http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pressfield_tribes.htmQuote:
Steven Pressfield
Forget the Koran. Forget the ayatollahs and the imams. If we want to understand the enemy we're fighting in Iraq, the magic word is "tribe." . . .
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http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pressfield_tribes.htmQuote:
Steven Pressfield
Forget the Koran. Forget the ayatollahs and the imams. If we want to understand the enemy we're fighting in Iraq, the magic word is "tribe." . . .
Good post and good read. I would say he is half right--it is tribal and it is also religious, although the Shia-Sunni divide is in many ways tribal in its origin, the Shia seeking succession via "blood" or tribal lines. In his defense, he does state this with the critical sentencebut he fails to follow up on the thought, which is really essential to understanding the AO.Quote:
"The enemy is tribalism articulated in terms of religion."
The best sentence in this entire article isIt's funny (sad funny not ha ha funny) that this same article could be titled It's the Clans, Stupid, dated Oct 1992 (3) and we could be discussing Somalia.Quote:
"you can't sell "freedom" to tribesmen any more than you can sell "democracy."
Best
Tom
What a mishmash of outdated ideas! Some of his "observations", if they can be called that, are pretty good - at least about how pastoralist tribes' honour systems operate. The rest is a rehash of some of the worst 19th century, armchair Anthropology.
Marc
If you haven't seen it yet you may want to take a look at a new book out this year:
Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 316 pp.
The strength of this book is its attempt to lay out a framework for analyzing tribal-based insurgents, terrorists, and militias in layman's terms. It presents a methodology for militarily analyzing how and why tribal-based groups fight.
They recommend the following criteria as a substitute for traditional Military Capabilities Analysis: the tribe's concept of warfare; its organization and command and control; its areas of operations; the types and targets of its operations; its constraints and limitations; and the role of outside actors. The authors make their argument by first discussing the differences between the western way of war and "primitive warfare," and then assessing the way wars have evolved since the end of the cold war.
It's a pretty good food for thought book.
Ray
Thanks for posting this, Ray. It sounds like they are updating the old Ft. Bragg military-culture briefings.
Marc
I agree. This looks like one of those "one stop solution" things that has been simplified to the point that it has no real value but can beguile many into believing that it has value. Perhaps that's what happens when someone who's predominantly a novelist takes a crack at major anthro-type writing.
LOLOL Too true!
What really got me was two things:
- he is using "tribe" as if there is only one type of tribe and "they are all the same" (which is a crock);
- his entire rant is based on the old, 19th century unilinear evolutionary argument for cultures (analogically similar to that AF article we have been talking about elsewhere).
Back in 1968, Marshall Sahlins wrote a little primer of tribes called, appropriately enough, Tribesman (Foundations of Modern Anthropology, Prentice-Hall). In it he identifies 7 different major types of "tribes", and we are pretty sure now that there are or have been more. I'd actually recomend it since you can usually find it in a second hand shop for a couple of bucks.
Sahlins also wrote what is probably the best analysis of how tribes hang together. It's mainly an argument out of economic anthropology (and somewhat complex), but brilliant: Stone Age Economics. When you tie it in with Marcel Mauss' argument in The Gift (which Amazon is offering as a bundle), you get a really good feel for the structural dynamics.
Marc
I hear ya guys.
But I would also say that even if his ideas as Marc points out are outdated 19th century mishmash, certain points that he makes are valid and are not completely without value, those being on exporting ideas on freedom amd democracy and freedom (as if those are necessarily the same). The same holds true with points on different mental frameworks.
Finally I would point out that in offering what is a simplified (grossly) view of a complex subject, he does offer a counterview to equally (and grossly) simplified view of the world that has gained a great following among those seeking such views. If someone who believes that an Iraqi's (or Afghan's) view of freedom (or democracy) is the same as an American reads this little piece and at least pauses to think for 15 seconds, the author has done that reader a service.
