Intro to the Tactics and Technique of Small Wars
I was saving this article for Volume VI of the Small Wars Journal - but thought there would be some interest here on the SWC in regards to opinions concerning the conduct of Small Wars by those who preceded us...
As always, we thank the Marine Corps Gazette for their permission to reprint these blasts from the past here.
An Introduction to the Tactics and Technique of Small Wars by Major Harold Utley, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, May 1931.
Quote:
It is obvious that this subject is of prime importance to officers of the Marine Corps, and Naval officers since they may, either as commanders of squadrons and ships supporting such operations or as staff officers of such commanders, find it necessary to pass judgment upon plans for this type of operations, should likewise have more than a hazy knowledge of what has occurred in the past; and finally, it is believed that officers of the Army cannot afford to wholly disregard this subject even though it is fundamentally a function of the Marine Corps, although it is true that the landing of a single armed soldier on foreign soil constitutes an act of war, whereas sailors and marines can operate all over the same country and suffer a considerable number of casualties while the nation concerned and our own are still at peace.
This very fact-that no state of war exists-coupled with that mentioned before-that only a portion of the inhabitants are hostile-frequently gives to the operations a character differing radically from that where a formal state of war exists, they complicate the situation immeasurably.
Although each situation presents its own peculiar problems, they all have certain characteristics in common, and these can be studied and prepared for. The frequency with which they have occurred emphasizes the importance of making careful studies, of selecting most appropriate organization and equipment, and of undergoing adequate training, in order that we may be properly prepared when we encounter them.
This type of operations has been designated by many writers by the title "SMALL WARS," a term which has no connection whatsoever with the size of the force involved, the extent of the theater of operations, nor the length of time required to bring the operation to a close. In spite of its rather general use, the choice of the term does not appear to be a particularly happy one. Colonel C. E. Callwell, British Army, whose book, "Small Wars, Their Principles and Practices," has been a standard text on the subject for over a quarter of a century, says that the term is used "in default of a better one." In some cases it appears difficult to define precisely the line of demarkation between "Small Wars" and major conflicts, but generally speaking Small Wars are those operations in which a trained regular force is opposed by an irregular and comparatively untrained enemy. All of our campaigns against the Indians, the Boxer Rebellion, the Philippine Insurrection, the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916, and the numerous campaigns and expeditions of the Marine Corps-except when serving with the Army in the Mexican and World Wars-fall under this category...
Right and wrong lessons from the past
I’ll be the odd one out on this one. We did well in isolated banana wars that required relatively few resources (with the Philippines being an exception, but the Philippines remains a basket case politically and economically much like the other nations we had temporary success in) and they were not fought in the main stream media. Today’s battlefield is not yesterday’s battlefield. We didn’t do so well with small wars during the cold war because small wars became a global phenomenon and we didn’t have the resources to conduct legacy COIN strategies and nation building throughout S. America, SE Asia, and Africa. Let’s face it, we could only afford so many El Salvadors, while there may have been a cap on advisors there, we brought thousands of their troops to the U.S. to train, plus we conducted large supporting operations out of Honduras to choke off logistical support to the insurgents. We spent billions, and we committed a number of resources for an extended period of time. As most of you know there was a lot of umph behind the tip of the spear.
We would need that much umph in each area we’re fighting now to achieve “that type of victory” in the tens of countries where we are executing GWOT now, and where we will eventually being executing GWOT. It is a case of Voodo economics when someone says we can afford this. Nor can we spread the military any thinner. I think most of us agree we need to grow the size of our Army, but that takes time, and more $$$.
Iraq is not a small war, it is in some respects a world war as several nations are involved in supporting one side or the other, much like the conflict in the DROC. I have been there twice and I don’t share the happy assessments that some seem to have. Being realistic we may be able to head off a civil war there and we may be able to get it to the level the international community brought Lebanon to (prior to the current problem) some day down the road, but that isn’t much of an accomplishment when you consider what we invested.
That brings me to my point about our national security interests and small wars, and that is small wars are very expensive and resource extensive, and when played out in the mass media they are draining on our nation's psyche. Iraq is what it is, I don’t want to dwell on it, but when I look at it and other small wars we have been and are engaged in and the associated cost that usually only yields limited and temporary results (Haiti as an example), then I think we need to be very select in determining exactly what type of fight we want to engage in based on a number of variables. In many cases if we’re aware of a terrorist element that threatens our national interests, we may simply decide to go in and unilaterally attack that organization and not necessarily engage in the expense of nation building. If we were really worried about Saddam, we could have killed him without invading the country and then let the Iraqis sort it out. In Afghanistan we could have hammered the Al Qaeda and Taliban and left, turning the country back over the warlords, and revisit it as necessary. We can sustain the costs of these options and show effect to the audience. I’m not against COIN, just a little leery of thinking that COIN strategy is the answer to all of our security woes. It could be if we had unlimited resources, but we don’t. We need to pick our COIN fights carefully and commit for the long term win. For other threats we need to maintain an Army and Marine Corp that can get in quickly and decisively (even if temporarily) defeat the enemy. We still need a conventional expedintionary war fighting capability.
Small wars and big strategies
Small wars are basically wars where the enemy choses to use a raiding strategy rather than a combat persisting strategy. The US is very good at destroying enemies who use the combat persisting strategy. Until we are able to destroy enemies who use the raiding strategy, we will have more small wars. Finding a way to defeat that strategy has to be one of our highest priorities and it has to be a strategy that can be accomplish the mission in a time frame that political support permits.
History has shown that raiding strategies can be defeated if they are attacked with sufficient force to space ratios, and with sufficient political skills. Denying the military sufficient forces to implement the correct force to space ratio lenthens the time needed to win and increases the killing on both sides. The recent decrease in violence in Baghdad after additional US troops were brought in demonstrates how this approach works. What is not clear is why it has taken three years to implement it.
