Printable View
"War on Film"
The often fraught relationship between military and media.
The advent of 24-hours news coverage and near realtime transmission of footage has left military wary of the media. Dodge Billingsley investigates how relations have developed in recent history and examines how the military can best use the media to its advantage.
http://www.webfilehost.com/?mode=viewupload&id=5584376
And of course Dodge wouldn't have any commercial interest in that would he ;)
The key piece of the argument that is missing from both sides in all of this is MOE. I can give you MOP on flashy PPT slides all day long -- how many releases I put out, how many images were released, how much vision was fed to the networks, how many journos I supported etc. People like Dodge can do the same -- I got 60 mins on this station at prime time, my vision was syndicated globally on CNN etc.
What we can't do effectively is the MOE bit. What level of penetration did my key massages have in that product? Then if we start to get into 2nd and 3rd order effects how do I tell if my messages actually had any cognitive impact (either positively or negatively). Then to take it a step further how were those messages interpreted by the different target audiences. Then the impact on the unintended audiences etc. etc. etc.
I'm yet to find a way (short of employing a whole lot of grads to answer my dodgy survey that any ORSA in his right mind would run screaming from the room if he saw it) to do proper content analysis of media. And of course there's a big reason for this ... the whole marketing/PR industry is built around reporting MOP because they don't want to highlight any failings in their campaigns. Therefore any useful tool is only set up for hits analysis rather than content analysis.
To be honest most of the analysis of things we've done show we continue to disseminate only one of our current five key messages -- that Iraq/AFG is a dangerous place. Other than that we're pretty much sucking up to the egos of journos and that's about it.
To do this properly requires so much more in the way of funding and personnel that I'm pretty much back to my PPT with a couple of pretty pics ... people like it better.
I was one of only two full-time military analysts employed by a UK broadcast company. I sat, live on Sky News, for over 200's hours of live comment and broadcasting watched by 60 million folks world wide, both after 9/11 and OIF, for 42 and 28 days respectively.
I am by no means unique, but apart from being invited by the British Army to talk at a conference, and write an article for the BAR, I am amazed at all the experts on this subject who have never spent a second in a TV studio, or even know how one works or how stories are put together and become stories. Having looked at the Elephant pretty close, I believe IO is not something armies should do.
Of course TV is only one medium for getting the message out, so that's a pretty narrow viewpoint from which to base your assessment that armies shouldn't be in the IO business. A whole bunch of pretty bright people from militaries across the globe have decided over the last couple of decades of thought and practical experience that it's CRITICAL for armies to be in this business.
If you meant to say that it's extremely difficult to be good at IO and that most armies don't train their people properly for this sort of work, I'll certainly agree.
Well I don't limit this view to TV.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rockbridge
IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.
forget that but if we do it will be at significant downstream cost to the Armed Forces. I will caveat that by stating the obvious and noting that it IS imperative that said Armed Forces not contribute to the opposition's IO effort by doing dumb things...Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Eets not our yob.
That's the point I continually make ... in a regular Defence Force of about 50,000 I can count the number of trained, competent and experienced IO guys on one hand. When we are that small in the equation we will always end up as a IO salt shaker sprinkling "some IO" (most commanders don't even know WTF it is or isn't) on an already developed plan.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rockbridge
The traditional view of the military as an element that only applies force to break will became obsolete years ago because it was overcome by the reality of our national security requirements. While it would be really nice if national security responsibilities could be divided up and put into little compartments like eggs in a box, that's not the real world. In order to influence population groups in areas that are too rough for civilians, the military has to do the job.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I hate to return to a discussion on definitions of IO, but what definition are you referencing when you state that IO is entirely political? As defined by US and NATO doctrine, IO is a military operation. There are certainly other related activities out there such as Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy that fall outside the military realm .... but IO is clearly defined as a military function.
If you don't agree with the accepted definition of IO as a military op, then we're not speaking the same language and I'm willing to concede that your argument may hold some validity. However, if you are arguing that the accepted definitions are wrong, then you've got an influence campaign to wage yourself if you plan to change the doctrine of several dozen countries.
@ - and that is a major problem because we are trying to apply military force to solve problems that are not essentially military in nature. The Military force is merely a tool of strategy.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rockbridge
@ IO is a subset of stratergy. It is not a subset of military force. - To say the military should be doing IO, makes as much sense as saying they should be doing "Economic Warfare."
@ - I don't plan to wage any campaign. My "Schtick" is that our understanding or war and operations is based on profound ignorance and a misreading of history. That's why we have 4GW and Manoeuvre Warfare, EBO and all the other silly bumper stickers, as well as IO.
Sun-Tzu did not write the "Art of War." He wrote "Bing Fa" - the "Way of Strategy."