Best
Tom
Hi Tom,
I hope the fishing was good! :)
Oh, I have no difficulty with that part of what he said :). Afterall, "freedom" may just mean the freedom to carry out a longstanding feud without some twit intervening. ;)
You know, most of the time I would agree with you on that. I think the reason I don't in the current piece is that the 15 second reader is also likely to pick up on terms such as "savage", "primitive" and "crazy". What really bugs me is that he is constructing tribesmen as "unknowable" and setting "them" up in permanent opposition to "us". I'm just waiting for the "Axis of Savagery" comments to start appearing...:rolleyes:
Marc
Oh I know and I understand your concerns; simplicity holds those risks whoever is using it for whatever point they are trying to make.
no fishing. just hunting Bambi. early season though and I still hope to have venison in the freezer before too long. it's that "savage" side of me :o
best
Tom
True, I just wish that he wasn't so - oooh what's the word I'm looking for? Hmm - "stupid" just about covers it <wry grin>. Seriously, thought, he could have made the same general pints and then proceeded to show just how Alexander won the Afghan tribes over to him. He was also confusing the magazine states of Sumeria (modern souther Iraq) with the tribal groups. Now, if he had talked about the Sogdians....
Hey, roast loin of Bambi is one of my favorite meals! Nothin' "savage" about it - just, hmm, how do my eco-friendly friends put it? Oh, yeah - just an "appropriate and ecologically sound use of resources" :D 'sides that, ever since my wife got forced off the road by one of them, I've been enaged in a feud with the species (hey, not a "tribal" one!!!! Perish the thought - just good old highland Scot's "inter-familial rivalry").
Now there's a thought - "how to win [triball] friends and influence people with a little shared hunting"! Love it!
Marc
My question for those who would find fault with this piece’s over simplification is do you know of a better work on the subject of a similar length? Obviously complex ideas have been simplified but if they weren’t any discussion of the effects of tribalism on the current conflict would be hundreds of pages in length.
Hi Stu,
Well, the Sahlins book Tribesmen is pretty short and there is another in the same series call Pastoralists that would also work. You could read either one of them in a couple of hours with a six-pack :).
I do agree that complex ideas need to be simplified depending on the audience, but there is a real difference between simplification and drek. Probably the best model of what I think would work for most people involvced in Afghanistan and/or Iraq would be something similar to the old quicky ethnographies produced by the US Army Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg. I believe there was an even simpler version produced for the various Pacific Islander groups during WWII in comic book form, but I've never seen any of them.
Marc
Well, not a "similar length", but certainly not hundreds of pages either...
The article jcustis posted the link to is well worth the read, as is this other material...
Earlier SWC threads:
Wars Less About Ideas Than Extreme Tribalism
An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting Adversary Networks in Iraq
3rd Generation Gangs and the Iraqi Insurgency
SSI: Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Strategy
USIP: Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq
Blog Excerpts: Iraq's tribal society: A state within a state , 4 parts
Geeze! You're not THAT masochistic, are you Steve?:eek:
Actually, I've found that talking with academics about their work becomes a lot more comprehensible with almost any alcohol <wry grin>. I've noticed that moderately decent Hungarian Red works very well for complex Anthropology theory.... especially at 3am discussion fests :)
On a slightly more serious note, I noticed years ago that academic Anthropology had a very weird culture, especially at conferences. It took me a bit of time to realize it, but it turns out that there is a "split" between how Anthropology is taught and written about, and how you "really" learn it. The "real stuff" (the official theoretical term is "tribal gnosis" for anyone who collects useless trivia) comes out in small groups telling stories. I suspect that everyone here already knows that, at least about their own disciplines :) .
What I found interesting about the Anthro tribal stories was the content, Most of the time, the stories were about people whose work I was reading and, sometimes, they were the ones telling the stories. Sometimes funny, sometimes silly, many times frustrated with how we have to write in order to get published, the stories were always enlightening and, frequently, contradicted everything in the "official" line.
Marc
We tend to see the same thing in history, although with history it's more like a gathering of competing tribes - each with their own unique rituals (otherwise known as "schools" or "specialties"). I'm a military history type, so I often end up at odds with some of the social history types - mainly because most I have met are convinced you have to be a warmonger to study military history. In the end it often comes down to obscure debates about value and bashing of political scientists...;)
Too true :D !
