Indonesian police scrutinized amateur video on Monday that showed a man apparently with a backpack entering a Bali restaurant seconds before one of three suicide bombings that killed as many as 22 people.
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Indonesian police scrutinized amateur video on Monday that showed a man apparently with a backpack entering a Bali restaurant seconds before one of three suicide bombings that killed as many as 22 people.
Interesting paper published on-line today (13 Oct) by the International Crisis Group: Lessons from Maluku and Poso
Quote:
In the wake of a second terrorist attack on Bali, the need to understand Indonesia's violent jihadist networks is greater than ever. Two incidents in May 2005 -- the execution of paramilitary police in Ceram, Maluku, and the bombing of a market in Tentena, Poso -- offer case studies of how those networks are formed and operate. Weakening the networks is key to preventing further violence, including terrorism. In Maluku and Poso, sites of the worst communal conflicts of the immediate post-Soeharto period, one place to start is with programs aimed at ex-combatants and imprisoned mujahidin due for release. These men are often part of networks that extend beyond the two conflict areas, but if they can be "reintegrated" into civilian life, their willingness to support mujahidin elsewhere in Indonesia and engage in violence themselves might be lessened. Addressing broader justice and security issues would also help.
Maybe they could look at some of the US programs aimed at helping former gang members integrate into normal society when they're released from prison...both for things to do and possibly things to avoid doing.
Indonesia has done a respectbale job of rounding up known or suspected terrorists. Whether it is done so out of self-interest vice concern for the GWOT is irrelevant. Unfortunately, recent governments have been handicapped by corruption, internal insurgencies, piracy, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting as to make them less than fully effective partners in the GWOT. What Indonesia does provide, along with Pakistan and Bangladesh, is a good example as a potential manpower pool for well financed terror organizations. With 55 million people living in absolute poverty and most illiterate, how do we begin to address their greivances in order for these folks not to become terrorists? Between Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia, you have over 100 million people living in total poverty and ignorance, thus making them susceptible to being deceived into actively supporting terror networks. What can be done about this? Are we prepared to embark on a global campaign to eradicate ignorance and poverty in order to eliminate those who turn to terrorist groups?
I'm kinda pessimistic about Indonesias hand in the GWOT. There was a report on this a few days back here in Australia. Take the report with a grain of salt. The liberal Islamist Wahid is going senile methinks, but the Indonesian police chief is spot on. POLRI (Indon Police) is incompetent and corrupt. The ICG released a telling report two years back on how POLRI members blatantly paraded a group through the town thereby stirring up violence. I think it might have been this report. The links between the TNI (Indon military) and militia groups is also well known. Seeing as though some of these militia are muslim oriented it kinda raises the question as to what extent the TNI are cracking down on extremists and to what extent they are interacting with them for their own purposes. So these social networks might have to be investigated and curtailed.
It's in my own view that a lot of the military members at the lower levels can get out of control. Because the TNI works right down to a village level, whereby members are actually embedded within the political structure of small communities, recklessness can get out of hand without any sort of authoritative oversight. Also considering the massive command and logistical strains over the archipelago which can leave military members isolated like a modern day Colonel Kurtz (just kidding, but you get my point on the ties between geographic isolation and information isolation).
On the political front the conservative political Islamists are doing an excellent job at separating themselves from the radical Islamists. This was seen in the 2004 elections. If anything the best warning signal for growing strife within Indonesia would be to watch their political parties and see which are starting to be influenced by the jihadi zeitgeist. Because the two can be closely intertwined it could pop out of nowhere. One way to weaken the extremist Jihadi political aspirations would be to support and strengthen the liberal Islamist movements within Indonesia, as they are an effective deterrent.
On the media front, if anyone peruses the Indonesian news on this board you'll be aware that corruption is the new black within the Indonesian media (that and their constant love of the paranormal, something that Ralph Peters would probably have something to say about in regards to bad information). So I would expect some of this news to either be: spotlighted for the international community on the corrupt links between terrorism and the military; or, for that news to be blowtorched by the government and military.
Also, in regard to the International Crisis Group ... they should be applauded for their work on gathering open source information on Jemaah Islamiyah.
From ICG: Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks
Quote:
The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist. In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to attack Western targets out of commission. But the problem of Noordin’s support structure will still have to be tackled.
For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region’s largest jihadist organisation, continues to provide the hard core of that following: the two killed in the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other organisations and some with no previous organisational affiliation.
Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together – he grandly calls it al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI’s military wing, even though he answers to no one. He justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam.
This report examines the way in which Noordin has relied on personal contacts to put his group together. It is based on interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources,
both official and unofficial.