Sun Tzu's a bumper sticker in and of himself. Many of his processes look inward and assume a static enemy who will make predictable mistakes.
That said, I agree that much of the military isn't suited to conduct IO. Neither are the majority of civilian agencies and governments. You want IO? Get a good marketer. Get the guy who created the ESPN ads. Governments don't do IO well because all they care about is influencing themselves. IMO, anyhow.
Sorry doctrinely and historically you and Wilf are both wrong.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
IO is not merely passive nor purely non-lethal. It involves physical destruction of communications systems and networks as well as PSYOP.
PSYOP is lethal and we do PSYOP as a military tool. If you have any doubt that PSYOP is lethal, look at the Rwandan genocide or the use of suicide bombers.
You can say it is not our job until the cows come home. We have always done it in various fashion and we will continue to do it.
Where we fail in particular in this IO effort is a lack of synchronization between what occurs via the military, the political, and yes, the economic.
Tom
Hi Wilf,
I've got to agree with Tom on this one. Yes, IO is a subset of strategy, but it is also a subset of military operations; every action, including non-action, sends a message. As such, every military operation has, as an emergent property of it, an information operation whether that is recognized or not. If it is not recognized, then you are leaving an open flank for it to be turned against you. If you say "It's not our job!", you are implying that it is someone elses job and, de facto, handing over part of a military operation to non-military personelle.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
BTW, on economic warfare, what do you think the use of Strategic Bombing, partisan (or SF) operations, and large parts of target selection are about in conventional wars?
OK, so all military action sends a message or has a psychological effect. How do you manage that when so much effect is unintended and unpredictable?Quote:
Originally Posted by marct
Soldiers should not be concenred that "every military operation has, as an emergent property of it, an information operation whether that is recognized or not."
Getting into IO is the same danger as the Sorcerer's apprentice got into.
Yes, IO can have lethal effect. "Kill all those with blue front doors," is not something we should be doing. Dropping bombs on those saying it, is!
The only IO strategy I see as militarily valid is denying the enemy all sources of information, and denying him the ability to conduct IO.
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Ignoring IO is not a strategy. This is the same thing as saying we con't do small wars or COIN because they make us uncomfortable.
And yes we do lethal PSYOP in that we seek to change behaviors in order to expose the enemy and kill him.
As for management of effects, we do that too regardless of what it is called. Again we seek to change behaviors.
We do this as part of our doctrine today. We have done it in our past as a subset of general military operations.
One reason I'm not a fan of the military doing some of the public side of IO is that they have often done it poorly...especially in the last 40 years or so. Is it a military function? Sure. I wasn't clear on that earlier. And it is certainly one we could do much better.
"Back in the day" officers used to write (openly and otherwise) for major magazines and news publications on a VERY regular basis. Custer did it, as did John Bourke and a number of other officers who served with Crook. Nelson Miles was certainly very aware of IO, and used aspects of it to push and shape his own career. Much of what these men wrote was aimed squarely at the American public...either in defense or justification of their own actions or as an attack on a rival in the command chain (officers were much less restrained in those days).
The military needs to be aware of IO, and perhaps of equal (or greater) importance to learn the difference between IO aimed at their own ranks and that directed outside. The "Five O'Clock Follies" are a great example of failed external IO. Granted, I take a narrower view of IO than either Tom or Marc, but that's my historical focus. The military is often called on to explain or justify its actions, and by denying IO they just open themselves up for more grief. IMO, anyhow. I defer to my more learned colleagues on the rest.:)
That's actually an excellent summation of what IO is doctrinally supposed to do in support of combat ops.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Destruction, deception, PSYOPs, EW, and OPSEC, coordinated with the related activities of Civil Affairs and Public Affairs are all elements that can shape the battlefield to protect our info systems, degrade the bad guy's and support the main effort, whatever it happens to be.
The danger starts when we confuse IO with Strategic Communications and put more emphasis on "selling the brand" like IO is advertising management (WTF is the brand? The war? Our forces? Our allies?) to the public. That is vastly different to employing IO in support of ops. Recruiting Command needs to worry about it in order to put applicants in boots, but designing campaign plans to comply with a strategic communications message is a scary thought. IO supports ops; it shouldn't drive them.
The little research I have done on government relations with the media as part of my MA work has convinced me that consumers of media products seek out messages that support their preconcieved notions more often then they seek objective content on which to base opinions. I'm not sure precisely how much good strategic communications does us with an audience that doesn't seek information so much as ammo to support their current positions on issues of war and peace.
denied there was such a thing as counterinsurgency. For quite a few years, doctrinally, we were going to do Air Land Battle -- with Battle books...Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
At one time in the late 70s, that Air Land Battle bit had troops on the forward side of the Rhine and all their ammo offloaded from the tracks and in ASPs on the other side; conflict between tactical and security "Doctrine."
