General Chiarelli said the modular force is “not as efficient as a division” and that he is looking at “adjustments” to it.
My question: What will be adjusted?
Much more in this article.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/09/23/ar...whacks-coming/
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General Chiarelli said the modular force is “not as efficient as a division” and that he is looking at “adjustments” to it.
My question: What will be adjusted?
Much more in this article.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2010/09/23/ar...whacks-coming/
The question to start with is "efficient by what metric?"
This is part of the standard self-flagellation by flagellation between centralized, financially efficient and decentralized, combat efficent organizations.
For example; efficent combat units have organic maintenance capabilities, but financially efficient units have the maintenance centralized at a higher echelon (and company commanders can just get in line to get their vehicles fixed). Same argument applies to any support function I can think of (intel, signal, trans assets, etc).
The discussion of precision guided munitions (PGM) vs conventional munitions was more interesting. I'd like to see a rigorous study of the advantages of PGM vs. iron rounds, integrating the consequences of increased gunnery to make up for less technically sophisticated munitions. That is, does increasing gunnery with the money saved on PGM increase the guns' accuracy and precision to a greater extent than the PGM allows?
This sounds suspiciously like GEN Chiarelli was directed to come to a specific solution and is attempting to rationalize the answer that has been imposed upon him.
I like the theme he's taking with PGM: one of the ongoing legacies of DESERT STORM is this myth of clean precise war that was fostered through the 90s in Serbia and Kosovo, and into OIF. PGMs are all very nice when you have the luxury of relatively undefended precise targets but less so perhaps against an adversary that is dispersed, concealed and able to retaliate and/or defend itself.
The articles pretty vague on how the modular force is “not as efficient as a division” and more so on the nature of the “adjustments” to it that he may be considering. My first thought is that the modular brigade structure seems to have been working fairly well to support the long campaigns of the last decade...
This sounds a lot less like anything to do with the structure of the army. It sounds a lot more like the Army, or at least certain members of it, want to get a handle on the enormous war profittering (for instance, of contractors & industry- hence the JRAP, MTLV, Hummer issue) in evidence since OIF I (anyone remember Halliburton? Civil contractors? etc.). The issue of PGms sounds a lot like an argument over "value for money" than it does "measures of performance/effectiveness". But that's just IMO from this side of the "pond". Perhaps there are domestic issues, tacitly presupposed by the article, which I am unaware of.
For my money the brigade based army is a sound idea in principle (in fact the Soviet army before it disolved had already come to that conclusion too). The only problem I have with the BCTs is the lack of true manouvre capability. They need at least three manouvre battalions and a cav/recon bn and one (as a minimum) proper arty bn (with 24 not 16 tubes:confused:). By the way, while I'm on my hobby horse get rid of the combined arms bn in the HBCT and return to flexible, task organsied (I know, this is still practiced) pure bns (two of each). A HBCT has four armour companies (two per Bn) that's one battalion's worth of armour for what kind of an overhead?:confused: Dammit, I need a fag (that's a cigarette to you:rolleyes:), I'm really grumpy this morning.:D
By using the word efficient and not effective one must assume costs. The following link is from an article by Lt. Colonel Melton which has been before, but is now about five years old, but I think it still applies and might very well be the adjustments the general is talking about:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...g05/melton.pdf
Here is another article I came across:
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
For those who don't have time to read and are unfamilar with Lt. Colonel Melton, he argued in his article that the small BCTs had caused the Army to have to create additional types of BCTs, which increased overhead. He recommened combining BCTs, attaching FA battalions to BCTs even if the FA battalion is not firing in support of the BCT, establishing an engineer hqs in the BCT, combining sustainment and maneuver brigades (which may have already been done - combat support brigades), BGs command BCTs.
You know...
I used to be a tad cynical towards the DA Civilian/Contractor (present complany excluded of course) who would tell me oh that concept (pick your topic from organization design to personnel policy to operational approach) is in vogue again... and then they would dig deep in their historical files to show you the other three times the pendulum had swung back and forth...
I need a Bud
Muzzle loaders? That's too effete.
Sabers. 1850 Staff and Field Officer Sabers.
Eliminates ammunition costs, allows for exception precision in targeting, virtually eliminates the possibility of collateral damage, useful in offence or defence, quiet, promotes morale and esprit de corps.
@Hacksaw - if you're in Honolulu, first round is on me.
Re: the PGM/conventional munitions debate - This is one where the pendulum has only gone one way so far. GEN Chiarelli is the first senior leader I've heard questioning the value or efficiency of PGM. I am curious to see if there is serious, quantifiable research done on this or some instantaneous and unreasoning ad hom attack on whoever questions the superiority of gadgets.
Something along the lines of determining exactly how and if PGM and associated delivery mechanisms may or may not change the calculus when one talks about field artillery?
