Check this story on WSJ:
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editor...l?id=110009758
Kuwaiti GITMO prisoners and their release - after a legal and PR campaign.
davidbfpo
Printable View
Check this story on WSJ:
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editor...l?id=110009758
Kuwaiti GITMO prisoners and their release - after a legal and PR campaign.
davidbfpo
Although the "PR" campaign discussed inthis article is quite extensive, it is actually nothing new. Attorneys do this all the time. Think about trial footage you see on TV. Usually, the defendant is dressed in a nice suit and, if he speaks, he does so in a relatively articulate manner. You won't see him in his gang-banger clothes or using the lingo he normally resorts to. Perception is reality. Even in trial, jurors are often swayed by intangible factors. A male attorney may be able to get away with being agressive while a female attorney doing the same thing is simply being a bitch. The fact is that people are swayed by emotion and attorneys will look to that. As a prosecutor, I do it. I choose words carefully and based on the meaning I want to convey. These guys are simply doing the same thing to a greater degree.
The problem here, is that the US government gave them the opportunity to do this. Whether you believe we should fight this war using the criminal court system or not is irrelevant. We are doing it. In a war that could possibly have no end, we must have some method of closure with respect to individual detainees. The world public will not permit us to simply lock them up forever without some form of trial. We are already seeing the backlash from keeping them this long without a trial.
We lost valuable time and created an opportunity for this "PR" campaign by trying to create a new system to try these guys when we already had one in place. We should have used the Uniform Code of Military Justice and courts-martial as the method of trial. It has procedures that account for all the constitutional protections afforded in civilian courts and allows us to handle classified information. It can also accomodate the use of civilian attorneys. Moreover, we already have plenty of attorneys trained in this system that are available as prosecutors and defense attorneys.
By creating an entirely new system, we've opened the door for criticism and given an appearance that we've stacked the deck. I know some of the guys that have worked in and concerns about this system and I trust their opinion. There is something wrong. If we're going to try them, it has to be a fair trail. If all you want to do is hang them, then do it; but don't try to justify it with some pretense of due process.
Julia Tarver, an attorney representing several detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
More on the story: Torture, Suicide and Imprisonment: A Look Back at Five Years of GuantanamoQuote:
"The level of hopelessness in the camp has reached a point where our clients are literally vowing they have no other choice but to die. The treatment they are receiving from the guards and the medical staff at Guantanamo is very, very disturbing. What we've learned is that in some sort of ill-advised attempt to stop the hunger strike, the guards and the medical staff are using intervention, medical intervention, to actually inflict forms of torture on our clients. They claim that in order to preserve life at the base they are inserting tubes into the clients' noses that go down into their stomachs, and they're able to be fed that way. But the problem is the clients have told us horrific stories repeatedly, from different clients, about how these same tubes are being forcibly inserted in by riot guards, how they're taken from one detainee and inserted into the next detainee with no sanitization, with the bile and the blood still on the tube from the previous detainee.
http://www.democracynow.org/article..../01/11/1536252
I'm just not buying this type of argument. The Gitmo facility is surely the most inspected and observed penal-type facility in the world. The Red Cross is there often. I personally know attorneys that have been deployed there and the care these guys receive is better than our guys get at Walter Reed. The cells are completely clean. They have 3 hots a day, time to pray, exercise, etc. In fact, many of the detainees have actually gained weight while there. A few have actually asked to stay when they were released.
As for the involuntary feeding tubes, what would they say if we just let the guys die of starvation? Could you imagine the rancor?
It was almost two years ago that there was a sudden flurry of articles in military professional pubs voicing second thoughts about the effectiveness of Gitmo. With the shift we've had in Congress, and presidential elections rushing fast upon us, I believe there's a lot more pointed discussion of the issue coming....
...here's some of the older material:
From Joint Forces Quarterly: Guantanamo Bay: Undermining the Global War on Terrorism
From Parameters: Six Floors of Detainee Operations in the Post 9/11 WorldQuote:
...In addition to undermining the rule of law, the consequence of the policy at Guantanamo has been to fuel global anti-Americanism, which undermines U.S. influence and effectiveness, degrades the domestic support base, and denies the United States the moral high ground it needs to promote international human rights. It appears that these costs have far outweighed the operational benefits that the detainee operations have generated...
From Military Review: Defining Success at Guantanamo Bay: By What Measure?Quote:
...There is good reason for the international community to agree upon more understandable and more stringent measures against unlawful combatants and terrorists in order to deter hostile forces from adopting such tactics. But we must not legitimize inhumane measures and debase ourselves by adopting anything like the tactics of the common enemies of mankind...
Quote:
...Success in the struggle against terrorism will be measured in generations. When future strategists look back on the early years of this decade, they will not judge Camp Delta on the relative value of intelligence reports but on humanitarian issues, how detainees were treated, the legitimacy of the trial process, whether laws reflected evolving definitions of “combatants”, and how detainees were ultimately dealt with when America dismantled terrorist groups. As we discover what the law will not allow, serious action to define what is permissible will follow. Justice—evidenced by whether criminal defendants were successfully defended or prosecuted, acquitted or convicted, fairly sentenced and safely incarcerated or repatriated—will be the enduring legacy of America’s actions at Guantanamo...
Part of the problem is that the Bush administration has been in no great hurry to mete out justice, military or otherwise. Consider the speed with which the German and German-American saboteurs in the Ex Parte Quirin case were caught, given a military trial ( by special tribunal if I recall), sentenced, had an appellate review by SCOTUS and then duly executed. Now consider Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is just now, perhaps, facing the initial steps in applying military justice.
Yes, in the wake of 9/11 there were overriding intelligence concerns with interrogating ranking members of al Qaida in American custody but five years? That speaks to an avoidance of justice as a policy with the unwelcome necessity of meting out death sentences to some of the illegal combatants and acquitting and/or paroling others. The inability of senior administration officials to settle differences of policy, authority and jurisdiction between the Departments of Justice, Defense, State and the CIA are also visible in the cases of Hamdi, Moussaoui and Padilla.
A streamlined, very tough but impartial and constitutional system to try illegal combatants for breaking the laws of war is very " doable" - if the political will exists to carry it out.
"Lack of political will" is the correct phrase for most of the last 5 1/2 years of "war". And the end result appears to be no different by Bush and Co. "wussing out" on certain critical issues.
June 3, 2007
A Legal Debate in Guantánamo on Boy Fighters
By WILLIAM GLABERSON
Quote:
The facts of Omar Ahmed Khadr’s case are grim. The shrapnel from the grenade he is accused of throwing ripped through the skull of Sgt. First Class Christopher J. Speer, who was 28 when he died.