Doctrine not only changes, it is far from error free...I realize that. The issue is not the mechanics or the finite action, which do in some cases -- many, even -- have a military function. It is the direction and focus of the campaign itself.Quote:
IO is not merely passive nor purely non-lethal. It involves physical destruction of communications systems and networks as well as PSYOP.
I have no doubt that PSYOP can be lethal and is -- currently in the US -- essentially a military tool (that was not true in WW II, nor is it necessarily the best solution outside of major war). Though I'd note that other agencies are even today also involved in PSYOP. My question is who's in charge?Quote:
PSYOP is lethal and we do PSYOP as a military tool. If you have any doubt that PSYOP is lethal, look at the Rwandan genocide or the use of suicide bombers.
The cows that will come home will be those that kick over the milk bucket due to excesses and screwups by the Armed Forces, predominately the Army, in the process of executing the broad IO campaign.Quote:
You can say it is not our job until the cows come home. We have always done it in various fashion and we will continue to do it.
The Army has merely picked up the slack in times of peace because our system of revolving Administrations has been unwilling to provide continuity in the subject area. The fact that they have not does not mean they should not. Having a 'take charge' mentality can sometimes lead to taking charge of things that one really shouldn't be too enmeshed with.
The Army does a lot of thing by default that are not its job and most all of them detract from ability to do the things the Army should be doing...Wilf and I thank you for reaffirming our point... ;)Quote:
Where we fail in particular in this IO effort is a lack of synchronization between what occurs via the military, the political, and yes, the economic.
We do it by default but it's bigger than the Army -- and it is a governmental and political responsibility.
Sorry but I took your point as reinforcing Wilf's sayingQuote:
Thank you for reaffirming my point...
We do it by default but it's bigger than the Army -- and it is a governmental and political responsibility.
With :Quote:
IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.
So you do agree that we have a role in IO?Quote:
Truer words were rarely spoken. We may forget that but if we do it will be at significant downstream cost to the Armed Forces.
Moreover, much of IO as it is defined falls exclusively in the military realm as in PSYOP, EW, and kinetic destruction. We do it because it is part of our mission and that is not by default. Our doctrine says that we do it and yes I can to come up with any number of examples of doctrinal errors. But as it stands now, it is in the doctrine of our armed forces and we train and execute it constantly.
Tom
CAVGuy mentioned to me last week that he heard an O-7(?) say that instead of an OPORD with an IO annex we should be writing IO orders with operations' annexes
So that's correct.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Sure we do. A role. The question is; should it be our realm as opposed to us having a or some role(s)?Quote:
So you do agree that we have a role in IO?
However, Wilf said:I agree with his first phrase; it is political. I'm not sure how anyone can deny that. I also agree with part of the second phrase; it should be the doctrinal and planning realm of the the government, not the Armed Forces. What we're quibbling about is the word 'entirely' and its application. "Realm" to me implies control and I believe that such control of IO must be a total governmental responsibility. I'll certainly concede that 'entirely' cannot be correctly applied to execution of some aspects because the Armed Forces do, will and must have some implementing actions -- in war, even the majority of such actions -- but the direction should be from the government.Quote:
"...It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.
I submit that at this time, the Armed Forces are largely doing that direction bit by default and I believe that is not a good thing. It is currently enshrined in NATO and US Doctrine, IMO, because the touchy feely governmental milieus that exist today are perfectly willing to fob off any dirty work to the military. Said military, being good, can-do guys, pick up the slack and try to do the job as best they can. The problem, as you said, is that does not address the political or economic portions of the pie nor does it address IO issues that fall outside a Theater of operations and thus the 'diplomatic' portion of the political aspect is too often ignored. Someone has to tie all that together and the Armed Forces cannot do it -- unless we're on a total war footing, ala WW II. So yet again, the residue of that war dictates the actions of the US Army...
As to the rights or wrongs of the current approach, I'll merely point out that by almost everyone's acknowledgement, the US today is pretty consistently getting creamed in the IO sphere... :wry:I totally agree that much of IO does fall in the realm of execution by the Armed Forces and that those parts which logically do so are not inherited by default; I do not agree that the whole bag properly belongs to said Forces. I'd also submit that much EW and virtually all kinetic destruction are at best only arguably IO operations (but that's a different thread).Quote:
Moreover, much of IO as it is defined falls exclusively in the military realm as in PSYOP, EW, and kinetic destruction. We do it because it is part of our mission and that is not by default...
