Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?
This could go in the Tunisia thread, but is a little broader than that, so I've placed it here.
An interesting piece on the implications of Tunisia in the struggle over the identity of Islam by Thomas P.M. Barnett over at World Politics Review.
For those not familiar with his books, Dr. Barnett's theory is that globalization's connectivity reduces conflict. Conflict tends to originate in the periphery where states are not connected or do not have adequate rules.
In this case, he posits that adherence to religion and making a buck don't have to conflict, and that folks in the Middle East and Africa want to be connected to the global economy more than they want to be a part of Al-Qaeda's world. The gist is that capitalism can beat fundamentalism just like it beat communism- economically, with democracy (politics) coming later. Once people are worried about buying a nicer TV/car/cell phone, they tend to worry less about hating their neighbors... you could argue that Iraq shows a positive correlation here as well.
While I'm inclined to agree with him, I think this line of reasoning also opens up another question- is it possible that a systemic shock (like the Great Depression or another state vs. state war) could discredit globalization so thoroughly that the majority of people would actually reject it? Could the current Chinese bubble popping lead to that large of consequences?
Unlikely I know, although there are precedents... Several earlier periods of globalization fell by the wayside for similar reasons, although the fact that we're back where we are seems to indicate that there's something to the phenomenon.
Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.
V/R,
Cliff
Good to see you again Cliff
On the subject of insurgency and its causes: Ted Robert Gurr, back in 1970, published what is still the best explanation in Why Men Revolt. In its essence, Gurr's argument was that revolutions take place when after a period of economic growth there is a sudden and sharp decline and the perception of the populace (or significant members thereof) that this is the fault of the venal and unjust government. He calls this "perceived relative deprivation." As a political scientist, I agree that this is politics, but economics is both relavant and the trigger mechanism expolited for political purposes.
Cheers
JohnT
You are dead wrong on this one Wilf. Dangerously so.
Wilf, you confuse "official" with "legitimate."
A strongman can deem himself to be "official;"
A puppet can be deemed "official" by some strong external power;
But only a governed populace can bestow "legitimacy" upon their government.
Vast sweeps of the populace of Saddam's Iraq did not recognize his legitimacy, they only feared his offical power. Same is true in Saudi Arabia today, and that number is growing as the gulf between the people and the Royals continues to expand and pleas of the people for change are not merely ignored, but attacked.
Do indeed look at Egypt as Slap suggests, but if one cannot see past the poverty to the factors of governance that I lay out, then all one is going to see is the surface issues. The people have always been poor in Egypt, even when the kingdom was rich. But as I recall, Pharaohs placed and sustained in power by Greek and Roman armies were far more susceptible to popular uprisings. They were inherently illegitimate in the eyes of the populace.
When Egypt explodes it will not be because the people are poor or because many are Muslim. It will be because they do not recognize the right of Mubarak to govern. By his own selfish actions he has robbed his office of legitimacy. It will be because many feel that they are excluded from full participation in economic and governmental opportunity as a matter of status. It will be because many feel that the rule of law as applied to them is unjust. It will be because hope has been removed from the political process there.
It will not be because they are poor.
I have to agree with JohnT...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
John,
You just described the United States. But though we have all of these "classic symptoms" there is no real danger of insurgency. I would offer that Gurr's position is sound, but that if he would have dug a little deeper he would have gotten closer to the true roots of causation.
As we discussed, you bundle the four primary causal factors that I look to under the single umbrella of "Legitimacy." That is one of those words that carries far too many meanings, I think it is critical to break it down into four more focused bundles when assessing insurgency:
Legitimacy: The populace must recognize the right of the government to govern.
Justice: The populace must perceive that the rule of law as applied to them is just.
Respect: No significant segment of the society can perceive that they are excluded from participation in governance and opportunity as a matter of status.
Hope: The populace must perceive that they have a trusted, effective and legal means of changing governance, when they believe such change to be necessary.
When these conditions exist and hope is absent, conditions of insurgency will grow. Certainly economic hardship adds fuel to this mix, but it is a mix rooted in domestic policies and politics assesssed through the eyes of "the populace" (which is never a monolith). At point all it takes is a spark. Some internal or external leader armed with an effective ideology; or some event (as in Tunisia). Whether it then goes violent or non-violent is a choice of tactics, with little bearing on the nature of the problem.
Hope is codified and preserved in our Constitution. This is the role of a Constitution. Any constitution that creates such hope in a populace is the kind of effective COIN tool our founding fathers intended and designed our own constitution to be.
Cheers!
Bob
Bob-
I think you could make an arguement that the Tea Party represents an insurgency, and I think economics are the prime driver of this movement. Comparing the US economic "woes" to those in some of these other countries is comparing apples and oranges, however- we're not that bad off (not that that's good, mind you!). We simply have a robust system that can process insurgencies - IE, the elections!
As for the other posts (sorry I am behind so mass replying) - I am closer to JohnT's opinion I think.
I agree that war is politics by other means, and insurgency is warfare by and for politics more so than most other types of war.
