Colonel Warden will be teaching a 5 day class in Montgomery,Al. (near Slapout:) Oct. 22-26,07. Details are posted at the link below.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...7601#post27601
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Colonel Warden will be teaching a 5 day class in Montgomery,Al. (near Slapout:) Oct. 22-26,07. Details are posted at the link below.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...7601#post27601
So your letting us crash at your place???? I'll buy the Jack and Crown.
Hi bizmarck, if you need to. I can put up 3 at my house and can draft some neighbors if that is not enough. Must like dogs:wry:
I will be away from a computer for the rest of the week so no SWC till then:(
The week after 10/22/07 the Smart Wars conference starts. I am going to see if I can do daily posts of what we covered in class that day. So while I am away from the computer does anyone have any questions,topics,etc. they would like me to bring up? Just list what you want and I will see what I can do.
The case study method will be applied using Warden's Prometheus Process for past wars,current wars and major disasters. We may just pick one or several or all. Here is the list from the Agenda I just received. Pick one if you like.
American Revolution
US Civil War
American Indian Wars
Napoleonic Wars
Spanish American War
Russo-Japanese War
WW I
WW II
Korea
Vietnam
Gulf War I
Serbian War
Future Asteroid Attack...thats what it says on the paper:eek:
Later Slap
Hi guys, just a short note to say what's going on. I have been really busy the last couple of weeks. The class finished last week and it was fantastic. I can say this that one of the attendees just finished a presentation to some general at the Army War college. The presentation was largely about our plan for Turkey. He was rather impressed with the planning methodology so we will see what happens. This weekend I hope to write a description of what went on last week but I just can not get to it right now:(
I had a lot of help from some SWC members in preparing for this SWJED,Rob Thornton,RTK,Cow Gurney,Jedburgh He was late:) John Fishel,Steve Metz if I missed anybody sorry. It has been rather eerie sometimes in the short time since this happened. Some exact phrases we said in class have appeared in the media.:eek:
Again thanks for all the input. Slap
I was not sure how to write this and then came to the conclusion that the best place to start is at the beginning:eek:
So here we go. The class was taught in two parts the first was SMART WARS and the second was SMART STRATEGIES.
The smart wars part was the a new part of Warden's writings that I had never seen before. So what is a smart war? It is one that you know you will win, before you start it. To do this a war decision calculus was introduced.
1-Is winning the war Achievable?
2-What is the reward you will receive?
3-What is the cost you must pay,$ and lives ?
4-What is the risk of loosing or damaging other relationships.
Only four questions but very tough questions. These were meant to be answered by the government. It is the level of Grand Strategy. Which was used to guide the level of Military Strategy
Once this was explained to us we looked at a number of historical wars and in retrospect stated why we thought they were or were not smart wars.
I through out two zingers. One was the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The Cuban Crisis received a fair amount of discussion.
The Missile crisis was a failure at the military level for the USSR but at the Grand Strategic Level it was a success. A pledge by the US not to invade and accept a Communist regime in our western hemisphere.
This emphasized the importance of the Grand Strategy level....it must be right to start with or you end up with a situation you don't like regardless of the military conflict.
From here we were told to act as the Government of Turkey and prepare a military solution for the PKK. This is when we moved to the SMART STRATEGIES part of the course.
I will leave this up for a while for your comments and questions and then post the SMART STRATEGY process.
I think the way that the questions are asked implies that there's an answer, when in fact there are a range of possible outcomes with probabilities attached to each, which reminds me of
Ike's theory of small wars
on war, all war -- as I read your link earlier it was not necessarily small ones -- don't cover the problems. Essentially, that 'theory' divined by Fred from talking to someone other than Ike puts emphasis -- according to Fred -- on the commnader's estimate of the situation. Valid -- and important.
Doesn't take much imagination to believe that you and I might look at a problem, absorb all the same data and arrive at estimates that differ. That can a have an obvious and significant impact on what follows.
Not necessarily a flaw but the first problem in the Warden theory that he supposes that entry to war is an elective. It generally, for the US, has not been. Slapout used two great examples, the Dominican Republic and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The former was elective and I submit that Wardens' parameters were not applied -- but did, in the end, apply almost accidentally. We just reacted to a situation not of our making but not to our liking and it worked out okay. ;)
The same can be said of forays into Mogadishu, Bosnia, Haiti and Kosovo -- though all three of the last are still to be 'settled.' :(
Cuba was not elective in the sense that all our actions were responses and that there was no war. There was not one simply to the fact that we gave away far more than we gained. Not only the strategic loss that Slap mentioned but the fact that our trade for removal of the few marginally accurate USSR missiles from Cuba was to remove all the many generally accurate US missiles from Europe and Turkey. Kennedy gave away the farm and covered it well. Not that he was wrong, just that there are a lot myths about that whole thing.
One could say that had Warden's rules -- or Ike's -- been applied to Iraq, we wouldn't be there. One could also say that had both sets been applied, we would be there. It's viewpoint dependent.
