Is the Clausewitzian idea of Center(s) of Gravity applicable in unconventional warfare?
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Is the Clausewitzian idea of Center(s) of Gravity applicable in unconventional warfare?
Yes, I believe it does. The definition of COG I like best came from a Navy article I once read. The quote may be imprecise but it described a COG as something you take away from the enemy so he cannot attack you! In this case it is about how the enemy can move freely because he cannot be identified. Stealth people. He dosen't wear a uniform so you don't know who he is. He can expand on this in many ways. He can steal an airliner and make his own stealth bomber and strike with the same precision as our advanced and costly smart weapons and he can conduct EBO without having an Air Force. Very cost effective. Figure out how to take this away from the enemy and he will have a big problem.
Look up Col. Boyds theories on non-cooperative centers of gravity ;)
It is the essence of unconventional warfare :cool:
In my opinion the center of gravity construct which many of our officers cling to blindly demonstrates a serious deficency in our professional education process. COG's are rarely correctly identified (assuming they exist), or the COG identified (such as the enemy's will) is useless from a strategy stand point. Furthermore, using the COG construct (assuming it works at all) only results in the defeat of the enemy's forces, but does not result in a victory (eg OIF). It doesn't allow for planning in depth. The sooner we shelve this concept, or at least subordinate it to other methodologies the better for the force.
Center of gravity is viewed and handled from only a physical standpoint.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
At times we seem to get enamored with physical centers of gravity because they fall into the easy to do category and can be assigned relatively simple metrics / measures of effectiveness. Second and third order effects are easy to identify, nodal analysis is easy, and the list can go on…Quote:
Originally Posted by GorTex6
Problem with Small Wars and COIN is that it is the human element and how it interacts with the physical environment that presents the problem set we face.
Several schools of thought have emerged over the last several years – one is that the civilian population is always the COG, another is that there are multiple COG’s, and yet another is there are no "true" centers of gravity in a Small Wars / COIN scenario.
Somewhere in all this – Lines of Operations fall out and I believe that probably is the best way to go… At least in getting a grasp on the systems of systems human and physical environment we are faced with.
Again, I apologize for commenting on something I know so little about. This quote from GorTex6 seems completely true to me.Quote:
Originally Posted by GorTex6
Unless you want to break the trust of your enemy, the enemy needs to see you exactly as you are. If the enemy sees you as an adaptive force that controls the COG in all situations, then, to remain in his OODA loop, which was formed when we penetrated his country, you have to give the enemy your complete trust and remain an adaptive force that controls the COG in all situations. Once the trust is broken the enemy has to readapt to the situation, which he seems to be very good at accomplishing. Strategically it may remain a good way to keep a lot of the enemy’s energy occupied by making him adapt, and in time the political force in Iraq might change for the better.
Perhaps, I should have stated my opinion in the original posting. I believe that Dr. Strange's COG construct of Critical Capability(s), Critical Requirement(s), and Critical Vulnerability(s) is VERY useful. However, I do not believe that we as planners should be slaves to this construct. The true utility of this construct is in assisting planners conduct conceptual planning and visualize the threat. No, not all adversaries fit neatly into this construct; however, by going through the process, one is capable of finding a 90% solution that will assist in futher detailed planning.
For Iraq, I would argue that there are 2 main adversaries - Sunni Rejectionists and Terrorists/Foreign Fighters. Most would agree that little can be done to positively influence the later except for direct kinetic acts, thus we are left with Sunni Rejectionists. Yes, I recognize that Sadr is not a Sunni Rejectionist; however, I would assert he is a minor threat who has demonstrated a desire to be included in the legitimate political process. In addition, I recognize that there are criminals that continue to destabilize the country, but that is no different than in the US, thus hardly worthy of comparison with rejectionists and terrorists.
Is it possible that the strategic and operational center of gravity for OIF is the Muslim - Sunni perception/feeling of marginalization - victimization? If coalition forces and the Iraqi government could somehow eradicate this perception and feeling, would our troubles not largely disappear? I say largely disappear due to the fact most agree that terrorists represent a small fraction of insurgents in Iraq. It is this feeling of victimization that leads Muslims to strike back. It is this sense of being victims of Israeli or American power that fuels anti-Western hatred. It is this sense of victimization that leads 300,000 former members of the Iraqi Intel, Security, and Military services to contribute to the insurgency.
If we accept this a the COG, then how is it vulnerable. Immediately, we see inclusion as the answer in Iraq, and not as we are currently mandating it through the "democratic" process. I put democratic in quotations due to the fact that any system which mandates 25% female representation regardless of the one man one vote idea is not democratic.
In the end, if the Brits can live with Martin McGuiness or Gerry Adams taking a seat in Parliament, then we can live with the Baath Party in Iraq.
ps - I have heard compelling arguments that the COG is the enemy's continued ability to destabilize the country, and that the critical requirement necessary for this to continue is our continued presence.
In resposne to Strickland's post:
I respect most, if not all, contributors to this council, for their contributions to the body of knowledge we are all trying to master, yet I still find many of their arguments against EBO illogical, especially when they turn around and embrace the center of gravity theory. While it does have limited application, it also is an extremely limited construct that doesn’t facilitate a strategy for winning a war. In some cases it may allow a strategy to defeat a particular enemy, but that is seldom enough. During phase III of OIF the COG was the Saddam Regime, and as we saw that foucs only provided a worthwhile intermediate objective, but destroying it didn’t allow us to win the war, of which military power is a only a part of.
Getting back to your comments, while thought provoking I think your example is a perfect illustration of the limits of the COG construct. It is a desire to identify a single enabler for a complex problem set, so we can focus our limited assets on a few enabling decisive points around that COG (as close to a silver bullet solution as possible), then we call victory and go home. This is a practice that some have associated with EBO, but I think it is much more prevalent in the COG approach.
The Sunni rejectionist problem you identified must be addressed, but you can’t address it in isolation. Also identifying the Sunni rejectionist as a COG doesn’t give a planner much to work with. You can’t wish away the other problem sets, since they are all interconnected. We can’t fix the Sunni rejectionist problem without establishing a viable economy, you can’t do that without security, you can’t have security within a criminal society with foreign fighters and ethnic hostilities or regional nations that don’t support security, etc.
