combat" in the Army).
Why is the AF not looking at their changing role and making bold adjustments, one could argue that the other services are also having a tough time, but necessity being the mother of re-invention..... Are we (in my case the Army) doing enough re-evaluation of the role of land power and making changes fast enough to provide advantages? If not, why? Is rapid change always possible; if so is it always wise?
I think MG Dunlap's comments are just the latest (amplified) version of public cultural bias we see in some leaders (military and political - active or retired). We all have it - sometimes its a good thing (since I believe it grows out of experience as much as environment).
What could be bad though would be a senior leader who is unaware of the impacts of his bias, or worse does not care. It takes us back to LTC Yingling's article and the focus of our leadership - what matters to them most? Is it solutions or distractions?
It may not be sexy to discuss the lift requirements or the number of sorties flown in support as much as kinetic targeting, but its certainly relevant. The USAF plays a large role in our ability to conduct COIN in a given location for a protracted period of time. In addition to actively flying men and materials (how'd all that stuff get over there anyway?), bombing (includes the AC 130 kinetics), shows of force, reconnaissance, they (and the navy) also provide deterrence in the region, and keep open the LOCs for projected forces. Their is some significant overhead associated with those missions. Its also worth mentioning their growing contribution to specialty jobs on the ground - lots of BOS guys out there from other services - filling OGA and backfilling DA jobs.
If part of our current strategy is one of employing limited means in limited wars to a political end, then certainly the USAF plays a vital role in that, two important questions are: do they understand it, and are they willing to accept it?
General Dunlap's Response
To "Non Cents" in the comments section...
Time for the USAF to step into the Arena
"It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat."
Theodore Roosevelt,
"Citizenship in a Republic,"
Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, April 23, 1910
I say one thing here to the MGEN and to the rest of the USAF, with all do respect, get in the game or go home. The current fight is in Iraq and in Afghanistan and around the globe, the AF has a role, it may be a lead it may be in support. But if you have a suggestion let's hear it. Critique time is over, weigh in and get your hands dirty.
It ain't over 'till its over
Quote:
Originally Posted by
LawVol
"I agree with Gen Dunlap on one point I took from his rebuttal. I do not think we'll be in any extended COIN campaigns in the near future although I am unwilling to put a time frame on it like he did. We can't even keep 125k (give or take) on the ground for four years without an uproar. Do you really think Congress and the American public would go for a 12 year campaign like Iraq?"
One issue here, that both LAWVOL and the MGEN miss, yes it is four years on since the Iraq war started, there are nearing 150k troops in country filling many different roles. While there is debate over withdraw timelines and benchmarks troops are still flowing in and out of country. The Army and Marines are growing in size adapting to the war and the flow of troops. The current administration has and will continue to resist withdraw. The next administration will be faced with the same issue withdraw or stay. How long will that take? What will the situation on the ground be? By the time it is all said and done it is concievable that 12 years will have passed before the war will be over, ending most likely in a similiar vein to Malaya: with the closure of a logisitics clerks ledger book and a standing independent government in charge. My main issue with the AF arguments has been that it has already assumed defeat and the critique of FM3-24 is a post mortem not a constructive dialogue. Lastly small wars, COIN, happen in many ways all the time, note that Senator Biden (dem from Deleware) has just called for a U.S. troops on the ground response to Sudan-Darfur. -T
Metaphorical rants on COIN and MTW
In running react drills for Marines in embassies, I learned how much harder it was for them to deal satisfactorily with less lethal intruders. They were far better prepared (mindset, equipment, posture, etc.) to deal with the fantasy deadly ninja teams than with a relatively harmless hooligan or activist. The Kent State flowers-in-rifles picture always came to my mind. And it froze them. We're reacting to having similar things happen to us on a much larger and deadlier, higher stakes scale.
We have seen that good capabilities in COIN are not lesser included capabilities for major theater war (MTW). They are different capabilties. In many ways, more complex and more challenging for the individual and small unit than MTW. But that doesn't mean that the reverse is true, that MTW is a lesser included capability of COIN. I happen to believe that the individual who can do COIN well can more readily adapt to MTW than vice-versa, but the scope and scale of the equipment, organization, and realted collective skillsets for MTW prevent a true two-fer in that direction. For a tiny window into that, picture a 1990s Bn from 1st Marines, all MEU(SOC)'d up, trying to do a CAX -- about as painful as 7th Marines in boats.
The sole remaining superpower is, almost by definition, not going to go toe to toe with a peer competitor. So we need to continue to adjust the "loaded for bear" idea that dominated the last decades, and reload for squirrel. History shows that our military's subsistence diet is squirrel, even when there are other bears out there.
Unfortunately, we don't need a peer to have a MTW requiring conventional skills, and the consequences of losing a MTW are at least as painful and probably far more immediate than of being neutered in our inability to successfully prosecute a small war or COIN. Even the baby bears have claws and teeth, and the cornered squirrels bite like hell.
So, we can't afford to suck at either, and it isn't good enough to optimize one since there is no two-fer. But we can't afford to field the dream team for either type of war, let alone both. It is a vexing problem.
Into the wild blue - way out into the wild blue
Quote:
It's not his most recent article, but here's a link to the Dunlap's article "America's asymmetric advantage" from the September 06 Armed Forces Journal.
Wow - "Earth to Buck Rogers", "Buck we have a situation down here - a human one - and well, we are going to be off the net for awhile, but don't worry." "Oh and Buck, one of the mission tech says he left a couple of things loose on your craft, and .....
War is about people - often its about killing them and compelling them, but its a human endevour. Any formula that tries to mimimize that into a technological one ignores the obvious, and risks the political objectives. Wouldn't life be simple if it were a parking lot?
Major General Dunlap's track record
Major General Dunlap's rebuttal to Frank Hoffman's critique is well written and smooth - what might be expected from one of the USAF's top lawyers. But it is well to remember that General Dunlap has a track record, or perhaps a better term is paper trail. It is one that goes back to his brilliant, well received, and extraordinarily clever 1992 article, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." In that piece, Dunlap argues that focusing the military on non-big war operations leads to disaster that in the worst, and very unlikely, case would put the military in charge of the government doing tasks that it is not qualified to do and unable to do its core missions of fighting the big wars. There is much of that view underlying his rebuttal of Hoffman's comments on his piece. It is, therefore, not an overstatement to suggest that Dunlap has never shown himself to be a supporter of COIN and its related missions.
Comment on Hoffman's view of COIN doctrine
I was particularly struck by Frank Hoffmann's statement on the dearth of COIN doctrine in his blog piece. "It
fills a 25 to 30 year void in our doctrinal library thanks to the Vietnam Syndrome and the Pentagon’s insistence on only preparing for wars we would like to fight instead of those our enemies are prepared to wage."
This is simply incorrect. The Army published FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict which focused primarily on COIN in 1981. In 1990 it published a revised and better version of FM 100-20 (with the USAF under General Larry Welch who had created with his Army counterpart the Army/Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict) called Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict which retained the cOIN emphasis. In the interest of full disclosure, I worked on that document from the USSOUTHCOM Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) which, along with the CLIC had significant input to the document drafted at Leavenworth by the cell headed by LTC Jerry Thompson.
This version of COIN doctrine was incorporated into both FM 100-5 Operations of 1993 and Joint Pub 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War.
There was nothing wrong with our COIN doctrine except that few military people read it. Certainly, even fewer civilians read the doctrine.
What makes FM 3-24 important is that it is being read and discussed both within and outside the military.