To American military prosecutors, Mr. Khadr is a committed Al Qaeda operative, spy and killer who must be held accountable for killing Sergeant Speer in 2002 and for other bloody acts he committed in Afghanistan.
But there is one fact that may not fit easily into the government’s portrait of Mr. Khadr: He was 15 at the time.
At the age of 13, the German enclave where I grew up in Northwest Iowa declared me "a man". I could shave, I owned 20 head of cattle, 3 horses and a couple hundred pigs. I could drive a truck, owned guns and I sat with the other "men" and drank beer. (Interestingly, driving the truck and drinking beer in these circumstances was perfectly legal at the time, in Iowa.)
While I still lived with my parents, and went to school, I was treated as an adult by the other adults in my community.
Bottom line, you'll see why I don't see a problem with treating this former 15 year old as an "adult" combatant. The question is; why is it taking so long to categorize these guys as legal/illegal combatants and then dealing with them?
Yup, if you can do the crime, you can do the time. I hear ya' 120mm - at age 12 I was doing a man's work on a tractor and my older brother at age 10 was doing a man's work in the fields. there were alot of 17 yr olds in Viet Nam in the early years and I have ancestors that were fighting Indians as young teens and had engaged the Brits in one battle each before the age of 18.
The process to charge a juvenile as an adult is pretty straight forward in Alabama it is just a due process thing. Why it takes so long in Gitmo is a very good question. LawVol this is your territory what's up with that?
I can't help you on that one Slapout. I'm only qualified to offer opinions on the law and I'm not sure if what they are doing down there qualifies as law. Rather than simply use the UCMJ for trying these guys, they've created something else that has alot of people concerned. The information sharing isn't done very well; you are in the dark unless you're involved with the process. I do know a guy that I respect alot that resigned his position there and is leaving the service. It seems a little strange coming from the same country that wants to spread law and order while wearing the white hat. But I digress...
Nice avatar by the way!
LawVol, thanks anyway.....Idea ask General Dunlap about this.
CTC, 25 Jul 07: An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries
Complete 39 page report at the link, plus:Quote:
...Between July 2004 and March 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT’s) for 558 detainees being held at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). The DoD’s objective in conducting this tribunal process was to determine whether those detainees continued to warrant the ‘enemy combatant’ designation through a non-adversarial, administrative status review process.
In early 2005 3 DoD (the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants) released 517 CSRT (pronounced “see-cert”) unclassified summaries.4 These unclassified summaries, prepared in advance of the actual hearings, informed the detainees about the unclassified basis for their detention as enemy combatants. Of the 517 unclassified records, one of those records is a duplicate, which brings the total of CSRT unclassified summaries to 516. The DoD posted those 517 unclassified summaries (including the one duplicate) on its public website in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
In 2007, the Office of Detainee Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked faculty at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point to review information recorded in the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries (hereinafter referred to as “CSRT records”) and provide an objective assessment of this information.
After querying the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries, the CTC found that 73% of the unclassified summaries meet the CTC’s highest threshold of a ‘demonstrated threat’ as an enemy combatant. The CTC established two other categories with four discrete proxy characteristics in each (‘potential threat’ and ‘associated threat’) in order to help assess whether the information in these records indicated these individuals posed or potentially posed a threat as an enemy combatant. The CTC found that six of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries contained no evidence that fit any of the CTC’s twelve threat variables....
Annex A - Assessment of the Seton Hall Report Findings
26 Jul 07 HASC testimony on Upholding the Principle of Habeas Corpus for Detainees:
Stephen Oleskey, Counsel for Six Guantanamo Detainees
David Keene, American Conservative Union
Patrick Philbin, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General
LTC Stephen Abraham USAR
Daniel Dell’Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel, DoD
Greg Katsas, Principle Deputy Associate Attorney General, DoJ
You are absolutely right in your prediction that more is coming on this. I just returned from St. Louis and the "press sheet inspection" for the October issue of Joint Force Quarterly. On page 117 is a piece by Kyle Teamey that deals with detainees and counterinsurgency (this is already on our website). There will be three more articles on this issue in the January edition, one of which makes a case that is quite contrary to the 3rd place student essay that you cited from JFQ #39. In fact, Colonel Jim Terry's piece: "Habeas Corpus and the Detention of Enemy Combatants in the Global War on Terror" capably deconstructs the emotional arguments against the GTMO detention facility.
Guantanamo operating manual posted on Internet
more here:Quote:
The U.S. military's operating manual for the Guantanamo prison camp has been posted on the Internet, providing a glimpse of the broad rules and tiniest minutia for detaining suspected terrorists.
The 238-page manual, "Standard Operating Procedures for Camp Delta," is dated March 27, 2003, and signed by Army Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, who was then the commander of the prison that still holds about 300 al Qaeda and Taliban suspects.
It appears to be an authentic copy of the rules as they existed at the time at the U.S. naval base in Cuba, a spokesman for the Guantanamo detention operation, Lt. Col. Ed Bush, said on Wednesday.
It says incoming prisoners are to be held in near-isolation for the first two weeks to foster dependence on interrogators and "enhance and exploit the disorientation and disorganization felt by a newly arrived detainee in the interrogation process."
Styrofoam cups must be confiscated if prisoners have written on them, apparently because prisoners have used cups to pass notes to other captives. "If the cup is damaged or destroyed, the detainee will be disciplined for destruction of government property," the rules say.
...
http://www.reuters.com/article/inter...24207020071114
Does this coincide with Yee's appearance on Syrian TV?
http://hotair.com/archives/2007/11/2...ated-at-gitmo/
DoJ OIG, May 08: A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq
Note the careful verbiage. Complete 438 page report (with redactions) available at the link.Quote:
....Our report found that after FBI agents in GTMO and other military zones were confronted with interrogators from other agencies who used more aggressive interrogation techniques than the techniques that the FBI had employed successfully for many years, the FBI decided that it would not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other agencies in which techniques not allowed by the FBI were used....
HRW, 9 Jun 08: Locked Up Alone: Detention Conditions and Mental Health at Guantanamo
Complete 59 page report at the link.Quote:
Approximately 270 prisoners remain at Guantanamo, most of whom have been in US custody for more than six years without ever being charged with a crime. Some 185 of them—including many of the several dozen individuals already cleared for release or transfer—are now being housed in prison facilities akin to and in some respects more restrictive than many “supermax” prisons in the United States.