Little can be done to influence the foreign fighters except kinetic acts? I disagree and this is a problem of trying to find the foreign fighter COG within Iraq. Assuming there is a COG for foreign fighters, maybe it exists outside of Iraq? Foreign fighters can be addressed through a number of indirect means, to include engaging the source nations with information and assisting them with economic development, not to mention swinging the stick when needed. Another indirect approach which is effective in some areas in Iraq is to turn the population against the foreign fighters which denies them sanctuary, and greatly impedes their ability to operate. By the way this is an effects based approach.
I don’t buy into your comparison of Iraqi criminals with U.S. criminals; thereby, disregarding a problem that is equal on scale to the stability of Iraq as the Sunni rejectionists. There is a difference between a criminal and a criminal economy. What we’re really trying to focus on is the underground or informal economy. Let’s face it, at the end of the day the economic system really determines who as the power, so if a tribe makes its wealth (limited as it may be) from emplacing IEDs, kidnapping, or black market fuel sales, then what is the incentive to support a central government in Iraq that at present cannot provide a viable economic alternative to the tribes? The economy and underground economy are the key competing factions regarding the future of Iraq as a stable state. I think that criminals (who are also frequently terrorists and insurgents) are a bigger threat than the Sunni rejectionists, because they are undermining the very concept of the state.
In summary I think an effects based approach is far superior to the center of gravity construct.
Unfortunately, I have limited experience with EB planning, and each of those experiences was a poor one. Maybe I am paralyzed by personal experience; however, I believe that EBO requires a level or amount of intelligence that is unreasonable in order to work effectively.
Again, I am not arguing for a single COG; however, am suggesting that in order to get our heads around a complex problem, one must pick something instead of continuously arguing that whatever is selected is wrong.
I am one guy you don't have to respect. As far as COG goes, I think the best maneuver is a flanking move, EBO to me is the firebombing of Japan during WWII, and I believe the forces in Iraq are composed of remnants of the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the Arabs, not to mention the forces of the USA. In short, I am completely ignorant. I believe COG keeps our troop alive; EBO only works if the General in charge envisions it, and I believe we are in the middle of wars fought long ago for goals both won and lost. I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
I think it is too late for the Baath party, they should be eliminated from the planet earth. Our strategy should be one of transformation instead of reform. This comes from the visions of our Generals and not through our civilian leadership.Quote:
Originally Posted by Strickland
Sometimes I read all the "smart guy" stuff and wonder what planet that conference was held on...Quote:
I am a simpleton. While this makes me without a place in today’s complex world, I have an extremely fast OODA loop.
Larry claims to have a fast OODA loop, but I think we all do or we would simply perish, but speed is not the sole essence of the OODA loop. John Boyd focused on speed when he used the OODA loop model from a fighter pilot perspective, but expanded the OODA loop concept considerably to address what we're now calling 4th generation warfare while he was assigned to Thailand.
We observe, we orient (perceive), we decide and we act, but both sides when they start a conflict are relatively weak at the orientation aspect due to the cultural biases we bring to the table. There is usually a learning curve (or should be) after observing the results of our actions. OIF is a perfect example where we learned after repeated failures that mass search and sweep operations were not effective at catching or killing bad guys, and they further alienated the local population, which in the end played into the enemy's hands. If you have some sort of effects based approach you'll learn and adapt, but if you're beholden to a COG you'll tend to stay the course regardless.
As for simply picking one system (COG or EBO) and running with it, why? Why do we have to have a regimented system that "limits" our ability to define and solve problems? We need less emphasis on planning systems/methods and more emphasis on independent thinking.
I'm not a big advocate of Effects Based Operations methods that are coming out of OSD and JFCOM, and concur with your comments on EBO, the planning episodes I have witnessed have been disappointing to say the least. We have tech centric leadership at OSD now, and if they keep evolving EBO into an information technology reliant system it will fail, as many of us have already seen, yet there are still some good aspects of using an effects based approach that will enable us to become a learning organization. It won't keep us from making mistakes initially, but it will allow us to steer in the right direction sooner (I think).
The pie in sky dream of an on line, all knowing, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Tool that can lay out every node, predict every effect, etc. is not just a fantasy, but a dangerous one that will make a few contractors rich, and in the end DoD will have wished they spent that money on weapons systems, getting spare parts for helicopters, etc.
It is the ability to analyze a spectrum of "noise", deduce information, and synthesize a new reality ie. build snowmobilesQuote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Fast thinkers are impulsive, slow thinkers think big
My OODA loop is fast because I live in a simple environment, with very few influences trying to get into my orientation and decision-making. I, as all Americans do, have implicit laws that enable me to move quickly from my orientation to decision making.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
If I were in Iraqi this would not be the case. I would still have those implicit laws, but I need to know my enemy’s orientation to influence his decision-making. To get up to speed, I would first try to get inside the insurgents OODA loop as outlined in the 28 articles on another post at this site. My speed would then depend on how fast I could understand the situation as it unfolds, I can't imagine it being all that fast.
Exactly true. Trust is the real important quality, without trust you cannot enter your enemy's loop and he can't enter yours. You have to trust your enemy to act like you think he will. If he doesn't he has broken the link (trust) between you. If you act unlike your enemy thinks you will, he will have to adapt to the situation or be destroyed. It seems to me they are adapting. I have no knowledge if this is so, and will gladly concede this point.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
“… when they start a conflict [they] are relatively weak at the orientation aspect…” Not true! The orientation aspect was strong (and quick) on both sides. We simply did not know each other’s orientations very well (the US military and the forces (all of them) in Iraq).Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
The information we needed in the beginning was in the Observation aspect. We had to know exactly what the enemy was doing and at all times. This was the reason for the rush to get information. This is especially true during a high maneuver strategy such as a blitzkrieg.