Just a guess, very interesting article though
I had the chance to attend a Fires conference in which General Ridge posed the PGM question as "How much precision can we afford."
In that vein, GMLRS makes a lot of sense because one guided rocket has the same planning value as six standard rockets, as well as twice the (UNCLAS) range. When accuracy for the standard round is 10 mils a 1M CEP is a tremendous improvement.
There was the implication that we could save money on PGMs and apply that towards more gunnery instruction. When you are using AFATDS the degree of accuracy possible is significantly higher than with standard techniques. When you are using a system like the M777A2 that can receive Fire Commands to the nearest tenth mil your accuracy increases as well.
You still have to account for the five Requirements for Accurate and Predicted Fire, four of which fall squarely on the artillery unit. An Artillerist on another forum that I frequent mentioned that when he was shooting in OIF he shot "cold stick" which means he made no attempt to quantify some non-standard conditions. Specifically, he stated that he shot without accounting for the differences in propellant lot. When you have dozens of different lots of propellant on hand it may be difficult to use the proper one (on the sun section) and quantify the effect on MVV (on the FDC).
With a system like PGK, the round would automatically compensate for that error and impact where the guidance system directed.
Excalibur is a different deal. It offers the ability to hit and kill a single building, or even a room in a building, with an increase in range over standard 155MM rounds, a near vertical angle of fall, and a small warhead that limits collateral damage. It also requires certain charges and the Fire Commands must be digital. Thus it has some limitations. It is also the most expensive FA PGM.
As for what we can afford, we have JDAMs in service or in development that can do all these things, but once you factor in flight time they may not be any cheaper.
I would like to ask those more senior to me if it would ultimately be cheaper to use aircraft to generate targeting information and then fire the mission from a SPLL or HIMARS.
But then, I do have a professional bias.
Chiarelli was in a Division in Desert Storm. He saw what Divisions did in Iraq in 2003. He commanded a Division there. Divisions work great in the Desert -- we found that out in North Africa in WW II. He saw that...
He's never fought anywhere else and is Armor, the Combat Arm of Derision; they believe in MASSS. ;) However, What we found in virtually all other types of terrain WWI and in the Pacific, in Italy, in Northwestern Europe during WW II, in Korea, In Viet Nam, in Afghanistan -- and even in Mexico and the Civil War -- was the Divs aren't much good anywhere else, they're too big and unwieldy (I'd say totally unnecessary and even an impediment in the form of underemployed and overindustrious Div Cdr and Staff except for the fact we haven't adjusted that admin / log effort to cope with the absence of the Div); so you break up into Regimental Combat Teams, Brigades or Combat Commands which do work and work well. The Div supports them and the Div Cdr gets to visit and ask odd questions.
Their (RCTs, Bdes, etc) biggest downside is they do not call for enough General Officers... :rolleyes:
Msg
Fm: Old DAC
to: Hacksaw
Pendulums swing. Fourteenth iteration :D
P.S.
Design an organization that EVERYONE says is one maneuver Bn light of a full load, that decimates the Field Artillery branch much to their chagrin and has acknowledged inadequate sustainment capability built in; then determine that it doesn't work as well as is we would like. Masterful... :rolleyes:
I own a Model 1840 Light Artillery Saber that shows signs of field use and also has the original leather straps still attached to the rings on the scabbard. It's marked 1860. I also have a Model 1840 NCO's Sword and leather scabbard that's in almost new condition. It was made by Ames and is dated 1864.
Propellant lots etc:
It's not necessary to have PGMs to compensate for such variances. It's been standard procedures with several MRL systems to shoot one rocket, observe with radar, then self-destruct the rocket (timer) in the air in order to prevent that the following rocket salvo with corrected aim loses the surprise effect.
It adds a few seconds and is not very efficient with large rocket calibres, but it works.
There's also a trajectory correction system with which the launcher simply aims too high and the trajectory correction module in the rockets gets radio command to deploy air brakes at the perfect time to negate the distance error/dispersion.
Divisions/brigades:
It's been accepted in Europe since the Division 59 (a brigade-based design) that brigades are the way to go. The Americans learned the same in WW2 and re-learned it after the Pentomic excursion (maybe after ROAD, don't remember ROAD details now).
I'm still struggling to learn whyTF the division has come back to favour with so many people. It's obvious to me that we should delete the division level, not the corps level.
Brigades might actually be too large already. A very small brigade (two reinforced battalions worth) might be the way to go (=full circle to early 50's). We need very agile formations, and we've got much to do till we have them.