Such detainees at Guantanamo spend 22 hours a day alone in small cells with little or no natural light or fresh air. They are allowed out only two hours a day (often at night) to exercise in small outdoor pens. Except for the occasional visit by an attorney or a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), they have little human interaction with anyone other than interrogators and prison staff. For many detainees, isolated confinement is not a time-limited punishment for a disciplinary infraction, but something they have faced day in, day out, for months and years.
None of the prisoners currently held at Guantanamo has ever been allowed a visit from a family member, and most of them have never been allowed even to make a single phone call home during the six-plus years they have been detained. Detainees receive virtually no educational or rehabilitative programming to help them pass the time.
The US government is quick to say that most prisoners at Guantanamo are not technically in solitary confinement because they can yell at each other through the gaps underneath their cell doors; they can talk to one another during recreation time; and they are allowed periodic ICRC and lawyer visits. The reality, nonetheless, is that these men live in extreme social isolation, cut off from family and friends, and even, to a large extent, from each other. They spend most of their days alone in totally enclosed cells, with no educational and vocational outlets, and little more than the Koran and a single book to occupy their minds—something that is of little use to those that are illiterate. As is to be expected, the conditions at Guantanamo have reportedly caused the mental health of many prisoners to deteriorate, as a number of the cases in this report suggest.
As officials at Guantanamo point out, some detainees pose significant security risks, and detainee management is easier when detainees are locked in their cells 22-plus hours a day. But such extreme and prolonged isolation violates international legal obligations, and can aggravate desperate behavior, potentially creating worse security problems over time. Should detainee mental health problems mount, as the limited available evidence suggests is already happening, the practice will also complicate ongoing efforts to resettle or repatriate many of these men.
Sorry Jedburgh I haven't read the entire report, but just from what you posted the conditions at Guantanomo would not meet US prison or jail standards. The only places that 22 hour lock down or special confinement is allowed for prolonged periods of time are at SuperMax in Canon City Colorado and the various Special Offender Centers. Each has their own methods of dealing with it. Inmate violence on the outside is NOT a concern unless the inmate has made specific and relevant threats upon incarceration. Most state and national standards also require judicial review at some point for that kind of lock down on pre-trial detainees. Most people have little to no understanding that what happens on the outside of a prison compound has little relevance on the inside. Both for the good and the bad. Unless you've worked in SuperMax or SOCs it is doubtful many people can understand the special breed of insanity that lock down breeds. This kind of lock down takes special training for the corrections personnel. Insanity inside a prison is literally infectious. I hope they are 3-4ing, or rapid rotating personnel.
IHT, 2 Jul 08: China Inspired Interrogations at Guantánamo
I take odds with the author's statement that the SERE program became a source of interrogation methods for the Army. I will caveat that by stating that I did have issues in the past with interrogators who had spent time working out at the RTL needing strong mentorship and focused training to ensure that the line remained stark and clear between methods used with those going through the RTL and methods that we use with prisoners and detainees. It would not surprise me that a former RTL interrogator had used such methods operationally - but that occurence is ultimately a leadership failure at the unit level. The article's implication that the Army - as an institution - adopted such methods is patently false.Quote:
The military trainers who came to Guantánamo Bay in December 2002 based an entire interrogation class on a chart showing the effects of "coercive management techniques" for possible use on prisoners, including "sleep deprivation," "prolonged constraint," and "exposure."
What the trainers did not say, and may not have known, was that their chart had been copied verbatim from a 1957 Air Force study of Chinese Communist techniques used during the Korean War to obtain confessions, many of them false, from American prisoners.
The recycled chart is the latest and most vivid evidence of the way Communist interrogation methods that the United States long described as torture became the basis for interrogations both by the military at the base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and by the Central Intelligence Agency.....
Here's the '57 study referred to in the article:
Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War
Quote:
....As a social scientist, I find of singular interest one result of the studies which we and other groups have recently made of Communist attempts to extort "confessions". It is that the finding of our studies whlich should be greeted as most ne-w and spectacular is the finding that essentially there was nothing new or spectacular about the events we studied. \We found, as did other studies such as those of Hinkle and Wolff that human behavior could be manipulated within a certain range by controlled environments. We found that the Chinese Communists used methods of coercing behavior from our men in their hands which Communists of other countries had employed for decades and Which police and inquisitors had employed for centuries. The Chinese interrogators succeeded or failed to influence the behavior of their victims roughly to the extent that the skill and persistence of the personnel they employed nmatched those of practitioners in other places and times.....
CSIS, 15 Sep 08: Closing Guantánamo: From Bumper Sticker to Blueprint
Complete 31-page paper at the link.Quote:
George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and John McCain all agree that the United States ought to close Guantánamo. But how can we expand a position that has been little more than a bumper sticker—"Close Guantánamo!"—and turn it into a blueprint for real policy change? This report outlines an answer to this question.It will likely fall to the next administration to carry out this new policy. The challenges are considerable, and there is no "silver bullet." In fact, there are only imperfect options. That said, Sarah Mendelson and the CSIS Working Group on Guantánamo and Detention Policy have concluded that the costs of keeping Guantánamo open far outweigh the costs of closing it. They recommend that the process of closing Guantánamo should be achieved through a policy called R2T2:
- Review
- Release/Transfer
- Try
During his first week in office, the next president should announce the date for closure of Guantánamo as a detention facility in conjunction with announcing the establishment of a new policy. Implementation of this new policy would be charged to a blue-ribbon panel of eminent Americans tasked to review the files on all remaining Guantánamo detainees. The duties of the panel would include categorizing all detainees to be released or transferred to the custody of another government or, alternatively, to be held for prosecution in the U.S. criminal justice system, whose record in international terrorism cases far outshines that of the Guantánamo military commissions. Since 2001, the U.S. criminal justice system has convicted 145 terrorist suspects, whereas the military commissions, thus far, have only convicted two. Overall, this straightforward policy—R2T2 —can help restore our reputation as a country that is built on and embraces the rule of law.
Got news for CSIS - we already have "a blue-ribbon panel of eminent Americans" working on the problem. We call them the Federal judges of the DC District and DC Circuit.Quote:
from CSIS
They recommend that the process of closing Guantánamo should be achieved through a policy called R2T2 ... Review ... Release ... Transfer ... Try.
...
Implementation of this new policy would be charged to a blue-ribbon panel of eminent Americans tasked to review the files on all remaining Guantánamo detainees. ...
And, unlike a "Gitmo Commission", the present "blue-ribbon panels" have the authority to order compliance with their policy of "R2T2" - including putting offenders into the prisons of their choice.
PS: The next president should simply order DoJ and DoD to get with it and clean up these cases. We are dealing with roughly 400 cases at issue - not a large number.