2 Jun 06 Terrorism Monitor: The Role of Kinship in Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya
Quote:
...The use of sibling relationships in jihadi recruitment is to provide further ideological support for the recruits beyond the group itself. Sometimes two or more brothers are recruited for jihad, helping each other during an operation and providing each other inspiration and reassurance. This particular type of recruitment is an effective use of kinship to ensure deeper engagement with the cause and group...
10 June Voice of America - Pending Release of Accused Jemaah Islamiyah Leader Raises Concerns.
Quote:
Pending Release of Accused Jemaah Islamiyah Leader Raises Concerns
By Douglas Bakshian
Manila
10 June 2006
Abu Bakar Bashir, the accused spiritual leader of the militant group Jemaah Islamiyah, is due to be released from prison soon. A top terrorism expert says his release sends the wrong message to terrorists.
Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir is expected to be released in a few days, after completing a prison sentence for his involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 people.
Western countries view him as the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, a regional militant network linked to the al-Qaida group, and he was convicted of being part of the conspiracy behind the bombings on the resort island.
Southeast Asian and Western authorities also blame Jemaah Islamiyah for other terrorist strikes in the region. Bashir denies any wrongdoing, and says Jemaah Islamiyah does not exist.
Bashir's prison term is almost over, and he will be released in a few days. Rohan Gunaratna, of Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, an expert on terrorist groups in Southeast and South Asia, says Bashir's release sends the wrong message to terrorists.
"It will be a huge boost for the jihadists, because Bashir is a leader of a terrorist group that killed 250 people… innocent people," he said. "I think that Bashir's release will send the wrong signal to jihadists, that you can be the head of a terrorist group and you can still be free."
Gunaratna told foreign correspondents in Manila Saturday that freeing Bashir will likely prompt more terrorist actions. He also argued that militant groups will get a political boost.
"Bashir is also the leader of the Majilis Mujahedin Indonesia, or the Mujahedin Council of Indonesia, umbrella organization of jihad groups in Indonesia," he added. "He will mobilize them, he will politicize them. He has the credentials, because he went to prison and he suffered. So, people will join him, people will work with him. That is why he must stay in prison forever."
An Indonesian court last year sentenced Bashir to 30 months in jail for conspiracy in the Bali bombing. That term was reduced because of time he spent in detention and a reduction he received on Indonesia's 60th independence anniversary in 2005.
Gunaratna describes Bashir as the leader of the most dangerous terrorist group in Southeast Asia, because Jemaah Islamiyah is the group closest to al-Qaida.
Things in Indonesia's Judicial system are different than ours; however, trust that Bakr Bashir will be re-arrested, re-tried, re-convicted, and re-sentenced, as he has been several times before, as soon as he is released. He is in extremely poor health, and similar to the US with Sheikh Abdel Rahman, there is considerable concern that Bakr Bashir will die in custody, and thus provide conspiracy "nuts" with something to potentially exploit. JI and Abu Bakr Bashir are NOT Indonesia's biggest problem. They are still trying to indict, try, and convict members of Suharto's family that stole $8 billion from the country, and left it in financial ruin.
2000 PHD Thesis by LtCol David Kilcullen (Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency) - The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99: A Fieldwork Analysis of the Political Power-Diffusion Effects of Guerrilla Conflict.
Abstract:
Quote:
Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority.
Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author’s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare.
The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999.
Principle research tools were:
• Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews.
• Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK.
• Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques.
• Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery.
• Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys.
Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974.
The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis – the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels.
This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means – most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis – particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation – tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level).
Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached.
Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military’s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures.
The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.
ICG, 24 Jan 07: Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge
Quote:
...This report examines how one neighbourhood in Poso became a JI stronghold and how a small group of men managed to terrorise the city for three years before their identities became known. It looks at the links between the JI structures in Poso and Java and the local grievances and resentments driving the ongoing violence and analyses the way forward...
The TNI have demonstrated a pretty good capability in COIN ops. Their performance in Lebanon has been solid, and their efforts in places like Poso have demonstrated the type of restraint that will contribute to winning some credibility. Gen Petraeus has asked for increased Muslim participation in the coalition. What are the councils thoughts regarding Asian Muslims and the help they can provide in OIF? How can we help MNF I?
The "JI Kinship" article is a great example of how local culture impacts the structure and relationships inside a terrorist group. To often I read about terrorist theories that try to explain all terrorist groups from Yemen to Colombia. It is not rocket science to think that a terrorist groups is a by-product of its local culture, but too often this angle is overlooked in favor of nodal analysis and number crunching.
