The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)
Moderator's Note
Prompted by the SWJ Blog article 'Meet An Urban Planner For Cities That Don't Yet Exist' and link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mee...dont-yet-exist I found that two hundred threads contain Kilcullen and nine threads specifically contain his name in the title, so before I merge them to this 'Collection' thread they were:
1. In 2008 'Killcullen Briefing' a link to another website
2. In 2008 after his book was published 'Kilcullen article' on defeating the Taliban
3. In 2009 announcing a speaking slot 'David Kilcullen at the Pritzker Military Library'
4. In 2009 a link to an Australian TV debate 'Kilcullen debates the ethics and tactics of contemporary warfare'
5. In 2009 a thread after 'Accidental insurgent' was published 'Recovering David Kilcullen'
6. In 2006 'Kilcullen -- New Theories for a New Way of War'
7. In 2010 'Deconstructing Kilcullen's Counterinsurgency'
8. In 2010 seeking questions for a meeting 'Questions for Dr. David Kilcullen'
9. In 2011 'Kilcullen on Libya: U.S. Should be ‘Air Referee’
In January 2015 four other threads were merged into this one.(ends)
Kilcullen's work has been discussed elsewhere on SWC, including the thread on his "28 articles". But given the high-level attention it has received, a dedicated thread seems appropriate.
Lt. Col in the Australian Army, Ph.D. in anthropology, Chief Strategist in the Office of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, recently awarded the Medal for Exceptional Public Service, and subject of a glowing review in the New Yorker article quoted above.
Here are his major works:
Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
Complex Warfighting, April 7, 2004
Counterinsurgency Redux, Survival -- IISS, Winter, 2006
Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency, Dr David J. Kilcullen*, Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C., 28 September 2006
Start at the beginning...
"28 articles" was written for a Coalition Company Commander just warned for deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan. With admirable clarity, at the opening he defines his subject.
Quote:
(Counterinsurgency) is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.
Right from the start … guaranteed failure. This definition is true when fighting a domestic insurgency, or if we are seeking to create or maintain a colony. Neither is true – yet – for America. Certainly not in Iraq.
The Iraq government must win the hearts and minds of its people for the Iraq State. A US company commander can only help, as a secondary player in this game.
Apologies, I forgot our ace in the hole!
As usual with the US military, deus ex machina saves the day!
Quote:
Originally Posted by "Knowing the Enemy", George Packer, The New Yorker (Dec 18, 2006)
... a “ruggedized” laptop computer, loaded with data from social-science research conducted in Iraq — such as, McFate said, “an analysis of the eighty-eight tribes and subtribes in a particular province.” Now the project is recruiting social scientists around the country to join five-person “human terrain” teams that would go to Iraq and Afghanistan with combat brigades and serve as cultural advisers on six-to-nine-month tours.
Since there are so few Arabic-speaking, Iraq-expert social scientists in the US (even fewer for Afghanistan), the data for these laptops’ will mostly come from the locals. That is, our maps of the social terrain will be that of various partisans in the Iraq civil war. (there are no neutrals in a civil war)
It's a high-tech way of making their enemies, our enemies.
Good idea, just the wrong time and place.
Also this illustrates our confusion between "data" and "knowledge." Even if the data is correct, most of our company commanders will lack the contextual understanding -- the wider view of Iraq/Afghanistan society -- needed to successfully apply it.
Who should we be listening to?
The usual suspects ... Lind, Richards, van Creveld ... and the other folks you see published on www.d-n-i.net
Unfortunately we are in the early stages of developing strategies effective in the age of 4GW. Early days yet. Yet the wealth of writing of the subject, from both in and outside the services, suggests that we'll have results eventually.
Implementing them might be a more difficult problem. I consider this the critical step, about which I've seen nothing of interest. Perhaps we must learn to wage 4GW on our own military institutions.
The sage who I believe has produced the first keys to winning 4GW is MAJ Don Vandergriff (The Path to Victory). In the end, our people are our greatest strength. Nothing is more important than getting the right system to attract, retain, and promote in the armed services.
Among my articles, the most operational is, I believe:
"Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?"
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/fabius_..._militia-1.pdf
Another view of Kilcullen's work, by T. X. Hammes
The below link goes to a favorable mention of "Counterinsurgency Redux" by T. X. Hammes. Hammes is on the A-team of 4GW experts. His opinion deserves attention.
http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-i...-guerrilla-war
Carl is right, from one perspective...
(a quickly written note, apologize for typos)
From the perspective of company commanders, this is just another set of advice, to be skimmed for a few insights. "#1 Know your turf ... tell me something I don't already know."
It's banal in the sense of commonplace, almost trivial.
(side note: For every members of Al Qaeda there must be hundred+ manuals on how to fight him, many of which are hundreds of pages long ... Perhaps we should conduct counterinsurgency by smothering our enemies with manuals.)
From a larger perspective this -- boiling his work down to commonplaces -- misses the key to Kilcullen's views. He's a brilliant PhD anthropologist - Lt Col in the Aussie Army.
I'll bet that he means this stuff, in its full glory as I described above. As do the senior DoD and State folks -- uniformed and not -- who promote his work.