That also is true -- but it doesn't address the question of who should have the overall responsibility for the IO effort. Or that of how successful we are in implementing the current 'doctrine'...Quote:
... Our doctrine says that we do it and yes I can to come up with any number of examples of doctrinal errors. But as it stands now, it is in the doctrine of our armed forces and we train and execute it constantly.
Just for clarity here is a brief extract concerning what IO is and what it is not according to Joint Pub 3-13 Information Operations 2006:
That is the current doctrine in IO at the Joint level. One thing of note is that strategic communications are separated from IO as a US government function per below:Quote:
Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.
IO consists of five core capabilities which are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. Of the five, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first by EW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing an adversary and other target audiences (TAs) by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information environment.
Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but can also serve other wider purposes.
There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civil military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy, specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.
Personally I believe such a separation is artificial at best and I would agree that if we lump strat comms into strat IO we are indeed getting our asses kicked. In that regard I agree 110% that it is a national issue and we--the military--are but supporting actors on the greater stage.Quote:
strategic communication. Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power
But at the operational and tactical levels we have made dramatic advances in IO since 2003 and especially since 2005. Some of those advances were luck but many were due to applied learning. We have learned -- again-- that COIN is not firepower dependent. And gradually we have incorporated non-military elements in that tactical and operational IO effort.
The above statement is wrong. IO does apply to the military. It is not purely political. Soldiers on patrol are very much part of the IO effort.Quote:
IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.
Best
Tom
dispute about application of the word 'entirely' in Wilf's statement. Small matter.
More importantly, I totally agree with you on these:Ain't semantics grand... ;)Quote:
"...if we lump strat comms into strat IO we are indeed getting our asses kicked. In that regard I agree 110% that it is a national issue and we--the military--are but supporting actors on the greater stage."
"...at the operational and tactical levels we have made dramatic advances in IO since 2003 and especially since 2005. Some of those advances were luck but many were due to applied learning. We have learned -- again-- that COIN is not firepower dependent. And gradually we have incorporated non-military elements in that tactical and operational IO effort."
"...Soldiers on patrol are very much part of the IO effort."
What one perceives is what one uses to categorize/identify reality. IO is largely, if not entirely, about shaping perceptions, and, as result, one's view of reality. Sometimes that is done by a kinetic restructuring of the perceptual field; sometimes it is done by a non-kinetic restructuring. As an example of the latter, OPSEC and camouflage preclude or limit observations/perceptions and, thereby, reorder what one's reality is.
No military force is able, uinilaterally, to so effect an another entity's perceptions in all of the aspects that would be necessary in order to get that other to reshape its view of reality sufficiently to change how it conducts its affairs. The military may have a lion's share of the IO operations pie at certain places and times. However, the full scope of IO operations between two adversarial nations far exceeds the abilities of the military. It is a case of all four pieces, not just a subset of DIME, talking the talk and walking the walk at the same time, and for the duration.
BTW, using a Joint Pub as a basis for defining IO seems to me to be a little bit of circular reasoning or an appeal to inappropriate authority--kind of like take a pronouncement from the Pope that Roman Catholicism is the true religion. ;)
I will read with interest, but I might further clarify my basic premise by saying, the Military needs to stay away from the media.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
If by IO we mean leaflet drops, PA broadcasts and good old "PysOps" stuff, then OK. You are merely spreading a message, to better enable your operational and tactical aims. "Don't eat yellow snow, etc" Fine! No problem.
The second you start trying to use CNN, FOX, SKY or BBC to be part of that process, you've just rubbed up the Genie!
I'm sure some soldier somewhere has issued false orders over the radio when they knew the enemy was listening. I don't know all the doctrinal definitions, but it sounds like an information operation to me.
and the relevance of that to the discussion is?Quote:
Originally Posted by Rank amateur
IO involving the media can be a dodgy bit. But it has been waged successfully before by State actors; British IO operations using both domestic and foreign newspapers scored quite some success in WWI; the prime example of this, the British exploitation of the Zimmerman Telegram, was crucial to the course of the War. Similarly, the Brits were able to wage a reasonably successfully IO war against Germany and Japan in WWII - and again scoring considerable political successful with perhaps the main target audience - the U.S. No doubt that this was due in no small part to having "the man" and "the plan" in the person and policies of Winston Churchill - soldier, journalist, politician, and Scotch afficionado - a most useful combination for dealing with this sort of matter if there ever was one. And the U.S., especially in the person of Lt.Gen. Kelly, waged a media campaign during ODS that was little short of brilliant - though incidents such as the "Highway of Death", with crucial political and subsequently military consequences, nevertheless occurred.
