Afghan National Army (ANA) thread
As the war and reconstruction efforts move forward the time for security reconstruction is here. The ability to train ANSF to handle there own security is paramount to successful reconstruction efforts. This is also not simple task and requires close interagency coordination. I would be interested in hearing some expierences and theorys on this topic. As we move forward from Iraq through Afghanistan and onto somehwere else the lessons we learn may help. We must apply lessons learned rather than relearning them. Interagency coordination also seems to be a hot topic lately (Killcullen, three pillars of Counter-Insurgency) (USG Counter insurgency Conference, Sep 2006).
V/r
Bryan
Afghanis 'May Not be Ready' in 2009
22 April Globe and Mail - Afghanis 'May Not be Ready' in 2009.
Quote:
The commander of Canadian forces in Afghanistan says it is uncertain if the Afghan military will be able to go it alone by 2009.
But Brigadier-General Tim Grant says Canadian efforts have already paid plenty of dividends to the people of Afghanistan...
He says there's a plan and a schedule in place to ensure Afghan National Army troops are trained and up to speed before a possible Canadian pullout two years from now.
But he says the jury is still out on whether the shattered country will be ready to go it alone if international assistance forces leave in 2009...
Afghan Forces Range From Ragtag to Ready
2 May NY Times - As Funding Increases, Afghan Forces Range From Ragtag to Ready by C. J. Chivers.
Quote:
... These wildly contrasting glimpses of Afghanistan’s security forces illustrate the mix of achievements and frustrations that have accompanied international efforts to create a capable Afghan Army and a police force after decades of disorder and war. They also underscore the urgency behind the renewed push to recruit and train these units, which is now under way with an influx of equipment and training approved by the Bush administration last year.
Yet, even after several years of efforts to create new army and police units, it remains difficult to fully assess their readiness. Some units, especially in the army, are motivated and much better equipped than any Afghan forces were five years ago. Others, especially in the police, remain visibly ragtag, underequipped, disorganized, of uncertain loyalty and with links to organized drug rings.
American officials say it will take at least a few years before most of the Afghan forces become more ready and reliable, and perhaps a decade before they are capable of independent operations. But they also say that the resources and plans are now in place to make such ambitions possible.
These ambitions are important because American military officials say a principal element of any Western exit strategy from Afghanistan will be to create competent national security forces. Such forces are regarded as necessary to contain, and eventually defeat, the Taliban insurgency that expanded in 2006, and to provide stability in regions where the government’s influence remains weak...
Afghan National Army (ANA) thread
Stumbled upon this earlier today. On the mark, though much has improved since my 2003-2004 ANA experience. Interesting to note that the ANA STILL cannot unilaterally funciton in terms of CAS and log support, though I understand that some progress has been made toward an independant Afghan rotory wing aviation contingent.
The one part I don't know that I agree with is
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Vic Bout
Stumbled upon
this earlier today. On the mark, though much has improved since my 2003-2004 ANA experience. Interesting to note that the ANA STILL cannot unilaterally funciton in terms of CAS and log support, though I understand that some progress has been made toward an independant Afghan rotory wing aviation contingent.
where the author suggests that the ANA need to be tested soon. Although they are being tested on a daily basis to place them in a situation right now which demanded they stand alone against AQ and the other groups would probably be a bad idea and might just be what they would hope for.
Unlike Iraq the Afghans have not had 30+ years of established military experience as a group in whatever form that may have been. They are literally building ground up a military designed to do much more than any of their parts have done in recent memory.
The Taliban however have been a governing military recently and despite the fact that they were such a bad one doesn't change the comparison. I'm afraid if we try to push too hard with the ANA we run the risk of a much longer possibly insurmountable setback for them which would cost more than any small scale successful efforts might be worth right now.
Now recognizing that there are probably factors or facts that I'm unaware of are there any thoughts on whether this might be the case or not.
ANA..Then, Today and Tomorrow...
Date: March through August 2003
Place: Gardez, Paktia Province, Afghanistan (with travel throughout Khwost & Ghazni Provinces)
At that time, the ANA was just in the process of standing up. There was a compound for training between the OGA and US Army PRT compound..some of you know the area.
The problems at that time was "tribal"...which seems to be a non-unifing entity both in Afghanistan, Iraq and having just returned from Southern Sudan with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/SPLA..a common thread of systemic challenges, that being "tribalism".
That said, and back to the issue of the ANA..If the soldiers who represent the ANA identify with a united Afghanistan and its government, be it evolving everyday..then perhaps the ANA can be a unifing force against radical Sunni Islam represented by the Taliban.