Amongst our recent news was the report that the USA, as part of the close Guantanamo Bay, sought the help of Australia and the UK, to absorb some of those released. Sensible to a degree if nationals or past residents; none were. Australia declined and so had Tony Blair when PM. Gordon Brown's view was unclear.
So I like some of the thoughts here, send the detainees back to where they were detained, which I understood to be mainly Afghanistan.
davidbfpo
never have been removed.
However, they were. No sense crying about it, it's done. Now we're stuck with people who cannot be tried for violation of US Law because making war against any nation outside that nation is not illegal. We could just release them -- and will release many who have IMO been held pretty much by, for and as Schmedlap says -- and as cover for those who should not be released because they are a threat and a significant one at that. They're prisoners of war in a new kind of war the Geneva Conventions -- and most nation's laws -- do not consider.
So we release Ali and he goes back to irregular warfare. So what, you say?
So he kills one American who happens to be one's nephew... Or one German who happens to be a diplomat and thus antagonizes the Germans. Contemplate what the effect would be were he to be far more effective and pull off a real coup of an operation...
We'd be roundly excoriated for releasing him.
Regardless, there is no easy solution; even the NYT admits that (LINK). They're going to be held somewhere without a trial for a while...
Check this Reuter's article (LINK).
The Obama administration will find this a harder nut to crack than can be done by a generalized EO which will sound good in principle. The problem will come in reducing the principle - "Close Gitmo !!!" - to practice.
Closing Gitmo will not solve the problem - nor sending them "somewhere". As to that, sending them back to Astan and Bagram is as good a temporary solution as any. Temporary - cuz that is the next dinner plate coming up the dumb waiter, as I reported here, at posts ## 161 & 163.
Two separate questions concern these detainees; and the others who will surely come into our hands in the future.
1. Their status under the GCs as ratified by the US. The Federal courts who have looked at this question have generally found (across the spectrum) that Common Article 3 of the GCs determines their status. In short, the Taliban, AQ and associated detainees are not PW/POWs under GC III, or civilians under GC IV. The arguments hinge on what treatment should be given detainees with this CA 3 status - and how long the detention can last.[*]
2. Criminal charges against those detainees under US law. First off, the statement that "making war against any nation outside that nation is not illegal" is simply not correct. It is correct to state that a lawful combatant can make war against any nation anywhere so long as that lawful combatant accepts and applies the laws of war.
Here, we again have two kinds of possible criminal charges.
2a. Criminal charges against detainee armed combatants who have Common Article 3 status - that is, armed combatants of a non-state actor (even if a "Power" in the armed conflict) which has not accepted and applied the GCs in its treatment of detainees, etc. In the olden days, they could be tried by a summary military board of field officers and even executed. CA 3 simply requires that they be tried by "a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."
2b. Criminal charges based on US Anti-Terrorist, Anti-Torture and War Crimes statutes. Those charges have nothing to do with Common Article 3 status, but hinge on whether the crime is committed by or against a US national.
Admittedly, the Bush administration has made a hash of explaining all this to the public - and, for that matter, in trying some of those cases competently. I await the practical solutions to be adopted by the Obama administrtation - a wait of 6 months to a year before we see a "field manual" would not surprise me.
At that point in time, some Bush Bashers will undoubtedly support the Obama "manual" - even if it resembles the Bush "manual" in all material respects. Ain't partisan politics wonderful ?
-------------------------
[*] Some arguments have been made that the 1977 Additional Protocals I and II should be applied to CA 3 situations. Those were adopted by many countries in the heat of "surges" for anti-colonialism and wars of national liberation. The US did not ratify those protocals - nor were they ratified by India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq - which cover the present areas of interest.
PS: As I finished this, a Cheney bashing segment on this topic came on. The two media pundits either know nothing about the GCs and US criminal law; or, are simply mendacious.
Can you cite the statute from any nation that makes the actions of a foreign combatant who does abide by the 'laws' of war (I'd say there are none other than those each nation passes to govern its own conduct but we can save that argument for another time) criminal if said war is on the individuals own or another nations territory?If neither of those apply and the individual was detained on a field of battle by another belligerent and we assumed control for whatever reason, what then?Quote:
2a. Criminal charges against detainee armed combatants who have Common Article 3 status...
2b. Criminal charges based on US Anti-Terrorist, Anti-Torture and War Crimes statutes. Those charges have nothing to do with Common Article 3 status, but hinge on whether the crime is committed by or against a US national.
Or if the individual was captured in or as a result of combat action by US troops but no CA 3 status or criminal action other than engaging in combat is alleged?
Seems to me that the statement ""making war against any nation outside that nation is not illegal"" is not so much incorrect as it just offends the lawyerly sensibilities... :wry:Heh. A wait of over eight years on this score will not surprise me...Quote:
...I await the practical solutions to be adopted by the Obama administrtation - a wait of 6 months to a year before we see a "field manual" would not surprise me.
As we both know, they don't apply and the issue of unlawful combatants in accordance with the Third Convention is not a settled fact regardless of the ICY for the Former Yugoslavia decision based on the 1958 commentaries...;)Quote:
[*] Some arguments have been made that the 1977 Additional Protocals I and II should be applied to CA 3 situations. Those were adopted by many countries in the heat of "surges" for anti-colonialism and wars of national liberation. The US did not ratify those protocals - nor were they ratified by India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq - which cover the present areas of interest.
does not offend my "lawyerly sensibilities" - nor any other of my sensibilities (assuming I have any).Quote:
.... making war against any nation outside that nation is not illegal.
My objection is that it is overbroad; and it allows the bad guys to hide among the good guys (lawful armed combatants who commit no atrocities and have combatant immunity - even when we kill each other).
You recognize that distinction when you ask for a statute that makes criminal "the actions of a foreign combatant who does abide by the laws of war". Obviously, there is no such statute or convention because that statement is the same in substance as what I said:
The defining "statute" is Common Article 2 of the GCs which makes the conventions applicable to the High Signatory Parties involved in an armed conflict (somewhat broader in scope than a war under Hague); but also to a "Power" involved in that armed conflict - if that "Power" accepts and applies the conventions (e.g., North and South Korea during the Korean War, although practice did not always conform to principle). If that is the case, that Power's armed combatants are lawful and fall into GC III (as PW/POWs) and its civilian adherents into GC IV (as protected civilians).Quote:
It is correct to state that a lawful combatant can make war against any nation anywhere so long as that lawful combatant accepts and applies the laws of war.