But you have to have real, dedicated and resourced, specialists, higher commanders with a real grasp of the import of the IO effort, and a true unity of effort (centred upon a common goal with a common approach and single consistent - though still as inherently flexible as possible; easier said than done, message) between services and especially between the Government and the Military. The political message must be clear, concise, and unremitting. Without all that, more or less, it's just a tragicomedy of errors, sheep positively throwing themselves to the wolves.
Posted on another thread, apologies if seen before, seems to fit here too:
Try the website of Professor Phil Taylor, Leeds University I am sure there will be something there: http://129.11.188.64/papers/index.cfm?outfit=pmt
He spoke recently on Psyops and has a ppt on AQ propaganda / use of the web; hopefully here on his site.
davidbfpo
Hi Wilf,
Hmmm. My problem with this is that I consider it to be impossible in the current information / civic environment. What the military does will be reported, so the media needs to be given a context in which that action is embedded. The reasoning for this is that, in the absence of a given context, the media will create their own context. I would also point out that this refers to the Mainstream Media (MSM) and not the "New Media" (e.g. bloggers etc., - Frontier 6 should wade in on this one).Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I would certainly consider that to be part of IO; just not the whole. Context, context, context... as a friend of mine in Mass Communications keeps mumbling. "Context" is a battlespace and one that, IMO, is often forgotten. Why did those nasty AF types bomb a wedding party in Afghanistan? A pre-emptive media, context-strike would have set that up before hand. It was still a blunder (amongst other, less printable, terms), but some of the effects of (inevitably) poor targeting operations in COIN can be countered by pre-emptive media context strikes. That, IMO, is also one of the roles of IO; establishing the context in which operations take place.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Maybe, but CNN et alii are part of the battlespace and denying that is analogous to arguing that infantry shouldn't think about what's in the air because that "ain't my department".Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
why I keep seeing ads for "Should Hillary Quit" in the google ad space? Honestly, the semantics behind that choice of ad being served in a thread on IO are truly fascinating :cool:!
It is an interesting discussion that we keep having at work ... is that PSYOP or is it physical destruction with a second and perhaps third order cognitive effect?Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
PSYOP is not pulling the trigger, wielding the machete or setting off the detonator ... that is physical destruction just the same as it would be for precisely placing a JDAM onto a key leadership target or the application of rapid aimed fire into an adversary.
Propaganda (we always like to make the distinction between us and them as futile as it seems) played a very definite role in influencing the cognitive process that lead to the Rwanda actions and the effects post the destructive activities were mostly psychological in that it reinforced the propaganda and influenced the cognitive to continue the bloodshed.
I would then argue was what we saw was IO ... the coordinated application of a number of lethal and non-lethal effects ISO of a line of operation.
Based on the assumption that IO is only targeted at an adversary.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
What a joy it is to not have any of that Smith-Mundt crap creating artificial firewalls between effects.
Our doctrine (which is not on the web) clearly identified that IO is a Operational activity. At the tactical end it is IO elements doing what they do best IAW the operational plan. At the strat level we "shape and influence" and if people get really smart and think about 80 per cent of those effects are created through a PA function. The remainder is done through specific strat targeting and as we see it simple relationships.
We are well progressed into a WoG approach to this. I chair a quarterly Strat-Com Working Group across all Fed Gov departments and we develop a WoG thematic approach to our operations regularly the receives the highest level of sign-off ... for those departments who only do PA our Strat-Com guidance gives thematic consistency. For those departments who actually execute operations it provides the strategic left and right for our operational documentation. When coupled with a strategic targeting directive which authorises the varying lethal and non-lethal effects, any restriction inherent on them and established a CDE methodology the Military has everything it needs to use information actions across the lines of operations. In no way does this mean we lying, deceiving or anything else in the media ... it just means that from a WoG perspective (and to borrow one of my favourite US Military terms) we achieve strategic “joined-uppedness” that supports our operations.
Whereas I quite like the working definition approved by the CJCS in Sep 2004 and became our mantra at MNF-I STRATCOM:Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
It looks surprisingly like the Aussie definition if you find and replace country names ;)Quote:
The transmission of integrated and coordinated U.S. Government themes and messages that advance U.S. interests and policies through a synchronised interagency effort supported by public diplomacy, public affairs and military information operations, in concert with other political, economic, information and military actions.
PS: my apoligies for the rapid-fire posting ... that's what I get for living on the other side of the world.
This is another can of worms - when IO becomes fused (or confused) with "Effects" - because the EBO boys actually say that EBO can be used "against" allies and neutrals. - and IO is a major part of EBO (and how do you usefully define the differences or two operational concepts that lack a useful or accurate definition)Quote:
Originally Posted by Spud
The ultimate sense of all this, is that ultimately a military commander may use EBO and IO to effect his own "political" leadership, or the leadership of an NGO, neutral entity, or even allie. The only person I have ever met who was uncomfortable with that realisation was a former ZAPU commander!