For us, it tends to, usually, not break down into schools, but "lineages" (who was your supervisor, and theirs, etc.). This makes for some pretty strange tribal gatherings :D . I remember one CASCA (Canadian Anthropology Society) meeting where my supervisors' supervisor was introducing me as her grandson.
Marc
Kudos for posting this link!
I just finished reading it carefully, and I'll tell you right now that I will be using it as a text / example in any course I teach on applied Anthropology. While it misses some of the bells and whistles so beloved by those of us in the academy (mainly those 5-sylable, Greek derived words that no one understands), it really does capture the basic structures and their operations.
The only additions I would really like to see are in two areas:
- What are the specific Rituals of Reconciliation?
- How does "historical memory" operate in these tribes?
On the specific rituals question, this is important not only for ethnographic detail but, also, for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons. On the theoretical side, any ritual of reconcilliation is a structural repair mechanism evolved to maintain a homeostatic condition withing a cultural group (cf. Max Gluckman (The Utility of the Equilibrium Model in the Study of Social Change, American Anthropologist, 70(2), April, 1968; Custom and Conflict in Africa; Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict). Or, translating this into plain English, all conflict resolution models serve to justify and reinforce a particular political and social model, and you have to use the approriate one for the culture you are operating in. On the pragmatic side, what are you going to tell the troops (and administrators!) to do in order to try and strat one of them?
The second question is more tricky but, actually, gets at the heart of the larger GWOT. How a culture constructs historical memory, both the mechanisms of that construction and the content, influences how current events will be interpreted. As one example, consider how the "Crusader" construction has been used agains both the forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now let's flip it around and ask "How will the Coalition forces be constructed in the future?" as a result of current actions, and how will this influence future interpretations?
Well, enough of commenting on this paper. It is excellent, and I can't recommend it highly enough. The three authors get a fictive "A+" and a hearty "Well done, guys!".
And now, I have to go off and sing for three hours...
Marc
Marc,
This paper addresses conflict resolution as influenced by Islam at the local level. I believe you will find the portion on Sulh and Musalaha of interest (beginning on page 11 of the pdf file).
Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts
Of course, there are significant variations in conflict resolution/mediation rituals and traditions between ethnic groups (i.e. Arabs vs Kurds) as well as regionally (i.e. the Levant vs the Gulf), that go along with the clearer rural-urban divide.
Roger Fisher and his work in the field of negotiation and conflict resolution was mentioned in another thread. I've found his work, and other material from the Harvard Program on Negotiation to be useful in training HUMINT'ers (with some modification for both integration with HUMINT collection methodology and application in the target culture). His book Getting to Yes, has been very influential in the field, and certainly has broad application. Prior to my retirement, I had some success in modifying and integrating aspects of Fisher and Urtel's Getting Ready to Negotiate with conventional interrogation planning and preparation methodology.
As has been stated many times and in several threads on this board, the problem with many in both the civilian and military arenas is lack of understanding when it comes to application. They just don't "get it". In my perspective "getting it" means far more than simply understanding the realities of the current conflict and the effective application of lessons learned - it means having the breadth of understanding necessary to implement valuable insights from multidisciplinary inputs with necessary adaptations for current context. Where the aforementioned lack of understanding enters into the picture is when inputs from fields outside the military - such as conflict resolution and reconciliation methodologies - are simply taken as a blunt whole without any real attempt to integrate and modify application in accordance with local realities and elements of existing methodologies that are proven to work. "Reinventing the wheel" and "throwing out the baby with the bath water" are more than just trite sayings.
What usually happens is that the troops & administrators are given a simple block of instruction on local culture and traditions (often repeatedly), but lacking any real insight or instruction into how to effectively synchronize culture and tradition with their operational methodologies.Quote:
Originally Posted by marct
I believe its a people issue - we don't have nearly enough people with the appropriate background and experience to leverage that sort of training and the scale required and those that we do have are fully engaged in doing other things.
Well, so much for Saturday morning rambling. Time for pancakes.