Take a look at them:Who makes the determination on achievable? Does the opposition agree with your assessment? Is or are stopping genocide, removing a dictator, honoring a treaty obligation, ensuring the viability of another nation adequate rewards? How do you capture the costs in a notoriously unstable and unpredictable milieu? Is honor more important than a relationship; more importantly, given the pragmatic approach of most nations to relationships, is that a temporary loss?Quote:
" 1-Is winning the war Achievable? 2-What is the reward you will receive? 3-What is the cost you must pay,$ and lives ? 4-What is the risk of losing or damaging other relationships. "
Lots of questions to ask and few answers -- and most of the time, the interpretation of the answers will be in the mind of the decision maker.
I'd also suggest that while attacking Iraq was a decision on our part, it was not entry into a war, it was an election to fight in a certain place at a certain time, the war which caused or enabled (again, viewpoint dependent) that election was NOT our decision.
My point is that the US rarely starts wars, thus to talk of "...a smart war? It is one that you know you will win, before you start it." is to artificially constrain ones vision, develop tunnel vision as it were, focused on a world we don't inhabit.
Better to develop strategic thinking on how to respond to provocations. I suspect we'll see a number of those for the next decade or so.
Ken makes some good points.
For a war of choice - like Iraq or Grenada- the two relevant questions are:
What's the worst case scenario?
Are you prepared for the worst scenario?
When you're attacked, pride pretty much demands that you respond.
Complicated analysis is only required when you get in a game of chicken: Iran. Diplomatic factors must be considered too. Since the cost of war is high, there is almost always a deal that is better for both sides than war, but obviously some governments are too stupid or too egomanical or too deluded about their military abilities or too idealogical or have other agendas, to take it.
First, three questions:
Is Iraq a war of choice or is the attack on Iraq simply an operational intermediate objective in a broader conflict?
In determining the "worst case scenario" are errors of commission or omission, even egregious ones, possible?
With respect to being prepared for the worst case scenario, if the best professional advice is that one is prepared and that turns out to be incorrect, who is at fault?
Plus a couple of comments:
There are reasons other than pride to respond to attacks. Not least of these is that a series of probing attacks eliciting no or little response can give the attacker a false image of the probability of eventual success and thus encourage the attacker to increase the tempo and strength of his attacks.
Accepting that "the cost of war is high, (and) there is almost always a deal that is better for both sides than war..." is true, it is possible that "...obviously some governments are too stupid or too egomanical or too deluded about their military abilities or too idealogical or have other agendas, to take it" is also true. The question that arises is what action should be taken if one side, NOT a government, will not deal and proves this by making 'demands' that are beyond the power of the nominal opponent, a government, to grant, if that side has no population or infrastructure to protect or steer it through votes or opinion and if it initiates hostilities by attacking that nominal opponent over a period of years, it would seem there should logically be a point at which the nominal opponent ceases to accept such attacks and takes some action of one kind or another.
I have beem chomping at the bit to post this because I new this was going to happen but I had to wait until it was public. This is an interview by a Colonel in the India military where Warden was aksed to give a speech earlier this year. Enjoy and let the flames fly.
http://www.idsa.in/specialfeature/In...den210409.html
would not mind comments by Wilf, Ken and anyone else - if they are so inclined - on the following two (short) statements:
and:Quote:
John Warden [JW]: Einstein once said that he was uninterested in observations unless there was a theory to explain them. Without theory, there is no rigorous way to develop and test new tactics for the strategic effect they may have.
Quote:
PKG: How does a combat leader demonstrate combat leadership qualities and lead by example in an age when manned aircraft are becoming increasingly obsolescent?
JW: The word “combat” may be an adjective that is not needed. Leadership is leadership.
he made a couple of good points, but staying true to form he made a couple of comments that just don't mesh with the reality that I know, such as his comments about rotary wing and fixed wing. Granted it is situation specific, but there are not a whole lot of fixed winged air strips supporting many of the remote fire bases in Afghanistan. I know crisis du jour, but....
and the following statement tells me he still has a very narrow view of conflict, we have proven again and again we can't defeat anyone from the air whether in N. Vietnam, London, Kuwait, or Afghanistan.Quote:
Other than carrying people and putting them down in small areas, it would appear that fixed wing aircraft can do almost everything a helicopter can do, but do it faster and more efficiently. In general, there is probably a greater need for more fixed wing capability (which includes UAVs) than for more rotary wing craft.
On the positive side I thought his comparison of the objectives between the first Gulf War and the second Gulf War and Afghanistan were useful.Quote:
We should really think about close air support as something that happens because of a big mistake on someone’s part. The idea should be to conduct operations in such a way that it is not needed. Finally, if a situation arises where close air support is needed, the decision to use it should be in the context of the operational level situation at the time.