What I am taking from this whole discussion is that there is marked reluctance to prescribe areas as "non-military" because admitting the limits of military thought and thus military power makes folks uncomfortable.
No Ken, I dispute the absolute pronouncement of Wilf's statement, meaning the entire statement and not merely the word entirely.Quote:
Ken: dispute about application of the word 'entirely' in Wilf's statement. Small matter.
IO does apply to the breaking of will; PSYOP targets the enemy and the relevant population.Quote:
Wilf:
IO is the nothing to do with the application of force for the breaking of will.
It is therefore nothing to do with the military. It is entirely political, and thus the realm of civil servants and elected officials.
It is part of military operations as well as political and economic
As Marc correctly says, this is absolutely impossible in today's operational environment. Media is part of the battlefield just like hills, deserts, and anything else you must adjust to as you fight. Moreover, trying to stay away from or isolate the media is not only fruitless, it is semi-suicidal.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
I will read with interest, but I might further clarify my basic premise by saying, the Military needs to stay away from the media.
Get out more. Wellington used IO although he did not call it that. Montgomery used IO. "Chinese" Gordon was at first an IO tool dispatched to the Sudan; he reversed the coin and used his status in Khartoum to influence the British government, of course losing his head in the process. Peacekeeping missions are to a very large degree IO formations as they are trip wires.Quote:
The ultimate sense of all this, is that ultimately a military commander may use EBO and IO to effect his own "political" leadership, or the leadership of an NGO, neutral entity, or even allie. The only person I have ever met who was uncomfortable with that realisation was a former ZAPU commander!
What would you use to define doctrine other than the capstone doctrinal reference? I used the definiion to add some clarity to what is being discussed in discussing doctrine, perhaps seeing a doctrinal refence might help.Quote:
WM: BTW, using a Joint Pub as a basis for defining IO seems to me to be a little bit of circular reasoning or an appeal to inappropriate authority--kind of like take a pronouncement from the Pope that Roman Catholicism is the true religion.
Tom
I concede it is impossible to discount the media, in the same way it is impossible to discount the weather. In the same way that you cannot control (or even fully predict) the weather, nor can you the media.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
You can inoculate yourself from the negative effects of the weather, and likewise the media. The media is what Clausewitz would have regarded as "friction".
The whole premise of IO, as I understand it, is that you can influence the media. To support this premise, we always seem to default to examples like Hezbollah and say "ooh look! They do it." - when they have no moral or legal restraints.
If someone can genuinely discuss how you can teach a legally mandated overt military grouping to consistently and successfully "influence the media," then I am all ears - as a lot of other questionable ideas and assumptions made by modern military thinkers would then fall into place.
...the only problem would still be a complete lack of evidence that any of this actually works as planned.
And that means that you do not understand IO at least as it applies in US military doctrine. It is a much larger concept than simply media relations. Public affairs is related to IO but not the core of IO.Quote:
The whole premise of IO, as I understand it, is that you can influence the media. To support this premise, we always seem to default to examples like Hezbollah and say "ooh look! They do it." - when they have no moral or legal restraints.
Of course we can influence the media. Anyone who choses to speak to the media will influence the media; the question is whether the results are positive or negative. And there is absolutely nothing dark or sinister about doing so; it has been done in many wars and many lands. As for evidence on whether media relations works, well look at the SWJ media rundown and see how many articles refer to media-military contacts.
But again in merely saying that IO is all about influencing the media, you are missing the larger effort.
Tom
As a tiny vignette on Tac IO and media relations, this ain't bad at al...
Quote:
Captain as Maestro, Conducting Amid Crises
On a recent winter evening in Mosul, Capt. David Sandoval sat at his desk dealing with the day’s various crises.
Michael Kamber for The New York Times
Capt. David Sandoval in Mosul, speaking with his men out on a difficult mission. “I sleep at least three hours a day,” he said.
Insurgents had fired on one of his platoons, killing a 10-year-old boy nearby. The captain sent men into the neighborhood to make sure residents knew American troops had not fired, and “to get the message out that the insurgents only bring you death and hardship,” he said.
Radios squawked updates from the field, and a phone rang incessantly with changes to a battle plan.
Two laptops sat before the captain. On one he updated targets his men would capture and kill before the night was over. He switched to the second computer and tried to finish a letter to his soldiers’ Family Readiness Group, run by his wife in the United States.
at all sure we do...Even though you also said:Quote:
Quote:
Ken: dispute about application of the word 'entirely' in Wilf's statement. Small matter.
No Ken, I dispute the absolute pronouncement of Wilf's statement, meaning the entire statement and not merely the word entirely.