The "excesses" (my word, not yours) that you throw away ("be the world expert on your district") are his key insights. Delusional as they might be.
This illustrates some key larger points as to why we lose these wars. Hence deserves attention!
Going out on a limb here, but...
FB,
I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.
That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:
Quote:
Kilcullen then gives 28 steps to victory. Let's start at the top.
As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.
Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.
a minor point about the discussion...
Folks, we're all stumbling around here. If you want good answers, call Martin van Creveld. It's long distance, but worth it.
Meanwhile, back in the weeds, it does not help me when you say that I'm wrong (btw, you're pussycats compared to the DNI editorial cabal).
Or that I've mis-read Kilcullen (ditto).
I've given a close analysis of his text. Please give specifics as to my errors.
Zenpundit, Merv, and others have raised some great and specific points, which I will attempt to grapple with later. Now on to the central question ...
the major & central issue
I've not communicated this clearly. Just to get together on the same page, let's start at the beginning.
For the past 100 years or so, western nations have lost almost every war like Iraq (fighting as aliens in a less developed state). You can call them colonial wars, low intensity conflicts, guerilla wars, insurgencies, or 4GW’s. There have been a few exceptions, either long ago (Philippines) or probably fictional (Malaysia).
Worse, 4GW’s might become the primary form of war in the 21st century. And as Iraq has shown, we do not know how to win such conflicts. In fact, we’re losing both wars in the Middle East theater.
One of our primary strengths is our free, competitive intellectual climate. Formally it is called the Delphi method. People write up proposals, which are circulated and intensely criticized. Eventually we find a solution. I doubt al-Qaeda has anything like this.
Kilcullen has written up a solution, in his various papers, for winning 4GW’s. The *proposal* might prove ineffective, but the *process* is of the highest importance.
This guy is a PhD anthropologist. If he wanted to write “cliff notes” – the basic stuff told to captains for generations or centuries (“know your turf”), he’d have done so in a fraction of the time and length.
The “cliff notes” version – boiling it down so that it only tells us what we already know – is just a recipe for defeat. Tried and failed.
Kilcullen is more ambitious, reaching far in search of a successful tactical formula for victory. Let’s not throw out the strange and new elements he suggests, but discuss what he actually said.
Even failed ideas move us forward, showing us another path that does not work.
two more points raised above...
What is new in Kilcullen's discussion of PR & propaganda?
John Adam’s defense of the Redcoats following the Boston Massacre was – and was seen at the time – as a masterstroke of PR, gaining British sympathy for the colonies’ struggle against the Crown.
Ditto in the Civil War (aka, for you southerners, the War Between the States), where the PR war in Britain had a decisive effect on the outcome.
Ditto in WWI (e.g. the Zimmerman telegram).
That we’re doing so poorly in the information war for both Iraq and Afghanistan probably reflects the small number of Americans with the necessary knowledge of their cultures. Don’t hold your breath for this to change.
Re: Kilcullen’s discussion of the Indonesian insurrection
He misses, in my opinion, the primary difference between that and our wars in the ME. As do most who reference Lawrence. And often those looking for tips to win from the Malaysian Insurrection.
All were wars waged and won by the locals. We are aliens in a strange land. What works for the locals might be impossible for us.
Two Ships Passing in the Night
FM – I’ve followed this thread since you posted it and have to say I believe the “misunderstanding” of the replies lies in your quarter. The replies from seasoned COIN veterans in defense of Kilcullen are merely relating that his words of advice are appropriate and work in the world they operate in.
Those of the “theorist camp" have the luxury of endless debate on the “grand strategic themes” of 4GW, COIN, IW, etal. Your views are better served directed at members of the National Command Authority and not Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders and Team Leaders.
The operators do not have the luxury of picking and choosing the operational environment they are ordered to. What they do is adjust and make do with the best available information at their disposal. As Tom Ricks related in his recent book Fiasco – one third of our officers get it, one third are trying to get it and one third just want the hammer as their only tool in the box.
Kilcullen offers practical advice to the first two thirds and from what I gathered the majority of our operators appreciate his efforts. Again, these guys on the ground are not tasked with bringing world peace in our time. They are tasked with a difficult mission – a fuzzy end-state - and look to his words as a way to be part of the solution – not part of the problem. I take exception to anyone who imposes a top-down world view to those on the point of the spear.
Moreover, to those who say that advice such as this from Kilcullen and warrior-scholars such as Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis are just a blinding flash of the obvious, I submit we are not "real good" at lessons learned and often our best and brightest find themselves under the thumb of the last third mentioned above. Doses of reality from guys like Kilcullen, Zinni, Petraeus and Mattis should be written in stone so we don't need the next COIN guru to remind us of what we already know.
Not a problem; plenty of time for eloquence after we've lost
We're losing, but I guess that's not a problem. Ok, let's try again.
Quote:
#2 -- Diagnose the problem.
Once you know your area and its people, you can begin to diagnose the problem. Who are the insurgents? What drives them? What makes local leaders tick?
Having “strategic corporals” was insufficient. Now we need “doctorate captains.” This is not a task for company commanders, with already complex and heavy load of leadership and managerial tasks.