Quote:
In the second Gulf War, US objectives for Iraq, other than deposing the Hussein government, seemed to be open-ended, but to include an effective end to historical, regional, religious, and tribal animosity; adoption of a democratic form of government; amicable compromise among groups over contentious issues; and ready acceptance of alliance with the US. Unlike the first Gulf War, with the exception of deposing the Hussein government, all of these objectives depended completely on Iraqi acceptance and cooperation.
Quote:
The first part of the Afghanistan war was strategic: unseat the Taliban government and replace it with one that would not support and protect Al Qaeda; and destroy Al Qaeda operating facilities in Afghanistan. Following success in the first part, however, objectives expanded to include nation-building, democratization, elimination of the drug trade, and suppression of the Taliban. As in the second Gulf War, success required either dramatic cooperation by most Afghans or intense military operations sustained over prohibitively long time periods.
In my opinion, he is correct, we made every mistake he said we did, but I would argue these mistakes were made because too many officers adopted Warden's theories, and didn't plan to fight a people's war. So I'm agreeing, but adding to his argument that his narrow view of war and the narrow application of force is partly what led us down the wrong path initially.Quote:
Open-ended objectives that required the conquered to change core beliefs.
Failure to operate against the right centres of gravity in the right way.
Assuming a short war in both cases while being aware that a very long and expensive war was not a palatable option either from a domestic or an international standpoint.
He is a die hard air power advocate and appears to sincerely believe that air power can the decisive tool in any conflict, yet history informs us that his argument is bankrupt. Air power plays a "critical" role in the joint fight, but in the end we have to put boots on the ground. When we do that, we sure as heck wouldn't mind having some close air support, so I hope we plan for it.
First, with respect to Slap's post. These excerpts from Warden:True in the ideal, unfortunately, it relies on fallible humans making the right choices, therefor...Quote:
Next, it became a powerful targeting tool because it provided a high level understanding of any opponent relevant to the objective for that opponent.
That myth has killed more people than it should have. I will agree that if if you resort to combat, any type, a mistake has been made by someone or several someones. But once combat is required, you are flat not going to end it with air power.Quote:
We should really think about close air support as something that happens because of a big mistake on someone’s part. The idea should be to conduct operations in such a way that it is not needed.
That's either an ambiguous or a meaningless statement. In the way I think he means it, it's not always possible and Afghanistan is an example -- the Operational level of that war is Afghanistan. The various actions that take place within that operational context are tactical and air support thus becomes of necessity tactically determined.Quote:
Finally, if a situation arises where close air support is needed, the decision to use it should be in the context of the operational level situation at the time.
I guess two out of four is okay. I also guess that the failures in the last two plus the need for Northern and Southern Watches show the best laid plans and all the rings can be upset by dumb humans making decisions... :DQuote:
JW: The political objectives we used to put together the first Gulf War air campaign were as follows:
- Iraq to be out of Kuwait.
- Iraq not to be a strategic threat to its neighbours for at least a decade (as a result of losing so much of its offensive capability including its WMD programmes).
- Iraq functional and able to defend itself against its neighbours.
- The Middle East/Persian Gulf area to be more stable.
Well, I can agree with him on that one...Quote:
I would agree that in all areas of competition ranging from business to war, strategy is absent or poorly done. We definitely need to get better at it. Given the performance (or lack thereof) of economics, I don’t think, however, that economics would be my model.
I also agree with most of Bill's comments.
As to the two questions of JMM:
White's corollary; "A theory rigorously tested may prove that an observation was either correct or incorrect and later experience may prove that the testing or the tester was not adequately rigorous."
I agree on leadership. With a caveat. For most people, the transition is not a problem but there are a few people who do well in peacetime yet cannot adequately handle the stress of combat and, conversely, a few excellent combat leaders cannot cope with the boredom and tedium of peacetime.
Thus his statement is essentially correct but the theory and the reality differ due to human vagaries. Make that statements, plural... ;)
Not much to add to this one. Warden for me is something of a one-track recording. You need airpower in some situations, just like you need any sort of combat power. IMO our own LawVol did a much better job of showing how airpower can contribute to the non-kinetic fight here than anything I've seen from the colonel.
Rubbish. War cannot change and warfare evolves. Strategy is a function of politics, so strategic principles are political principles.Quote:
PKG: Do the nature and character of war change?
JW: Yes to both but strategic principles seem to be fairly constant over very long periods.
As for the rest, there are a few other statements I catergorically disagree with but Ken White and Bill Moore got there quicker and with more style!
As a Dutch RNLAF major I'm studying Air Power and I'm familiar with the theory of Warden. Now I read the interview with Col (rtd) John Warden and have the following question: Is the theory with 'the five rings' (not the Olympic rings ;)) as useble in COIN as it is in conventional conflicts?
Who can (and will!) help me with this....
Thanx for the response!
I'm an Air Traffic Controler within the Dutch Airforce, major, age 38. I will start with a joint internal study of the Dutch Defence School in August this year. One part of this study is a deeper knowledge of Air Power. Therefor I'm reading different books related to AP, for example Air Campaign, The War in the Air and The Path of Heaven.