The Pentomic force structure with Battle Groups didn't work out.
the Colonels didn't like it. That and the fact that the intended equipment got stalled in the bureaucracy and only started appearing in units AFTER the decision was made to revert to the tired and true -- and easier to control if you're into centralizing things -- Brigade of ROAD. The Pentomic concept had a great many good things, but it was designed for those who are willing to delegate and trust subordinates. Not the Army way...:wry:
Oh well, I might be one of the only people here who knows what Pentomic force structure and Battle Groups were. I read that it had something to do with dispersing units on a nuclear battlefield in Germany.
Pentomic infantry divisvion consisted of five subunits commanded by colonels. The initial intent of the modularity mafia was to create five BCTs from division assets only. Hmmm - coincidence?
From what I read, Pentomic divisions did not include armor divisions which remained combat commands.
Sorry, I disagree. Although I like the idea of having brigade groups you'll still need an intermediary HQ between Corps and Bde if not because of span of control then information overload (I think the two might be connected;). A purely divisional HQ outfit, no supporting arms (etc), purely devoted to C&C (anyone remember that game? brings back memories...) will be needed (as per UK practice). In fact, if 'm not mistaken the whole Uv/Ux/Uy/Uz (or whatever the acronymns are, Yanks really do love 'dem acronyms) is based on the concept that a "divisional" type HQ will be set up (on an ad hoc basis) to manage the bdes. Can't see a corps commander having to deal with up to 5 manouvre bdes, a couple o' support bdes, maybe an artillery bde or two (if the US still has those of course) and maybe an aviation bde (for starters). Of course if fewer bdes are attached you've just got an old school Div anyway. Come to think of it, IIRC I read somewhere that US doctrine calls for US commanders to plan two levels below them (hardly aufragstaktik, but if it works for them, who am I to judge). IFF (if and only if) that's the case then a Corps cdr is going to have to plan not only for the 5 bdes (my maths isn't as good as TAH's, or anyones for that matter, so 'll forgoe mentioning the other bdes:o) but also for their constituent bns (lets say four) for a total of 20 and five Bde HQ. That's my take on it anyway.
I can describe a leadership & command method that easily allows for such a corps, the span of command is no insurmountable challenge. It's basically about horizontal cooperation instead of synchronization planning, Auftragstaktik and about a different training of leaders.
Military history has seen many highly successful operations with a very small amount of directions from corps or division down to brigades.
The challenge at the operational level doesn't seem to be the span of command, but the understanding of the situation and issuing missions in a timely fashion.
An emphasis on reconnaissance / skirmishing forces helps with the former, minimal staff sizes and careful selection & training of leaders and staff personnel helps with the latter.
Straight up, I'm sceptical about that but would love to stand corrected and see this occur. I think it might run all very well so long as every thing was IAW THE PLAN but at the point of departure from THE PLAN, I think the corps staff, no matter how augmented by staff and technology, would be unable to keep up with events. The complexity would not come so much from the conduct of combat/kinetic operations but from the need to sustain those forces one their initial loadout was consumed and equipment began to require maintenance, recovery, etc...
A centralised headquarters would also be just that, centralised, keeping the next higher level of command and coord away from where operations are being conducted i.e. unless the missionspace is so small or the tempo so slow, the corps command can only be close to some not all of the actions that may need influence/guidance from the next level up...
Well, this may be the right time to mention that I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions.
The force densities and the mobility of a well-organized and well-trained battalion exceed the horizon of a divisional headquarters anyway. To restrict brigades to Div Cmd and to lead a corps operation by issuing orders to two or three divisions isn't going to work well any more any way.
Such a mode adds too many restrictions, too many delays, too much friction ... let's just mention that it's a bad idea. The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset.
West Germany would have introduced a brigade-centric army without divisions based on late war experiences in the 50's, but didn't for entirely political reasons: The government had promised 12 "divisions" to Western Allies.
That's how outdated the division actually is.
I don't even know where to start... but I will do my best to be brief...
Mandatory caveat upfront... I too am a fan of reducing unnecessary levels of bureacracy where and when appropriate...
"I'm not exactly convinced of planning or even a fan of planning. I'm more into creating opportunities and exploiting the same with cat-like reactions."
Hmmmm.... Not sure which of the two to begin with... is it that you don't enjoy planning or is it that you don't find the activity of identifying likely future challenges and possible solution approaches very productive? Trust me, I hate planning too... it sucks... never ending series of what if's that the CDR wants examined... that said, perhaps not everyone has cat-like reactions or that they should have cat-like reactions... sometimes you have to go slow to go fast... maybe this approach is good up to a certain point... but to be honest I'm not a fan :rolleyes:
"Such a mode adds too many restrictions, too many delays, too much friction ... let's just mention that it's a bad idea. The time of the division has passed away. it has actually passed away back in the 50's when NATO planned to defend a 1,000 km front-line in Central Europe with basically only 26 divisions instead of having 100-400 divisions on a 1,000 km front-line as Europe experienced it a few years earlier. The wide frontages required a mobility and agility which simply didn't fit into the division corset."