ICG, 22 Mar 07: Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh
Quote:
When local elections were held in Aceh on 11 December 2006, conventional wisdom (shared by Crisis Group) was that candidates from the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) would not do well. They might pick up two or three of the nineteen district races, but the biggest prize – the provincial governorship – was almost certainly out of reach. The old Jakarta-linked parties would benefit from deep pockets, established structures and a split in the former insurgency’s leadership. Polls just before formal campaigning began showed GAM’s governor/deputy governor slate – Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar – virtually out of contention. But GAM won overwhelmingly, in what an analyst called “a perfect storm between the fallout from the peace accord and the failure of political parties to understand the changing times”. The challenge now is to govern effectively and cleanly in the face of high expectations, possible old elite obstructionism and some GAM members’ sense of entitlement that it is their turn for power and wealth....
ICG, 3 May 07: Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status
Quote:
...We will have to wait for more arrests and more information from those detained in March for definitive answers to questions about JI’s current status. It is resilient but not invulnerable, and while it continues to recruit, the organisation as a whole may be shrinking. People have left for different reasons. In some cases, like Subur Sugiarto’s, it may be because a more militant wing finds JI too cautious and bureaucratic. Others, particularly released prisoners, may be co-opted, if only temporarily, by government officials hoping to infiltrate and divide the organisation. One alumnus of a JI pesantren said that he realised he had graduated with no useful skills, and the only occupation open to him, outside petty trade, was teaching in another JI school. If schools are critical to JI’s regeneration, then dissatisfaction with restrictions inside and opportunities outside may ultimately do more damage to the group than arrests....
May 2007, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Where the War on Terror is Succeeding by Josh Kurlantzick.
Quote:
In October 2002, Islamic radicals set off two powerful bombs on the Indonesian island of Bali. Detonated in the heart of the tourist district, they obliterated several bars and nightclubs, killing over 200 people—visiting Australians, Americans, and other foreign nationals, as well as Indonesians—and wounding still more. It was the worst terrorist attack in the country’s history. Shocked and taken aback by the carnage, the international media proclaimed the end of innocence for the tropical retreat.
To anyone who had been paying attention to political developments in Southeast Asia over the previous decade, however, the surprise was misplaced. Well before the Bali bombing, Islamists had turned the region as a whole into a front in their global jihad. In the Philippines, the radical group Abu Sayyaf, which received funding from the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, had built itself into a powerfully lethal force. In Indonesia, an even deadlier terror group, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), had also expanded, bombing churches and ultimately putting in motion the Bali plot...
Today, less than five years after the attack on Bali, the situation in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. Across the region, jihadist groups like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah are struggling to survive, Islamist parties seem to be weakening, and the region’s newest leaders openly wage war on terror. Moreover, the United States has played a leading role in these successes, and it has done so without creating much in the way of an anti-American reaction. Indeed, Southeast Asia is proving to be a model for the “long war” against Islamist terror. The lessons of its recent progress deserve to be studied closely...
I wonder how much of this can be attributed to the good guys providing some pretty wonderful tsunami relief to the region while the bad actors did nothing to help the stricken.
It would be interesting to see how things stand with terrorist organizations in
Thailand , Malaysia, and Myanmar these days as well.
15 June AP - 2 Terror Leaders Arrested in Indonesia by Robin McDowell.
Quote:
The head of Southeast Asia's most feared terrorist group was arrested along with his military chief, police said Friday, claiming a breakthrough in the fight against extremists in the world's most populous Muslim nation.
Authorities warned, however, that Jemaah Islamiyah - blamed for the 2002 Bali bombings and other attacks - and breakaway factions could still carry out strikes against Western and Christian interests...
Counterterrorism Blog, 17 Jun 07:
Major Changes within Jemaah Islamiyah Alleged
Quote:
Based on initial interrogations of top Jemaah Islamiyah members who were captured over the past week, the Indonesian police are now painting a picture of a terrorist organization attempting to consolidate in the face of heavy attrition.
According to the police, JI has now done away with its earlier region-wide mantiqi ("regional command") structure. Previously, JI had four mantiqi covering large portions of Southeast Asia and Australia. At its peak (prior to late 2002), each mantiqi consisted of up to a dozen wakilah, and each wakilah were comprised of several fiah, or cells. Overseeing all this was a markaz, a small headquarters consisting of top JI members.
It is now understood that JI still recognizes a markaz. But under the markaz, JI now divides itself into four ishoba which only cover the Indonesian island of Java. These ishoba are named after historical figures in Islam....
18 June NY Times - Indonesian Terror Group Limits Attacks by Seth Mydans.
Quote:
Long before the arrests of two of its top militants last week, the region’s major terrorist group had been moving away from the tactic of large-scale attacks, experts said Sunday.
