The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security
The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security
Entry Excerpt:
The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.
Yemen is not currently a failed state, but it is experiencing huge political and economic problems that can have a direct impact on U.S. interests in the region. It has a rapidly expanding population with a resource base that is limited and already leaves much of the current population in poverty. The government obtains around a third of its budget revenue from sales of its limited and declining oil stocks, which most economists state will be exhausted by 2017. Yemen also has critical water shortages and a variety of interrelated security problems. In Sa’ada province in Yemen’s northern mountainous region, there has been an intermittent rebellion by Houthi tribesmen (now experiencing a cease-fire) who accuse the government of discrimination and other actions against their Zaydi Shi’ite religious sect. In southern Yemen, a powerful independence movement has developed which is mostly nonviolent but is increasingly angry and confrontational.
More recently, Yemen has emerged as one of the most important theaters for the struggle against al-Qaeda. Yemen is among the worst places on earth to cede to al-Qaeda in this struggle, but it is also an especially distrustful and wary nation in its relationship with Western nations and particularly the United States. All of these problems are difficult to address because the central government has only limited capacity to extend its influence into tribal areas beyond the capital and major cities. The United States must therefore do what it can to support peaceful resolutions of Yemen’s problems with the Houthis and Southern Movement while continuing to assist the government’s struggle against al-Qaeda forces in Yemen. It must further pursue these policies in ways that avoid provoking a backlash among the Yemeni population which will not tolerate significant numbers of U.S. combat troops in Yemen.
The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security.
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Yemen: all you want (2011-2015)
President Saleh abandoned by his own tribe
Quote:
SANAA, Yemen – The U.S.-backed president of Yemen suffered a devastating political blow on Sunday when his own powerful tribe demanded his resignation, joining religious leaders, young people and the country's traditional opposition in calls for an end to his three decades in power.
Massive crowds flooded cities and towns around the impoverished and volatile nation, screaming in grief and anger as they mourned dozens of protesters killed Friday when President Ali Abdullah Saleh's security forces opened fire from rooftops on a demonstration in the capital.
Saleh appeared to be trying to hold on, firing his entire Cabinet ahead of what one government official said was a planned mass resignation, but making no mention of stepping down himself. Yemen's ambassador to the United Nations and its human rights minister had announced their resignations earlier in the day.
Experts said that Saleh, who has cooperated closely with U.S. military operations against his country's branch of al-Qaida, had lost the support of every major power base in Yemen except the military ...
Interesting that the collapse in Saleh's support has come about due to indiscriminate violence on the part of regime supporters. Makes a remarkable contrast with the situation in Bahrain.
NYT Op Ed: The Boss Falls. Then What?
Which ends with, in abbreviated form:
Quote:
The United States and its international allies will have a limited window of opportunity to get things right in Yemen. No longer can the American government insist on seeing the country only through the prism of terrorism.....
Think of it as a strategic investment to defeat the current generation of terrorists and to prevent the formation of future ones.....
This may well be the West’s last chance in Yemen. If Mr. Saleh falls and the international community fails this time, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will be waiting in the wings to take advantage of the situation....
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/op...rssnyt&emc=rss
Countering Extremism in Yemen
Countering Extremism in Yemen
Entry Excerpt:
Countering Extremism in Yemen:
Beyond Interagency Cooperation
by Kaz Kotlow
Download The Full Article: Countering Extremism in Yemen
Extremism, especially violent extremism, is a clear threat to the national security of the United States. It is widely believed that effectively addressing quality of life issues, encouraging peaceful conflict resolution and enhancing political inclusion are critical to neutralizing extremist messaging, helping prevent the development and spread of violent extremism. Traditionally, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and The United States Department of State (DOS) are the primary agencies for development, with Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in support. But traditional “interagency cooperation” has often not resulted in effective programs. The U.S. Government (USG) should maximize integration of effort, bringing all government elements together from inception to planning and assessment, of a single coherent plan. DOD assets, from doctrine to personnel and funding, can be of great benefit in helping create and execute those integrated efforts.
Download The Full Article: Countering Extremism in Yemen
Colonel Kazimierz "Kaz" Kotlow, USA is currently a visiting Senior Service Col-lege Fellow at The Washington Insti-tute. Most recently, he served as the Defense and Army Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, a post he previously held at the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon. Colonel Kotlow also deployed as a political/military advisor to the Multinational Force (MNF) Commander, III Corps, in Baghdad, Iraq. Prior to his postings as a Foreign Area Officer, Colonel Kotlow served as a Special Forces detachment commander, deploying multiple times to Eritrea and Kuwait to train host nation forces in infantry operations and demining. The views expressed herein are his own.