Which operations are you referencing? Division centric operations in DS/DS weren't overly pedantric... leash was logistical not an inability to operate without detailed orders... OIF 1 wasn't exactly plodding either on the combat side... again logistics was the leash (that and a biblical-esque mud shower)...
How exactly have Division staffs impeded BCT operations in OIF/OEF beyond initial combat operations???
"The West German Army would have moved to BCT centric forces if not for NATO..."
and the obvious reason that keeps popping up... Resourcing, Managing and synchronizing non-maneuver combat enablers/forces
Redundancy in these capabilities is not sustainable (pun intended)... or at least that seems to be the case in this instance
Live well and row
Which restrictions?
Well, a corps might order one division to give a Bde to another Div, but then you're again at a higher span of command for the latter division (and the div/bde staffs don't know each other). Keeping brigades under command of a specific division ties them together. You get bundles of brigades which you couldn't move as freely in a corps sector as you could without the division layer. That's one restriction.
A corps HQ has a picture of the corps area, issues missions to division HQs which in turn update their own intent and issue orders to brigades.
The lag in here should be obvious. Such a lag is a restriction on agility of command.
I'm not particularly interested in DS or OIF experiences. That's like boxing experiences based on punching ball training. The fact that there were problems at all is embarrassing. A competent army would have created very different challenges and a modern army structure should not be modelled with the least problematic and long since gone opfor in mind.
Yet, if OIF was of interest; the British 1 Armoured Division wasn't an effective HQ in that operation. It issued few orders, and those came often very late. The brigades pulled their weight.
By the way; the quotation marks (" ") are not for paraphrasing. Your third quote was paraphrasing and I would appreciate not to see false quotes.
I can assure you that nobody in the 50's thought of "synchronizing", for that is a much newer fashion - and mostly an anglophone fashion. There's an official military history book on the early years of the Heer (up to 1970) and it clearly tells us that the reason for the division in the second army structure was a political one. The German experts were advocating a brigade-centric army. The result was the Division 59, an often-copied structure which focused on the brigades and left only a small role for the division.
The math earlier in this thread regarding span of control is incorrect. A Corps C2s (commands and controls) 3-5 divisions, plus appropriate support brigades (usually, a maneuver enhancement BDE, combat aviation BDE, battlefield surveillance BDE and fires BDE). A Division C2s 3-5 BCTs, plus appropriate support BDEs (usually, a CAB and a fires BDE, at least). So, eliminating the division HQ would increase span of control from 7-11 to 19-34.
Are there any examples of a military HQs handling that kind of span of control during operations? I can't think of any.
In LTC Melton's article on small vs large BCTs http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...g05/melton.pdf discusses the span of control hypthetical for OIF 2003, in light of his proposed organization.
Using the proposals here to eliminate the division, span of control for V Corps in OIF 1 would have increased from 23 to 77. I reached this by using the task organization listed in On Point, beginning on pg 510 of the pdf file, or p 454 of the document. http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/OnPointI.pdf In reaching the second count, I counted BN and BDE size elements that were directly subordinate to the divisions, the COSCOM and CORPS ARTY (division level elements). I assumed that the CO and smaller elements would have been split out to the BDEs if the divisions were eliminated. I can't see how a HQ manages 23 subordinates, even though some of them are fairly limited in scope, much less 77.
This will be a learing lesson for me. In OIF1 the brigade commanders reported to BGs right? The BGs reported to the division commander. What if the BGs were removed - does that limit the layers or is that too much for the division commander and his deputy to manage? The BGs removed fill corps staff positions probably like they do now. So that would be 3-5 BCTs, a FA brigade, sustainment brigade and CAB reporting to the division commander. Again, is that too much?
What if corps and division were combined - the division commanders are part of the corps command staff during operations? That might be putting many eggs in one basket.
It seems what LTC Melton recommends is combining BCTs, with a BG as the commander. This removes the BG as the "middle man" in drug enforcement talk - buy directly from the source. I'm I 2way off here and I need to stick to drug law enforcement or should I be promoted to general?:)
For all your bold pronouncments on the invalidity of the Division, the relative incompetence of the US Army, etc, etc there is nothing I can see that backs up your theories of an all singing, all dancing Corps that can handle such a large span of command.
The fact that all armies use a Division (a grouping of small formations), have used the division since Napoleon, and continue to use the Division as a organizational construct either means every professional military out there is crazy or perhaps you have to present a better case. I'm not being argumentative here - I am honestly asking you to present a comprehensive case as you've merely hinted at things with your posts.
LCol (ret) Jim Storr puts for a convincing argument of Divisional command in his book. He cites some operational analysis (on your favorite war, not the "punching bag" wars) of over 200 battles that concludes that the practical span of command for commanders is actually quite low - 1.7 subordinates committed on average to combat. This suggests that, historically, Division commanders have put forth at most 8 companies during a majority of their actions. Employment in DS and OIF seems to validate this observation.
