Terrorist Precursor Crimes
CRS, 24 May 07: Terrorist Precursor Crimes
Quote:
Terrorist groups, regardless of ideological ilk, geographical location, or organizational structure, have certain basic needs in common: funding, security, operatives/support, propaganda, and means and/or appearance of force. In order to meet these needs, terrorists engage in a series of activities, some of which are legal, many of which are not. Terrorist precursor crimes, offenses committed to facilitate a particular attack or promote a terrorist campaign’s objectives, are thought to be often carried out far away from the primary theater of conflict associated with a terrorist group. Much of the precursor activity, especially with regard to crimes conducted for the purpose of fundraising, takes place in wealthy Western countries, including the United States. Precursor crimes, known and/or alleged, include various fraud schemes, petty crime, identity and immigration crimes, the counterfeit of goods, narcotics trade, and illegal weapons procurement, amongst others. The implications of domestically occurring terrorist precursor crimes on the current threat environment, and specifically the United State’s security posture, are not fully understood....
Along the same lines, here are a couple of good papers (2 years old) from NIJ:
Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational Organized Crime & International Terrorism
Quote:
The nexus with transnational organized crime is increasingly a focus for security planners in their analyses of terror groups. Their approach is best described by the phrase “methods, not motives.” While the motives of terrorists and organized criminals remain divergent most often, our research indicates this is not always the case. For that reason, this report argues that such a general approach has become too restrictive and can be misleading since the interaction between terrorism and organized crime is growing deeper and more complex all the time. In short, the lines of separation are no longer unequivocal.
The report analyzes the relationship between international organized crime and terrorism in a systematic way in order to highlight the shortcomings of the “methods, not motives” argument. In so doing, the report considers the factors that most closely correspond to crime-terror interaction and identifies those regions of developed and developing states most likely to foster such interactions. Likewise, the paper will suggest an evolutionary spectrum of crime-terror interactions that serves as a common basis for discussion of such often-used terms as “nexus.”
The centerpiece of the report is a groundbreaking methodology for analysts and investigators to overcome this growing complexity, identify crime-terror interactions more quickly and to assess their importance with confidence. The approach is derived from a standard intelligence analytical framework, and has already proven its utility in law enforcement investigations.
The report is the product of a recently concluded and peer-reviewed 18-month NIJ-sponsored research project, and includes empirical evidence drawn from numerous case studies developed in the course of the research program.
Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Prevention
Quote:
A decline in state-sponsored terrorism has caused many terrorist organizations to resort to criminal activity as an alternative means of support. This study examines terrorists’ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and manufacturing illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. Special attention is given to transnational organized crime. Crimes are analyzed through the routine activity perspective and social learning theory. These theories draw our attention to the opportunities to commit crime and the criminal skills necessary to turn opportunity into criminality. Through these lenses, the research appraises the "successes” and “failures” of terrorists’ engagement in crime.
on a broader analytical issue
Let me move the discussion away from Napoleoni for a moment, and towards a broader issue that has increasingly troubled me. It may seem like a bit of a tangent to begin with, but you'll see by the end how it connects.
Since 9/11, there has been--for obvious reasons--a dramatic expansion in the number in the number of (government) analysts addressing CT and Middle Eastern issues. Many of these have been newly-minted graduate (or even undergraduate) students with some topic or area expertise. Some of this group are already very good, some may be good one day, and some are far from impressive. A key issue here will be mentoring, and whether organizations have the seasoned, skilled, mid-level analysts who can nurture a new generation. A second key issue will be human resource management, and whether the system recognizes and appropriately deals with the gifted, the promising, and the flawed among the new recruits.
In addition, there are a number of organizations with traditionally little CT or ME analytical responsibility, where they've felt the need to develop it, whether by new hires or by reassigning mid-level professionals with very different previous responsibilities. I've found that, at times, this group seeks an overarching framework of analysis, a theme or motif as it were, to make sense of the complex new world and responsibilities into which they've been thrust. As a result, they buy into catchy (sometimes rather politicized) explanations that reduce issues to near sound-bites, and hence make the complex world around them more intellectually manageable.
A case in point: I was at a conference of security and intelligence professionals and scholars a few weeks ago in which a great number of the participants fell into this later category. One of the speakers was Melanie Philips, British author of the book Londonistan.
Now, I recognize that immigration, refugee policy, diasporas, and multiculturalism all have security implications. However, Philips presentation (and the book) was a thinly-veiled rant against all of these things in the name of preserving a narrow, even racist, vision of British identity. As her website notes:
Quote:
Melanie Phillips pieces together the story of how Londonistan developed as a result of the collapse of British self-confidence and national identity and its resulting paralysis by multiculturalism and appeasement. The result is an ugly climate in Britain of irrationality and defeatism, which now threatens to undermine the alliance with America and imperil the defence of the free world.
The actual presentation was far more strident.