A very interesting article, and you're right, the parts on sulh an Musalaha were very interesting. Thanks for posting it. It was especially apropos, since I had just finished re-reading the first lecture in Gluckman's Custom and Conflict in Africa called "The Peace of the Feud".
I think that this goes back to the culture of the military. In general, it makes a lot of sense to create a "book" and then get people to "play by the book". This is esecially important in building militaries in cultures that otherwise have "individualism" as a central value, and has been a hallmark of armies since the Napoleonic era (okay, William the Silent if you will).
The problem with this, in this type of fight, is that all the training expectations, the "patterns of expected behaviour" are rote-learning - read this manual, follow these 6 points, use the following steps in the proscribed order, etc. Do you think it is a lack of insight or a lack of institutional support for insight? (I'd bet on the latter, myself, but I could easily be wrong).
It could well be, I honestly don't know. Even if it is mainly a "people issue", I suspect that there are lots of institutional factors stopping it as well. For example, if a Sulh ritual is considered leagally binding as the Irani article points out (by tribal law if nothing else), then what happens if a unit that engages in one rotates out and is replaced by another unit?
Things to think about but, for me at least, not today <wry grin>. I just finished singing three hours of Baroque and Rennaisance music and I now get to spend the rest of my weekend building a web site - Oh Joy! Oh bliss! Oh rupture!!!
Marc
I'm replying after reading only the essay, so pardon me if this was covered in any of the responses. This isn't the author's central theme but I think it's related to the general idea.
I've long thought that a western style representative republic (it may or may not be democratic as we define the term) can only work in Afghanistan and Iraq, if it can work at all, if it's organized along tribal lines.
Representatives could be sent to congress by tribes, not American style congressional districts. The bigger tribes have more representatives but each tribe has the same number of senators regardless of size. Also, let the tribes select their congressmen however they want. Who cares if tribal congressmen are elected or appointed by a tribal chief? Who cares if some tribes do it democratically and others do it autocratically?
This still may not make Afghanistan and Iraq true republics, of course, but I think it's a lot more likely to work than trying to establish American style democracy.
Hi Rifleman,
I s'pose that when it comes down to it, most of us have a "live and let live" attitude which, for us, gets expressed via a democratic mythos - whether that's republican or a constitutional monarchy (a la Britain and Canada). Afghanistan and Iraq have, historically, followed a somewhat different route.
"Tribalism", and there are some pretty significant differences between that of Iraq and Afghanistan, is, on the whole fairly similar to modern democratic states, at least as far as the power held by any individual is concerned. In other words, it's pretty darn limited <wry grin>. Honestly, that's really a function of population size and density (I really hate to sound like an academic, but cf Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society, 2nd edition or, for a more American take, check out Thomas Paine's Common Sense).
In most democratic states, with the possible exception of the US, people have turned over their right of self defense to the state. In tribals societies, the right of self defense is held by the individual and their "vengence group" - close friends and kin. In most democratic societies, security is a function of the state, whereas in most tribal societies it is a function of an implied blood fued. Both work fairly well to maintain a fairly stable society.
Coming out of this right of self defense is a placement of political power. In most republics, it is in the control of voting blocks and state institutions (take a look at Rome during Marius and Sulla, Athens after Pericles, or the US for the past 25 years or so). It's similar in constitutional monarchies, but the monarch retains some powers which may ofset the worst ravages of the political aristocracy (pre-revolutionary Russia and Britain in the 20th century are examples). In some cases, the monarch remains the chief of the armed forces and execises a moral suasion over them (e.g, Thailand).
In tribal societies there is always some mechanism to control the potential for conflict and guarentee safety. In Afghanistan, one of those mechanisms was the Loya Jirga, although the last one in 2003 was rather contentious.
Iraq is another matter entirely. Iraq is not really a "nation" in the same way as western nations are or as Afghanistan is. It was created in the aftermath of WWI with the breakup of the Ottaman Empire. While the area has been a centre of civilization since at least 6000 bce, whenever it was "unified", it has been under a strong centralized monarchy, usually a "god-king" of some type (Saddam was drawing on a long lineage from Gilgamesh on down). "Democracy" just doesn't mean that much in Iraq historically. It is especially difficult to encourage democracies of any type in areas where there is no history of them.