The "so what" out of this is that bigger formations are unwieldy, despite the notions of "combat power" we like to ascribe to them. Combat power is nice, but only if the organization is one that can be properly utilized by a human commander.
Having a Corps Commander with 20-40 subordinates seems to fly in the face of this and unless you are going to take humans out of the equation, I don't know how you are going to get around it. What we probably need is smaller Bdes, Divs, and Corps served by smaller staffs.
The article Command of British Forces in Iraq (attached somewhere in these threads) indicates otherwise. Brigades in general suffer from the same problems that Divisions do in that the C2 is clunky and focused on output rather than outcome. The most famous example was the British Bde that issued orders to its battalions to take Basrah - 24 hours after those battalions had already entered the city.
I'd also challenge that command is a human thing, not a technical one, and that observing divisions in Iraq in 2003 is just as valid as France in 1940 as the essential human dynamic is unchanged.
So that study finds that, instead of the span of 5-7 commonly held to be manageable, actual practice is much less than that i.e. 1.7? Might that be commanders focusing on their main effort operation and leaving supporting operations to their staff to manage? Does he distinguish in the study between the span of a commander i.e. the individual, and the span of command i.e. a command headquarters and staff? Please don't misread the question as critical of the statement - I think it's a fascinating insight and am just seeking clarification for myself.
Once again, just for myself, how does that reduced span link into the 8 companies in the next sentence? Is that a reduction of the number of companies by the same reduction as for the span of command?
That's different than what I usually hear. Many on this board (and other boards I've lurked on) seem to advocate a return to big brigades of three or four battalions.
The idea of a smaller division with a smaller staff is interesting. Am I correct that commanders of most Roman legions actually commanded about 10,000 men in the field because the famed legions of 5000 - 6000 men were supported by an almost equal number of auxiliaries? And, of course, the Mongol tumen was 10,000.
I don't know if those examples are applicable to modern warfare but I find it interesting that their strength is what we would think of as a small division.
I'd say, though, that their support overhead would be a lot smaller though...no troublesome '6' to bitch about comms problems, a '4' whose main problem was skill in foraging...
The emphasis was on "committed" in regard to "8 companies". Storr links it also to organization and appears to dismiss whatever the other units are doing (reserve, security..) as uninteresting.
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I wrote a lengthy response with an example of a typically complex action, but this is not the right place for such details. This has to suffice:
The current system is not very indicative or the actual potential for another reason; a different system would need a different doctrine and different training. It's doable.
Guderian is known as champion of armoured divisions and as influence on tank development and production. His most important contribution was another one, though: He transformed his armour commanders into commanders which were useful in his new system. He had to exorcise the fear of open flanks and slowness, for example. He had to select daring officers with the inner urge to move forward. The officer corps of 1935 wasn't suitable for the armoured division actions of 1940. Those actions would have appeared foolish and impossible in 1935 to most officers (and actually kept looking foolish & impossible up to their success in May 1940). They WERE impossible with 1935's officers.
The corps concept which I'm thinking of would require a different officer training, even if applied in Germany.
The span of command at that time depended on marching speed, courier rider speed and visual battlefield range. 25,000-30,000 was the practical corps/army size until the 19th century.
This doesn't tell us much about today. It's merely interesting up to the early 20th century divisions, which were almost that large.
Example 1: Task Organization... you find your example a restriction... that Armies in general and the US in particular find the attachment of another maneuver force troublesome? Which decade and situation do you refer to??? 101st received a balanced TF during OIF and we couldn't be happier... and I KNOW if you asked the LTC or CPTs in that unit that they would overwhelmingly tell you we employed them properly... and in the end they wanted to wear our combat patch... they were fairly emphatic... we certainly didn't find them a burden... nor did they feel as if they were malused or somehow otherwise neglected... anecdotal evidence - certainly... any less rigorous than your hypethetical... nope
Example 2: Orders process... exactly how deliberate/regimented do you perceive the orders process to be in execution??? Corps finishes their order, then the Division starts, etc? Beyond the initial orders self-flagulation that might be CLOSER to reality, but not really representative of the parallel nature of the process... in combat the orders are actually without much delay at all because we've already done the staff work prior to receipt of the order... The fact that a British Division issued the order after the fact is not necessarily a condemnation... I don't KNOW, but I SUSPECT the order was meant to "clean up" the battlefield and formally capture the VOCO issued as commanders executed with CAT-like reflexes... an order as opposed to a FRAGO actually has a shelf life... since I don't presume that our British allies are a bunch of bungaling baboons... I think it likely to be closer to the truth
Example 3: DS and OIF are not valid... they are what we have in the last 20 years... so we should delve back to the 1940s or 1950s or 1960s as more representative of our likely future challenges??? Why is that? For which future challenges should we organize???..