Items which are abviously beyond the capability of the Armed foreces to integrate...Quote:
Where we fail in particular in this IO effort is a lack of synchronization between what occurs via the military, the political, and yes, the economic.
I also said ""Ain't semantics grand...;)""
You further said, in response to WM:Could I possibly and respectfully suggest that you are discussing Doctrine as it stands while some of us are discussing policy as it should be?Quote:
What would you use to define doctrine other than the capstone doctrinal reference? I used the definiion to add some clarity to what is being discussed in discussing doctrine, perhaps seeing a doctrinal refence might help.
Wayne made a very interesting point when he said that using doctrine to define IO was similar to using a Papal announcement. In one way, he is absolutely correct in this - it creates a self-limiting discussion; a semantic tautology if you will. At the same time, I think there is a real problem with not having a definition of IO and most of them come from doctrine.
So, in my usually modest way, I'm going to build one outside of doctrine, legal restrictions, etc. and see what we can come up with :cool:.
Let's start with some part defintions. First, what is "information"? My favorite definition of information, for a variety of reasons, comes from Gregory Bateson: "Information is a difference that makes a difference". From Steps to an Ecology of Mind (2000 edition):
"What is it in the territory that gets onto the map?" We know the territory does not get onto the map. That is the central point about which we here are all agreed. Now, if the territory were uniform, nothing would get onto the map except its boundaries, which are the points at which it ceases to be uniform against some larger matrix. What gets onto the map, in fact, is difference, be it a difference in altitude, a difference in vegetation, a difference in population structure, difference in surface, or whatever. Differences are the things that get onto a map.This is part of a larger discussion on the map-territory problem in epistemology; a problem that Wilf is alluding to when he defines IO as not part of the military sphere of operations (it's definitional).
A difference is a very peculiar and obscure concept. It is certainly not a thing or an event. This piece of paper is different than the wood of this lectern. There are many differences between them - of colour, texture, shape, etc... Of this infinitude, we select a very limited number which become information. In fact, what we mean by information - the elementary unit of information - is a difference which makes a difference (pp.457-459).
Now, second definition; what is an "operation"? I would suggest (not require ;)) that an "operation" be defined as an "action which has the potential to transform some part of perceived or material reality". Note that there is absolutely nothing about intentionality in that definition, nor is there anything about who is acting or who is being acted upon - this allows for unanticipated consequences of actions in unintentional populations (the Butterfly Effect from Chaos theory if you will).
My earlier comments that mediaspace is a battlespace derive from this observation - it may not be part of the military "map", but it certainly has an indirect effect on military operations and hence must be part of an updated military map. This requirement, i.e. that mediaspace (broadly construed) must have a significant place in the military mapping of their battlespace is how I interpreted the argument by Frontier 6 on the SWJ blog. As to why it must be considered as part of the battlespace, I think Frontier 6 makes some good points, but I would add in a few others:
If we combine these two definitions together, we end up with a definition of Information Operations that reads something like this:
- The media, both "old" and "new", helps to define and shape the "national will".
- The "new" media allows for the rapid recruitment and deployment of pattern-based assets in the current conflict (a "pattern-based asset is any pattern of information that might "make a difference" to the current conflict, e.g. information on location, numbers, etc., recruitment, interpretation of current intelligence, PSYOPS, computer viruses, weapons construction plans, training materials, etc.).
- The fragmentation of the media (both old and new), along with the introduction of highly interactive media (mainly "new") has reduced the efficiency of operations based around broadcast technologies (e.g. TV, Radio, Newspapers, etc.; See Levinson, The Soft Edge for a really good discussion of this).
- The fragmentation of the media has also reduced the reach of any singular form of media and increased the formation of contingent and specialized communities.
Information operations are actions taken to produce changes in the material and perceptual realities of populations through the redefinition of those populations perceptual "maps".Yes, I know that such a definition includes things such as propaganda, PSYOPS, strategic communications, etc. ;). In order to bring that definition down to something that is a little more manageable and usable by the military, it should be possible to isolate a sub-set of these operations that have a direct effect on what I called "pattern-based assets" in point 2 (above).
Having tossed the cat amongst the pigeons, think its time for another cup of coffee :D.
Marc
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Abu Assad DulaimyQuote:
"We admit we lost the media battle, but we didn’t lose the military battle”
Spokesman for the insurgent-led Mujaheddin Shura Council that controlled Fallujah,
Washington Post Dec. 18, 2004
How?Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
The whole concept of a WoG approach to operations instantly negates this. If I acheive thematic consistency in messaging and establish the key narrative in a WoG sense the strategic guidance is being given to the operational commander. We don't operate without it. There is no way in hell I could influence my version of State, USAID or any of the other departments into approving S&I objectives that are focussed in that regard. What we've achieved (through lots of banging of heads on tables) is a WoG failsafe that ensures our military information activities have clearly defined left and right of arcs fully supported by the remainder of Government.