As you know the Dutch are also involved in ISAF, with F16's and Transport and Attack Helicopters (AH64D and CH47). While I read the theories of John Warden I was wondering what AirPower could achieve in ISAF. While surfing on the internet I discovered your forum and thought; let's ask the experts! :)
And so I dropped my question.....
TS
(my initials of ATC)
TS, we like for new members to introduce themselves here at this link.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=1441&page=50
We do this for all new members so please do so when you can. After you do that I can give you some references to research. But in the meantime he is very well known over there and has lectured at your defense college (not sure what you call it). Anyway looking forward to the discussion. Slap
Slap,
I replied your link and introduced myself on SWJ. You mentioned that John Warden lectured in the Netherlands, do you know when?
TS
Of course I would like to speak to John Warden!
Next week we have different lectures about AP and one of these is the theory of John Warden. On Thursday 18th of June I have to start the lecture with a presentation. Therefor I want to know more about Warden in relation to COIN. FYI other speakers that week are Prof Dr Frans Osinga about OODA of John Boyd, Yaron Rosen about the Israeli War and John Olsen about DS and theory of Warden.
From the 22nd of June till the 3th of July we are in the USA at Maxwell AFB to do the simulation game of Air Campaign Planning. Will Col John Warden be interested in sharing his knowledge with us when we're visiting the USA...?
Thanx in advance for even trying to connect me with John Warden!!:cool:
Jan
Hi Jan,I think he would if he is not busy. Give me a couple of days to find out what he is doing. I will also send you a message with some research you may wish to review, I warn you up front there is a lot of reading in some of the reports. Also I live in Slapout,Al. just outside of Montgomery,Al. near Maxwell AFB so give me a call when you get over here and if you get some free time. Again give me some time for your request about Warden and I will get back with you and let you know what I found out. later Slap
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...4581#post74581
Glad to see somebody finally admit just how much Colonel Warden's theories have been used to win the War. Like I said Clear the skies,Hold the skies,Build an Air Bridge to the Objective;)
Kayani on an Aircraft Carrier. And the reference to Blimps... :D
That was enough... :D
Washington Times interview with short quotes with Warden's views on Israel-Iran-US Options.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...p-nukes/print/
Link to the article below. Read and find out why Airpower Theory has NOTHING to do with the Air Force, it is simply anything guided that moves through Air or Space regardless of which organization owns it or the platform from which it is launched. Also Wilf will have a fit as he takes Clausewitz to task and makes a good argument for "Bloodless Warfare."
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr..._04_warden.pdf
Not really a lot new here, mostly a rehash of:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...les/warden.htm
and
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...ttle/chp4.html
A synthesis of this "strategic paralysis" school of thought , combined with with Boyd's work is done in:
http://ebooks.gutenberg.us/AU_Press_...adok/fadok.pdf
The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.
There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/n...d-the-hive.ars
Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adsersary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actualy kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.
The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any apprciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.
A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.
Air warfare strategy (real strategy!) becomes pretty interesting once it's being aimed at the enemy leadership's will (or ability to stay in power).
All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.
Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).
I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?
Well, save for me, I think of myself as the great airpower strategist, of course. On the other hand, I thought I was a good driver until I wrecked my car without much outside help!
pvebber-
Col Warden's point is only partially to re-hash his theory, but to point out that airpower (as Slap pointed out, this doesn't just mean the Air Force) can be used in "complex" situations as you call it.
So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not. As Warden says in the article:Quote:
The fundamental flaw in the Warden school of thought is that it is based on a fundamentally mechanistic view of systems theory. The only way you can "backplan" from a desired future state to the sequence of "centers of gravity" you have to break, is if there is a rigid cause and effect linkage amenable to such a decomposition.
There is a name for systems that do NOT exhibit that feature. "Complex". If you are trying to break simple systems with rigid cause and effect like power grids or supply chains then the Warden theory works great. Start trying to apply it to political systems and social networks and, well Aaron Barr of HBGary found out the hard way about how "the adversary gets a vote"
In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?Quote:
Opponents are complicated things with many moving and static parts, but we can simplify our analysis by seeing them as a system, which means that they function in some reasonably connected manner.
An organism is any living system, or the highest level of cell organization (Nation Institute of Health). So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.Quote:
Airpower allows the simultaneous attack of key points in the adversary system causing it to collapse. The more precise the ability to attack, the smaller the actually kinetic effect required and the less the collateral damage.
The reality is that "centers of gravity" are not static and a true systems theory understanding of an adversary of any appreciable complexity is that they are not "mechanism" but "organisms" that do not simply and predictably collapse when "affected" but adapt, repair, re-orient, and exhibit unpredictable emergent responses.