Bill Moore's statement can't be over emphasized. After gathering information to satisfy our observation of the enemy, we needed to know him (28 articles) and ourselves. This new knowledge is what enables an army to plan what the enemy will do. We got into their OODA loop and they enter ours. Whoever reacts quicker wins the battle, but not necessary the war.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
One reason might be because that is the system that the enemy knows you will use, and you know you can defeat him with it. According to Boyd, you want to react as your enemy's orientation dictates and not how yours dictate. If the only thing you know about the enemy is that he understands how you move, I guess you have to go with that. I know too little about your COG and EBO, so I really can't be more specific. Even if I did know more, I am a civilian so my overall knowledge on how the military operates is very limited.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
War has such a high level of chance and the outcome can be, well... so final, I wouldn't want any "limits", but then I don't know the limiting factors in the military.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
Emboldening the front-line troops wins battles, but I am beginning to believe that it takes leaders with vision, and knowledge to win wars. I also believe this vision has to begin at the top. Independent thinking is great for winning battles, but the US military needs to present a unifying strategy to win this war.
If the COG is about installing leadership in the Iraqi government, I would say that sounds about right. If the EBO is directed at influencing that leadership, I would say that sounds about right. Using EBO against the enemy is great if all the effects it causes are known. I am just not sure if it can be known completely in such a complex situation.
If the companies are trying to sell you a system (pie-in-the-sky) that wins every battle, it is too late, you guys already accomplish that. Sounds to me like a bunch of whistles and bells you don’t need.
Your knowledge of the facts of the situation sound spot on. It sounds to me like the discussion for and against COG or EBO needs to be carried forward by qualified guys like you.
In Iraq the enemy is primarily targeting noncombatants so that the media will say it is another example of the US sides failure to stop them from engaging in mass murder. Our primary response to this has been to concentrate on finding and taking out bomb builders and better intelligence in finding those doing the attacks. What is missing from this loop is an attempt to get inside the news cycle or to challenge the premise of the stories. The enemy has said that 80 percent of his battle space is in the media, yet we have no one in charge of fighting in that battle space. The weekly newsbriefings run as many as seven days behind the news cycle. Too often a charge is thrown out and it takes days and sometimes weeks for a response, by which time the cycle has moved on to a new charge to be investigated. If we took the same approach to a kinetic battle space, we would have a lot of friendly KIA's to deal with.
Here is an example of an average day's worth of Iraq reporting (MSM, Official and Blogs):
Iraq and OIF / Telic / Catalyst
- Bush Says U.S., Iraq Will Assess Troop Levels - Reuters
- Coalition, Iraqi Leaders Meet to Discuss Future of Iraqi Security - AFPS
- Talks on Security Continue in Iraq - Los Angeles Times
- PM: Iraqi Forces Could Stand Alone in 2007 - Agence France-Presse
- Bush to Make Assessment of Iraq's Needs for U.S. Military Help - VOA
- Delay in Key Iraqi Ministries Will Affect U.S. Troop Levels - VOA
- U.S., Britain to Start Iraq Exit in July - The Australian
- Far From Model Army but Iraq's Troops Battle On - London Daily Telegraph
- Iraqi Security Forces Leading Operations in More Areas - AFPS
- Diggers to Pull Out of Muthanna if Iraqis Take Over - The Australian
- Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos - New York Times
- Iraqi Insurgent Gives Chilling Confession - Washington Post
- 30 Iraqis Die in Attacks Across the Nation - New York Times
- 40 Killed in Iraq, 11 Near Shiite Mosque - Associated Press
- Bomb Kills at Least 11 at Baghdad Shi'ite Mosque - Reuters
- Hands-Off or Not? Saudis Wring Theirs Over Iraq - Los Angeles Times
- Rights Under Assault In Iraq, U.N. Unit Says - Washington Post
- U.S. Is Faulted for Using Private Military Workers - Los Angeles Times
- Amnesty Urges U.S. on Iraq Contractors - Associated Press
- U.S. Urged to Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters - New York Times
- Judging Iraq On Its Own Terms - Christian Science Monitor Editorial
- Iraq's Next Giant Step - Seattle Times Editorial
- Revisionist History - Wall Street Journal Commentary
- For Neocons, the Irony of Iraq - Washington Post Commentary
- Iraqi Progress - Washington Times Commentary
- Securing Baghdad is a Numbers Game - Los Angeles Times Commentary
- Troop Withdrawal To Speed Up: Guardian - Captain's Quarters Blog
- U.S. & Great Britain Will Start Iraq Exit in July - Gateway Pundit Blog
- Government Forms; Recent Counterterrorism Ops - Counterterrorism Blog
The list with the links is here. I read most of it and post the links every day. I feel many of the same frustrations as Merv in reference to lagging behind the MSM daily news cycle on events in Iraq, Afghanistan and the GWOT.
Many of the blogs pick up some of the slack but they do not have the wide exoposure the MSM does. Moreover, many (if not most) of the blog readers tend to be selective and visit blogs that more or less reinforce their particular views on Iraq and other issues.
The official DoD press reporting and transcripts lag behind events and tend towards straight forward script that reads like press releases.
DoD did try to get into the enemy's IO OODA Loop but the program to pay Iraqi reporters was outed and the MSM had a field day with that, to say the least.
Merv I don't disagree, but I would love to quote your source that the enemy said 80% of their battle space is the media if you can find and share it. I know we have all read and heard a lot over the years, so you may not have it at your fingertips.
From an effects based approach, the information system is definitely the most important, as it has a disproportionate impact on all the other systems such as political, economic, social, military, etc. We can win every kinetic battle and still lose if we can’t effectively influence the info sphere.
Although we discussed at length the failure of our ability to influence the info sphere in previous discussions, this is the first example I have seen where you framed the argument using the OODA loop construct, which is simply brilliant. Obvious in hindsight, but not until you pulled open the curtains.
I think we should run with this a little more. We may be able to convince our public affairs officers to get off their duff and respond quicker, but I don’t think that is the right answer. For those of us in the military, we all know we’re repelled by most commercials, and news on the Armed Forces Network (AFN). It comes across as simpleton in nature and disingenuous, I rather Korean, German, or Japanese television. Instead of having a polished prince presenting the approved official side of the story after the response has been murder boarded a few times, why not let one of our NCOs or younger officers speak directly to the media about what happened right after it happened? It may not be polished, but it will be genuine and from the heart and people will have no choice but to believe it. That is the type of IO that will have an impact.