Now, what of a Power to an armed conflict that does not accept and apply the GCs to its own military actions and its own detainees - even in the minimalist view that the GCs must only be applied (giving an implied acceptance) ? Very simply, its armed combatants are not lawful combatants to which the PW/POW provisions of GC III apply. That is so even if an individual armed combatant of that non-complying Power himself otherwise complies with the "laws of wars" as we understand them.
And, its civilian adherents are not entitled to the protected civilian provisions of GC IV. That is the price that one pays for adherence to a Power that does not apply the GCs. So, do these combatants and civilians have any rights ?
The answer is affirmative - under Common Article 3 of all the GCs, which applies to any non-state actor ("Power") which does not apply the GCs.
Those provisions, which recognize detention of both combatant and civilian adherents of a non-complying Power, require a trial before a competent tribunal before execution, etc. Similar provisions are in the main body of GC III (if a CA 3 detainee claims PW/POW status) and GC IV (if a CA 3 detainee claims protected civilian status). The last two claims are what the DC habeas cases are all about.
We have not charged AQ detainees with the crime of being unlawful armed combatants (which is allowed under CA 3). Gary Berntsen feels they should be charged and executed if convicted - for which, there are some older precedents under the "common law of war" ("We shoot partisans, don't we ?"). I happen to disagree cuz I don't like "common law crimes".
What is not in dispute is that CA 3 allows detention of persons subject to its protection. I can see no limit on duration of detention - until the end of the armed conflict with the non-complying Power to which the person adheres. A large group of apologists disagree with me and demand that CA 3 people have to charged with a crime or released.
-------------------------------
As to your questions:
The only valid reason for detention would be the civilian's adherence to the non-complying Power (e.g., to AQ). The DoJ claimed this as to the Uighurs and got smacked on the facts. I suppose this ground for detention could be useful where the person is a member of the non-combatant infrastructure of the non-complying Power - and you could prove that. Otherwise, he's a protected civilian under GC IV.Quote:
If neither of those apply [no criminal charges and not an armed combatant] and the individual was detained on a field of battle by another belligerent and we assumed control for whatever reason, what then?
Since you exclude CA 3 status, the combatant cannot be a adherent of the non-complying Power (e.g., Taliban). A wayward Pakistani ISI advisor, perhaps ? Since Pakistan is a High Signatory Party to GC III, I suppose he would be a PW/POW under GC III. Interesting case hypothetical.Quote:
Or if the individual was captured in or as a result of combat action by US troops but no CA 3 status or criminal action other than engaging in combat is alleged ?
Were you thinking back to your mispent youth as an advisor ? Again, practice did not accord with theory - (e.g., Dan Pitzer, Nick Rowe and Rocky Versace - not a hypothetical).
You keep me up too late.
Penalty of being old... ;)Always a possibility and I have little doubt that a few have so hidden in most wars but on balance, most get caught at it or killed. It all works out.Quote:
and it allows the bad guys to hide among the good guys (lawful armed combatants who commit no atrocities and have combatant immunity - even when we kill each other).
Huh. That's funny -- I thought that's what I said -- that what you said was what I said. More or less... :DQuote:
... Obviously, there is no such statute or convention because that statement is the same in substance as what I said:
I agree with you and not Berntsen or the apologists...Quote:
We have not charged AQ detainees with the crime of being unlawful armed combatants (which is allowed under CA 3). ... I happen to disagree cuz I don't like "common law crimes".
What is not in dispute is that CA 3 allows detention of persons subject to its protection. I can see no limit on duration of detention - until the end of the armed conflict with the non-complying Power to which the person adheres. A large group of apologists disagree with me and demand that CA 3 people have to charged with a crime or released.
Dumb cliam by DoJ.Quote:
...The DoJ claimed this as to the Uighurs and got smacked on the facts.
That's what I thought and the issue then becomes that he got picked up as a possible fighter -- wrong place at the wrong time -- and it could be exceedingly difficult to prove he was NOT a civilian entitled to GC IV. So either you determine he is such and let him go or you're sure that he was in fact a fighter but you may not be able to prove that so you just hang onto him -- particularly if you think he might return to his old ways...Quote:
I suppose this ground for detention could be useful where the person is a member of the non-combatant infrastructure of the non-complying Power - and you could prove that. Otherwise, he's a protected civilian under GC IV.
Do I exclude it or can I just not -- or don't wanta -- prove it??? :wry:Quote:
Since you exclude CA 3 status, the combatant cannot be a adherent of the non-complying Power (e.g., Taliban). A wayward Pakistani ISI advisor, perhaps ? Since Pakistan is a High Signatory Party to GC III, I suppose he would be a PW/POW under GC III. Interesting case hypothetical.
This is the lead sentence from a story here.Quote:
A former military prosecutor said in a declaration filed in federal court yesterday that the system of handling evidence against detainees at Guantanamo Bay is so chaotic that it is impossible to prepare a fair and successful prosecution.
So, could one option be to release all the detainees because the control of evidence has been so botched that the possibility of fair trial no longer exists? The US then just brings all the detainees back to where they were first detained and releases them.
(An interesting twist on the old "catch and release" program:
Announcer: Well, detainees, thank you for playing "Lock Up the Terrorist." Johnny, please tell the contestants, our studio audience, and the folks at home, about the lovely parting gifts we have for them. )
The WP article is here. This case and other cases with much the same problems have been posted in "War Crimes". I'll try to get back to this later this afternoon or tonite - and see if I can link to the original declaration.
The WP article, and another Gitmo article here (with a slant), deal with the Jawad and Khadr cases - both involving alleged grenade tossers.
Posts on the Jawad case are here (#63), and here (##121 & 124).
Posts on the Khadr case are here (#62), and here (#147)
Since this thread is about lawyers and Gitmo, we may as well start with some of the lawyers. The first thing we have is a tom cat p...ssing match between LTC (ret) Darrel Vandeveld and COL Lawrence Morris. That may or may not have anything to do with the merits. One thing sure - those two are not about to agree on anything.
We also have MAJ David Frakt (defense for Jawad) who has elected to try the case in the media. That is his right - since he is not under a gag order. I wouldn't chose to do that, but that is a matter of taste, not ethics. Watched the MAJ on TV last nite and was not that impressed (purely IMO).
The only lawyer I personally know who is involved in one of the Gitmo cases is Mike Cooper, pro bono defense for one Adel El Ouerghi, an alleged "Tora Bora boy" with some Tunisian problems. Mike is older than I and younger than Ken.