That said, I think you ignore economic causes at your peril. Certainly they are expressed politically, but economics have been at the root of numerous revolutions/insurgencies - like our own (taxes due to the British debt) or the French Revolution (debt from numerous wars against the Brits). In many cases where this doesn't hold true I would argue that a few self-interested folks hijacked the populace's economic dissatisfaction (Lenin, Mao)...
I am not arguing that all insurgencies/revolutions are caused by economics. But I am arguing that these will become more common than ever before. Globalization means that our economic interests are more integrated than ever before. While globalization has occured before, the integration of supply chains across nations has never occured to the level we see today. Likewise, the competition in almost every area of the economy has never been as widespread as it is now. This round of globalization is different as a result- it's not trade in raw materials or finished products but technology enabled flat supply chains operating on just-in-time principles.
Due to the system of liberalized international trade and finance set up by the victors of World War II, states tend to compete in the economic realm rather than in the military one, and we haven't seen a great power war since World War II. Let's be honest - as long as your average middle class person has a job and can take care of their family and improve their life, they don't have as much to be dissatisfied about. That's why China hasn't seen massive countrywide protests- as long as the CCP can deliver reasonable growth, the folks will stay reasonably happy. In places where this is not the case, you see upheaval.
Again, I am not saying that politics or legitimacy do not matter. They most certainly do. But I am saying that economic issues will become even more important than ever before. As countries develop this will tend to be more the case, while in lesser developed countries it will be less so. Is the development the cause? It seems that you could make an arguement that people at the low end (very poor, little economic activity) tend to dislike their government, and people at the high end of development (more economic activity, developed economy) also tend to get there. South Korea is a good example - not much democracy until their economy took off - then massive protests and upheaval.
In summary, I think that economic causes are a major part of many insurgencies. Getting bogged down on semantics or trying to separate economic and political causes (It's only about the legitimacy - in four parts!) disregards important aspects of the problem. I think part of the reason for this tendency is the centrality of the military to dealing with insurgencies in the West - which is exactly why Dr. Barnett and others argue for a "department of everything else" or Goldwater Nichols for the interagency - to give the USG non-military tools to deal with these issues.
V/R,
Cliff
PS - good to see you Prof Fishel! Hoping I can be a poster and not just a lurker, at least for a few more months!
One or two points to add...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
selil
If you apply these concepts to the military an entire new venue of conflicts arise and become possible. The simple assumptions of state power become limited when it is falsely assumed the state has "power". Similarly there are issues with assumption that the "corporation" has power too. When the market place shifts from provider/user to produce/consumer an entire new set of paradigms rise. This is both unprecedented and continues economic models that have long existed in non-monetary systems. Assuming that the nation-state with what are now entirely minuscule armies (in comparison to population densities) are going to pacify large swaths of the population is simplistic. When the need for the state as primacy of control is replaced by localized relationships there simply will be break downs. Corporations realized this changing venue of power matrixes a long time ago and companies like WalMart grew from not just being "providers" but convenience providers and relationship builders.
Most military members are missing other elements of globalization even as they use it to their advantage. The soldier in Afghanistan web-cam chatting with his spouse and children in America is engaged in a peering relationship. So, are the fifth graders talking with the Imam in Iran while sitting in Colorado. Same for the college sophomores who are working on a project with Chinese college on a project. Projections of nationalism to those domestic populations are eroded by the consistent peering relationships. Domestic attempts by political forces of the nation state are buffered by personal contacts with foreign nationals. This leads to a disconnection of populace support for foreign aggression and in a democracy leadership challenges. The attempt by politicians and military members to say "This is true" is met with a sigh and "not from my experience". The adage that the military went to war and American went to the mall is a truism. Fed in part by the disconnection of the Military and political process from the populace and the rapidly escalation of a growing divide caused by globalization.
Less than 1 percent of the United States population serves in the United States military and it costs more than the next five militaries on the planet combined. The money spent effects relatively few Americans in a very small swath of cities and regions (and dwindling with base closures). Consider the civil/military relationship and then consider the globalization relationships. Would we expect a government or military that doesn't understand the former to have any clue about the latter?
Selil-
I think that Barnett's point mirrors yours- by "connectivity" he doesn't mean the internet, he means the ability of folks in one place to do business/interact with others. The internet is obviously the biggest enabler of that, but it is an enabler - not the effect. This is why I think the economic factor is becoming more important- it results in the "peering" process as you call it. It's tough to get someone to go to war with somebody they work with every day - and even tougher to convince them that that person is the "enemy". One reason you see so much hatred in places like Pakistan is that disconnectedness.
One of my big concerns though is the strength of military might. You mention it, and several others have alluded to it. Certainly even our military has a hard time "pacifying large swaths of the population"... but this is because we choose to follow the Western norms for warfare. Raw, naked force still has the ability to subjugate, and it could disrupt globalization and cause regression. It would take a massive amount of force, true- but the lesson of WWI and WWII is that at some point even the most fanatical organizations/governments will surrender if they are faced with annihilation- and afterwards, there are significant psychological and social consequences. I'm not arguing that this is a good idea, or right in any way- but if an actor with sufficient power chooses to use it in this way... well, it would probably work. We need to make sure we don't assume that the rules we use will always apply to everyone else.
V/R,
Cliff