On the other hand, if the ANA represents factions of tribal members who identify with their tribe..by language, custom and religion, then the idea of a united ANA with a common enemy will be a "bridge too far.."
The current focus on small company size commando type units who can move, shoot and communicate without too much coalition assistance...who know the terrain..who know the enemy will provide perhaps a better opportunity to defeat the enemy based on the phrase.."no thy enemy better than I know myself.."
Salaam/RH
The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine
The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine
By Sergeant First Class Anthony Hoh, US Army; Small Wars Journal Blog
Quote:
A critically important security transition task that is often a secondary effort is the development of host nation military doctrine. This effort is paramount to the creation of a successful and independent force. When the world’s focus has moved on to other issues, and the coalition advisory effort draws to an end, the Afghan National Army (ANA) security foundation will rely heavily on their doctrine to continue the fight and provide national security and stability. So a few critical questions one must ask is; are we on track with the current doctrine development program? Do we have the right formula for developing doctrine on behalf of the ANA? Is developing doctrine for the ANA the right approach?
Joint Pub 1-02 defines doctrine as the “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” It is important to note that this definition of doctrine does not describe doctrine as how the Army wishes to fight, or how it may be able to fight at some point in the distant future. Obviously, doctrine profoundly affects a nation’s military development, but it should not be used too heavily as the catalyst for change in terms of simultaneously trying to quickly modernize an immature force. In the writing of Afghan doctrine we fail to account for Afghanistan’s history, technology, social constructs, and the nature of the threats that its armed forces face. We should no longer attempt to gift the ANA tactical, strategic or operational doctrine. Current ANA doctrine that has been “Afganisized", consists of manuals that have been cut copied and replaced… M4 for M16 or AK, Javelin for RPG. The utility of such an approach remains questionable, when manuals like the 7-8 MTP instruct Patrol Leader’s to submit overlays with route classification formulas. (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-2000), suggests the use of soft rounds when clearing staircases (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-1000), or describes the use of integrated BOS (Battlefield Operating System) in the ANA 7-20 MTP. In fairness, none of these items are tactically obtuse, far from it. However when taken on the whole they are not part of the “fundamental principles by which these military forces guide their actions”. This doctrine is generally light years ahead of anything that Afghan Army is capable of now or can be in the foreseeable future. To be clear this is not a slight towards the ANA, they can function without map overlays at the platoon level and continual BDE MDMP (Brigade Military Decision Making Process) seminars, they could get by with a few TACSOPs and GARSOP’s (Tactical and Garrison Standing Operating Procedures) that are linked with each other...
I would really, really like to say that was an exception
to the norm and we do not normally micromanage like that.
I really would like to say that.
Unfortunately, right now I'm too disgusted at the fact we never learn and we kill people unnecessarily through arrant stupidity like that to say much of anything.
We used to be able to just turn off the radio and ignore them and I've done that numerous times. Now, with the eye in the sky, the troops are screwed and the rear area staffs win...
Sad. Really, really sad.
To make matters even worse...
We're not talking about a U.S. unit 100 miles away micromanaging a subordinate unit, they were in effect jerking the ANA bn. The sooner that the ANA can get its own enablers, the better. Then get them used to using their own stuff rather than being dependent on our temporary, high-tech stuff.
Illum, for God's sake!
BW: Thank you for this one ...
Quote:
....and letting our efforts to take down Bin Laden's gang go back into the shadows where they can continue their girm, and quiet business of avenging the attacks of 9/11 and shutting down his his ability to wage UW to incite the populaces of the middle east
although I expect many novenas to St. Jude will be necessary to see that plan become practice.
PS: Bill Moore - did you mean "flesh out" (the post), rather than "flush out" ? No need to respond - I think I'm getting a bit punchy.
'Nother good post, Entropy. Thank you..
While I agree with you and with Bob's World on the possibility of major failure of a future Afghan government and its institutions and with the description of the path that got us where we are today -- and decry the effort to build an Army like our own to the maximum possible extent that is in fact not only ego but ignorance driven (most of the US Army knows very little about how other Armies are organized or train; too many do not care...), I think we all should recall the diplomatic effort that brough NATO to Afghanistan -- a very good diplomatic coup for us.
Good diplomatically but bad militarily for unity of command, overall flexibility and decision making reasons -- since NATO nations are helping with the training and equipping, I suspect that decision also significantly impacted the ANA design as a western Army clone. People like what they're comfortable with...
I also seem to recall there was much upset by some NATO Foreign Ministers at the thought of paying and equipping Warlords...
BW: The third step won't work ...
Quote:
BW
So, "All men are created equal" is a principle; but how we valued that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today.