The only nut we have yet to crack is when we work hard to synch with our coalition partners but at the WoG level there are other issues at play ... look at the current NATO troop commitment issue ... no one is near cracking that nut.
MarcQuote:
Originally Posted by marct
from our down-under POV ... spot on. Army currently operates within eight Battlefield Operating Systems one of which is the IO BOS. Over the past few years it has been in and out of doctrine as higher struggled with where it fit ... is it C2 or is it a BOS of its own? For us (currently) it is the same as manoeuvre or offensive support or even (I'm cringing here) CSS.
Our use of IO in this regard is not the carefully constructed (so as not to offend anyone) US IO definition posted by Tom ... it is simply an aspect of operations in which we can apply combat functions to create an effect.
IO for us doesn't actually do anything more than coord and synch ... I can't IO you but I can deny, influence, destroy, inform etc using IO and non-IO elements. If I tie all of those actions together to create a specific effect ISO of a wider acty (or sometimes not) ... that is IO.
While it means our doctrine is somewhat unwieldy ... ie everything is IO yet nothing is IO it has allowed us to truly crack the nut whereas the latest US one reigning it all back as only the five elements of COPED has simply meant true synchronisation is that more difficult as for the most part it is conducted by scifwits behind closed doors in separate compartments.
My experiences in MNF-I in 04 proved the value of co-ording and synching these effects. STRATCOM in that HQs achieved successes that have never been replicated because we physically made the PD, PA and IO types sit in the same room and work together. Unfortunately however that loss of a dynamic one-star saw old rivalries come to fore and the organisation as it stood disintegrated and went back to operating in silos.
WoG may (what ever that is). I just take it as being axiomatic that any concept that talks about "influencing adversaries, allies and neutrals," runs the risk of commanders seeking to influence their political leadership, AND having the doctrinal justification to do so.Quote:
Originally Posted by Spud
This is what I find so frustrating about all these wiz-bang concepts. They all seem to lack simple definitions, that state simply:
What it is. Why we do it. How it should be done.
...and the counter argument is always "Oh, it's all terribly complex!" Frankly, the Babylonian Talmud, makes more sense to me than some of the stuff we discuss here! :)
At the most senior levels of military operations, commanders DO influence their political leadership. Every single day. The most effective plan for how they’re going to do it. They provide military impact assessments when political leaders decide to undertake a particular diplomatic course of action. They argue for resources. They propose Concepts of Operation for how to execute an op, and submit that COA to leaders along with a briefing that is designed to sway the approval authority’s opinion. The Commander who doesn’t influence his political leadership is negligent because one of his principle jobs is to utilize his many years of training and experience to ensure that the actions the military is asked to execute are feasible and nested with national security objectives. But … influencing your own political leadership (or that of allied nations) is not what IO (the military operation) is about, and that’s why this conversation keeps bouncing around so much.
IO has a pretty simple definition and is a pretty simple concept, but I guess certain concepts are more difficult for some people to grasp than they are for others. I have a hard time with non-Euclidian geometry. ;) It’s very difficult to talk about IO intelligently when those discussing it refuse to adhere to a common lexicon. If, for example we set out to discuss "football coaches," it will prove challenging to hold an intelligent conversation if you are referring to large vehicles that carry soccer fans while I am referring to the men who are in charge of teams like the Dallas Cowboys and New England Patriots. We may be using the same phrase, but we're sure not talking about the same thing.
If the purpose of the discussion is to develop a definition for IO (as opposed to discussing an operational concept with an agreed upon definition), then the context of the discussion needs to be clarified.
IO is very difficult to execute because there are more variables in the information environment that there are on the battlefield and because there are so many amateurs employed as IO planners. Adversary, neutral, and friendly parties from around the globe have direct impact in the information environment, almost exclusive of geography; timing is critical; and the best-laid IO plans can be completely turned upside down by seemingly innocuous actions taken by people who don't intend to spoil the plan.
@ ...and in current operations, more junior commanders with access to media possess the same ability. It's how they are directed to use influence that is critical.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rockbridge
@ Which is pretty much what I have been saying since I started posting here, especially as a lot of definitions and terms used are misleading, inaccurate and nonsensical.
@ So the accepted norm for the critical activity is to entrust it to the least skilled? I'm not going to argue with this. Most of what I read about IO is amateurish and my first hand encounters with those who claim expertise in it, in relation to broadcast news, confirms your hypothesis.