This is the point of Warden's article - that airpower is not being used as effectively as it could be because the accepted wisdom is that it is "too hard" to use it in complex systems, and that "everyone knows airpower won't work" in situation x (say COIN). He argues that this is because of our terminology and past history. He believes we can find ways to make it work if we try. Warden is arguing that we should try to make sure we keep our desired end state in mind. He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.Quote:
A strategy based on the ability to predict the future - which is what is required in order to foresee a desired end-state, and determine a set of simultaneous actions that will result in an inexorable path to it - is not a realistic one. Despite how energetically we may wish it were so.
Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.
Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?
V/R,
Cliff
What else is war about?
Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...Quote:
All else in air warfare is of rather secondary quality and ranges from support for army/navy (often very indirect) as lowly as to petty punishments.
Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?Quote:
Warden's airpower theory sounds to me like a) a misunderstanding and b) a surrender in face of the challenges. It's no wonder that many people are not convinced by him (and equally difficult to grasp why he's still famous!).
Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.Quote:
I wonder whether there's really no much better airpower strategist available (who's willing to publish something)?
I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.
I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.
V/R,
Cliff
pvebber,
I don't know where you got the idea(you are not alone,many people believe that) that warden believes in predicting things as his chart on the Time Value of Action points out it is about "probabilities."
He has always warned about war being the most dangerous activity there is because of the unpredictability, it goes all the way back to his original publication of "The Air Campaign." Below is a link to a 2004 presentation warning about trying to predict the future.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joi...Warden-PPT.pdf
pvebber can answer for himself but, for your consideration:True, however there are two problems that must be addresssed -- and Warden and many smart guys who defend him do not bother to address them. First, the Rings model is also a simple way of depicting a system that may be more complex than some not so smart guys who try to use it realize. i.e. it can lead to mistakes. As yousaid above:Quote:
So we should just give up on trying to understand the enemy? Warden's rings model is simply a way of depicting a system, complex or not.
Secondly, it can depict the system but as has been said, many things out there defy categorization as a system.Quote:
I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.
I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.Quote:
In other words, we must somehow simplify the enemy into a system to understand it. How would you recommend understanding the enemy's political system?
Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...Quote:
...So no, they aren't static- and Warden isn't suggesting that. But we still need to simplify even a political "organism" into a system that we can understand if we are to affect it. Warden is also suggesting that the faster we hit a system (or organism) in a parallel attack, the less it can adapt and re-orient.
My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.:wry:That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses... :oQuote:
He also is arguing that if we can't find ways to reach our objectives quickly, we should consider if we should really should go to war.
In reverse order:Quote:
Warden is arguing not that we need to predict the future, but that we should know what future we want to create.
Do you really think that our strategy should not try and foresee our desired end state?
Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well. :D
We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time... :wry:
Most warfare is not about directly breaking will, but about doing something that has an indirect effect on the enemy leadership's will, around several corners.
It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.Quote:
Hmm, how do you think the Wehrmacht, or say the Iraqi Military in 1991 felt about this? Pretty secondary quality huh...
This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".
The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.
He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.Quote:
Can you explain why you think this is a misunderstanding, or a surrender?
None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.Quote:
Warden's strategy worked out pretty well for us in Desert Storm - it pretty much allowed the US to achieve its objectives. I know that many folks in the ground services scoff his theories... but then again, he is an airpower strategist. He is pretty well respected in the USAF, and his theories are taught at the USAF professional schools.
There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.Quote:
I think part of the problem with Col Warden's theories is that people want to use them like an Army FM on the Military Decision Making Process, like a cook book rather than a guide.
I think there's plenty of airpower strategy out there - the doctrine is fairly well established.
V/R,
Cliff
The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)
Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?
The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.
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Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).
Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.
How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.
THIS is elegant strategy.
Warden is also terrible when it comes to using historical examples to "prove" his points. His "The Air Campaign" is riddled with poor examples and things massaged to fit. His guide is flawed in that he really doesn't admit that airpower has any limitations and totally ignores the "soft" aspect of airpower (where I think it can have a greater impact, especially in wars that fall below the "toe to toe nuclear combat with the Ruskies" level). I use his book as a class textbook simply because it's one of the few accessible works out there, but it generates good discussion every time.
True, but we have to try to understand it somehow. Do the folks who say you can't understand things as a system advocate a trial and error approach to strategy?
I agree that it is hard. Warden is arguing that we should acknowledge when things are difficult, but not let that make us think they are impossible.Quote:
I suggest that trying to understand the enemy's political system is often unnecessary -- it is also exceedingly difficult to get right, particularly if that system is conducted in another language and / or stems from a quite different culture. What is necessary from both a military and a strategic standpoint is relatively sure if basic knowledge of what that system does. 'What' needs to be known, 'why' and 'how' will most often be nice to have for diplomatic purposes but actually relatively useless for strategic or war purposes.