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AP Exclusive: al-Qaida in Yemen adapts to evade US
Hardly a surprise and the details on SIGINT and AQAP's ability to adapt are not new:http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...218c42ce225bbd
The last sentence is worth thinking about IMHO:
Quote:
If the Yemeni government collapses, the concern is how al-Qaida, with its track record of adapting to new adversity, will adapt to new freedom.
Yemen leader Saleh agrees to step down
BBC report:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13178887
An interesting twist with the opposition being given responsibility.
Elites or the people "running the show"?
A succinct analysis by Ginny Hill of who matters:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13560514
Quote:
Yemen is currently witnessing two parallel power shifts: a popular revolution inspired by the 'Arab spring', and an elite power struggle.
an intereresting perspective...
http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/...186/story.html
Quote:
Feud within key Yemen tribe could tear nation apart
The unrest shaking Yemen began months ago as part of the idealistic movement for democracy and political reform sweeping the Middle East. It is now a battle of money, power and egos within a single powerful clan that threatens to tear the country apart.
I don't know enough about Yemen to say whether it's true or not, but somhow the idea of an "idealistic movement for democracy and political reform" devolving into "a battle of money, power, and egos" seems fairly credible to me... though maybe I'm excessively cynical!
Yemen defector says terror crisis was manufactured to win western support
No great surprise such an allegation, but from an 'insider' adds some weight and the sub-title is:
Quote:
The oldest military ally of Yemen's injured President Ali Abdullah Saleh has said the al-Qaeda terrorist crisis in the country was manufactured to win backing from outside powers.
Topically given recent events he alleges:
Quote:
Just after Saleh spoke of al-Qaeda seizing control of provinces, the regime handed over Abyan to terrorist gunmen. I fear that the regime might hand over control over other provinces to terrorist groups.
Now where have we heard, nay encountered with substantial evidence that a government has 'manufactured' an internal terrorist group?
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...n-support.html
Elites and tribes "running the show"?
At last some insight on what is happening, thanks to FP Blog and written by an Australian:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...saleh?page=0,0
I don't suppose the FBI are advertising their role in this ****:
Quote:
There aren't many foreigners traveling to Sanaa these days, but one group of outsiders is getting a lot of attention: an FBI forensics team, which reportedly arrived last week to investigate the attempted assassination of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is now convalescing in Saudi Arabia.
Evidence from the scene indicates that the explosion may have been caused by a device that was planted inside the mosque on the presidential compound, and not by a mortar shell or rocket, as was initially reported. If true, this means that someone with close access to the president was involved, which raises the question of why members of the Yemeni regime's inner circle -- set to mark its 33rd anniversary in power next month -- now appear intent on destroying each other?
Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh 'will not return home'
The headline says it all and is if by magic:
Quote:
Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen's embattled president, who is being treated for shrapnel wounds in Saudi Arabia, will not return home, according to a Saudi official.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...turn-home.html
Yemen, AQAP, and Counterterrorism Opportunity
This week, Frank Cilluffo and I co-authored an article on the spread of AQAP, the collapse of Yemen and a small window of counterterrorism opportunity that is currently available.
We advocate for the use of drones and SOF to remove AQAP's key leaders planning attacks on the U.S.
Yemen's shift to a 'failed' state provides the U.S. an opportunity to engage AQAP without being forced to go through the Saleh regime.
We are also interested in how Yemen is indicative of future scenarios the U.S. will face and how we can identify alternative CT & COIN strategies that are effective and efficient in disrupting threats from failed and weak states.
For those interested, the article is available here at the Homeland Security Policy Institute via this link:
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss..._yemenAQAP.cfm
Looking forward to any of your thoughts on this issue....
Countering AQAP in Yemen: Continued Debate
I posted the original introduction[/URL] to an article written by Frank Cilluffo and Clint Watts. The debate has continued on this topic and we would enjoy hearing the perspective of CT/COIN practitioners as we search for viable solutions to counter AQAP in Yemen.
Last week, Gregory Johnsen of Waq-al-Waq crafted a thoughtful response to our article “Yemen & Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism Opportunity.” Below is our response to further what we believe to be a particularly important debate. We will begin by addressing Johnsen’s conclusion and then discuss each of his points individually. For each point of debate, we attributed original quotes from the article as Cilluffo and Watts and quotes from Gregory’s post at Waq al Waq as Johnsen.
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Johnsen- “I think this is what happens when smart people tackle a complex problem in an environment they don’t know particularly well. “
While we respect Johnsen’s knowledge of Yemen, we likewise believe his criticisms reflect what happens when smart regional experts encounter a complex enemy they don’t know particularly well.