I won’t even attempt to sugarcoat what we did in Abu Grab, and in my opinion the failure of our leadership to aggressively respond to it, gave the enemy an IO victory of enormous scale. Of course ever so slowly we brought several of the culprits to justice, but it was a behind the scenes show. How do you manage the damage for something like this? You don’t manage it, you stand on principle, what people around the world love us for, and you aggressively respond to the crime. Concurrently, and equally if not more important, we show what the terrorists are doing to the population, to include pictures of the tortured bodies. Hell, I read a depressing story today about a 12 year old Iraqi boy that was tortured to death, why wasn’t that one the front page or headline news? We have to show a clear contrast, which means we admit our mistakes, and in the case of the guilty we punish them. The terrorists are murdering pricks who brag about their atrocities online! Why can’t we get that across to the Arab street? It is a story right there to be told. We wear the white hat, that is obvious to us, but it isn’t all that clear to the Arab world. We can do better, much better.
I don't want to divert too much from the COG versus EBO argument, but this has merit.
The 80 percent figure came from one of the intercepted al Qaeda communications. I will try to find it and post a link.
I do not think public affairs offices are set up to respond in a timely way to enemy media campaigns. The best analogy I can think of off hand is a groups of trial lawyers responding in real time to the other side in complex litigation situations. They have the sense of urgency to get their sides position out there and to tear down the assertions of the other side. If properly manged by a skilled attorney they can be devatatingly effective. This is not the same as lawyers giving legal advice on operational matters. It is about presenting a case in an understandable way that ordinary people can understand. Trial lawyers are very different from deal lawyers in terms of their OODA loops. They can't afford to let testimony bad for their case just hang out there without dealing with it while it is still fresh in the minds of the fact finders.
Experienced trial lawyers tailor their message to the audience. They'll use different approaches depending upon the judge and jurors as they know them.
The Arab mindset seems a bit difficult for westerner's to wrap their heads around - certainly I don't grok it. Heightened concern for social honor, a penchant for paranoia, major concern over person to person relationships as opposed to detail oriented deal making, etc. It's easy to see how rotating a press secretary in and out of the Green Zone isn't going to cut it.
At the same time, the internet offers an incredible opportunity to insurgents everywhere - untraceable, immediate and virtually impossible to refute (because you can't verify anything online - thus folks believe the stuff they want to and ignore the rest). And for the finale - in Iraq you've got scads of local Imams whose livelihood is dependant upon their popularity and who have far more credibility and authority than any American.
Frankly, I can't think of a more difficult information operations environment.
Not a press secretary, a meme, which I suppose could be a collection of a single conscious (SOF).Quote:
Originally Posted by Jones_RE
This is a link to a Multi-National Forces-Iraq press briefing where Maj. Gen. Lynch discusses the Zawahiri leter to Zarqawi.
This is a link with a link to the text of the letter in both English and Arabic.Quote:
...
I talk about the Zawahiri letter to the point where you might be tired of me talking about it. But there is something that I have not talked about in the last several press conferences that I want to emphasize. In the letter from Zawahiri, the second in command, if you will, of al Qaeda, he told Zarqawi - he says, "Remember, Zarqawi" - he says, "Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media." Half the battle is in the battlefield of the media. The terrorists will use the media as a combat multiplier to hide their limited capabilities. And let me use an example that you're all very familiar with to highlight that point.
...
Elsewhere, the 80 percent figure has been used, but in either case the point is the same, we are not really engaged in half or more of the battle space.Quote:
...
Among the letter's highlights are discussions indicating:
* The centrality of the war in Iraq for the global jihad.
* From al Qa'ida's point of view, the war does not end with an American departure.
* An acknowledgment of the appeal of democracy to the Iraqis.
* The strategic vision of inevitable conflict, with a tacit recognition of current political dynamics in Iraq; with a call by al-Zawahiri for political action equal to military action.
* The need to maintain popular support at least until jihadist rule has been established.
* Admission that more than half the struggle is taking place "in the battlefield of the media."
...
I would point out that the Arab audience is not the only one these attacks are suppose to infleunce and probably not the most important. Part of the design is to reduce support for the war in the US. That has been the most successful aspect of the enemy's war strategy, and people who can make the case in the US are certainly important to the continued success of the operation. The enemy's goal is to change our policy even if he can not win militarily.
Several of you have just given good explinations of what EBO realy is. Our enemy understands it better then we do. Specifically you are talking about Col. Wardens ring #4 connection to population groups. Which is a COG and if you can manipulate public opinon through population EBO ops and achieve your political objective you can win at a cheap price. When you do EBO ops against all 5 rings at the same time you have what Warden would call parrallel warfare.
Merv, I agree 100% with you in that we are the IO campaign to date has been a failure. As Bill stated, there is a great deal of potential leverage to bring into play in a properly orchestrated and synched IO campaign. We do have people (not many, and damn sure not enough for all the missions they are in demand for) with the requisite local and cultural knowledge to develop such a campaign. There's been plenty of doctrinal ink spilled, and lots of high-level discussion, regarding effective integration of IO at the tactical and operational levels, but it ain't happening on the ground.Quote:
Originally Posted by Merv Benson
Not that it matters that much, but the 80% figure Merv quoted from Al-Qa'ida is in relation to pre-attack intelligence gathering rather than media battlespace. In the Al-Qa'ida training manual it states (on page 42 of the pdf file) that ...by using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.
"...those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."
Lot of smart guys here, so I'll be weighing in with some trepidation. The above is the "official" DoD definition of COG. Most of this conversation has revolved around "effects based oriented" operations (EBO?) relating to our enemy's perception of coalition vulnerabilities and vice versa-in Iraq. Collectively, you guys have seemed to narrow this to the conduct of Info Ops (I.O.), both ours and theirs-and the relative skill which each side brings to the fight.