Agreed... again, Warden isn't saying there aren't limitations, he's just saying that we shouldn't let current limitations make us stop trying to overcome them.Quote:
Without quibbling over details, I agree Warden has some good points. As did John Boyd. And Curtis LeMay. Or CvC, Jomini, De Saxe (probably one of the best of the bunch) and Subatai (certainly one of the 'winningest' of all time...). So do you and so do I -- a lot of folks do. None of us or of them has all the answers. I know neither you or Slap suggest that, I'm just reiterating it to point out that the principle sometimes gets lost behind the name. Warden is good but he's not the be all and end all; the Rings have applicability in some situation -- but not in all. Airpower (all source) is great but it also has limitations -- as does ground power or sea power...
Valid point, I would re-iterate my point above on Warden's intent.Quote:
My problem with John Warden or anyone who offers THE optimum solution (even though they add caveats, their primary pet rock shows in their pocket) is that I'm old and have yet to see any one trick pony win the dressage.
Unless the parochial response is from the Army, then it's ok, right? ;)Quote:
That's true, he always has -- and he rarely gets credit for that. I suspect his 'air power uber alles approach has a great deal to do with that and his valid points get obscured by that. Parochialism tends to draw parochial responses... :o
Won't argue with you here- again, I think Warden acknowledges this, he just is trying to argue that difficult shouldn't mean impossible.Quote:
Our 'strategies' (multi polar plural ) have not done that at all well in 236 years. Fortunately, we muddle through rather well. :D
We aren't doing the present really well. The future may be a step too far. The Wardens of this world might be able to get there but those really smart guys are only about 20% of the grand total -- that other 80% of us have to be dragged along and herded like a batch of cats. Hard to get there from here. Really hard. Particularly with a governmental system that changes directions every 2 to 8 years (that annoys the daylights out of the Strategists...). We tend to get really serious (that applies to both domestic and foreign political as well as military issues) only when confronted with an existential threat and there are none of those in view at this time... :wry:
My next paper is going to be on ways to try and improve our strategic process...
Anyway, good points Ken, I think part of why Warden is misunderstood is because people see him as so parochial. What folks miss is that a lot of his efforts aren't addressed at outsiders, but the folks inside the USAF who are stuck in old ways of thinking. The message for them gets misread when people think it applies to outsiders...
V/R,
Cliff
OK, but Warden is arguing that we should try to focus on the ultimate object... getting the enemy to do what we want - IE, "War is politics by other means" as CvC would say.
Uhhh, this may have been true before... but not anymore. While World War II did require a lot of effort, Allied Force, OEF and OIF required much less effort. The cost in lives is much less on both the friendly and enemy sides. Do you really think that a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo and Serbia would have been less effort, less cost, and less casualties than Allied Force resulted in?Quote:
It's secondary quality because it requires a huge amount of effort and damage in order to reach the real goal very indirectly.
Uhh, Warden is arguing for the direct approach as opposed to attacking fielded forces... how is this poorly aimed?Quote:
This time "indirect" does not mean "smart", it means "poorly aimed".
You are correct, the USAAF didn't have an adequate force until early 1944, and in early 1944 it was used on France and the intended areas of landing, not for strategic attack. Once it was unleashed on Germany mid 1944 it did some real damage. The Iraqi Air Force had 700 aircraft and was (for the time) a fairly credible Soviet-style force. I'm not saying they weren't outnumbered, they were. But the real key was in training, maintenance, technology, etc. You are essentially arguing that airpower was not effective because it worked too well...Quote:
The meagre quality becomes more visible if you assume that the same would have been attempted with a copy of the Iraqi air force, negating the extreme disparity in resources. Hint: The Wehrmacht failed in 1940 against the British with pretty much the same as the U.S.A.A.F. attempted in 1942-1944.
Did you read the paper? Warden is suggesting selecting targets on the inner rings carefully so that you don't have to attack so many targets, the exact opposite of what you are saying above.Quote:
He offers so many targets to attack that I can only conclude he failed to find the real lever.
Warden's initial plan was not used, but because LtGen (at the time LtCol) Deptula was kept to be one of the key planners. He ended up writing the final plan.Quote:
None of this is really an argument in itself, especially not the firs ton, for his actual proposal for Desert Storm had been rejected in favour of a less fancy one - and that one produced some interesting and unanticipated effects.
This is just silly, Fuchs. What would you recommend airpower doctrine change to? What do you see as the major flaws in the current system?Quote:
There's almost always something "well established". Infantry and cavalry doctrine were "well established" in 1913.
Why is airpower failing in Iraq and Afghanistan? I think it has done more to enable the land forces than anything else. OBTW the drone program has been pretty effective. How would the Army/Marines have done with no airborne ISR, airlift, CAS, AAR, etc?Quote:
The actual air power in use was
- successful in Iraq 1991 with an extreme resource disparity in near-perfect terrain
- semi-successful at most with various punitive strikes during the 1990's
- successful in Yugoslavia 1999 with an extreme resource disparity, yet still thoroughly embarrassed tactically, technically and strategically.
- successful in Afghanistan 2001 with a total resource disparity that didn't even encounter noteworthy resistance
- successful in Iraq 2003 with 'beyond extreme' resource disparity in very good terrain, but still with major gaffes
- failing in Iraq 2003-2007 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy
- failing in Afghanistan 2005-2011 with total resource disparity against an elusive enemy (probably even with a negative net effect!)