Well, I guess we have one now in Iraq, and it will be interesting to see what heppens with it. Personally, I expect that, barring a lot of good luck, sacrifice and some really intelligent operations, it will fall apart. Western democracies don't have a good track record with long wars, and we have a worse track record with nation building exercises.
Hmm, midnight, too much brandy, and I think I am feeling a touch pesimistic.
Marc
Interesting study I found by random Googling. A study of the tribes of Iraq and specifically Anbar province. Lots of very interesting historical info.
This is the type of product we should have about anyplace we are and any and all places we may go in the future.
Anyone for making like a British press gang of old and 'pressing' a few Anthropologists into service in the interests of national security and strategic planning?
I don't think the problem is a lack of knowledge. The problem is a lack of willingness to listen to and use that knowledge. See: State of Denial, Cobra II and Imperial Life in the Emerald City.
This is not just politically in the White House, but also institutionally on the part of the military and the Department of State.
So if this type of information were available in 2003 to the extent possible (i.e. some of the information from the report is based on post 2003 actions), is your thought that it wouldn't make a difference? Also, it would seem that you are arguing as well that there can't be any bottom up influence on decisions.
I don't disagree with the thought that senior policy makers aren't attuned to the details, and that that has hurt us, but at some point the rubber meets the road and rhetoric gives way to the practical. Had someone made this kind of information available to me in 2003-4 while I was in Iraq, I could have been much more effective in fighting the insurgency in spite of any national level policy that disregarded this type of information.
Here's a very brief summary of the key points of Iraqi Arab tribal structure from the Congressional Research Service:
Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities
Quote:
For centuries the social and political organization of many Iraqi Arabs has centered on the tribe. Socially, tribes were divided into related sub-tribes, which further divided into clans, and then into extended families. Seventy-five percent of Iraq’s estimated 26 million people are a member of a tribe. They are more strongly bound by these tribal ties and a strict honor code than by ethnic background or religion. This report describes the political orientation of several Iraqi Arab tribes, including the Shammar, Dulaym, and Jibur tribes. This report will be updated as warranted. For further information on Iraq and U.S. policy, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
Back in ancient times when I was a current intel analyst on the Army Staff, CIA produced a classified basic intelligence document on nearly all the countries of the world - it had everything you ever wanted to know, and a lot you didn't. Then, sometime in the 70s or 80s they stopped producing it. Meanwhile, the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, on a DA contract, produces the Area handbook Series - Country Studies. They are good but not at all up to date. (El Salvador is current as of 1988!) DOD does produce some Country Handbooks - marked FOUO - with lots of pictures of military hardware. And that seems to be where we stand on basic intelligence, so we have to contract out for a study like this one - long after we really need it.
In the Spring 2005, the Security and Defense Studies Review (the e-journal of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of NDU) published a special issue devoted to the ongoing UN PKO mission in Haiti. See link:
http://www.ndu.edu/chds/journal/indexarcspring05.htm
The study is being published this summer by NDU Press/Potomac Press under the title, Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti, with all the chapters that were in Spanish or Portuguese (about half) now translated to English - as soon as I finish the final edits. The final article/chapter (at the link in English) by my colleague Andres Saenz and me addresses, in part the issue of this forum - the dearth of basic intelligence and recommends several fixes. But even if implemented beyond my wildest dreams, the problem remains: "You can lead the horse to water, but you can't make him drink." (It really is as true of horses as it is of people.)
Shek,Quote:
So if this type of information were available in 2003 to the extent possible (i.e. some of the information from the report is based on post 2003 actions), is your thought that it wouldn't make a difference? Also, it would seem that you are arguing as well that there can't be any bottom up influence on decisions.
This information was available in 2003 as it was in 1990 when I was the current intel analyst on the Middle East for the Army Staff, including Desert Shield and Storm, Provide Comfort, and the aftermath in southern Iraq. Given that the Undersecretary of Defense Wolfowitz had testified before Congress that there were no ethnic divisions in Iraq as in the Balkans and that a war against Iraq would pay for itself, I don't see any chance that input from below, outside, or elsewhere inside would have changed the operative assumptions of that period.