What about Afghanistan? There, I'd suggest a more tangible COG exists-Opium. When I consider this as a COG, I acknowledge the monetary importance it plays to the Taliban. I see the physical connection opium establishes between our opponent and the community- coercive and corruptive. I consider the correlation between smuggling routes leading to labs outside, and enemy LOCs leading inside to Afghanistan, as I'd bet they are one and the same. Finally, opium connects the interdependance between the drug warlords and the Taliban. Like LOCs, finding one almost certainly means finding the other.
I welcome disagreement, but HERE seems to lie a tangible/material center of gravity in a low intensity/C.I. battlefield. However, while tangible and material, it would also appear elusive, as it seems both insidious and culturally pervasive.
Curious to your thoughts, thanks.
A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.”
A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and will to fight.
COGs exist in an adversarial context involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths. They are formed out of the relationships between the two adversaries and they do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum.
Ask a psychologist, an anthropologist, a sociologist, and an economist what the center of masses are. Even more important, what are ours?
Adam,
EBO (strat and opn level) is an extensive process; I won't argue for it or against it.
But an effects based process at tactical level does work and it achieves the magic word "synchronization" of lethal and non-lethal effects. The intel requirements to support such a approach are heavily tactical--that is soldier and small unit; but that is the same in any COIN/stability opns environment.
the key to using an effects process is to modifying it to meet the tactical level; constructs such as COGs must be (and are) adjusted to match the user level.
Best
Tom
"A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance — what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.”
I don't know if 19th century U.S. Army officers were familiar with Clausewitz, but evidently they understood how the concept of COG applied to a non state enemy in their situation.
I believe most senior Army officers encouraged buffalo hunting and pioneer settlement. These two things did more to defeat the Plains Indians than military operations. The Plains Indians needed room to roam and a mobile commissary. When they lost those two things they lost physically, spiritually, and emotionally.
The down side is that we still have a Bureau of Indian Affairs and a reservation system over 100 years later. Even if a COG can be identified in a non state or guerilla enemy is it always wise to strike it? Maybe if total subjugation and dependency is the goal, but otherwise?
Maybe I'm way off base with that last statement. I like military boards for the tactical discussions, my understanding of strategic ideas like COG and EBO are vague at best.
Ah now you're getting at the key difference between the way we currently use the COG construct and EBO. Most military officers think in terms of directing their forces/efforts against a COG to puncture the enemy's ballon sort of speak. EBO on the other hand allows indirect approaches to achieve desired effects. There is almost always more than one COG, and the type of enemy we're fighting today will adapt to COG based strategies has he has been doing quite effectively in Iraq.
Is opium really a logistical COG for the Taliban? If we took the opium away (somehow) do you believe the second order effect would be that the Taliban would be finished ecomonically? I don't know, but I do recall that the Taliban eradicated opium in the Afghanistan when they ruled it, and they still seemed to function. I do think if you targeted the opium you would alienate a number of clans that would then form a temporary allegiance of convenience with the Taliban to fight the coalition.
COG's are still relevant, we just have to be mentally agile enough to make the jump from physical space and locations to intangibles such as peopl's will, public opinion, and such. IMO, we do a poor job at IO, it is under-resourced and misunderstood.
Bill,
The Taliban stopped growing opium to appease the international community and then reaped the profits of selling the previous years bumper crops at increased prices due to the lack of a current crop. However, that being said, opium is a critical piece of the puzzle in Afghanistan for multiple parties, but you correctly identify that whether it would be beneficial to eliminate it immediately on balance is a tough question to answer and hence a tough nut to crack.
Shek, wrong thread, but I understand and concur. I read the piece that Jedburgh attached and it explained that the Taleban was basically trying to create a shortage to increase the value of their product.
Jimbo, I'll bite, so tell me what "the people's will" means to a military planner as a COG?
I think it is obvious we're always targeting the enemy's will, but I can't focus military efforts on their will unless they're a rational actor. How do I target Al Qaeda's will? (I mean target as lethal and non lethal)
I'm not sure that targeting will is necessarily a feasible goal. Targeting and mitigating ideology in a fanatical people isn't going to get you very far. To say that we'll target their will infers that adversarial will is based upon logic and reason. When you're an extremist, no amount of logic or reason is going to allow you to look at the other side of the coin.
However, isolating insurgent groups from their support basin will. One of the only things that seperates the disenfranchised Bubba at the end of your block who hates the government and the insurgent population is the amount of localized support he receives from his neighbors. If Bubba started blowing up mailboxes and putting bombs on the sides of roads, his neighbors will turn him in.
I use the term "support" loosely, as passive support would include those who are so afraid of the reprocussions of action that they do nothing, allowing the insurgent to continue his reign of terror. We need to do a better job, through IO, of debasing the grasp insurgent groups have on the population. Depending on what part of the country we're talking about (Al Anbar having a higher concetration of insurgent supporters), we're only looking at about 5% of the population with an overt support of the insurgency. What we need to worry about is the 80% or so who passively let it happen out of fear of reprocussion to themselves or their families. How do we mitigate this? We show them, through our own actions, that it is more adventageous to them to turn in the wacko down the street than it is to sit by and do nothing.
In this sence, one of the lines of operation in the COIN environment must be Information Operations. By making IO a LOO within the mission development cycle, we're placing as much weight in IO as we would with combat operations. I submit that the four LOOs all units should follow in Iraq are:
1. Combined Combat Operations
2. Development of Security Forces
3. Civil-Military Operations
4. Information Operations
Given we're strangers in a society as unfamiliar with us as we are of them, IO must be an imperitive in COIN operations. Many of the preconceptions Iraqis have of Americans is based upon the information operations that insurgent groups propegate amongst the people of the society. In this sence, the insurgents are winning the IO war. We must make IO as important to us as combat operations are.
One of the most successful IO campaigns I saw in Ninwah province was a series of fliers with pictures of children killed by a homicide car bomber. After that flier went out, tons of tips came in, most actionable. The problem is that after doing this once or twice, we figure that the momentum will continue. Oftentimes we kill our own initiative by resting on our laurels and figuring that one or two fliers is enough, particularly if they produce some sort of temporary action. By constantly reengaging the IO target, we chip away at the base of support the insurgents enjoy until eventually its a moot point.