Very few targets have been missed. Warden is arguing that improvements can be made to make airpower more effective in COIN - you won't find me arguing with that. But you seem to think that past failures mean the concept is doomed. By your methodology, we should have declared failure in Iraq and withdrawn in 2007... good plan.Quote:
Well, if I go to a funfair and easily pling all targets there, and tomorrow I go into the wilderness with a shotgun and miss almost all the rabbits, hitting many trees, squirrels and cats instead - does this mean that my marksman skill is well established and satisfactory?
Are you serious? You seem to have no familiarity with the way air campaigns are planned now... while brute force is a part of it (I suspect Wilf would argue that it must be part of any war!), the process is very tightly controlled.Quote:
The only thing that's well established is the orchestration/'synchronisation' of strike packages.
Airpower strategy of the last two decades has been a joke; I saw only a primitive application of brute force.
The whole idea of elegance is totally gone missing because too many resources were at hand for too many conflicts.
Initially the air targets were limited to fielded forces. Only later was the political leadership of NATO finally convinced to allow the air component to target key infrastructure and the regime. It was the specific push to target Milosevic and his cronies as well as their financial concerns that finally led to the Serbs capitulating. (See RAND report) This is not an airpower strategy issue- that is a grand/political strategy issue of going to war without the will to do what is neccessary- exactly what Warden is arguing against.Quote:
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Just an example; scenario 1999 Kosovo Air War against Yugoslavia, what I would have done:
(1) negotiate an electricity embargo against Yugoslavia by all neighbours, employ observers along the high voltage power lines.
(2) Take out all powerplant turbine rooms in Yugoslavia (save for the one of the nuclear power plant; instead cut its nodes in a safe distance) with a single B-2 sortie (JDAMs were already available).
Again, something similar to what you propose is basically what ended up happening... Oh by the way, you have just used Warden's 5 rings model to develop your "elegant" strategy. I would also submit that just being without power is unlikely to convince someone like Milosevic, especially when opposition to outsiders is the source of much of his power. But again, that's not an issue with airpower...Quote:
Offer a deal:
Yugoslavia re-establishes autonomy for Kosovo and accepts foreign (military) police forces of its choice (no more than 50% slavs, though) as reinforcements for a mostly prejudice-free maintenance of security in Kosovo.
NATO repairs the damage ASAP and asks the neighbours to lift the electricity embargo.
How many months would they have accepted a life with electricity restricted to hospitals, the upper class residence area of Belgrade and state buildings? In resistance to what? Basically a gift!
I guesstimate they wouldn't have accepted it for much longer than they endured the resistance-provoking bombardment.
THIS is elegant strategy.
The problems that occured were not airpower strategy issues, but problems with NATO's internal political and military leadership. That's not an issue for airpower theory to address directly. Airpower does help mitigate these problems, however, by making the war shorter and less bloody, as Warden points out. So I guess you basically agree with Warden! :D
V/R,
Cliff
Cliff,
There is one more thing missing in Warden's article: the effect of his strategy on OUR OWN leadership. This lacuna is a bit odd, because this effect was at the heart of his original article (see John A. Warden, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century”):
The problem with Warden's theory is that public and political intolerance for destruction and civilian casualties has grown faster than the effectiveness of surgical bombings. The steep increase in bombing precision that makes Warden's strategy feasible has been followed by an even steeper decrease in public tolerance for destruction and collateral damage. The 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon by Israel proved that Dan Haloutz's application of Warden's strategy destroyed the center of ISRAEL's five-rings model rather than Hezbollah's.Quote:
All military operations, including air operations, should be consonant with the prevailing political and physical environment. In World War II the United States and her Allies imposed widespread destruction and civilian casualties on Japan and Germany; prior to the Gulf War, a new political climate meant that a proposal to impose similar damage on Iraq would have met overwhelming opposition from American and coalition political leaders.
I agree that Israel mis-used Wardens model in Lebanon, and certainly discrimination is important. IMHO, one of the big problems with Israel's efforts is that they didn't discriminate adequately between Lebanon and Hezbollah when they did their systems analysis... and so ended up hitting targets that were used by Lebanese civilians. I think that Warden would argue that they failed to adequately find and target the leadership ring, and ended up hitting fielded forces and infrastructure too hard.
As Warden points out, the big issue is time... the quicker a war, the less likely there is to be civilian casualties and the less likely public outrage is. Certainly the "baby milk factory" in Desert Storm and the Chinese Embassy in OAF cost us in the court of public opinion. I think that the actual effects of public outrage are somewhat overrated, however, due to the media and politicians views of them.
This raises a deeper question that goes more to Fuch's grand strategic arguements... that is, do we have the will to do what it takes to win? Warden argues we shouldn't go to war if we do not. As Ken pointed out, in our current political system, it's tough to get there... politicians like G.W. Bush (whatever you think of him otherwise) who are willing to throw away their careers to do what they think is the right thing are few and far between.
