Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?
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Should FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency be updated?
As one point of reference concerning this issue please see "Gentile: How I would revise the Army's counterinsurgency manual" at Tom Ricks' Best Defense.
With the greatest respect to Gian Gentile, I think he's slightly over complicating the solution. The aim to is Kill, Capture, and Deter any armed opposition to central authority and/or the policy in place at the time. That's it. You need a pretty slim manual to get that across.
Basically FM3-24 needs burning because it should never have been required and the solution does not require it either. A "Small Wars / Irregular Enemy" manual would more than suffice.
If the enemy is dead, any clown can "re-build" because no one is going to stop him doing it. To paraphrase the Sultan of Oman, "Defeat the rebels SO THAT, we can begin development."
Personally I don't huge value in changing military doctrine so long as the deeply flawed, essentially colonial strategy that is it designed to execute persists. And only civilian leaders can do that.
Steve makes a great point. Will better strategy overcome bad policy? Not likely. Does bad strategy enable policy makers to avoid reform? Possibly, but this really needs a comprehensive approach.
My vote, however, is yes, we must revise the "Zombie COIN" of FM3-24. It lacks a soul, and that soul is a clear understanding of insurgency itself.
Not sure what I would call our controlling, naive approach to foreign policy that is so blinded by our inflated positive self-image that we either cannot see, or refuse to acknowledge when we do see, how it is perceived by friend and foe alike. It is definitely time to break the cycle.
We need to fix both, but confused perceptions of duty and overly narrow concepts of where the limits of advance are for military input to policy are will likely keep the military from leading the way.
Oh, what a tangled web we weave when we ask the Big Army to become a nation builder/political gap closer.
They are a force designed to kill, capture, etc... and, on the side, do short-term immediate response humanitarian relief/disaster recovery efforts where their unique logistical structure is both appropriate and irreplaceable.
Somehow, the lines got crossed so that the Pentagon took on missions not do-able through UN, DoS/USAID, and nobody had the gumption to say anything other than "Hua!," when they should have said "Hooey!."
The FM is a result of the political/admin/mission creep confusion that brought us to this point.
Where I disagree with Gentile is the level of critique/reassessment.
I think that Iraq today forms an excellent lab to compare what we did to what resulted. No need to draw inaccurate correlations to obscure alternatives.
The analysis, though, should be done by competent civilians, and not military, or they will just miss the whole point (over-and-over).
Steve
Steve does make a good point however, better, more realistic doctrine can potentially improve militry advice given to policymakers.
Still, let's say we started updating FM3-24 tomorrow - when would the revisions be complete? 3-4 years maybe?
3-4 years for an Irregular Warfare TTP manual? Nothing about so-called COIN needs "inventing" or much "thinking about." It's a "how to kill the bad guys - AND ONLY THE BAD GUYs - book," and context would be very important so it probably deal in very broad brush strokes, because what really matter is "Theatre Specific" Manuals like the CATOM.
IMO the problems, while significant, are largely nuance. If one just went through the current manual and addressed those points of nuance it would only take 3-4 weeks.
So, 3-4 weeks to make the fixes, 3-4 years to get such a manual approved.
Or, as WILF suggests, merely label all citizens who support violent opposition to the government as enemies of the state (regardless of the fact that they often have no legal options to effectively oppose the state) and kill them. Simple and effective. These are problems that can be easily suppressed if we would simply man up and deal with them. 4 out of 5 dictators endorse this option (the 5th was assassinated by his royal guard and unavailable for comment).
Just of interest...I recently attended a book signing for David Kilcullen. At the beginning of his comments to the attendees (SWJ/Quantico sponsored event 60 - 80 folks were there) he stated the FM needs to be re-written and is out of date (he also stated that it was out of date from day one because things are always changing and we are always learning). He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that. :D
Slap,
No worries, Wilf on warfare is typically spot on. It's when he applies warfare to COIN where he starts to drift off track. Our reasonable (or unreasonable, as its really up to others to assess that status) minds will differ, but it is such public differing that makes SWJ such a handy tool.
The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.
As to the FID force (that intervening role we find ourselves in), I would strongly advise staying out of the insurgent killing business altogether, and to keep our focus on guiding governmental reform and mediating the popular voice into that process (or staying out of the mess altogether unless national interests truly demand our presence).