Certainly there are those whose minds we will not change. They are labled collaborists and must be dealt with appropriately as well. The burden is on individual units to A). Know the enemy their dealing with, B). Determining their base of support, C). Mitigating or neutralizing that support within every means at their availability, and D). constantly pursuing innovative ways to diminish passive support.
As has been written in multiple threads, the only way to do this properly is to understand the culture with which you are working. Obviously, what would be sound logic in the United States doesn't necessarily work in Iraq or Afghanistan. Its up to small unit leaders in both of these areas to get to know their populace, forge relationships with local leaders, and get inside the psyche of those their working around, with, and for.
The reality is that as we practice tactical effects thinking here, we use COG analysis as a fundamental tool in understanding effects. I would certainly endorse both in this context.
best
Tom
Hi RTK,
You make soem interesting points that I'd like to pull apart a bit.
I have to disagree with you on this - specifically your last sentence. One thing most Anthropologists learn pretty quickly is that "logic" and "reason" are cultural constructs rather than absolutes. What we, in the West, assume to be logic (and it is for us) may not operate in other cultures. This is not because they are not "logical" but, rather, because other cultures use different axiomatic assumptions and different syllogisms of logic.
Hmmm, again, I think you may be understating Iraqi sources of information on America. Yes, you are quite correct about the IO from the insurgents, but I don't think that it is a good idea to forget about all of the information comming in from other sources as well. In particular, I am thinking about Internet based sources, family diasporic networks, and IO passed through tribal lines.
There's a model in Anthropology that may be useful for looking at this. "Information" is just a set of sensory perceptions which must then be interpreted for and by individuals. Most of these sensory perceptions are "value neutral" originally and get their valuation during the interpretation stage. This "interpretation stage" is where cultural logics and interpretive schema get added into the mix and, if they run long enough, get converted into "rules of thumb" which, in turn, are passed throughout personal networks. In order to establish something as a "rule of thumb" interpretation (aka a "meme") within a given population, there has to be fairly strong reinforcement in the environment for that interpretation.
Yup. In effect, you are doing it by creating your own memes, "rule of thumb" interpretations, and then reinforcing them. Let me take this situation a little further and see how it could have been extended, and please excuse me if I'm unaware of a chunk of the details of this specific situation.
From the sounds of it, right after the car bombing, flyers with pictures of the dead children went out and the tips started coming in. Did any military personelle go to the funerals and show grief over their deaths? If not, they should have.
"Momentum" in most pastoralist societies is based on ongoing personal connections and relationships and, grotesque as it may sound, this was a perfect opportunity to establish this type of personal relationship while, at the same time, clearly showing that Americans value the lives of Iraqi children. More importantly, the people who should have attended would be the ones involved in tracking down the others involved in the car bombing. This action would have been perfectly understandable to the Iraqi people since it would be interpreted as a blood vendetta.
I totally agree, and probably the best way to do that is to look at cultural parallels. For example, most Western cultures understand blood feuds even if we don't use them (well, most of the time). Most pastoralist cultures have them as central to their orientation. Most Western cultures say that personal relationships are not as important as legal relationships, but the reality is that they are, in all probability, more important (e.g. "networking"). In most pastoralist cultures, personal ties are crucial to social operations.
If we really want to hammer at the will of the insurgency, then we have to do it by changing the interpretations of action, the memes, of the population such that the commonalities with the Coalition are stronger than the commonalities with the insurgency.
Marc
Marc,
I have no hope in going toe to toe with a Ph.d in Anthropology. My undergraduate degree will only get me so far. :)
In the long run, we're essentially saying the same thing, though you're more elloquent than I. I was trying to make the point that what we view as logic and reason doesn't necessarily apply in the same way as it does to your everyday Iraqi. Breaking it into the lowest common denominator, this is difficult for our soldiers to understand.
As for the IO sources available to the citizenry of Iraq; I intentionally focused on one aspect of all their sources. Just as a western citizen has numerous media outlets to choose from, Iraqis have the same. It's a matter of which one they pick. Some are more overt than others. In a society where tribal links are paramount to everything else, obviously this will take a precedence of all else. Depending on the tribe, emphasizing these ties will help or hurt our side of the issue, given our relationship as soldiers with those particular tribe.
After 2 years in Iraq I can tell you that it really depends on where you are. We had success in Al Anbar when I was there in 2003-4 but our success was entirely dependant on the support of tribal leades. My second tour last year in Ninewa Province enjoyed a fantastic relationship with tribal leaders which enhanced our success.
I agree with you and acknowledge all your points. Again, I broke it down to the user level with some fairly specific examples.
Drat, I certainly wasn't trying to set it up as a fight (wry grin).
I agree, it definately is difficult to understand. Sometimes, I think it is harder for Ph.D's to understand that for the people on the ground ;) .
I think I was reacting to the idea, call it a "sense interpretation", that the extremists are not using logic and reason. I've seen a little too much of that coming from politicians, and all I see it serving to do is to seperate "us" from "them". :o
There's a debate I get into with a lot of my friends about why we need to be really careful about semantics (okay, yeah, it's a soapbox of mine). We use language in a lot of ways to construct our understandings of reality and the habits of speach we use often condition the people who listen to us. So if "we" deny "them" the use of logic, then we are saying that we can never get them to change since their is no basis of communication other than a kinetic strike. I would far rather see us set up a situation where we assume that they do use logic and that we can manipulate that logic to our benefit.
Okay, I'm off my soapbox :)
I totally agree with you on this, and I certainly understand why you focused on the insurgents as the primary means of information. I have to wonder how more effective the IO operations could be in the immediate situation. Believe me, I'm certainly not faulting anyone in the field - that would be nuts! But, if we have to play catch-up, what can be done to make that more effective?
So, I have to ask, how were those relationships established and maintained? I'm asking because if you enjoyed good relationships with the tribal leaders, then you were doing something right that needs to be communicated both with other people going into the field and in the international mediaspace.