Mike has chosen the quiet approach (via diplomacy through DoS Legal Advisor's Office) to find a new home for his client. Mike's suggestion to the court is here. No merits decision yet that I could find. If diplomacy doesn't work, then Mike has reserved the habeas route.
----------------------------
These two grenade cases (like many others) involve two separate issues:
1. Whether and how long the detainees should be detained, which is a CA 3 question.
2. Whether the detainees are guilty of criminal charges (murder and attempted murder), which is a Federal statutory question.
The media mixes these two issues with reckless abandon - and so do defense counsel since the criminal charges require a higher standard of proof and the evidence (that which exists) is weaker.
The problem of missing and undisclosed evidence is a valid gripe (IMO), which has been discussed in a number of "War Crimes" posts.
------------------------------------
Sending them all back to Bagram - and starting from square one - has some merit. Release for all - no; release for those against whom there is no probable cause to find them armed combatants or AQ adherents - yes.
Only problem with that is that the DC District has hold orders on all of the habeas detainees - limited to Gitmo. The Federal judges will eventually (within this year) decide which detainees should be held and which should be released. Those hearings are solely on the lawfulness of detention, not what crimes may or may not have been committed.
That process will continue unless DoJ decides to fold on all of the cases. If these decisions pile up, the Obama administration may simply decide to let the Federal judges decide the detention issue.
in the El Gharani case, which is here (post #165), illustrates many points raised in prior posts above.
If the other Federal judges would move with his diligence over the next 6 months, these Gitmo cases could be cleaned as to the issue of detention.
That would still leave the questions of where and how long to detain - as well as the question of what crimes (if any) should be charged against those whose detentions are found valid. Those questions must be addressed by the Obama administration in specific terms.
Suppose we simply release them to wherever. Over the following few years, a few will initiate lawsuits, some will try to build useful lives, and so on. Some will almost certainly pop up again in terrorist or insurgent actions. After the first couple of incidents where the good guys take casualties from recycled bad guys, what is the likely response of the good guys when presented with the opportunity to take a prisoner?
Second question concerns potential trial rules. Are we going to see these people released because nobody read them their Miranda rights? Will they be released because the troops were too busy fighting to properly gather evidence? Will they be released because we sent troops instead of cops, lawyers and public defenders?
I'm also confused about just exactly what has gone on. These people were captured on the battlefield. They went through the tribunals, I thought, to determine a. whether they were engaged in acts of war and b. whether they were "protected persons" as defined by the GC. If the answers were no or yes, I thought they were released. I also thought that if there was too much uncertainty, they were released, which led to our guys meeting some of them on the field of battle again. Did I miss, or misunderstand, something? Haven't we been following the GC by determining their status? Aren't the people still in Gitmo the ones who were determined a. to have been engaged in acts of war and b. to be unprotected persons under the definitions of the GC?
At least, I don't think they are. I'd be willing to bet a bunch of money that the first 'hypothetical' has occurred, is occurring and will continue to do so due to the "catch and release" policies. Joe is not stupid...
Policy makers sometimes let their idealism or urge to please get in the way of their common sense.
For the second, I don't doubt it'll get that bad in some courts.
For the last, mostly true, I think but there are a few of questionable status who are the cause a lot of friction due to trials by media, adverse publicity and / or some curious actions by DoJ -- most caused, I'm sure by some Intel Agency worried about releasing too much info in an Unclas forum.
However, I think I totally understand your logic and agree...
I'll keep this short. The basic problem was that CSRT review was flawed (not so much as it was written, but in how it was run and staffed). The net result was that no one had any confidence that all the bad guys were really bad guys. That was exemplified in the two completed MCA trials, where the military judges re-determined (before the merits hearings) the detainee's status as an "enemy combatant" ("unlawful combatant"). It also has been proved by the 6-3 release score in the habeas cases decided by Judge Leon (not a liberal by any test).Quote:
[3] I'm also confused about just exactly what has gone on. ...
The simple issue of a detainee's status (EC or not) is not rocket science, since it is really a question of whether there is probable cause (50% + a nose) to hold. That question is decided by Federal and state magistrates (lower level judges) in 100s of cases every day. Ken hits on part of the problem (secrecy) which was as much DoD and Bush WH policies as intel. As the Federal court cases prove, classified information is not a valid issue. It has been handled without problems to the US in many detainee cases.
In any event, the DoJ (not the detainees and not the courts) took the initiative to scrap the CSRT process - and the DC Circuit in Bismullah agreed with DoJ, as reported here (#164). So, EC status will have to be re-determined in each of the habeas cases - as Judge Leon is doing.
--------------------------
As to Miranda - definite "No release" under present MCA rules. If torture (defined in MCA) or "totality of circumstances" proves the unreliability of a statement, the statement must be excluded. But, that does not release the detainee if other evidence proves EC status. See how Judge Leon (link in #35 above) went through the charges and evidence item by item. He was more than willing to remand the detainee to custody if the DoJ could win on only one item. It couldn't make a preponderence on any item.Quote:
[2] ... Are we going to see these people released because nobody read them their Miranda rights? Will they be released because the troops were too busy fighting to properly gather evidence? Will they be released because we sent troops instead of cops, lawyers and public defenders?
What I'm seeing in these cases, is that the field investigations were fine. The problems have been loss of evidence (e.g., chain of custody) which was properly collected by troops in the field; and the failure to follow up the leads suggested in that evidence. Those failures were DoD and DoJ failures (in part caused by transfer of detainees and evidence between commands and agencies). IMO that is the main reason for secrecy in these cases - call it CYA. In this area, our troops can walk and chew gum at the same time (without added cops, lawyers and public defenders). The same can't be said for DoD and DoJ.
------------------------------
IMO (not a legal analysis) -Quote:
[1] Suppose we simply release them to wherever. Over the following few years, a few will initiate lawsuits, some will try to build useful lives, and so on. Some will almost certainly pop up again in terrorist or insurgent actions. After the first couple of incidents where the good guys take casualties from recycled bad guys, what is the likely response of the good guys when presented with the opportunity to take a prisoner?
The good guys will (1) adopt their own release policy (detention or a form of release); (2) render the detainees hors de combat (any of Indian ancestry out there still adept at hamstringing ?); or (3) kill the detainees. All according to the situation and the commander.
Here is one view from MAJ "Fury". Context: Some AQ surrendered at Tota Bora. A group of them, escorted by Ali's muhj, ran into MSS Grinch (a composite Delta-SBS force of about two dozen).