Ten years of American counterterrorism efforts demonstrate that the best way to defeat al Qaeda is to go directly after al Qaeda. Bin Laden’s personal notes articulate that building schools in Afghanistan didn’t slow down al Qaeda but drone strikes halted many of their operations. Johnsen’s title “The Allure of Simple Solutions” suggests the only way to deter AQAP in the near term is via a complex solution instituted through a failed Saleh regime or its successor. Pursuing such a solution will fail to stop AQAP’s immediate threat to the United States and is not feasible in light of the current situation in Yemen.
As we noted in our original article, we believe our recommendation is neither comprehensive nor simple, but instead the best option for achieving immediate U.S. national security interests with regards to AQAP. If we’ve learned anything from the past ten years, it is ‘yes’ sometimes simple (as distinguished from simplistic) strategies with clear goals and objectives work far better in achieving our near term interests than costly, complex strategies spread across convoluted bureaucracies. Increased use of drone and SOF forces, when executed as designed, can help eliminate the immediate threat of AQAP and improve U.S. options for pursuing a long-run Yemen strategy less encumbered by counterterrorism concerns.
We respect Johnsen’s opinions and rely on his analysis of Yemen to improve our perspective. However, we have yet to see any other feasible near or long-term U.S. strategy for mitigating the threat of AQAP. We welcome any feasible alternative solution put forth. However, until that time, the U.S. must protect its citizens and interests. The AQAP threat remains acute and inaction is not an option.
We thank Gregory Johnsen for his thoughtful analysis and look forward to his policy recommendations with regards to Yemen. We’ll quickly respond to each of his individual points below with short rebuttals.
For the complete discussion on Dr. Gregory Johnsen's assumptions, we invite those interested to read further at the Homeland Security Policy Institute:
http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/1...%80%99s-chaos/
Change in Yemen: nothing is due to change
An Australian academic, Dr Sarah Philips, from the Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney, has published several papers on the crisis in Yemen, partly based on first-hand research in-country.
'Yemen: Developmental Dysfunction and Division in a Crisis State' (Feb 2011) is on:http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/P...is%20State.pdf
A summary:http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/P...20Division.pdf
Quote:
Deeply patrimonial systems of power are not transformed overnight, and many of Yemen’s structural and human barriers to developmental change remain in place. The defection of key members of the inner circle to the opposition was not in itself a signal that a more developmentally inclined elite is in the ascendant, although many of the young protesters have been articulating demands for a fundamental revision of the political system. Those who defected from Saleh’s inner circle have been instrumental in instilling the dysfunctional political settlement that brought Yemen to this point. By joining the protest movement they have not necessarily heralded a new era for the Yemeni people. Indeed, none has gone so far as to openly renounce the patrimonial system of government, or the ‘rules of the game’ that will shape the behaviour of anyone who might follow President Saleh.
This week IISS has published an extended edition of her work, Adelphi Paper 'Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis' and earnt this review comment by Nabeel A. Khoury, director of the Near East South Asia Office of the US DoS bureau of political analysis:
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An important, timely and well-written book that delves into the country’s informal power structures and comprehensively addresses the Yemeni dilemma for Arab and Western governments.
Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/ade...manent-crisis/
Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency
Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency
Entry Excerpt:
An American-designed strategy attempts to link counterinsurgency and traditional development programs in Yemen and thereby provide a model that can be applied elsewhere. Rapidly changing conditions with simultaneous multiple small wars impair the ability to design and implement such a challenge. At the same time, there are legitimate questions about the thinking that went into the original formulation.
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Try again, SWC may respond?
CWOT has tried to get a response on SWC with his two thoughtful comments, but to no avail - this does happen here and can be rather predictable.
Perhaps the linked SWJ article will prompt reflection and response(s). See 'Yemen: Testing a New Coordinated Approach to Preventive Counterinsurgency':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...ew-coordinate/
Note please there are two threads on Yemen, 2010 & 2011, plus IIRC a couple of others.
This guy really, really wants to run the show in Yemen.
Apparently Saleh wants to be in charge of things in Yemen until the day he dies. Fortunately for him any number of people are interested in helping make that happen.
A dead cleric has what local impact?
From the BBC:
Quote:
US-born radical Islamist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a key al-Qaeda leader, has been killed in Yemen, the country's defence ministry said.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15121879
No doubt much ink will be spilt on the demise. MY interest is the local impact inside the Yemen as it appears to lurch along, with neither of the many sides making gains and bloodshed notably in Sanaa.