False quotes... my deepest apologies... did I misrepresent the West German's allies by calling them collectively NATO? If so, mea culpa... For the record, I don't find the 1970's German Army particularly interesting so I guess we are even... However, for the sake of argument... that force would be used to do what??? defend the IGB... didn't have to deploy (actually was against the constitution right?) fought on intimately familiar terrain... known and well rehearsed OPLANS... hardened facilities and incredibly nice road and rail infrastructure... this is exemplar and more intellectually interesting than the fights of the past 20 years in terms of informing the future???
To be perfectly honest, I'm usually far more swayed by your logic
No, the DCG is not a link in the chain of command between BDE/BCT and DIV- he is just what the name says, a deputy. The chain of command goes DIV CG to BCT CDR. The DCG assists the DIV CG as he (the DIV CG) directs/requires.
As understand things, the traditional division is for the DCG-Operations/Maneuver to run the DIV TAC, the COS to run the DIV MAIN, and the DCG-Support to run the DIV REAR. This leaves the CG to place himself where he feels best, based on the fight. Obviously, this construct is better suited to a linear MCO, and to the traditional organization that had these 3 organizations (TAC, MAIN, REAR). I'm not sure exactly how DCGs are employed today- I'm sure there are members that can detail it better than I can- I've never worked above BCT.
As I understand LTC Melton, he is about maximizing span of control (4 BNs, RECON, FA, EN, BSB, a couple separates) is alot for a BCT to manage, but doable (in my opinion). In conjunction with the original concepts of modularity, I think we can eliminate one headquarters for most operations (MCO excepted), but at the cost of the huge increase in the BCT staff that we experienced in the 2004-2006 changes. Tradition kept us from implementing it, just like (AIUI) traditionalists killed the pentomic organization.
Based on my reading of German military history (Moltke the Elder and his political mirror image excepted-Bismarck) I'd say that's been a problem for a while. Yes, sure you can create opportunities on the battlefield, exploit gaps and infiltrate entire armour coprs into the Ardennes (for instance)...but then what? Dunkirk? Orsha?(i.e. the command conference duruing Op Barbarossa, eastern front). How the hell do you "plan" (sorry, dirty word:rolleyes:) for contingencies (in a world of finite resources and a limited force size at your disposal)? How do you know which manourvre groups need to be augmented with extra armour/artillery/infantry/engineers? Where do you take an operational or even (if you're feeliong lucky) and operational pause to allow your log tail (or log pack if you're feeling corporate) catch up with you?
Oh look, we've penetrated 50 miles into Clairmont(Kelly Heroes reference there for all you fans!:cool:) shame we didn't have any bridging equipment or have sufficient logistics stored to maintain it given that our feline reflexes meant that all our unused CSS elements were commited to another bright spark suffering from over-activity! OTOH, ooooops, I really wich we'd thought this through (aka "planned") and had an extra few inf bns to secure our flanks (etc., etc., etc.). Or something along those lines.
Well, thanks. I'll work on another way to communicate my idea and reasoning, for this crude & short approach obviously didn't work.
A proper explanation would take a dozen pages and reveal more than I'm read to publish today.
Not only that, but the proliferation of communications works against the development of anything remotely resembling cat-like reflexes in most military organizations. It seems that without the proper application of a ball-gag, senior leaders (no matter how far removed from the action) simply cannot resist the urge to "help." Stripping out a division command and replacing it with a corps isn't going to change that a jot.
.....(note to self: put them in some kind of order you dote!:mad:) here are some interesting takes on the place of the division and the divisional HQ:
OPTIMIZING THE UNIT OF ACTION BASED MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION FOR HIGH INTENSITY CONFLICT
The U.S. Army Heavy Division: An Appropriate Platform for Force Projection Operations?
The Brigade based Division: Saddling the Right Horse
...and the monograph that really got me thinking about the role of the divisional HQ...
Does the U.S. Army Need Divisions?
I should be careful here. One of the key assessments that Storr makes is that combat is not fractal. Brigades are not big companies and corps are not big brigades - commanders at each level have different things that they must take into consideration during the fight. A Division Commander doesn't care about the range of a GPMG, but to a platoon commander, it's one of his primary concerns. Dead ground is everything to a company but irrelevant to a Brigade.
With this principle in mind, I must make it clear that Storr only argued about the Division. The Brigade and the Corps will have different factors and thus different requirements. I made my guess of "smaller" based on some fundamental aspects of Div command which I extrapolated to the Bde and Corps level.