This is a time of religious and social ferment, as Indonesia’s tradition of moderation and inclusiveness is tested by a rise in conservatism and an increased focus on Islam as a religion and a moral code.
Islamist violence is only one factor, and there is division and debate among militants as well as among the population at large...
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 19 Jun 07:
Indonesia Neutralizes JI as Immediate Threat
Quote:
...It is evident that the number of first-generation, al-Qaeda trained operatives is dwindling, which will have important ramifications for the strategies that JI embarks on in the coming years. A lesser-known cadre of leaders should be expected to emerge out of the more traditional Darul Islam wings who will be more engaged in fomenting sectarian violence as well as in social welfare and dawa activities to rebuild JI's depleted ranks. Two of its four wings focus on recruitment. Assassinations and kidnappings by fringe groups may also increase. In the short-term, however, Indonesian counter-terrorism police unit Densus-88 deserves inordinate credit for neutralizing JI as an immediate threat.
The success of Detachment 88 is obviously starting to 'bite' amongst JI. The latest from the alleged spiritual leader of JI, quoted by the Australian Broadcasting Commission this evening (Tues 26 Jun):
http://http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin"]http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin"]http://http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin
....he's not just complaining about CT efforts, he's considering a run for office:
ISN Network, 9 Jul 07: Courting Sharia in Indonesia
Quote:
Reports say that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir - the reputed spiritual leader of the militant Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and head of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia party (MMI) - is considering running for president of Indonesia in elections scheduled for 2009.
While an estimated 86.4 percent of Indonesia's 234 million citizens are Muslims, most are moderates, and some of Ba'asyir's policies, especially his call for the implementation of Sharia law, could well strike resonant chords among many.
Ba'asyir's MMI is an umbrella organization for groups fighting for Sharia law in Indonesia.
While Ba'asyir denies involvement with the militant JI, he has stood trial and been convicted of involvement in terrorism and the recent arrests of top JI commanders have implicated him in direct involvement in the group's leadership.....
JI is definitely a minor rump group compared to many other Islamic parties that have already 'embraced' the democratic process in Indonesia. The idea of Bashir getting a serious run in the presidential elections would appear to be a farcical pipe dream.
For good information about the state of these things I really commend the International Crisis Group's reports on JI to you. Sidney Jones has a hand in these and I do not think that there are too many others with such in depth knowledge.
At the same time, I would try and avoid 99.9% of what Abuza or Gunaratana write about JI. From SE Asia and Indonesia experts I have spoken with , their fame appears to be inversely proportional to their knowledge.
Well the JI is here in the Philippines and from my first hand knowledge of Zack's and Rohan's work I believe that they do know what they are talking about and other SE Asia experts, operators and analysts, that I know and work with in Indonesia and throughout the region respect highly their work as well.
I stand by my statements.
Hi David,
I think it is important that people understand that there are a lot of quite different interpretations of what is happening in SE Asia other than those being offered by these two men.
That is not to say that they should not be heard - far from it - just that what they say should be evaluated against both credible criticisms, and some knowledge of their positions and backgrounds. The problem at the moment that I see (as foreshadowed in my previous post) is that the 'popular media' (and some government and defence agencies) has to date almost uncritically swallowed hook line and sinker whatever these men publish.
There are two parts to developing such a picture. First is establishing the veracity or otherwise of what they write. Second is understanding their motivations and or support.
For the first part, I note that I am relying in part here on a recent seminar conducted by Prof Carl Thayer (who at one point Abuza has acknowledged as a form of mentor on SE Asia) at the Defence and Security Applications Research Centre at the Australian Defence Force Academy.
I have also spoken at length to credible regional experts based here in Australia and the region regarding both authors works.... perhaps / probably even some of the same people you refer to .
I have only relied on open source, unclassified material in forming my concerns.
There is a body of literature critical of the techniques and analysis employed by both authors. These criticisms have been published in refereed journals( World Politics, Critical Asian Studies, Survival and South -East Asian Affairs) as well as regional newspapers such as the Jakarta Post.
I have distilled down these criticisms into the two main ones made openly:
1. Both authors make unsubstantiated claims. This normally involves only citing 'Intelligence sources". Byman on Gunaratna's Inside Al Qaeda "Although it often overwhelms the reader in detail , many of its key claims... are unsupported. In addition, it often relies on intelligence reporting without so much of a hint of whether the material is from an interview, a document , or a media leak. Other claims by Gunaratna deserve additional substantiation..."