The "Grinch boys" and their attached Arab linguist did get near the AQ prisoners and engaged in a brief photo op and debriefing, including one AQ who responded to a question about UBL by saying: "I could tell any Muslim brother where Sheik Usama is; and they wouldn't tell you."Quote:
Upon seeing the American commandos, the muhj became nervous, clearly not wanting the boys near their prisoners. A rumor had spread after the laughable surrender deal a few days earlier that the Americans would kill all prisoners in cold blood. In a war zone, that wasn't necessarily a bad reputation to have.
Dalton Fury, Kill Bin Laden (2008), pp.269-270, which is available here (a good book for JAG officers to consider in advising go and no-go).Quote:
Every nervous muhj guard present during this exchange thought the next action would be an American commando putting a .45-caliber hard ball into the prisoner's smart-ass mouth. But we are more civilized than our terrorist adversaries, a characteristic seen as a sign of weakness by al Qaeda's ilk, and let them live. In a war zone with these people, such compassion isn't such a good reputation to have.
I will keep blowing my trumpet that "a law of war" must be based on actual reciprocity in practice. Otherwise, it will not work.
The Obama administration would do well to remember that when it makes the "new rules" in this and other areas (e.g., targeted killings).
I believe that (1) would be precluded by the commands; (2) Is highly unlikely. Most Americans do not go in for torture, mutiliation or unnecessary wounding; to be sure, some do but they're a minority (3) but most will kill someone in a heartbeat -- and what the commanders says or wants may or may not have an impact; most firefights are not very well organized...I disagree. Fiction is not a good guide for lawyers...Quote:
Dalton Fury, Kill Bin Laden (2008), pp.269-270, which is available here (a good book for JAG officers to consider in advising go and no-go).
I do not disagree with you on "a law of war" but would remind you that Ali or Joe do not always heed the laws or their bosses; sometimes they think for themselves and do what makes sense to them. Americans in particular are very much into independent action and making decisions. They also tend to be selfish and to dislike excessive or unnecessary work, so catching the same guy three times in three months doesn't seem to them to be really smart...Quote:
I will keep blowing my trumpet that "a law of war" must be based on actual reciprocity in practice. Otherwise, it will not work.
I'm unsure what you mean by targeted killings. if you mean the attacking with direct action groups -- or Hellfires from predators -- of so-called 'high value targets' or the leaders of insurgent or opposition groups, I suspect you'll be disappointed. That's a technique that's as old as warfare and it works...Quote:
The Obama administration would do well to remember that when it makes the "new rules" in this and other areas (e.g., targeted killings).
What commands ? The context of JW's example suggested a group of good guys acting independently in fact - thus, no assumption of "legalisms" or ROEs for that matter. So, good guys decide what to do individually or do what their commander tells them. Aside from capture (detention), accepting surrender and leave in place is another (lots of variations here if you have an imagination - which you do).Quote:
... (1) would be precluded by the commands
I see - OK to kill them (#3), but not disable them (BTW a necessary wounding assuming your team cannot detain prisoners). More humane to kill than to maim. Perhaps true to a majority of Americans.Quote:
(2) Is highly unlikely. Most Americans do not go in for torture, mutiliation or unnecessary wounding; to be sure, some do but they're a minority
Nope, won't let you cop out so easily - BTW: agreed that there is a lot of slack in a firefight & so, a surrender is a risky proposition until the situation becomes stable. I'm assuming a stable situation after the firefight, where the choice has to be premeditated and deliberate.Quote:
(3) but most will kill someone in a heartbeat -- and what the commanders says or wants may or may not have an impact; most firefights are not very well organized...
Hell, let's simplify this. Mission (one person team) is to get from point A to B. AQ retread (one person) fights and surrenders. Your (or my) choice is (1) detain AQ as captive, bring AQ back to A and abort mission; or possibly leave him in place in some way so he won't screw up you getting to B; or (2) disable him so he probably won't screw up you getting to B; or (3) kill AQ so he will not screw up you getting to B (and also correcting the screwup in someone releasing him in the first place). Add to it: no Operational Law Handbooks, ROEs, etc. - in short, only White's Law (or McCarthy's Law) applies.
I don't think that situation is that simple - and probably has no correct answer. However, your move ...
----------------------
What is your factual basis for the assertion that the book is fiction. Since I'm a Dalton Fury neutral, I stand to be educated by facts. If the man is "not factually accurate" (he says the book is fact), I'd like to hear the facts.Quote:
I disagree. Fiction is not a good guide for lawyers...
------------------------
We agree here - and that is what I am getting at by actual reciprocity. I would add that our troopers see even less reciprocity where American detainees in AQ hands are beheaded, mutilated, etc. The problem of AQ retreads is a smaller subset of a much larger problem caused by AQ-Taliban non-compliance with the GCs. Where there is a substantial disconnect between the law and those subject to the law, the law will fail.Quote:
I do not disagree with you on "a law of war" but ....
-----------------------
Yup, I do
My disappointment will be if the "new rules" outlaw those tactics. AQ has no qualms about killing our leaders - and destroying our government. Actual reciprocity in this instance supports continuation of the tactics.Quote:
mean the attacking with direct action groups -- or Hellfires from predators -- of so-called 'high value targets' or the leaders of insurgent or opposition groups
Trying to figure why you read me wrong. I think it is because some people do argue that we should not kill their leaders because, if we don't do that, they won't kill our leaders. Now, if that theory worked in practice, there would also be actual reciprocity. I will start believing those apologists when beheadings, suicide bombings and a number of other things end.
Not so, he gave no context, you assumed that -- and it's incorrect.The 'good guys' will determine what to do individually only so much as the situation allows, if the ROE governing contacts say capture, the commander on the ground will almost certainly follow the rules. However, if Joe decides that a given person he sees had been seen before, he may ignore his commanders desires and the ROE -- IF he thinks he can get away with it. That is far from an unknown phenomenon.Quote:
So, good guys decide what to do individually or do what their commander tells them.
Thank you for the acknowledgment of my imagination; an accolade from the cretaor of the Chimps... :DQuote:
Aside from capture (detention), accepting surrender and leave in place is another (lots of variations here if you have an imagination - which you do).
Correct in my observation and experience -- not in my imagination; yours is the one that went to maiming. ;)Quote:
I see - OK to kill them (#3), but not disable them (BTW a necessary wounding assuming your team cannot detain prisoners). More humane to kill than to maim. Perhaps true to a majority of Americans.
Watch it. I'm not trying to cop out of anything.Quote:
Nope, won't let you cop out so easily
There you go with the ass u me bit again. That is very unlikely to occur, the chances of detection are too great and penalties for doing that are too severe. If it occurs, it will be in the heat of a firefight or not at all.Quote:
- BTW: agreed that there is a lot of slack in a firefight & so, a surrender is a risky proposition until the situation becomes stable. I'm assuming a stable situation after the firefight, where the choice has to be premeditated and deliberate.