That is not to say that such material or thinking is irrelevant; just the opposite in fact because sooner or later reality catches up making this input critical.
Best
Tom
I second Tom as to the availability of this type of info on Iraq both pre-Desert Storm and pre-OIF. The pre-OIF info was even more detailed, because we had people on the ground inside Iraq reporting on many fine elements of information post-Desert Storm - especially during the OPC and UNSCOM periods in the early to mid 90s. In '03 there was a helluva lot of good, solid info of this nature readily available to those who were willing to look for it.Quote:
Originally Posted by Shek
As regards "bottom-up influence on decisions", if you have the time I highly recommend the book Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars, published by Princeton University Press in 1986.
The book isn't a Small Wars piece; it looks at pre-war intel for WWI and WWII. It consists of sixteen essays that review intelligence collection, analysis and decision making at the national level in various countries at critical junctures in their history (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain and Italy before WWI and Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the US before WWII).
To the point that has been raised here, the book clearly illustrates that even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all drop in the crapper due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail. It is a must-read classic in the field of strategic intelligence.
Tom and Jedburgh,
Thanks for the responses. I guess I was unclear in my prior post - I don't harbor any thoughts that such information would have changed the administration's decision making (and I am not that surprised that it wasn't factored in); I was merely stating that at the tip of the spear, such information would have made a difference if it had been readily available down to that level. That being said, I don't know if it would have gained enough traction to have created enough of a bottom-up "revolution" to have changed the grand strategy in Iraq. For example, I might have been able to have built relationships with all of the power players in my AO (I didn't realize the extent of how tribal relationships permeated all of Iraqi society, to include in the urban areas), but I would have still been limited in being able to harness those relationships bcecause of a lack in reconstruction funds to provide mutually beneficial projects.
Also, thanks for the book recommendation - unfortunately, my Amazon wishlist has now grown over 200 books long now - the mind and wallet are willing, but the schedule is not able :(
This article speaks to several points that have been made in this thread:
Military Review, May-June 2007: The Power Equation: Using Tribal Politics in COIN
Quote:
....Infantry officer courses and intermediate-level professional military education schools must incorporate courses on negotiating skills into their programs of instruction. Because tribal leaders are often expert negotiators, company commanders must be well prepared to win across the meeting table as well as on the unconventional battlefield. Cultural awareness means more than just being sensitive to a community. It is a component of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and a capability that can help us achieve our objectives.....
I went to a Karrass Group (you know that insert in the inflight magazines?)seminar years ago. It was a little goofy, but darn good. It couldn't be all that difficult to get a trainer in and spin up a hundred or so folks at a time.
I thought the Schultz book was pretty good.
The issue of tribes vs. religion is that you are dealing with both in Iraq. I guess it is a hybrid of the two.
CSMonitor article focusing on the Anbar Salvation Council and the Bu-Fahed subtribe in Hamdhiyah in particular.
Does anybody have this book? It looks like a potentially promising purchase, but I'd be curious to see if the 30 years since it was first published has outstripped its relevancy. Thanks.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/086...=3BV4R4OFS2ZIM
24 May The Belmont Club post - More on Anbar.
Quote:
... Isn't this what we are seeing in Anbar? A tribe that is allied with the US is much more similar to Hezbollah than it is to a nation-state.
Here's the real takeaway though: this never would have happened without some sort of American presence in Iraq. It was not diplomats that turned the tribes, it was military officers. That is the secret that will be hard to swallow: we are in an age wherein the opposite of the 'exit strategy' will have to be the lynchpin of strategy: presence, not early exit, is what is required in these broad swaths of the world that where instability threatens US interests. The key will be not to figure out whether to be there or not, which is the current debate. The key will be to figure out how much to be there and in what form: soldier, diplomat, spy, or some other category that has yet to be determined: perhaps a combo of all three, or perhaps some privatized version of any one of them.