AQ and non-state UW organizations like them that seek to employ such insurgent organizations and populaces to conduct their acts of terror for them are another matter altogether, and for them we should show now mercy or respite, wherever they might hide. (Just don't listen to the Intel guys who paint everyone they talk to with their same stink, as that throws us right back into killing nationalist insurgents 9 times out of 10).
This FM 3 -24 is designed for battaluion level and above "leaders and planners". So it's not a TTP manual.
What about something for the guys battalion level and down who actually are there to do the business? A doctrinal gap?
Start with what the private soldier needs to know to effectively fight this type of war and then take it from there. It doesn't matter what the colonels know if the soldiers on the ground know Jack.
It's marginally adequate, way too big and overly pedantic but that seems to be the trend nowadays...:rolleyes:
Follow the link provided by Cav Guy on this page (LINK - big .pdf). Not much of any import in the rest of the thread...:wry:
No need for a "tactics in COIN" manual - tactics in COIN and tactics in a conventional fight are the same, just applied to a different environment (here comes the METT-TC thing again).
Offensive and defensive operations and patrolling, patrolling and patrolling. That and learn how to eat with the locals.
only correct IF you got trained right in the first place. When I was doing my basic in 1980, all the training was peppered with Northern Ireland TTPs. The problem was that by 1988 when I was doing Recce Commanders, NI TTPs had washed out what you needed to fight a Soviet MRR.
I used to have great respect for Dave, back in the day, but I think he's wrong these days, unless I am not understanding what I keep reading.
a.) FM3-24 was not out of date. It was wrong and bad.
b.) We keep learning? Sorry, what crushes a rebellion hasn't really changed. What has changed is the constraints place by policy.
NOW, - I admit, my ideas have changed. I have learnt. I have publicly viewable record of my though in the 3,000+ posts here, BUT my ideas now all conform to what got taught back in the old days and was written down a long time ago. The problem with the COIN-fusion is that is simply ignored history to pursue either the avant-garde or reputations.
....yet clearly that was the source of the problem because they weren't killing the right people and only the right people.Quote:
He also stated that yes part of counter insurgency is killing bad guys...that didn't come across in the FM because everyone was thinking the military already knew how to do that. :D
Thank you, but I think you overstate your case.. :)
The population will support who ever has POWER, by having the monopoly on armed violence. ONCE that is done, then the political fixing can start.Quote:
The killing of certain insurgents absolutely needs to be a strong, well resourced, supporting effort of any COIN campaign. Main effort must be the repair of governance and re-earning the support of the populace through change, not charity.
Time and again it is the "power" of a populace seeking liberty from tyranny that over comes the power of even the strongest and most effective of governments.
As to the trite catch-phrase of "monopoly on armed violence," I gladly toss it to the same bone pile where so many half-right phrases commonly associated with the efforts of intervening powers to suppress such popular uprisings duly belong.
The American populace was guaranteed freedoms of speech, the press and assembly so that movements such as the Civil Rights, and now the Tea Party, could not be deemed treason or insurgency by the sitting government; and were guaranteed the possession of our arms to ensure that they never grew too bold in their possession of some concept of "monopoly" on armed violence. It is the lack of such monopoly that leads to (ultimately) the stability of good governance. It is the presence of such monopoly that leads to the stability born of oppression.
Not true. Cambodia in the 70's, Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany, Saddam's Iraq, A'stan under the Taliban, Saudi-Arabia, Syria, North Korea etc etc etc.
This "power from the people" is not a reality in the real world, unless they do a lot of killing to get it, and unless they are prepared to keep killing, they can loose it.
Then you don't understand it. It means "Man on the ground with a gun." It's not presented as a "system of Government". It is a means by which control - for both good and bad - is gained and maintained for the Government to function.Quote:
As to the trite catch-phrase of "monopoly on armed violence," I gladly toss it to the same bone pile where so many half-right phrases commonly associated with the efforts of intervening powers to suppress such popular uprisings duly belong.