I strongly doubt anyone can say what they'd do in your hypothetical situation; you say "'one person team" and if that means an individual operating alone (improbable but possible) then none can accurately say what they would do in a situation until they're in that situation, there are simply too many variables.Quote:
(omitted as unnecessary)... let's simplify this. Mission (one person team) is to get from point A to B. AQ retread (one person) fights and surrenders. Your (or my) choice is (1) detain AQ as captive, bring AQ back to A and abort mission; or possibly leave him in place in some way so he won't screw up you getting to B; or (2) disable him so he probably won't screw up you getting to B; or (3) kill AQ so he will not screw up you getting to B (and also correcting the screwup in someone releasing him in the first place). Add to it: no Operational Law Handbooks, ROEs, etc. - in short, only White's Law (or McCarthy's Law) applies.
It never is; few do; and I'm not moving anywhere.Quote:
I don't think that situation is that simple - and probably has no correct answer. However, your move ...
My factual basis is that he could not tell everything that occurred in the book due to the classification of the actions involved, that his was not the only unit that had that mission and thus that his book may be mostly fact -- but cannot be totally so. I used the word 'fiction' simply to point out that his book, like many others will ALWAYS leave out some things and will be a one person view of what occurred and thus not all encompassing. Memoirs and "I was there" books are seldom totally factual, they cannot be for a variety of reasons, thus there's always an element of fiction or "I think what happened was...' I can also say that I hear among his former compatriots there are mixed emotions about that specific bookQuote:
What is your factual basis for the assertion that the book is fiction. Since I'm a Dalton Fury neutral, I stand to be educated by facts. If the man is "not factually accurate" (he says the book is fact), I'd like to hear the facts.
Based on what I hear, they seem to be very much aware of that; the word is that avoiding capture is paramount...Quote:
...I would add that our troopers see even less reciprocity where American detainees in AQ hands are beheaded, mutilated, etc.
It's an imperfect medium for communication; my excessive wordiness is an attempt to add clarity in view of the lack of expression and context due to the medium; even that frequently doesn't work as this exchange shows -- as one of my kids says, the internet doesn't do nuance... :wry:Quote:
Trying to figure why you read me wrong.
Nope, I can't claim credit for invention of the Chimps and the Gorilla. That credit belongs to this guy, whose post #70 (13 Nov 2008) can be found here; and who said:Quote:
Thank you for the acknowledgment of my imagination; an accolade from the creator of the Chimps...
I liked this zoo example then and still do - gets down to the basic equation, without evasion and escape.Quote:
That does not mean that we need to continue our current approaches and 'strategies.' No one messes with 600 pound Gorillas -- unless the gorilla proves himself so utterly lacking in agility that he can be annoyed to distraction if not defeated by a young chimpanzee...
That's where we are. If I weighed 600 pounds, I'd stay out of the Chimps cage but if one got close to me, I'd just kill him. Other than that, I'd leave them alone if they left me alone. Some of them -- not most -- would be likely to respond by standing off at a distance and throwing whatever came to hand. Not a prob; I can throw also -- and bigger stuff, harder -- and should be willing to prove that to them at the slightest provocation. They'll soon quit...
As to the rest of your "Counter factual?", I'll be back after a little bit of simian contemplation. :D
always too many variables - in real life.
Totally agreed. BTW: "fiction" IMO is a bad word (sound bite) in this situation, since some would read it as a charge of fabrication and lying on the author's part. Perhaps, "factually incomplete" or "context incomplete" would be better - nuff said, since I don't like semantic arguments.Quote:
My factual basis is that he could not tell everything that occurred in the book due to the classification of the actions involved, that his was not the only unit that had that mission and thus that his book may be mostly fact -- but cannot be totally so. I used the word 'fiction' simply to point out that his book, like many others will ALWAYS leave out some things and will be a one person view of what occurred and thus not all encompassing. Memoirs and "I was there" books are seldom totally factual, they cannot be for a variety of reasons, thus there's always an element of fiction or "I think what happened was...'
So, what do we do when the context is incomplete and there are too many variables - I suggest that applies to all real life situations ? Thus,
1. Freeze like a deer in the headlights - "Oh, I just don't have enough facts. There are just so many variables. Oh God, what shall I do ?" Not a good place for complex planning.
2. Jump right or jump left. One or both options may be wrong - you still may be dead. Perhaps better if you'd a thunk out some options (simplified hypotheticals) ahead of time and practiced them. Anyway, not a time and place to re-invent the wheel.
-----------------------
and I agree with your kid:
We could get to the point(s) much better and quicker if we were sitting on your back porch with beers and bourbons - "candy is dandy, but liquor is quicker". Not on my back porch, cuz we's a heading for 200" right quickly. Have to eat something and blow snow. :)Quote:
It's an imperfect medium for communication; my excessive wordiness is an attempt to add clarity in view of the lack of expression and context due to the medium; even that frequently doesn't work as this exchange shows -- as one of my kids says, the internet doesn't do nuance...
PS: No problem with your "excessive wordines" cuz I don't think it's excessive. But, you certainly are a master of verbal escape and evasion - not a bad thing BTW. Working backwards from the bottom to the top of your post - "I shall return".
a simple one shot metaphor may be credited for the invention thereof but it doesn't seem to me that it equals in imagination the adoption and multiple uses??? LINK, Many, many LINKS -- I suppose one could argue that for hours on end... :D
Attorneys. Sort of a learn by doing thing... :D
If anyone wants a straight answer from me, all they have to do is ask a straight question. Attempts to tap dance on the head of a pin OTOH will usually draw a broadly similar response. I really prefer straight talk as opposed to dazzling with footwork but am prepared to play either way. Always remember, snark draws snark as they say... ;)
I like that one also.Quote:
I have many friends who are ... Attorneys. Sort of a learn by doing thing...
This also seems a factually accurate statement (unfortunately based only on what you write - neither one of us can accurately assess the realities that attach to the other one - an Internet defect).
Also accurate:Quote:
I really prefer straight talk as opposed to dazzling with footwork but am prepared to play either way.
Which can be a strength or a weakness. Usually a strength for me, but sometimes running with the ball ends up in getting clobbered.Quote:
... but it doesn't seem to me that it equals in imagination the adoption and multiple uses???
Snow !!
In the 50s here in Montana. We'll take your snow and cold, Ken.
I know where this (LINK) was before it got there...
Or something like that. :D