2. Abuza lacks sufficient knowledge of Islam, Arabic, Indonesian or Malaya and Islam in SE Asia in general (The Jakarta Post). This leads to excessive reliance on secondary sources . Tim Huxley on Militant Islam: "It reads largely like a rough, unedited first draft, replete with inappropriate and factual inaccuracies". Kit Collier on the same work: " It is tedious to recount the numerous errors of fact, spelling, and interpretation that plague Abuza's work. This may explain why there has been so little published criticism of it. For country specialists, these errors expose a weak grounding in history, geography, and culture of the peoples described. Unfortunately, the errors are reproduced by other regionalists drawing on Abuza'.
It should be noted that prior to becoming an SE Asia Islamic terror 'expert' post 9 -11, Abuza's substantive academic knowledge was in other parts of Asia. He was not an Islamic scholar.
I have also heard both men speak at seminars. I have questioned Abuza about some of his assertions with regard to the (to date) unsubstantiated claims he has offered about JI's alleged or likely role in Southern Thailand. He could not offer any proof of the claims made and basically admitted it was in fact largely speculation based on what seemed plausible.
I have no problem with admitting the 'possible' plausibility of his points - they are highly plausible in this instance - but that does not make them fact. I have serious concerns when a man regarded as a credible figure is making assertions based on speculation.
Two weeks ago I had a substantial discussion with Sidney Jones from the ICG. She basically offered a diametrically opposed view of JI ,and its current abilities, to that offered by Abuza in Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. I do not have sufficient knowledge of the subject matter to have arrived at a definitive personal opinion, but the differences that arose were striking and again gave me cause to question the certainty that Abuza offers in his opinions.
The second point was with regard to where both men are coming 'from'. Gunaratna's organisation receives a significant amount of support from his national government. It would reasonably be expected that this shapes certain things with regard to perceptions and message delivery. Likewise, Abuza receives / has received quite large sums of money from various think tanks and organisations in the US, some of whom are neither independent or non-partisan. All messages need to be interpreted against the background knowledge of who is paying for their production (and why).
Finally, both men make money from selling books. Books that do not sell do not make money. Since 9/11 very few authors have gone broke by inflating the threat of terrorism....
regards,
Mark
Excellent points and certainly you have provided a useful perspective. Thank you. However, in Zack's defense I would offer that the books he has written do not sell well. He has not made a lot of money from his books. But I appreciate your analysis and perspective though I find Zack's first person sources from actually meeting with and interviewing key figures on both sides in SE Asia to be very valuable.
V/R,
Dave
ICG, 19 Jul 07: Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict
Good background, also from ICG, 5 Sep 06: Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked QuestionsQuote:
Most outside observers see only one dimension of conflict in Papua – the Indonesian government vs. the independence movement – but it is much more complex. Tensions among tribal groups and between indigenous Papuans and non-Papuan settlers, as well as competition over political power and access to spoils at the district and sub-district levels, are also important. The issues vary substantially from one region to another. National and international attention has tended to focus on the northern coast and the central highlands, with relatively little on the districts in the south, which have long felt excluded from politics in the Papuan capital, Jayapura....
Time, 9 Aug 07: How Indonesia is Winning its War on Terror
Quote:
....Since the first Bali bombings five years ago, Indonesia has transformed itself from a country riddled with radical Islamist movements and terror threats — Indonesians once called autumn "the bombing season" because attacks had become so regular — to one of the world's few triumphs in fighting terrorism. Even better, Jakarta has succeeded without resorting to the draconian antiterror tactics increasingly preferred by governments from Sri Lanka to Iraq.
In recent years, Indonesian authorities have arrested or killed some 300 alleged militants. Indonesia has won removal from the Financial Action Task Force's list of nations not complying with global standards on fighting money laundering and terror, and earned praise from the U.S. State Department, which lauds its "new urgency on counterterrorism." The International Crisis Group's Southeast Asia project director, Sidney Jones, probably the world's leading expert on Indonesian terror, agrees, concluding that J.I. is "certainly much weaker" today than ever before.....
ICG, 4 Oct 07: Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications
Quote:
Two years after the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Helsinki, the peace is holding – but it is not the peace that many envisioned. The euphoria that swept Aceh after GAM candidates trounced their opponents in the December 2006 local elections is gone, replaced by a sense of gloom that the new elite is not that different from the old, and as many divisions are being created as healed in Acehnese society.
Jobs and contracts are going to the victors: loyalty to GAM has replaced good connections to Jakarta or local army commanders as the key to political and business opportunities. Extortion by ex-combatants is rampant, and armed robberies are on the rise, many carried out by former fighters operating outside any command structure. In some areas – North Aceh is one – former commanders of GAM’s armed wing, now called the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA), serve as a virtual shadow government, playing much the same role as the Indonesian military did in the past vis-à-vis civilian officials, although without the clout of an authoritarian state behind them. Journalists have found that many KPA leaders have an allergy to criticism and a sense of themselves as above the law that do not bode well for democratic governance.