So, for engagement, I decided that we need to:
1. Stand on Principles, (here are core beliefs that we think are important)
2. Hold Values (here is how we in Amereica assess and apply this principle, and this is the standard we hold ourselves to)
3. Withhold Judgment (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about about the principle for continued engagement).
No problems with 1 - I'd think of "All men are created equal" as a theory, until it is reduced to practice. But, whether a concept is called a principle or theory, that concept can become a belief even though never reduced to practice. An example is the end state of Communism in M-L theory, which was never reached because they never got beyond the Dictatorship of the Workers (which morphed to the Dictatorship for the Workers, and then to the Dictatorship for the Dictators).
No problems with 2 - I'd call this step the reduction of the theory to practice, but we are saying the same thing (I think). Again applying the priniciple (BW) that "All men are created equal", your history is correct that "how we valued that principle in 1776 is very different than how we value it today." In fact, there was a difference of opinion as to what that principle meant in terms of how it was valued (BW) in 1776 and before.
Now I digress briefly. On May 18, 1652, the governing body of Providence & Warwick (1/2 of Rhode Island) enacted a statute providing for abolition of slavery. The rest of the future state (whose economy relied more heavily on chattel slavery) was not about to adopt such a statute. That division presaged the greater national division of the next 3 centuries.
Nonetheless, this action by these Rhode Island Reds (several ancestral to my wife - which partially explains her attitude :D) began the abolitionist thread which extended, in fits and starts, to the present - where, if nothing else, the principle that "All men are created equal" was vindicated at the presidential level.
Now, my digressive point is that the principle "All men are created equal" was not seriously in dispute. J.C. Calhoun adhered to that principle, but you can be assured that how he valued that principle (that is, how he reduced the theory to practice) was far different from how Barrack Obama or I value that principle.
In school, I skimmed through the Slave Cases Reports (texts of all US cases involving slaves). There was a case from the early 1800's in one of the Deep South states where the defendant (white) argued that he could not be prosecuted for manslaughter because the victim (black) was not a human being. The court (in long opinions) divided, with the majority holding that yes, indeed, an African-American was a human being. No doubt, the defendant believed that "All men are created equal" - his definition of "man" was the limiting factor (which was his valuation of the principle).
Turning to step 3 (quoting it again, but adding the words for the principle to be valued):
Quote:
3. Withhold Judgment (we don't expect you to have the same values, but know that we will be persistent about the principle "All men are created equal" for continued engagement).
Now, so happens that Xistan (absolutely essential to the national strategic interests of the US) is firmly committed to chattel slavery; and happens to have a foreign minister who is a direct descendent of J.C. Calhoun and inherited all of his legal and political skills - his gg-grandfather having left S. Carolina after the War of Division.
He says, "COL Jones, I understand exactly what you are telling me about the principle that "All men are created equal". As you can see here, that principle is inscribed in our constitution. Now I also realize we value that principle a bit differently than you USians. But your ROEs here state you will withhold judgment about valuation and, furthermore, that we can expect continued engagement so long as we accept that principle. We, of course, as you can plainly see right here, accept that principle. Now, we need an ODC, 3 ODBs, 12 ODAs and your super aviation group for insertion and extraction. When can we expect them ?"
What does COL Jones tell President Obama ?
Yup, it's a variation of the "Can we kill the shepherd boy" hypothetical.
Bill Moore, I ought to have known better ...
than to engage in verbalistics with a Moore. Point conceded to you.
The mind picture I got from "flush out" was one of the old castles where the privies were built into the walls with chutes to the outside - and where they did "flush out" stuff.
I guess you had to take care if you pulled sentry duty and had to patrol the lower walls. :eek:
Ken: I imagine that pulling that duty was involved in one of your early deployments. Can you tell us what precautions you took - or were you too busy looking for unicorns. As you well know, they existed in those bygone days. :D
Six minute You Tube item on ANA
This undated You Tube item on the ANA by two US soldiers, with very direct comments has appeared on the Uk blogsite and comes from The (UK) Guardian newspaper, which I only rarely check: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.co...alities-5.html
davidbfpo
Americans and Latvians Betrayed by ANA?
From Fox News:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520182,00.html
Quote:
U.S. Probes Whether Afghan Forces Colluded With Taliban in Deadly Attack
Kunar River Valley, Afghanistan — A pre-dawn attack by the Taliban that killed three American soldiers and six other coalition troops earlier this month is raising new questions about many of the Afghan soldiers who were supposed to be fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with them.
I knew SSG Vile, and I'm not sure which Latvians were involved but I worked closely with two of the OMLTs. I'm feeling a little ill.