The figure of 1.7 is from a Dupuy study. Also citied is an unpublished DERA study which, in looking at Division activity in WWII, showed that at no time were all nine battalions of the measured division employed at the same time. Of the 81 days the measured divisions spent in combat, 43 featured only 3 battalions employed. Thus half the time divisions employed only 1/3 of their strength to defeat the enemy. Looking further at this data, divisions only employed a majority of their forces 1/3 of the time. Additional data from Suez and the Gulf further support this view. Fuchs mentioned reserves and rear duties - do these duties routinely use up over half a division's strength, especially when it is committed to frontline activity? These studies seem - at least to me - to give some concrete evidence of what the span of command actually is.
The so what - if 6-10 maneuver companies (and 2-4 battalions and 1-2 brigades) are all that a division commander can realistically employ at once, than the division should be designed around sustaining 6-10 maneuver companies in combat while, at the same time, making the organization as nimble and agile in combat. 6-10 maneuver companies do not likely require an additional 14-17 companies in reserve.
What does this mean for the Brigade and the Corps? I dunno - but the methods behind identifying the above structure (span of command, movement times, relation of space and time, etc, etc) can probably give us a good idea.
Infanteer, I’ll tread carefully because I may be reading you completely wrong. Like my fellow Kiwi, I’m really just trying to get my head around this.
What does “practical span of command” actually mean? Is that the max a commander should/can be dealing with or the average he happens to deal with based on subunits in contact? If the latter is the case I should think it is perhaps a meaningless statistic.
In post 30 you say:
Does ‘committed to combat’ suggest that the remaining units are held in reserve to the point that they are shelved till required, or just that they are not in contact?Quote:
… the practical span of command for commanders is actually quite low - 1.7 subordinates committed on average to combat. This suggests that, historically, Division commanders have put forth at most 8 companies during a majority of their actions. Employment in DS and OIF seems to validate this observation.
Based on a ‘typical?’ WWII triangular infantry division, 1.7 Brigadiers may suggest about half the division. 1.7 CO’s may suggest half of those brigades. 1.7 OC’s may suggest half of those battalions. By this reasoning your estimate of 8 companies would be about right.
But this seems a bit simplistic. Firstly, 9 companies in contact could be one from each battalion, in which case the division commander has all his brigades and battalions in contact. (this is working up from your number 8 instead of down from 1.7)
Also, even if the commander holds subunits in reserve and has only one in contact most of the time that contact is made, that does not mean that he is not pulling the strings on the other units. He may be manoeuvring them and/or leapfrogging units in contact or moving one through the other etc.
This may be in line with what Fuchs said in post 35:
From your previous post:Quote:
The emphasis was on "committed" in regard to "8 companies". Storr links it also to organization and appears to dismiss whatever the other units are doing (reserve, security..) as uninteresting.
OK, that would counter my earlier mentioned alternative. I have not read the studies.Quote:
The figure of 1.7 is from a Dupuy study. Also citied is an unpublished DERA study which, in looking at Division activity in WWII, showed that at no time were all nine battalions of the measured division employed at the same time.
Are these not the times that matter?Quote:
Looking further at this data, divisions only employed a majority of their forces 1/3 of the time.
Is one third all a division can employ, or the most that a division commander likes to employ at any one time for the purpose of holding a reserve? So a question here could be: is ‘one up’ at division level realistic/sensible or just not required? Is ‘one up’ at division level really one up in the same sense that it is within companies and battalions? This in terms of the size of brigades and the relative distances involved.Quote:
The so what - if 6-10 maneuver companies (and 2-4 battalions and 1-2 brigades) are all that a division commander can realistically employ at once, than the division should be designed around sustaining 6-10 maneuver companies in combat while, at the same time, making the organization as nimble and agile in combat. 6-10 maneuver companies do not likely require an additional 14-17 companies in reserve.
So iff (wink to Tukhachevskii) 6 – 10 companies are realistically the most a division can employ at once, then should the division be reduced in size or (to support I think Ken and Fuchs) should the division be cut out of the hierarchy. If you cut down the 14 -17 companies in reserve to only a few, then what’s left is perhaps a descent size brigade.
I can think of a few extreme cases where divisions were fully employed (not including the desert). UK First Airborne in Arnhem. US 101st in Bastogne (I think).
I confuse me, I’ll stop here.
I'm not sure that this cncept of looking at the % of a formation in combat at any one time is not a bit of a red herring...a large proportion of the force will (should) be committed to reserves at each level - I think 1/9 at each level from distant memory e.g. a section/squad at company level, a platoon at bn level, a coy at Bde level etc - that's a lot of troops when you roll them all up but I don't think it's correct to say that they are necessarily 'out of combat/contact' and thus not necessarily out of the span of comamnd equation.
I'd argue that the NZ Div on Crete and at Minqar Qaim was pretty heavily committed, as was pretty much every airborne div immediately following a combat drop in WW2...