The cash that has made new and lucrative patronage networks available to GAM members has also divided a fractious movement still further, deepening divisions at the top and creating new fault lines between commanders with access to funds and the rank-and-file who feel they have not received their fair share. Many KPA members who consider themselves short-changed or simply deserving of a cut take matters into their own hands and exact payments from businesses, contractors and sometimes non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or turn to profitable pursuits like illegal logging....
ICG, 19 Nov 07: Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons
Complete 35 page paper at the link.Quote:
Even as the police are focusing their deradicalisation program on prisoners and ex-prisoners, they are the first to acknowledge that the current state of Indonesian prisons undermines their efforts. It is a telling indictment of the system that they do their best to keep top terrorists at police headquarters, out of the normal prison system entirely, because the chances of backsliding are so high.
Choices about isolation or integration are important but they cannot be made outside a broader program of prison reform, particularly an attack on prison corruption, which is very much on the agenda of the new director general of corrections. More important than choosing between two policies, in any case, is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and tailor prison programs to their needs.
Deradicalisation programs are important but they will inevitably be trial-and-error in nature; there is no single intervention that can produce a rejection of violence among a disparate group of people who have joined radical movements for many different reasons. Within JI alone there are the ideologues, the thugs, the utopians, the followers and the inadvertent accomplices; local recruits from Poso are motivated by very different factors than those who graduate from JI-affiliated schools in central Java.
Much more thought needs to be given to how to evaluate the “success” of deradicalisation programs, because there is a danger that many people deemed to have been deradicalised are those who were never the real problem, or that the reasons individuals renounce violence have nothing to do with police programs. Even if we could measure the number of people deradicalised according to specific criteria, that figure would only have meaning if we had some sense of the number of new recruits and knew that the balance was going in the right direction.
Focusing on the criminals-turned-jihadis in prison is also important. In all the prisons where “ustadz” are held, there is likely to be a small group of such men but it is not clear that anyone is tracking them or turning deradicalisation efforts in their direction. If it is important to design programs to ensure newly released JI members have vocational opportunities, what about the criminal recruits who may, like Beni Irawan, the Kerobokan guard, turn out to be more militant than their mentors? These men also need to be the focus of special programs and thus far have been left out.
It is hard to set performance goals for deradicalisation because it means so many different things to different people. But setting such goals for improving prison management is possible, desirable and critically necessary.
22 Jan 08: Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso
Complete 12 page paper at the link.Quote:
Serious violence in Poso has had a ten-year history. Between 1998 and 2001, it had been the scene of Christian-Muslim fighting. After 2001 and a government-brokered peace pact, the violence became one-sided, with local extremists, many of them linked to and directed by the extremist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), mounting attacks on Christians, local officials and suspected informants. The 11 and 22 January 2007 operations were the culmination of almost a year’s unsuccessful effort by the police to persuade those responsible for criminal acts to turn themselves in. Fourteen militants and one policeman died in the process, but Poso is quieter and safer, by all accounts, than it has been in years. As a result of the January operations:
almost all the JI religious teachers from Java have fled the area;
the perpetrators of all the jihadi crimes committed since the 2001 Malino peace accord have been identified, and most have been arrested, tried and convicted, without any backlash;
the JI administrative unit (wakalah) in Poso appears to have been destroyed, at least temporarily;
a major vocational training program is underway aimed at ensuring that would-be extremists have career opportunities that will keep them out of trouble;
the central government has made new funding available, including for improving education in the hope of diluting the influence of radical teaching; and
no serious violence has taken place in Poso in twelve months.
ICG, 28 Feb 08: Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry
Complete 25 page report at the link.Quote:
A handful of members and persons close to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s most prominent extremist organisation, have developed a profitable publishing consortium in and around the pesantren (religious school) founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in Solo, Central Java. The consortium has become an important vehicle for the dissemination of jihadi thought, getting cheap and attractively printed books into mosques, bookstores and discussion groups. The publishing venture demonstrates JI’s resilience and the extent to which radical ideology has developed roots in Indonesia. The Indonesian government should monitor these enterprises more closely, but they may be playing a useful role by channelling JI energies into waging jihad through the printed page rather than acts of violence.....
ICG, 16 Jun 08: Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua
Complete 35 page report at the link.Quote:
....The potential for communal conflict is high in Papua because both sides consider themselves aggrieved. Indigenous Christians feel threatened by ongoing Muslim migration; Muslim migrants feel democracy may be leading to a tyranny of the majority, where in the long term they will face discrimination or even expulsion. Even though there are significant rifts and factions in both communities, especially over competing nationalisms (Indonesian vs. Papuan), the developments in Manokwari and Kaimana may be a sign of more clashes to come.....