As I listened to her, I was certain that everyone in the room would see her simplistic, narrow-minded, highly ideological "analysis" for what it was. Much to my surprise, however, a great many people found it attractive: the problem of terrorism could be simply understood by recognizing that we had departed from our classic 1950s values, that we had contaminated Western culture with foreign imports, that we had become defeatists inappropriately ashamed of the grand colonial past, that the vast majority of Muslims were jihadist sympathizers, and that consequently immigration and refugee policies were little more than fifth columns. Typically those that found the call most seductive were middle-aged professionals recently thrust within their departments into some sort of security and intelligence role, and much less so younger analysts (and almost no one with any extensive analytical background in the issues). Clearly there was a real danger that this simple (and simplistic), nicely-packaged drivel
could drive out much more nuanced, messy, and less easily digested diagnosis. As someone who spends his analytical time with well-informed, experienced area and issue professionals, it was frankly quite a shock.
My reaction to Napoleoni is, in some ways, fueled by the concern that although she offers a very different analysis (and clearly knows her issues infinitely better than Philips, who is a political columnist and not a scholar), it offers the same kind of seductive appeal and suffers from some of the same shoehorning of data to fit a preconceived analytical frame.
I've also become intrinsically suspicious of scholars and analysts with flashy self-promoting websites that use their own name as the domain URL ;)
Jedburgh (and anyone else): I would be interested if you've observed any of the same issues arising from the expansion of CT and analytical capabilities within organizations, especially those with less prior experience in these areas. Or did I just have an unlucky experience?...
Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism On the Cheap
Al-Qaeda Masters Terrorism On the Cheap
Financial Dragnet Largely Bypassed
By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, August 24, 2008; Page A01
Quote:
LONDON -- Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, al-Qaeda has increasingly turned to local cells that run extremely low-cost operations and generate cash through criminal scams, bypassing the global financial dragnet set up by the United States and Europe.
Although al-Qaeda spent an estimated $500,000 to plan and execute the Sept. 11 attacks, many of the group's bombings and assaults since then in Europe, North Africa and Southeast Asia have cost one-tenth as much, or less.
The cheap plots are evidence that the U.S. government and its allies fundamentally miscalculated in assuming they could defeat the network by hunting for wealthy financiers and freezing bank accounts, according to many U.S. and European counterterrorism officials.
I don't know anyone in the CT business who thought that they "could defeat the network by hunting for wealthy financiers and freezing bank accounts" — it is all part of engagement on many, many fronts, to which AQ (and others) naturally have countermoves of their own. Still, an interesting article.
The illicit goods trade and it's links to crime/terrorism
For my undergrad poli sci class we have to write a final paper and my prompt is on the worldwide illegal illicit goods trade. Which deals with everything from knockoff parada bags, sunglasses and pirated movies to bogus medinces, auto/aircraft parts, as well as illegal arms, and even humans themselves. Now in my paper I want to deal with this particular trade's links to organized crime and terrorism. However I haven't been able to find many useful sources in the academic library here at the college and the same goes for the internet also.
So I was wondering if someone would mind pointing me in the right direction in terms of finding sources?
Thank you,
STRATEGY TO COMBAT Transnational Crime
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defa..._July_2011.pdf
Quote:
In years past, TOC was largely regional in scope, hierarchically structured, and had only occasional links to terrorism. Today’s criminal networks are fluid, striking new alliances with other networks around the world and engaging in a wide range of illicit activities, including cybercrime and providing support for terrorism. Virtually every transnational criminal organization and its enterprises are connected and enabled by information systems technologies, making cybercrime a substantially more important concern. TOC threatens U.S. interests by taking advantage of failed states or contested spaces; forging alliances with corrupt foreign government officials and some foreign intelligence services; destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states; undermining competition in world strategic markets; using cyber technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds; creating the potential for the transfer of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists; and expanding narcotrafficking and human and weapons smuggling networks. Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to criminal networks to generate funding and acquire logistical support. TOC also threatens the interconnected trading, transportation, and transactional systems that move people and commerce throughout the global economy and across our borders.
While researching documents to better understand the potential links between terrorism and transnational organized crime I came across our relatively new TOC National Strategy.
Kidnapping: Why AQ Needs Donations More Than Ransoms
An article by Clint Watts (CWOT) which opens with:
Quote:
I discuss the trade offs and disadvantages for al Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM that are dependent on illicit funding schemes, namely kidnapping, to sustain their operations. I conclude with the opinion that al Qaeda needs donations more than ransoms if they intend to orchestrate a comeback.
(He ends)...Another detractor of illicit revenue generation for al Qaeda groups is the scrutiny brought on terrorists by law enforcement and the military when they conduct illegal activities like kidnapping and drug smuggling. An important point that I overlooked in the FPRI post.
Link:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=975
Pursuing terrorist finance: UK perspectives
Within the linked document - written evidence given on 'Pursue', part of evidence presented to the House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs (HASC) - are several contributions on terrorist finance and counter-action. It includes officials and others, including charities. On a quick read some "gems" lie within.
Link alas no longer works:http://www.parliament.uk/documents/c...20Evidence.pdf
A "blind eye" to supporting Syrian insurgents
I recently heard an open source analyst comment that the Syrian insurgents were receiving financial support, up to US$600m, from rich families and others in the Gulf who move the cash to Kuwait ostensibly to donate to Kuwaiti charities. Kuwait and the Gulf states have legislation on countering terrorism finance, but being charitable donations prefer to "look the other way". Plus a Salafist faction is present in the Kuwaiti parliament, who would not support an official response.