There's usually no reserve up to company level in many armies; instead, the combat troops are meant to be capable of counter-attacks without a dedicated reserve. That's more responsive.
A battalion reserve is often not much more than a platoon, if there's any at all (a Verfügungsplatoon - a platoon directly under command of the Bn Cmdr - is an enticing idea from the Cold War; it could serve as recce Plt, as couriers, as HQ guard, as traffic organizers, as CO escort and as Bn reserve).
The share of reserves grows on formation levels, unless these formations are overstretched (on the other hand some experts think that reserves are even more important the more you're overstretched).
Kiwigrunt, I'm no fan of Storr's considerations about how few companies of a force are typically involved in combat at once. He exaggerates the point. That's especially ironic as he focuses much on the human side of war in that book.
Let's say a division has never more than ten companies at once in combat. Could it b replaced by a 10 company brigade? No!
There would be no rotation, the companies would quickly be exhausted if not depleted.
There would be no reserve, and thus no good tactics.
There would be no security elements, and thus great opportunities for OPFOR.
Perfect anticipation would be required to have these ten companies at the points of action.
OPFOR could deploy in a way which would require more than ten companies to counter.
It's one of the weaker parts of his book. My reasoning in favour of brigades rests on completely different foundations.
I would contend that we never stopped being division centric.
We still retain Division HQs. We still deploy Division HQs for C2.
What changed was how divisions are structured/organized.
We went from "Type" divisions (Light, Armored/Heavy, Airborne, Air Assault etc) to Modular.
So what's different? The Division "Base", the types of units organic to the division not including its maneuver battalions.
These were: ADA Bn, MI Bn, Signal Bn, Engineer Bn(s), Cavalry Sqdrn, number and types of tube/rocket Artillery Bns and their controling HQs (DIVARTY), the number and type of CSS/Support Bns and their controling HQs (DISCOM), number and type of aviation Bns and their controling HQs (Division AVN Bde) as well as MP and NBC/Chemical Companies.
In many ways, the modular BCT are acknowledgement of how we task organized maneuver brigades for operations with supporting artillery, engineers and CSS units.
The issue to be solved/re-solved is how do modular divisions operate. Who plans fires for the modular division? A section on the division staff or folks over in a assigned/attached Fires Bde? Same question/issue for division level Aviation operations.
If we follow existing CSS doctrine, Sustainment Bdes are NOT just replacements for DISCOM/COSCOMs. They are supposed to be assigned/attached to a theater-level Sustainment HQs (A TSC or ESC) and provide "area support" to all units within their designated AOR. Currently none of the deployed division HQs/CDRs are allowing that to happen. They have TACON (a command versus support relationship) of their supporting Sustainment Bde.
No adequate replacement has been found/resourced for the Division Cavalry Sqdrn. For lots of reason, its NOT a Battlefield Surveillance Bde (BFSB).
We have also not solved the issue of, I need more X but not a whole modular Bde of X, where to I go to get it?
two star + 2 one star spaces plus the Staffs. In peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945 -- flags and spaces mean more than capability and competence.That's why when we ostensibly went 'modular' we deliberately did not restructure the EAD echelons to cope with that 'modularity.'
The Div Cdrs insist on TACON of CSS elms in their AO because they want control of all forces in an AO if they're going to be held responsible for that AO. That is simply perfectly logical self protection in an Army that, at this time, hates decentralized execution and where few trust people they do not know -- a factor stems partly from mediocre training and partly from institutional bias....
Span of control depends little on the technology or communications ability available; those factors are a crutch to allow marginally competent commands / commanders to function with an enhanced degree of success. The tech stuff can be a force multiplier but there are absolutely no guarantees that it will be.
The effective span of control really rests on state of training or experience at all levels AND ability plus willingness of the Commander(s) to delegate and trust their subordinates. Really good units / people can do a span of 9 or 10, really poor units / people have trouble with 2. An average of 3 to 5, mission dependent, is a rule of thumb, -- and thus a design parameter -- and little more. It very much depends on people and that level of training or experience...
If you recruit, train, promote and retain your entire force for great competence you can design small elements with a large (~10) span of control. If you do the same things to achieve mass and thus aim for acceptable competence, you can got to a span of ~5. If you're in need of greater mass, you'll have to accept less competence and may be constrained to a span of two or three.
Since people change with time and the Peter Principle exists, there is little chance of ensuring an acceptable design size of the span for other than a year or two at a time. Any attempt to design for specific people and mission s will probably have to change when the parameters change; thus the need for a simple, generic organizational template / TOE that allows then current Commanders to tailor their forces for specific missions with little effort. If that is done reasonably well, then the span of control issue sorts itself out with no problems and you may well have a Bn commanding a 300 plus man Co Team; seven independent Platoon Task Forces and have two Co Cdrs assigned to CP guard along with their Hq elms.:D