All sounds good, till you look at Somalia, the Congo, Sierra Leone, parts of Colombia, Thailand etc etc etc. It's the competition for the monopoly that creates the problem and it is frankly ridiculous to suggest the US citizens owning guns gives them the capacity to defend themselves against their government. Never seems to work and never has.Quote:
It is the lack of such monopoly that leads to (ultimately) the stability of good governance. It is the presence of such monopoly that leads to the stability born of oppression.
Well, in 7 months of COIN I did three things:
1. Employed Basic Infantry Doctrine;
2. Tried, as much as possible, to know my backyard; and
3. Respected/Observed Afghan culture.
To me, nothing here requires a new manual. If I'm missing anything, please enlighten me.
Well, that is sort of implied. If I send a poorly trained person to do something, I'm probably not going to get the results I want.
Agreed - anyone can be defeated, we just aren't willing to acknowledge or accept much of that threshold these days (Jim Storr said that in a conversation we had). I think today's junk-COIN is an effort by the military to find something around that. Unfortunately, in my opinion, it's just farting around with no real solution (because you aren't approaching that threshold).
It is not that I fail to understand, rather that I refuse to agree with your understanding. I merely point out that reasonable minds can differ, and that the model you profess while often applied, is not, IMO, one that can produce enduring, positive, effects.
or said another way, as posted on Doctrine Man's (I am a fan) Facebook
http://www.facebook.com/#!/photo.php...&id=1275108793
or this:
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fb...&id=1082681298
Maybe the new manual has already been written...it is called the Armor Manual.....now we are talking:)link to article below.
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapc....tanks/?hpt=T2
Exactly... and that is why western or civilised countries can't "win" counterinsurgencies or suppress rebellions.
Take Zimbabwe for example. Mugabe, that darling of western liberals (in the US sense of the word) faced a rebellion of sorts in Matabeleland through the actions of a number of armed dissidents.
Didn't take him long to suppress that rebellion and not a word of protest heard from the West or anywhere.
Mugabe saw the dissidents as fish swimming in the water (of the general population). Kind of hard to find the dissidents if the population won't report them (through support or fear) so leave the fish and focus on the "water".
IF you "poison" the water so that the "fish" can't survive in it then you win... yes?
Yes.
Conservative estimates were that Mugabe's (North Korean trained) 5th Brigade killed 30,000 men, women and children until the Matabele population reached tipping point. The Matabele were crushed.
That's the way you do it... and you don't have to fix the political thing because even today if the people of Matabeleland hear of soldiers in the area wearing red berets the whole nation has a collective bowl movement. All you need to say if they become problematic again is "do you some some more of the same"?
Then (in a tamer example) we see Sri Lanka first securing support from China (that great nation with supposedly thousands of years of civilisation but still no human rights conscience) then they too apply a little "poison" to the water in which the (Tamil Tiger) fish were swimming. The rest is history.
That's how you put down rebellions and win counterinsurgency wars... brute force.
Now which western country would dare employ such an approach? So that is why in most cases one has to give away the farm to "win" the war. Always a Pyrrhic victory to be sure.
The Canadians and the Danes have had Tanks there for some time - with good success and no real problems or 'bad' things...
Found this piece on the Canadian use of armour in Afghanistan enlightening.
... but if I hear the word risk again I think I will scream.
To quote Para 6-84, of FM3-24
So no MBT or IFV? Thanks for bad advice FM3-24 writers.Quote:
"In COIN operations, having many versatile vehicles that require simple maintenance is often better than having a few highly capable armored
vehicles or combat systems that require extensive maintenance."
Whoah there Mudhara! ;) You're about 50% right, but....
Western or civilised countries can suppress rebellions IF they recognise the limit of the military instrument, to using armed force against armed force, and the employment of criminal convictions to those sustaining it.
The political problem may continue, BUT you use violence (military AND Police) to ensure it remains a political problem that the rebels will not seek to resolve by force. The ONLY thing armed force does is stop the other guy (rebels) using armed force. That is the key thing FM3-24 doesn't get.
Wilf:
Today's KGS Nightwatch does a pretty good job of summing up the new changes:
Return to Air Power, Tanks and a higher war tempo as the way to break the stalemate, and actually impact the Taliban by returning US "invincibility," at the expense of "hearts and minds."