IHT, 3 Jul 08: Islamic militants abort terror attack in western Indonesia at last minute
Quote:
Militants linked to Southeast Asia's most wanted terror suspect placed three bombs inside a tiny cafe in western Indonesia, but aborted their attack at the last minute after realizing many of the victims would have been Muslims, police said Thursday.
The revelation came during the interrogation of 10 men who were arrested this week on Sumatra Island. Twenty-two explosives also were seized, many packed with bullets to maximize the impact of the blasts, said police spokesman Maj. Gen. Abubakar Nataprawira.
The busts highlighted the lingering threat in Indonesia, which has been hit by a string of suicide bombings in recent years, including the 2002 Bali nightclubs attacks that thrust the world's most populous Muslim nation onto the front lines in the war on terrorism.......
CHD, Jun 08: Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh
Quote:
....Two peace processes were conducted in Aceh, first, lead by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (from now on HDC) in 1999-2004, and the other by the CMI-Crisis Management Initiative (from now on CMI) and the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (Helsinki negotiations) in 2005. Both created an atmosphere of optimism and reduced the annual number of casualties. The fact that the latter of the two heavily built on the principles agreed upon by the former makes the distinction of the two processes difficult. From the point of view of third party agency, though, they can be separated as the third parties involved, were different. After the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on peace between GAM and the government of Indonesia on August 15, 2005, the conflict has ceased to exist and there has only been a few casualties ever since between the two former conflicting parties.5 While there is a considerable risk of the conflict reoccurring, if economic and political structures of conflict cannot be transformed in time, and if the agreements agreed upon are not honestly implemented, the process to peace can be largely treated as a successful case. Aside with the fact that peace negotiations never involved the parliament, and the lack of commitment of the parliament could become a problem in the legislative implementation of the peace deal, it would be difficult to pinpoint clear problems in the peace process itself that could later be seen as causes, if the conflict reoccurs.....
http://www.usindo.org/publications/r...arOnTerror.pdf
Indonesia’s War on Terror, by William Wise describes the threat from international terrorism and Jakarta’s response. The desirability of law reform and
improving Indonesia’s intelligence capabilities are highlighted.
ICG, 20 May 09: Indonesia: Radicalisation of the Palembang Group
Quote:
Indonesia has earned well-deserved praise for its handling of home-grown extremism, but the problem has not gone away. In April 2009, ten men involved in a jihadi group in Palembang, South Sumatra, were sent to prison on terrorism charges for killing a Christian teacher and planning more ambitious attacks. Their history provides an unusually detailed case study of radicalisation – the process by which law-abiding individuals become willing to use violence to achieve their goals. The sobering revelation from Palembang is how easy that transformation can be if the right ingredients are present: a core group of individuals, a charismatic leader, motivation and opportunity. Another ingredient, access to weapons, is important but not essential: the Palembang group carried out its first attack with a hammer and only later moved to making bombs......
CSIS, 30 Jun 09: Conflict, Community, and Criminality in Southeast Asia and Australia: Assessments From the Field
A collection of essays with a foreword by Marc Sageman.
Essays include:Quote:
....In Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, it would be naïve to believe that terrorism can be defeated. It is and will remain a tactic of the weak against their government, and Southeast Asia has seen its share throughout modern history. However, the appeal of Islam is fading in some theaters but gaining strength in a few others due to local reasons. In the future, terrorism in Southeast Asia may still be waged in the name of new concepts. The key to holding it in check is to not overreact, punish only the criminals directly involved in violence, and encourage young people that might be attracted to violent ideology to pursue their political activism in a more effective and lawful way.
- Radical Islam in the Middle East and Southeast Asia: A Comparison
- The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia: Pull versus Push Factors
- Jemaah Islamiyah and New Splinter Groups
- Can Indonesian Democracy Tame Radical Islamism?
- The Role of Radical Madrasahs in Terrorism: The Indonesian Case
- Communal Violence in Indonesia and the Role of Foreign and Domestic Networks
- Radical Islam in Malaysia
- Governmental Responses to Extremism in Southeast Asia: “Hard” versus “Soft” Approaches
- The Malayu Insurgency in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces
- “A Carnival of Crime”: The Enigma of the Abu Sayyaf
- Will the Conflict in Mindanao Look Like the Insurgency in Southern Thailand?
- Little-known Muslim Communities and Concerns in Cambodia, Burma, and Northern Thailand
- Assessment of Criminal Threats Emanating from Burma
- The Extremist Threat in Australia
- Muslim Alienation in Australia: Europe Down Under?
