The John Boyd collection (merged thread)
Can anyone recommend a good introduction to Colonel Boyd's strategic thinking? I know some regard him as America's greatest strategist, but I know nothing about him beyond the Fighter Mafia/F-16 stuff and OODA Loop. Is there some good stuff of his online, or should I read Coram's book?
better Q might be where should his influence have ended
Boyd seems excellent in fighter tactics and strategy but the central analogy when applied to forces of size seems to hold only when one faces a rational enemy who above all wishes to preserve the lives within the force. An army division can outmanuver and corner an enemy but unless the enemy is willing to surrender you may still have to destroy him and that requires a certain level of political will to support such actions made even more difficult when the opposing force usually justs melts back into the populace rather than die or surrender.
Often we solace ourselve that a force that melts back into the populace is destroyed this in fact is not true they melted effectively on their own terms still armed with knowledge and experience if not actual arms.
Summary Links for Boyd 2007
4GW as a Model of Future Conflict
4GW as a Model of Future Conflict
Boyd 2007 Conference, 13 July 2007
Warfare Since Boyd Panel Presentation
F. G. Hoffman
Quote:
I have been asked to be the token diversity candidate from outside the 4GW “church” today, and am honored just by the chance to appear at an event that preserves John Boyd’s deep intellectual contributions, and to be on stage with my fellow panelists and Col Eric Walters. My assigned task is to explain why academics and historians have problems with the 4GW construct. My remarks will draw up upon my work on an alternative concept called Hybrid Warfare which I have presented at Oxford University this past winter. My comments will also draw upon unpublished work about to be released in a book titled Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict, edited by Dr. Terry Terriff, of University of Birmingham (UK) and Aaron Karp and Dr. Regina Karp of Old Dominion University, in which several of our distinguished speakers have prominent contributions including Mr. Lind and Col Hammes.
Let me begin by summarizing the arguments up front. The 4GW construct is often criticized for three major faults.
The theory is described as “weak” and the concept is too diffused, having become over time the equivalent of everything that is asymmetric.
Second the history that is drawn upon is uneven and often “too selective,” that is it is packaged to support a major component of the theory without full examination of trends or detailed counter-findings.
Finally, the generational framework is labeled “indefensible” and unnecessary. In my own assessment, I find that it hides more than it reveals...
More at the link...
Heh. Does that come under the heading of:
Quote:
"The truth will set you free, but first it will make you miserable."
~Attributed to James A. Garfield :D
I shall prepare my popcorn...
What is the argument all about?
I hear the traditionalists, "if Clausewitz, Mao or Sun Tzu didn't say it, then it isn't worth saying". Perfect position for an arm chair warrior, but not for someone who is leading our Soldiers in battle. What is important to the leader is successfully accomplishing the mission, and if traditional theory doesn't contribute to this, then its value is questionable.
We bring preconceived solutions and theories to the table before we even study the problem. This mindset is a perfect example of why we fail more than we should in irregular warfare.
Those who fault 4GW for its short comings have a lot of ammunition to support their arguments, but one could argue that the whole generational method to describe warfare is what is at faulty. It assumes that one generation replaces another, but the reality is that 1GW through 5GW are additive, they add to the repatoire of options available. The first step to clarifying the debate is doing away with the generations of warfare, then we won't have to waste time defending them, and instead can focus on the real issues at hand.
The nature of warfare and conflict can change as technology and political systems evolve. 5GW is supposed to describe the empowered individual, which is a possibility that can't be denied unless you live under a rock. An intelligent deviant can to some extent now, and to a much greater extent later, will be able to wreck various degrees of havoc with information technology, bio-engineering, etc., but then we argue can one man declare war? or is it just a crime? One man spreading bio-engineered small pox is a national security threat whether it is a war or a crime, and key take away isn't whether this is 1GW, 2GW, or 5GW, but that we have a security problem to solve.
I having seen where serious futurists have criticized Clausewitz, they simply added ideas to be discussed. Clausewitz, Mao, and maybe even Sun Tzu, were extremely intelligent and effectively captured the truth as it existed in their day for the situations they observed, and much of it remains relevant today, but evolution of war didn't stop with the death of Clausewitz (unless you're an U.S. Army CGSC product).
Everyone wants to throw stones at everyone else's ideas and endlessly debate: principles of war, centers of gravity, etc., which unfortunately rarely translates into effective strategy that wins wars. Did we get the center of gravity correct in Vietnam? Iraq? Afghanistan? And as Steve Metz pointed out in another post we're still fighting the insurgencies in the Philippines and Columbia, where victory always seems to be just beyond reach after tens of years of various efforts, so again did we correctly identify the center of gravity, apply the logical lines of operation correctly? Did we incorrectly apply the principles of war?
Instead of criticizing those who at least attempt to develop new ideas at least listen to them, then if need me attack the idea, not the person. So far all I have seen is attacks on the person (in this post Boyd and Lind), but not one valid counter argument to refute their positions.
If the traditionalists are intellectually correct, then prove it. To make it clear I'm not defending the new or the old, but simply want to see the argument evolve into something more productive than saying Boyd (for example) didn't add anything to the body of knowledge, but fail to explain why not.
Boyd added considerably to the body of knowledge of how to engage in aerial combat, and his OODA loop is applicable there. That doesn't mean it applies at the operational and strategic level. However, Boyd brought more to the table than the OODA loop over the years. He also supposedly was involved in crafting the Desert Storm offensive, after then SECDEF Chenny rejected Swarcofts (sp?) initial proposals. I suspect he added a little something to the body of knowledge, as I suspect Lind did also. The question is the same as it is for the traditionalists, does it translate into effective strategy that accomplishes our missions?