Thanks and, again, I apologize if I appeared to be coming down on you. mea culpa.
Marc
I'm in the beginnings of a COIN handbook written as little AARs for direct actions, CMO operations, IO, and partnership with local leaders and security forces. Hopefully some of what we did can be highlighted and shared with the force.
In reply to your question, we didn't do anything that we felt was out of the ordinary. Having said that, in retrospect, we did a lot of things that others evidently aren't doing:
- We placed one platoon within a restive town and they lived with both the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police.
- Everything we did was combined with Iraqi Security Forces.
- We met with town councils on average of about once a week.
- We met with tribal leaders at least once a week, oftentimes more.
- We'd stop by the houses of key leaders as a matter of routine to check in on them, much like you might do with a good friend who lives down the block from you.
- We never made promises we couldn't keep
- In working everything combined, we put an Iraqi face on operations, not an American face. In hanging out in the shadows and only appearing when we had to it also gave the impression (rightly so) that the Iraqis were in charge of their own area, not just being paraded around by us as puppets
- We took council of their concerns and worked together to correct them. After we would produce they would tell their tribesmembers what had taken place.
- When our leading advocate, a tribal sheik, died suddenly, we attended the wake without body armor or protective gear to pay respects. We left our rifles in our vehicles (we kept our pistols). This may have been ballsy, but it showed the people we were there to mourn with them and were not afraid of what could happen to us. (This was planned for, however, like an operation, with the rest of my troop pulling an observation cordon out of sight and mind, but with the ability to act as a QRF if things got bad).
In essence, we treated them as equals, not as people who didn't know what they were doing. We ate their food, drank their tea, exchanged gifts, and stories. By the end of it, the aforementioned tribe adopted us.
My measuring stick for success was this; when we talked to these people for the last times before we left theater the second time, tears were shed on both sides. I have gifts from them in my office. They have pictures of as all like a family photo on their wall. I worry about them constantly, like I'd worry about a part of my family. I think once you get to that level of understanding then you can stamp the entire experience with the success label.
This may be a stretch, but if you look at Kevin Costner's character in "Dances with Wolves," maybe we need to start looking at that as a model for bilateral engagement progression. In simple terms, that's essentially what we did.
You know, your list is a really great checklist for how to do it right :). And. leaving out the fact that we usually aren't armed, it's pretty much what Anthropologists do in the field - live with the people you are studying and "become" one of them.
This is just the type of thing that would work, especially the leaving the rifles behind (honouring their ability to protect you) and carrying your side arms (showing your willingness to protect them under guest right in case of an attack). Brilliant:D !!!!
Absolutely! Have you managed to keep in touch with them at all?
I've got my own take on Dances with Wolves but, yes, the idea of partially "going native" is something that really needs to be done. It has its own dangers in some ways, but it certainly makes what is happening more comprehensible to everyone and, IMHO, would probably make for a better model of engagement that of occupier and occupied.
I'd love to see that handbook when you get it done, either as a draft or as a final product. I hope you'll be able to share it.
Marc
Gentlemen, the intent of this thread is to clearly show the superiority of effects based planning versus using the outdated center of gravity construct.
Put your guns down, I'm only joking! Great comments, but I would still like to see how the "people's will" as the center of gravity could be useful in a functional way to a military planner?
Using an effects based approach which is intended to integrate all of our government agencies, and hopefully academia, still seems more appropriate than trying to make centers of gravity work in this situation. Sometimes there are COG's, other times the COGs are unsuitable to facilitate planning, such as the people's will.
Marc, you bring a much needed voice to the council, and I was hoping you might share some ideas on where you think you could fit into the planning process to help us get off on the right track? Let's say we were going into country X to assist the government defeat an insurgency. What would you consider must know information to facilitate you giving advice to military planners? What type of advice do you think you give that could help military planners? I use the term planner, but that isn't restricted to the future operations planners at the joint level, but inclusive of the company commander that is developing a strategy for his area of operations.
Hi Bill,
Okay, I will apologize in advance for sounding like an academic :).
As far as I see it, "centre of gravity" is a concept, a mental schema if you will, that is already embedded in the minds of many military planners. Whether it is a worthwhile concept, or whether EBP would be a "better" concept is, for this point, moot. The short answer is that using the "people's will" as a centre of gravity is useful because it is drawing on a concept that already exists in the minds of the military planner. What tends to be missing from the concept is the operational specification. Still and all, it is always easier to "sell" a modification or "amplification" of an existing idea/concept than it is to sell a "new" or "different" concept. It's really just a matter of changing the referential semantics of the debate.
Can it be useful functionally? Probably, but some modification would be needed. First, I think we would have to change the name of the main focus from "people's will" to something like "people's beliefs". Second, it would probably be useful to "create" new foci for "insurgent's will" and, hmm, "COIN will" (where the popluation of the latter is those people who are actively engaged in COIN operations, both "native" and "non-native").
This allows us to stay in the emotionally "safe" construct of centre of gravity, and to shift the EBP into an operationalization of how these centres interact and how those interactions can be manipulated.
Honestly, I think that you are quite correct here, at least as far as actual operational planning, in the broadest sense of the term, is concerned.
Hmmm, that definately is the "put up or shut up" question, isn't it:cool: . I'm going to have to think about this a lot more, but I will try and take a stab at answering some of the questions.
First off, thanks. As it currently stands, I see myself "fit[ing] into the planning process" primarily in two areas:
- As a Canadian academic, I am somewhat constrained in who I have access to talk to. I am truly grateful for the existence of SWJ and for the council in listening to what I have to say, since this is one of the few venues I have to make my ideas heard by people who can actually do something. Certainly, what I have to say will not be heard by many Anthropologists (more on that one later - I'm putting an article together on it).
- I think the greatest contribution I can make to the planning process is in working with people to develop adaptive methodologies that integrate culture, media, and actual operations. I think that the advantages I would bring to this are that I am an expert in "systems of meaning" (i.e. how people construct reality via symbols), I have a background in comparative religion as well as Anthropology and, finally, as a Canadian, I view US operations through a different, if friendly, lense.