I suspect that the above, if accurate, speaks strongly against the mixed concept of nice guys gently extricating evil from an otherwise happy and democratic Lake Wobegon.Quote:
A fourth consequence is that the coalition might begin to start making its own luck. Diligent prosecution of the fight in a more warlike fashion is more likely to shorten the conflict than the mixture of fighting with development projects to win hearts and minds. Under the pressure from no withdrawal date and increased losses, the Taliban inside Afghanistan might be more receptive to negotiations.
If the changes are implemented consistently, and are not just piecemeal, spot fixes, they should improve security conditions. However, they also are likely to produce significant negative consequences in property damage, civilian and militant casualties and bad press, all consistent with a war. On the other hand, the stalemate will continue if the most important change is a longer conflict.
Reality. People in war zones must respect those in power---the goal is to protect yourself/family. Period.
Security is much more important than obscure western concepts, which might be great to think about once security and minimal life-safety/food security is in place.
Steve
Been thinking about this. Maybe there is a ROE connection to this?
If you can't get CAS without a whole bunch of confirmations with attendant delay then it is better to have the direct fire power of tanks immediately available where they deem it necessary at that moment?
Highly recommend discussing (and reviewing) the emotion over tanks spilled in this thread:
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3951
You'll see where I stand.
Armor has no inherent goodness or badness in COIN, only effects by the user.
Actually, I suspect it reflects the restrictions on the use of close air, attack air, and indirect fires; the very real need to minimize innocent casualties; and the insurgent tactic of occupying and fighting from compounds where such innocent parties reside.
The tank provides a very effective way to deal with such problems short of ordering a squad to conduct fire and maneuver across 100 yards of knee deep much in an open field; or to try to move an MRAP down a narrow IED laden roadway.
This insurgency fluctuates with the season and by location, but it is no where near phase III; nor would I expect the Taliban to even attempt surging to Phase III tactics so long as the coalition is present. Phase I and II tactics are far more effective against effective Phase III forces like ours.
Plus, it is always wise to remember that the insurgent can prevail in any phase, and flows up and down between them as best suits his purposes. There is no requirement to progress, but such progression is natural in certain circumstances. (I.e., the Taliban is not intellectually burdened by dogmatic adherence to doctrine like some western military personnel/organizations can tend to be. They simply fight the fight before them.)
The real danger in bringing in Tanks is that, like the Strykers, like the MRAPs; (like patrol cars for policemen) they separate the soldiers from the populace and also lead to Means-based approaches to problems.
Can anyone imagine a Stryker commander leaving his Strykers in the motorpool? Or an Armor commander leaving his tanks? I have not talked to any Marines about their intent, but I would expect that they would plan to use these tanks in infantry support mode, much like the way we employed armor in WWII.
Bob,
Left 8 of my 14 tanks at home in 2006. Rest of tankers walked or took HMMWV's. It's actually very common the past 5-6 years for tankers, artillerymen, and mech infantry to act dismounted without vehicle overwatch.
In a Stryker unit now, training heavily to operate with and without them. We expect to do both, as have the previous two stryker units. A Stryker IN company is basically same as an Airborne IN Company when you subtract the vehicles.
As Ken would say, METT-TC rules. Problem is the vehicles bring unique capabilities (protection, long range comms, digital connectivity, advanced sights, mobility) you lose when you separate from them.
Contact with the population is mainly influenced by command climate and training - for example, one TTP is to lager the vehicles outside the town and foot patrol in, keeping the vehicles for QRF. More than one way to do it.
Niel,
I know, everyone is out there doing their best. Personally I don't read too much into the tanks, the guys need something to compensate for the reduced ability to employ indirect fires. There is a place for a 120mm sniper on this battlefield.
My bigger concerns is the lack of interest to bring in the policy version of tanks to put some heavy pressure on Karzai reconcile the issues of poor governance that pour out of his government; to reform the constitution that codifies and enables so much of the corruption and illegitimacy, etc.
Similar concern is that I didn't see anything about tanks for the ANA. I thought this was their fight...
Agree all. As someone commented - this is a tactical solution to a tactical problem, nothing more. The coax is also precision to 1100m, which is useful.
I think those who see this as something other than a solution to a problem in one particularly brutal area are over-reaching.