The link to this study no longer works, but I have it saved. However this document is FOUO - in light of recent changes to regs, I have doubts if this is kosher to put up on the internet. Anyone know for sure?
Another interesting article about tribal mobilization - possibly moving beyond Anbar.
Iraqi tribes shift from hurdle to help - MilitaryTimes, 25 April.
Quote:
Several weeks ago, Lt. Col. Kurt Pinkerton came face to face with the leading edge of a movement that senior coalition officials say has significant potential to shift the war against al-Qaida in Iraq in their favor.
Pinkerton, commander of 1st Cavalry Division’s 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, was meeting a tribal sheikh in the Baghdad suburb of Abu Ghraib.
“The battalion commander goes to meet with this sheikh,” said Gen. David Petraeus, head of Multinational Forces-Iraq and the senior U.S. commander in country.
Pinkerton knew that the sheikh and his tribesmen were “sort of on the edge” of those who had been fighting the coalition.
“These guys are more resistance than hard-core insurgency,” Petraeus said. “They’re a tribe, and the tribe has sort of helped the insurgents a bit.”
But the sheikh had a surprise for Pinkerton. He told the lieutenant colonel the tribe was ready to take up arms against al-Qaida.
“What makes you think you could possibly turn out volunteers?” Pinkerton asked him, according to Petraeus.
“Well, come out back,” the sheikh replied.
When Pinkerton stepped outside, Petraeus said, he found roughly 2,000 tribesmen staring back at him. “And they all want to be provisional police,” the general added ...
Todd et al, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, The Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe (2006, recently released by DoD), via Pat Lang's blog here.
Quote:
Based on an examination of the identity and history of Iraq’s tribes and attempts to influence them; case studies of influence of other Middle East tribes; and an analysis of a wide range of counter insurgencies, a number of insights on influencing Iraq’s tribes have emerged. These insights are key to successful tribal engagement and influence operations aimed at the Sunni Arab tribes of al-Anbar Governorate...
Glubb’s Guide to the Arab Tribes (Part 1) by Dan Green at the SWJ Blog.
Dan Green works at the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He served a year as a Political Advisor to the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, for which he received the DOS's Superior Honor Award and the U.S. Army's Superior Civilian Service Award. He also received a letter of commendation from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bush Administration, the DOS, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense. Mr. Green recently returned from Iraq where he served as a tribal liaison officer (US Navy Reserve).Quote:
To enable one country to appreciate what another people really thinks and desires is both the most difficult and the most vital task which confronts us. -- John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 147
As military units prepare for service in the Middle East, it is not uncommon for them to consult the published works of British military personnel and diplomats who played such a large role in the politics of the region in the 1910s to the 1930s. It is already customary for deployers to consult the works of T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell and for those who have read more expansively, perhaps even the writings of Sir Alec Kirkbride , Sir Percy Cox, or even General Aylmer L. Haldane. Collectively, these various authors have taught our military personnel a great deal about working in the region, fighting alongside Arab irregulars, working with tribes, building governments, fostering development, and combating insurgents. The reason I've written this brief essay is to bring to your attention another great British soldier and diplomat, John Bagot Glubb, whose experience is as expansive if not more so than many of the aforementioned authors. His robust experience of thirty-six years in the great deserts and Bedouin tents of Iraq and Jordan greatly informs our current operations. I have written a brief biography of Glubb in order to familiarize the reader with his achievements and then compiled a collection of his observations, thoughts, and musings taken from his published writings about working with the Arab tribes, fighting guerillas, service to the nation, and on operating in the Middle East. Glubb's views are as useful today as when he made them, incorporating them into our operations in the Middle East will greatly improve our chances for victory...
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Part 2 - John Bagot Glubb's Published Works and The Tribes of Arabia to be posted 3 November.
That is very interesting. Thanks for posting this!
This study is good but there are some errors....I used in country and benefited greatly but was initially frustrated with the few mistakes. What I realized is you will never get the tribes of Iraq, Arabia, and perhaps the entire world completely figured out.
Don't get me wrong, its a great read.