Worse, Kilcullen’s work persistently ignores this advice. There is little consideration given to the locals’ motivations, or al Qaeda’s. How does this struggle look to them?
Also, this advice highlights the difference between the UK “victory” in Malaysia and our current expeditions to the Middle East. The UK had over a century’s experience governing Malaysia, local knowledge that we lack and cannot quickly develop.
Quote:
#3 -- Organize for intelligence.
In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will be intelligence driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a “product” prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and intelligence section.
Kilcullen is moving regimental/battalion level functions onto combat companies, who are neither staffed nor trained for this level of complex and technical operations.
Training for this level of intelligence works takes at least two years, and the US State and Defense departments have far too such people for this to be realistic.
Wishing for what we lack is not a tactical doctrine; or rather it is a doomed one. Why not just ask for ten divisions of multi-lingual MP’s and be done with it?
We have fielded an army of the best educated and trained company commanders the world has ever seen. We can ask much of them, but not anything of them. Putting our Captains on a runway does not make them airplanes.
Increasing their responsibilities should not substitute for the military’s lack of effective doctrine and operational intelligence.
Simplifying their job might produce better results than making it more complex. Certainly the insurgents’ operational doctrines do not require leaders with a college degree, let alone graduate studies. Perhaps we can learn something from them in this respect.
we're coming to agreement, I think
I absolutely agree that there are two perspectives displayed in this thread.
To borrow your phrase, there is a "ground" level view of Kilcullen's work. Company commanders get this memo, extract what they can out of it, and move on. It is not their job to win the war - just to accomplish their missions at the lowest possible cost. The previous thread – linked in the opening comment – covered this quite well.
Then we go to SWJED’s key observation:
Quote:
Those of the “theorist camp" have the luxury of endless debate on the “grand strategic themes” of 4GW, COIN, IW, etal. Your views are better served directed at members of the National Command Authority and not Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders, Squad Leaders and Team Leaders.
The senior US leaders are the audience of Kilcullen's work. We're not winning, and Kilcullen's proposals attempt to change that, as clearly seen in his work taken as a whole. He's attempting to innovate, radically. I'm attempting -- by direct quotation -- to describe his innovations, and illustrate their weaknesses.
To "translate" what he says “down” into standard doctrine is, I believe, to frustrate the purpose of his work. That's what I believe was said earlier by referring to his work as a "cliff notes."
Cliff notes are essential tools. I just doubt that was his intention in writing this. That is clear in his other works, which we might get to if we work thru his 28 articles.
Bill Moore:
Quote:
... I have yet to see a real strategy for countering 4GW. The strategies I have seen lack substance, and are based on a future force that doesn't exist.
I agree.
Standard doctrine is not, I believe, working in Iraq and Afghanistan -- just as it has failed in so many similar wars. I believe Kilcullen agrees with me on this key point.
Nor have we devised anything better, yet. That's what I said in my post below, beginning "I'm not communicating clearly." Kilcullen is participating in a process to find such a strategy. Unfortunately, his solution is based on a force that does not yet exist, and which I believe will not exist in any reasonable time frame (generations).
Worse, his recommendations take us in the wrong direction. A bit of a complex discussion, probably not appropriate at this point.
This problem is not unique to Kilcullen. I believe it is common to those of many 4GW experts, such as Wilcox and Lind. This discussion is perhaps central to the debate about ways to fight 4gw, but unfortunately off-topic here. (Note the references below to past articles of mine that discuss this in greater detail)
Why didn't I see it right in front of me...
The answer to this has become obvious. The only way to wing fourth generation wars is to refurbish and redeploy M113 Gavins across the entire force, as they are profoundly more survivable than wheeled LAVs or Strykers, can be uparmored to withstand insurgent weapons, and can traverse 4GW battlefield terrain that other platforms cannot.:rolleyes:
Alas, an extremely relavent addendum
RTK's points are spot on, and anyone can apply the W=RM rule to make them apply to their own organizations. Thanks for another tool. I'll be turning off my Surefire now...
Sacred cows make the best burgers.
A spirited and heated thread. I have no visibility of what is going on in the PMs, just that there are many of those, too.
Points are strongly felt and generally professionally presented on both sides, despite the passion behind them. At risk of violating my content-agnostic personna when logged in under this identity, I have to say that I tend to support those who prop up Kilcullen. Nevertheless, I am also concerned that we are on the brink of some FM bashing. I, for one, appreciate his voice even as I disagree with it. I know the answer to cold fusion and world hunger is not on d-n-i net. It still makes me think. Plus everyone is all lathered up and writing good stuff here in reply.
My two cents -- the debate is welcome (even if one-sided), our charter is that contrarian viewpoints are welcome (even if unpopular), the tone has been largely civil, rock on. Happy god damn new year.
There's nothing that will replace a lifetime of PME. But it needs some cliff notes to get it rolling out of the mental cobwebs at the tip of the spear. Praise be to both. Kilcullen's 28 to me is sort of like the model T of COIN theory. Not perfect, available only in black, but darn good and reaching folks that weren't served before.