(Sheesh! I feel like I'm writing a cover letter for a job application :). Still, you asked and honest question, and deserve an honest answer.)
I would have to say that two things were crucial at the start of such an operation. First, what is / are the local culture(s)? Most of that material is already available in libraries, but until you know the general structures of a group, their symbol systems don't really make that much sense. Actually, it's more complex than that, but that's the basic part. Then I would have to tie in the symbol systems to those structures.
The second imperative would be to look at the insurgency's propaganda. For any insurgency to succeed, it has to operate using a symbol system that derives from or is cognate with the local symbol system(s). Most of the time, this will be tied in to a crucial, everyday "lived experience" that the vast majority of the general population can experience. By way of example, Guevera's campaign in Bolivia hinged around land distribution and when the land was redistributed by the government, the insurgency collapsed.
The case in Iraq is much more complex than that of Bolivia, unfortunately (sigh). At the absolute minimum, there are four seperate cultures to examine and each of them extends beyond the geographic boundaries of Iraq.
I think that in order to answer that question, it would probably be better to split it into three seperate areas:
- Initial planning
- Company level "advice"
- Ongoing analysis
Initial planning
Most of what could be done in the initial planning stage would be what I was talking about earlier: identifying the structures, symbol systems and propaganda nodes. Once they are identified, then certain initial "suggestions" could be made on how to operate. Honestly, I'd be a fool to say that any advice coming out of this would work 100% of the time. Based on WWII experience in the Pacific theatre, we would be lucky to get about 60%-70%. Still, that would be better than nothing.
Company level advice
Again, initially, it would come out of the initial planning stage. The trick, I think, would be to set up a "cultural intelligence" operation where information from the field is sent back ASAP for analysis and reworking, which brings us to...
Ongoing analysis
To my mind, this is the core "value add" that Antrhopology can bring to the table (not that most of my colleagues would do so :mad: ). We have had a lot of discussions about how much cultural training the strategic corporal and other frontline troops can have. The reality, at least as much as I see it at present, is that the mind set required for someone to be a good combat soldier is quite different from that required to be a good cultural analyst. Having said that, however, I think that it is absolutely imperative that information, analysis and observations flow freely back and forth between the two groups.
Let me return, for a second, to the tangential conversation RTK and I were having. Notice that both of us mentioned showing up at funerals. In my case, I was placing that type of action in a cultural symbolic context. In RTK's case, he was placing it in an operation and personal context. How would this work together? Well, if nothing else, I would hope that when RTK produces his COIN handbook, he includes that "story" along with a recommendation that other people do the same where possible. Why? Because it not only establishes and strengthens individual personal relationships, but also because it honours the local system of tribal honour.
Bill, I don't know if this has answered your questions. I know that I'm not happy with it on the whole, but I wanted to give you a quick answer before taking a week or two to put something more complete together.
Marc
Dear RTK,
Bubba wants you to know "he ain't got no neighbors" He don't live on know block neither, he has a trailer like all regular folks does.
So back to the original question - what is or are the center(s) of gravity in Iraq? We have been in Iraq for 42 months, so I would imagine someone must have figured it out by now.
Physical:
- Cities
- Infrastructure (water sources, communications, electricity)
- Line of Communication
Organizational:
- Tribal links
- Religious ideology
- Political parties
- Ethnic factions (Sunna, Shia, Kurd)
- Kurdish political parties
- Iraqi Security Forces
Since Clausewitz would contend that the purpose of war is to make another nation or people submit to your will. I will bring up people's will as a planning construct is important because it is the key terrain in an insurgency. What actions are you going to take make the local population neutral to passively friendly, and break the will of the insurgent. RTK posted alot of "how to" information. The key in using "people's will" as a COG for planning is that it helps drive and synchronize your CMO, IO, and security operations. It is tied to public perception and public opinion. As a military planner it is important because we try to avoid it and pawn it of on other government entities that either don't exist, or they are not resourced for it (state/commerce/IMF,UN,etc). Since the NGO's/PVO's/agencies can't do it, as a militayr planner I have to. I saw the shoulder shrug, hell I shrugged my shoulders, in May and June of 2003 when we had not factored people's will and how to win it as a planning construct in Iraq.
Symbolic
- Communications media
- Symbolic associations between individuals and actions (i.e. "stereotype" expectations)
- Emotional evocations of sensory input (e.g. how do the locals emotionally react to a patrol)
- Interpretations of religious ideology
- Interpretations between religio-legal systems
- A symbolic "repatterning" of basic emotional equations (e.g. value of children)
- Construction of a "safe space" for symbolic discourse
Physical (a few additions)
- Food
- Fuel
- Communications media and programming (e.g. Voice of America style a la WWII & cold war)
- Medical care
- Infrastructure reconstruction, especially at the personal level (e.g. housing, means of livelihood, etc.)
What is the defeat mechanism we should use to win?
Maybe I misunderstood or misread Clausewitz, but dont COGs have to offer resistance? How does either terrain or infrastructure provide resistance?
Whether Clauswitz said that COGs have to offer resistance, I have no idea. I'm going with the definition in FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A operational Terms and Graphics, which states:
Centers of Gravity – (DOD) Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs.
Additionally, COGs are talked about in FM 3-0, Operations:
5-27. Center of Gravity. Centers of gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity is the most direct path to victory. The enemy will recognize and shield his center of gravity. Therefore, a direct approach may be costly and sometimes futile. Commanders examine many approaches, direct and indirect, to the enemy center of gravity.
5-28. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool in the design of campaigns and major operations. Once identified, it becomes the focus of the
commander’s intent and operational design. Senior commanders describe the
center of gravity in military terms, such as objectives and missions.
5-29. Commanders not only consider the enemy center of gravity, but also
identify and protect their own center of gravity. During the Gulf War, for example, US Central Command identified the coalition itself as the friendly
center of gravity. The combatant commander took measures to protect it, including deployment of theater missile defense systems.
It was in these terms that infrastructure and terrain can be centers of gravity (think oil fields).