Again, I'm not arguing that Warden's model is the end-all be-all, but that he is misunderstood because people focus on the 5 rings as a prescriptive solution and ignore the other points he is trying to make.
V/R,
Cliff
Marc-
I disagree. In our system of government the politicians ARE the strategists- that is the problem that Ken was pointing out.
Agree that we as the military must strive to recommend strategies that alleviate this - that is why Warden argues for airpower to make wars faster/less bloody.
V/R,
Cliff
Cliff,
Great points. I hope to be more responsive to them this evening, but to make sure I don't put words in your mouth or build a strawman, what do you think are the key points Warden is making that are new in this most recent paper?
What do you think is being misunderstood about his other points?
What I argree with him on are:
This is true almost by the definition of strategy. The issue becomes what is the best approach to strategy and comes down to Jomini vs Clauswitz which at its root gets back to Plato vs Aristotle...Quote:
Strategy provides the framework for finding the best means to attain objectives.
One must have a 'desired end-state' that one wants to achieve. The issue comes becomes how tightly coupled cause and effect are in the 'systems' involved.Quote:
The objective of a conflict is to achieve a future picture, not to kill and destroy.
Almost a throw away given a desire for "just war", but important not to take to the extreme. The rub is in how you define "bloodless - force"...Quote:
As we consider conflict, we should explore bloodless-force options exhaustively before reverting to traditional war and battle.
What I disagree on:
Presupposes the existence and determinability of "direct, strategic centers of gravity" and linear cause and effect relationships between them and the desired outcomes. In Real Life, there are few "strategic centers of gravity" that can be determined (implying determinism...) and the cause and effect chains between them are not identifiable, or linear.Quote:
The best approach to strategy starts with a future picture, determines the systems and centers of gravity that must change to realize that picture, takes into account the impact of time, and preplans an exit.
We should focus on direct, strategic centers of gravity to the maximum extent possible.
How does our vocabulary invalidate any of our current Joint Concepts? Which of those concepts no longer make sense and why? How does changing vocabulary (to what, that of business and return on investment?) enable different concepts. Capabilities enable concepts, not vocabulary.Quote:
Our conflict vocabulary flows from ancient times and traps us mentally and physically into concepts that no longer make sense, so our vocabulary must change.
Assumes not just a linear Newtonian world-view, but one that presupposes relationships between the enemy system and our desires. Who defines "closely related"? Have not seen enough cultural mismatches in our recent wars to put this sort of thinking to rest?Quote:
If we want to change our opponent as a system to conform to our objectives, then the most direct approach entails affecting opponent centers of gravity closely related to the objectives.
There is a missing consideration of intensity. The reductio adsurdum is that all war should then be nuclear because it is the fastest and shortest conflict.Quote:
Fast action and short conflicts are imperative and far less expensive than slow, long ones.
THis is perhaps where I disagree with Warden the most. "Battle" is used almost pejoratively, but in its barest sense means "competition". To remove "battle" from the vocabulary of conflict is to remove "competition" because what is a "battle" really, but a constrained competition between two or more adversaries?Quote:
“Battle” is at best an expensive and risky means to a distant end, and we should almost always avoid it.
By removing "battle" from his vocablary, Warden attributes to Airpower the power to act unilaterally and without the "enemy getting a vote", as though our recent abaility to establish and maintain dominance of the air is a given in any future conflict.
If the other guy has an the capability to compete with you in your desire to apply airpower, how can you assume away "battle"?
And this leads to the ultimate hubris:
and no mention of the "5 rings" ;)Quote:
It also opens another very exciting possibility: conflict with little or no unplanned destruction or shedding of blood.
Cliff,
Then we know exactly where we disagree. Democratic politicians ARE NOT strategists (maybe they should be, but they are not). I can recommend two books on the subject:
Dick Morris "Power Plays: Win or Loose - How History's Great Political Leaders Play the Game." (especially Chapter Six: Mobilizing the Nation in Times of Crisis)
and
Erik Claessen "Stalemate: An Anatomy of Conflicts between Democracies Islamists and Muslim Autocrats".
Expecting politicians to take up the role of strategist is a short route to disappointment.
Interesting discussion so far.
I think the first point I would make is to suggest that a one-size-fits all methodology that biases toward one particular element of national power is, at best, inadequate.
Secondly, a primary problem with airpower-centric solutions is what do you do when you strike all the targets on your prioritized target list and the effects are not achieved? The inevitable temptation is to go further down the PTL into tertiary targets and start hitting everything - hence you get the Israeli's striking an empty Hezbollah office in a populated multi-story building which does nothing to Hezbollah and is ultimately counterproductive. In short, how does one tell when the strategy has failed? In an environment where political concerns limit the use of ground forces, both politicians and the air forces are going to want to "keep going" and hope for some kind of success.
So, ironically, one of air power's great advantages is also a disadvantage.