A partial support comes in this Kuwaiti newspaper report:http://alhayat.com/Details/568664 The Google translation is not perfect.
A "blind eye" to supporting Syrian insurgents Part 2
More on the role of Kuwaiti individuals and others in raising funds for the violent Jihad in Syria:http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.c....MqY5DsXo.dpbs
Curious to learn some support President Assad and of course there is now a law about to counter terrorism financing. Clearly working well.:wry:
Financing Terror: A Strife 4-part series
'Strife' is a blog run from Kings War Studies and the series started today, with a "broad brush" review and opens with:
Quote:
Al Qaeda, ISIS, and the Taliban are household names these days. Yet, in the climate of the ‘War on Terror’, how do organisations like these survive and even thrive? It takes more than just strong leadership and organizational skills to uphold the proper functioning of terrorist groups – it takes money. Terrorism is the culmination of costly planning. It includes the dissemination of ideology, maintenance of logistics, recruitment and training of operatives, and perpetration of the terrorist act itself. Financial activity related to terrorism accounts for an estimated 5% of the annual global output, or about $1.5 trillion US$.
Link:http://strifeblog.org/2015/01/07/fin...4-part-series/
Coming up:
Quote:
Over the next few weeks Strife will feature a four-part series on terrorist financing. Each author will examine a different method of terrorist financing, using modern and varied case studies, offering a new look at who and what is funding today’s terror activities. Arne Holverscheid will discuss the role of private Kuwaiti donors in financing rebel groups in Syria affiliated with terror organisations and blurring the lines between good and bad, friend and foe. Claire Mennesier will examine the involvement of Pakistan in financing terror groups, and the motivations and challenges presented by this involvement. Samuel Smith will address the frightening trend of kidnapping for ransom as a source of finance for terror groups through a case study of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Finally, Drew Alyeshmerni will shed light upon the use of charities as a cover for terrorist financing and the implication that defining certain organisations as terror groups may have upon the eradication of this source of financing.
European terrorists’ financial activities are remarkably ordinary
Once again Norway's FFI provides public insight, with a report 'The financing of jihadi terrorist cells in Europe', in English and 68 pgs long. Short of time read the summary and the conclusion.
From the summary:
Quote:
This report takes stock of how jihadis in Western Europe raise, move, and spend money. Usingnew data from court documents and media reports, it reviews the financing of 40 jihadi terrorist cells that have plotted attacks in Europe, and examines a selection of cases in depth. European terrorists’ financial activities are remarkably ordinary. Jihadis who have plotted attacks in Western Europe most commonly relied on funding from the cell members’ own salaries and savings. The vast majority of the cells studied (90 %) were involved in income-generating activities, and half of them were entirely self-financed. Only one in four received economic support from international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida.
Finally, jihadi terrorist attacks in Western Europe have generally been cheap, with three quarters of the plots studied estimated to cost less than $10,000.
Link:http://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/14-02234.pdf
Anyone aware of a similar report covering the USA?
A financial "minority report"
A somewhat odd, UK-centric BBC commentary by a RUSI expert:
Quote:
Over the past 18 months, hundred of people have travelled from the UK to fight in Syria. Most have joined the self-styled Islamic State. Could banks assist the security authorities identify some of these so-called foreign fighters by uncovering "telltale" financial footprints?
(Near the end) ... engagement between the authorities and banks in exploiting this capability for security purposes remains limited despite the obvious benefits it can bring.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32722318
'Suspicious Activity Reports', known as SAR, are the common referral mechanism from the banks and other insitutions to the police. In both the UK & USA there are plenty of them, with only very few being productive. Above all "cash is king" and so the value of such cooperation is very moot.
Danish jihadists cashed in on welfare benefits
Gotta give them credit for knowing how to game the Socialist System.
Thirty-two Danes have collected nearly 400,000 kroner worth of unemployment benefits while fighting in Syria, it was revealed on Monday.
http://www.thelocal.dk/20150518/dani...lfare-benefits
Terror on the Cheap: Financing Lone Actor and Small Cell Attacks
Another short RUSI commentary; the summary:
Quote:
As recent reports highlight the increasing risk of Daesh-inspired lone actor or small cell homeland terrorist attacks, an urgent recalibration of terrorist-finance disruption efforts is required to include both funds flowing to Syria/Iraq and those raised to be used at home.
Near the end:
Quote:
The traditional measures in place for tackling terrorist financing play little role in disrupting this rapidly emerging form of low budget terror.
Link:https://www.rusi.org/analysis/commen.../#.VeB3KH2pNiV
White Paper on Islamic State Funding
A Canadian lawyer's viewpoint, a 14 pg. document from March 2015, which on a quick scan has some gems within:http://www.duhaimelaw.com/wp-content...g-Methods1.pdf
The author's CV:http://www.duhaimelaw.com/lawyers/christine/