- Jihadi Ideology: An Overview
CTC, 22 Jul 09: Radical Islamist Ideology in Southeast Asia
Essays Include:Quote:
....The 17 July 2009 terrorist attacks on two hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia were a vivid reminder of the breadth of the battle space and the importance of constant vigilance. This break in Indonesia’s four-year calm might be a one-time event or an indication of a resurgent regional terror threat. With crude weapons and little logistical support, a small group of people were capable of carrying out an attack that received global media attention. The focus on the perpetrators of this attack may also veil the importance of ideologies other than global jihadism to political violence in the region, such as various strands of ethno-nationalism. As this report highlights, global jihadism is not the only ideology animating terrorist violence, and ethno-nationalism is still a prevalent force in Southeast Asia.
The inherent difficulty of tactical defense makes it ever more important to address the broader ideological and strategic aspects of the terror threat in the hopes of identifying important trends. This volume examines the salience and content of jihadi ideology across Southeast Asia in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the types of threats and susceptibility to global jihadist violence in the region.....
- The Landscape of Jihadism in Southeast Asia
- The Current and Emerging Extremist Threat in Malaysia
- The historical development of Jihadi Islamist thought in Indonesia
- The Influence of Transnational Jihadist Ideology on Islamic Extremist Groups in the Philippines: The Cases of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Rajah Solaiman Movement
- Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conflict
- A Survey of Southeast Asian Global Jihadist Websites
ICG, 24 Jul 09: Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings
Quote:
On 17 July 2009, suicide bombers attacked two hotels in the heart of a Jakarta business district, killing nine and injuring more than 50, the first successful terrorist attack in Indonesia in almost four years. While no one has claimed responsibility, police are virtually certain it was the work of Noordin Mohammed Top, who leads a breakaway group from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the regional jihadi organisation responsible for the first Bali bombing in 2002. One of the hotels, the Marriott, was bombed by Noordin’s group in 2003; this time, a meeting of mostly foreign businessmen appears to have been the target. The restaurant of the nearby Ritz-Carlton was also bombed.
The attack sets back Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts, but its political and economic impact has been minor. On 23 July President Yudhoyono was declared the winner of the 8 July elections with more than 60 per cent of the vote; nothing about the bombing is likely to weaken his government or prompt a crisis. The impact on the business community, which lost four prominent members, has been devastating, but economic indicators are stable.....
I'm not sure I'd agree that the attacks are a "setback to Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts"... they seem to me less a setback than an indication that the job is not finished.
JI and other jihadi groups have been substantially alienated from the Indonesian public. The deaths of Indonesians and Muslims in terror attacks have not been well received, and the jihadi agenda lacks popular appeal. The general quiet in sectarian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi has removed a powerful recruitment driver. Many JI leaders and members have been arrested and the group has splintered to a large extent.
It must be remembered, though, that JI is not an insurgency, it's a terrorist group. In many ways the group is most dangerous when it is pared down to a small core network of committed extremists. Even with very limited manpower and resources, a group like Top's can still generate very dangerous attacks.
ICG's recommendations make sense, though I would emphasize the need to achieve a permanent resolution to the sectarian conflicts that have provided extremists with their raison d'etre in the past. The Indonesians are on the right track and need to stay on it, but that does not and cannot assure that there will not be more such attacks as the process goes on. Unfortunately the nature of modern terrorism allows even a largely defeated group to make an enormous mess.
ICG, 27 Aug 09: Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base
Quote:
This briefing examines the linkages among the people Noordin drew on for the 17 July attacks in an effort to understand his support base. It is focused on the local network, mostly on Java, not on the overseas links, as those were still being uncovered as this went to press. It is not about the ongoing police investigation and does not draw on any privileged information from the men arrested since 17 July. It is necessarily an interim study, using the known pieces of the puzzle to help explain why Noordin and his network have not only survived in Indonesia, but in some senses thrived. It is based on press reports and interviews conducted in connection with the current investigation, and extensive reading of documents collected for previous Crisis Group reports.
A little reported insurgency, even if in a strategic location and understandably Indonesia did not want an external media role. This is an update on Aceh, with a podcast:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...ceh-today.aspx
I'd forgotten the eventual peace agreement was signed in Helsinki and without research a sign that Nordic quiet diplomacy worked.
The link in the original post appears to be broken. If you are looking for this document, please try this link instead: The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99.
Link:http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2...adicalize.htmlQuote:
Due to a host of factors, Indonesia continues to witness an upsurge of religious radicalism. Some salient characteristics, the DNA of radicalism so to speak, stand out when one analyses the attitudes and behavior of jihadists.
The jihadist embodies the following characteristics: