I'm with Entropy on this Issue
I think Entropy is on target with respect to his comments concerning technology. I will only add a little to what he already expresses.
When I was still in the Marine Corps, my Marines and I suffered through this painful process of serving technology, vice technology serving us on numerous occassions.
This misfocus caused warfighting skills to atrophy. Misfocus kills. Misfocus kills because service members in harms way find they do not know how to quickly adapt to a combat environment because the baseline references to operate with an infantryman mindset are lost once people depart from basic training; sustainment training is set aside to follow gadgets and develop new systems when time should be focused on studying the nature of the fight, language training, anthropological and infrastructural studies of the threat environment via the use of sophisticated technologies.
Once service members deploy in theater, they lose access to bandwidth, technologies do not hold up well in indigenous weather/environmental conditions, and I spend more time maintaining the system than reading the enemy. This is ludicrous. Machines should serve me, not the other way around.
This frustration lead me to become an ardent follower of the late Colonel John Boyd when he stated the priority in preparing and execution of war lies in "people, ideas and hardware" in that order.
Warfare is about people. Warfare is about weaponizing time and space; the weaponization of time and space is best prosecuted by those who make the most effective timely decisions utilizing a tool/model known as the "Boyd Cycle" or "OODA LOOP". We need people of all ranks to be able to make rapid/effective decisions in a time of crisis. This requires increased investment in the human mind in the form of language training, cultural training, free play exercises employing technologies and w/out technologies since our adversaries know the U.S. has the technological edge and evade/exploit their gaps. General Van Riper did this in Millenium Challenge 02 and this shut down the tech based exercise. One can read more about it here... http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/ne...0906-iraq1.htm . For those interested in learning how other countries see they can fight us best read "Unrestricted Warfare" via this link... http://www.terrorism.com/documents/T...restricted.pdf
Thank you for making a post regarding this subject and allowing people, like myself, to respond.
Cheers and Semper fi, Bob
One good thing about OODA
Quote:
Originally Posted by
OODA.LOOP
Warfare is about people. Warfare is about weaponizing time and space; the weaponization of time and space is best prosecuted by those who make the most effective timely decisions utilizing a tool/model known as the "Boyd Cycle" or "OODA LOOP".
I respectfully and absolutely disagree. Making effective decisions in a timely manner is nothing to do with the OODA loop. The OODA loop is a simplified model of one possible decision making process.
The idea of cycling the loop faster and faster means that bad decisions based on bad observations get acted on faster, and the same point of incomplete observation is revisited in a shorter time. The problem is further compounded when technology enables faster bad decisions, based on a pretence of understanding -EG: Robert's Ridge.
If the loop was merely to state the actions for which the enemy is unprepared both, temporal and spatial, are those most likely to succeed then it would be useful, and also the definition of surprise. However I have yet to see anywhere, where Boyd stated this.
Consider the implications of the fact that
You know what you know and as such you can choose to act on or not act on such things, but much the same as any interactions between humans you can and do only control you so of course you can only plan for your actions or inactions.
This is not necessarily the same as having no control over others. Anyone whos seen crowds together for one purpose or another can see that there are ways in which to produce almost certain reactions to stimuli. This is the only way I can see that one can honestly plan for enemy actions but it still comes down to a better more informed SWAG then one might generally make intuitively. The "hard" decisions still have to be made but the tools can at least help to make them slightly more informed than might otherwise happen.
Since this thread has devolved into an OODA debate
I refer readers to an earlier Boyd/OODA debate that sort of started with my post here
One good thing about OODA
In a number of currently active threads, there has been a lot of discusion about the failures and inadequacies of Boyd's OODA loop theory. I agree with most of them. However, I feel that it did bring one important fact to the table and this fact is often forgotten. OODA focuses on the "human" factor and that it is men that fight and determine the winner and loser in a conflict. For this reason alone, I feel OODA has some merit, though it is flawed as a complete model.
Reed
forgot to include this...
"If the loop was merely to state the actions for which the enemy is unprepared both, temporal and spatial, are those most likely to succeed then it would be useful, and also the definition of surprise. However I have yet to see anywhere, where Boyd stated this."
William, your comment is exactly what the Boyd Cycle is meant to capture. Boyd's works were put into writing by Dr Chet Richards.
Cheers, Bob:D
In relation to these rediscovered wonders
Found a book at the second hand shop called:
A WAY TO VICTORY- The annotated book of five rings
(Miyamoto's Mushashi's classic guide to strategy)
Was I wrong to think it might be another descendant of some of our "great ideas
Eating the OODA Elephant One Bite at a time...
I think I've captured all the relevant complaints about the OODA Loop concept and hope to publish a series of postings here and in the other OODA Loop thread (they'll be mirroring each other for starters) to hopefully lend some clarity to the issue, at least WRT how we in the Marine Corps intended to deal with it. That said, the concept is grossly misunderstood, mistaught, misapplied, and misused...and weeding through all that is going to be difficult. But separating all that chaff to get the germ of the wheat should be productive, if nothing else but to cast some light on what the issues behind the OODA Loop concept really are. Like any other concept, OODA has uses in situations best suited for it--and it is irrelevant in others or just plain dangerous in the hands of the unskilled. It's very difficult to make generalities regarding the concept outside of situations/scenarios. But I'll make that attempt. You'll find, however, that in a philosophical/conceptual disagreement I'll quickly "go to ground" in specific scenarios and situations, both to illustrate what I think your qualms are and what I think the proper understanding and utility of the concept is.
As an intelligence officer, I have a particular interest in the concept/model from a practical standpoint in designing intelligence architectures, systems, techniques and procedures, and in training Marines. How the OODA Loop concept helps me do this is something I probably won't get to for some time, because I've got to lay a helluva lot of conceptual foundation/groundwork to establish before I get there.
The complaints I see in the threads revolve around two areas:
The validity of the OODA Loop Concept
The utility of the OODA Loop Concept.
If you don't buy the validity of the concept, you generally don't think much of its utility. Even if you buy the validity of the concept, you may still think it's not terribly useful from a practical standpoint.
My Particular Bents and Biases on the Subject:
First, I am a "German School" Maneuver Warfare advocate for reasons established in other threads that I won't repeat here. I was also an armor officer with a light armored vehicle battalion commander in my tank battalion at one time (he retired a three-star general)--he was pretty big on deliberately designing shorter decision cycles with no compromises made on quality of judgments, even though mistakes were generally tolerated. But more to the point, I also learned "Soviet School" MW when in grad school--I got fairly engrossed in Soviet tactical cybernetic theory (what they termed "Troop Control" theory) which had very much of a mirror concept to the OODA Loop. Interestingly, the Soviets spent a huge amount of effort on the "Orientation" piece, trying to simultaneously shorten the time required to achieve it and increase the quality of the understanding to be achieved in that phase. Most of my judgments on the utility of OODA Loop theory is going to be founded on Soviet School MW practice, although there is quite a bit of German School MW utility as well. I'll cover both, but the German School applications appear relatively squishy in comparison.
Secondly, I was and still am a big fan of MW influences in commercial hobby historical wargame design and development. There have been a number of efforts to model OODA loop processes for various historical periods, but the "German School" MW applications of C2--decentralized command to facilitate tighter OODA cycle time--has been the most problematic to model. So far the most successful effort I have seen (but still not the most perfect) is the Tactical Combat Series (TCS) games published by The Gamers and Multi-Man Publishing. Repeated play of these games--which are overwhelmingly focused on WWII, naturally--provides some compelling insights into what is theoretically (and practically) possible with the concept in ground warfare at the tactical level. There are other titles and game design systems that also do a good job, but a little more abstractly which makes them harder to visualize what is happening and accept some of the game outcomes. I'll get into that as well much, much later--probably at the end of my discussion.
Lastly, there are limitations and issues regarding the OODA Loop concept, and my interest here is to increase the understanding of what those truly are as opposed to what many perceive them to be. I may not be convincing enough as much depends on your particular background and desires. But it's worth a shot. If anything, if you fail to agree with how I lay this out, at least you understand why I'm thinking in the way that I do...and if we agree to disagree, it's because we're coming at the idea with widely differing assumptions borne from widely different experiences.
OODA Loop Catechism: Establishing Articles of Faith
If you are familiar with my posts in discussion threads elsewhere, you can perhaps better appreciate why I used the terms I did in the title.
Instead of plunging into Osinga's description of Boyd's concepts of the OODA Loop and "fast transients," I thought I'd start with the foundational MW theory as Marines understand it and work backwards. That way I can uncover the issues regarding validity and utility one onion layer at a time so we maintain some coherence in approach and cohesiveness in discussions. We'll eventually cover everything mentioned so far (and I expect a good deal more besides), but it's a very large subject and it must be tackled in layers. Each layer is going to build on the other layers.
Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.
MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.
What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characterstics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.
MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."
What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).
MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.
What does this mean? If additional hitting power (strike) or force sustainment/survival (protect) cabilities are purchased at the price of speed and focus to gain leverage/advantage (maneuver), then the force is potentially off-balance vis-a-vis an opponent who enjoys better speed and focus and can leverage these to advantage. MW interpretations of history (and possibly narrow selection of examples--we can talk about those) are that, given the dilemmas regarding balancing strike/protect/maneuver capabilities, one is better off putting more initial emphasis on maneuver over strike and protect, given an uncertain situation.
MW Essential Premise #4: Where agility and action quality in executing "fast transients" have been historically seen as important and improvements made in weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operations, and training to accomplish these have been made, the explicit intent to design all aspects of military command and control around this idea is a relatively recent occurrence.
What does this mean? Command and control--in all its components and aspects--is to be explicitly designed to execute fast transients. What differentiates German School and Soviet School MW is how command and control is designed to achieve it; each reflects differing requirements, restraints, constraints, and compromises made between tempo and quality. German School MW uses Boyd's decision cycle as its means of explanation/analysis, whereas Soviet School uses a similar conceptual device but with different emphases in the subcomponents.
My next post will catalogue and investigate the challenges to these premises before we move on. Once that is done, we'll delve into the Bill Lind and the USMC interpretions of the OODA loop and the various challenges to the validity and utility of the concept.
I think I must be a heretic
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ericmwalters
Like theology, we've got to start with some foundational beliefs. There's a lot of reason and logical edifices that are erected, but none of that means much if you don't buy into the basics.
As I see it, the foundational beliefs postulated are all different ways of describing one thing: exploiting asymmetry with one's opponent. If you have done a good job, you are able to leverage your strengths against your opponent's weaknesses to win That does not necessarily equate to maneuver warfare. And it is no great feat of brilliance to saty that you can probably beat your opponent if you use your advantage well. However, your advantage has to be one upon which you can actually capitalize.
Some examples:
Rommel was able to maneuver much better than the British in N. Africa. He neded to execute all of his operational efforts quickly because he had a limited logistics base to resupply him. He well knew that he could not hope to beat the British once the American industrial base kicked into gear and started delivering. Once that happened, it matter little how well and how quickly Rommel could observe, orient, decide, and attack--he no longer had enough "stuff" in his arsenal to win against the industrial juggernaut whose products were lumbering across the Atlantic. If all you have is pebbles, how quickly you run around an elephant throwning them at him does not really matter. You will never win. And, once you tire yourself out, the elephant can just stomp on you when you have to lie down to rest.
I submit that a similar analysis applies to Napoleon's Russian campaign--no matter how quickly the French were able to campaign, they were unable to overcome the sheer geographical size of the Russian Empire. The asymmetry between "how fast" and "how far" resulted in a mismatch that French speed could never overcome.
Airborne operations as negative examples?
reed11b writes regarding the MW Essential Premise #3: Weapons, organizations, techniques, procedures, concepts of operation, and training to accomplish these must be oriented towards achieving higher quality "fast transient" actions when confronted with such situations.
Quote:
The historical failure of airborne operations would stand in strong contrast to any historical support for this theory. The AH-64 deep strike failure in OIF is another historical counterpoint. Decentralized control provides greater “maneuverability” then emasculating the force structure TO&E
Reed
Hmmm. I probably need to talk about a SPECIFIC example here. Some will say that airborne operations were not historical failures. Even the German air assault on Crete in 1941--catastrophic in casualties as it was--proved an operational success.
The crux of the issue here is "maneuver" in the MW sense of the term and "decisive maneuver" which is what most airborne operations sought to accomplish on the battlefield, which was generally confined to a single, decisive, vertical envelopment. This is not what MW "maneuver" means, particularly when we are talking about the OODA loop. What "maneuver" means in this context is the imagery of two wrestlers, each seeking leverage over his opponent. There are many, many maneuvers--not just one that is judged to be decisive ahead of time. Indeed, the wrestlers aren't sure what pin or hold is going to win the match for them...or whether they're going to win on points.
Most airborne operations sought to achieve a military fait accompli on the battlefield--and this requires a very high degree of certainty regarding the situation to pull off. That's quite different from MW/OODA, which is designed to work in situations of relatively poor certainty/high uncertainty. The problem with airborne operations is that, once the troopers are on the ground, their ability to execute fast transients is extremely limited against certain kinds of enemies. So you want to ensure that the blow truly is decisive just by landing it where you land it, and not depend on the flexibility of the airborne force to overcome signficant opposition once it's on the ground.
Bottom line--you can't execute just ONE "fast transient." In this MW essential premise, the OODA Loop is judged to be an interative process that constantly repeats/cycles, and you have to execute "faster" and "focused" overall/in aggregate, if not in any single iteration. Airborne ops execute one fast transient (operational-level insertion to tactical employment on the ground) and then they can have severe difficulties after that.
Lest anyone think I'm poking the paratroopers in the chest here, let me just say that it works very much the same way for amphibious operations. The one crutch that amphib forces have that airborne forces don't is the potential for very high throughput of follow-on reinforcement and logistical sustainment, provided sufficient facilities are seized early on, compared to purely vertical envelopment. Interestingly, the USMC's initial and tentative forays into Distributed Operations and Ship To Objective Maneuver tended to be much more reminsicient of airborne operations, with all the attendant advantages and disadvantages regarding being able to mount consecutive "fast transients" once on the ground....
Challenges to MW Essential Premise #1
To recap:
Quote:
MW Essential Premise #1: Speed and Focus are two characteristics of successful operations in an environment of uncertainty.
What does this mean? While these are not the only two characteristics needed for success, these are the two characteristics that discriminate the MW style from other styles. Additionally, there is a belief that these characteristics are necessary (but not sufficient) for success in an uncertain environment. If the environment is relatively static and certain, then these characteristics may not play such a significant role. Siege operations (whether on a tactical, operational, or possibly even a strategic scale) would seem to put much less emphasis on achieving relative speed advantages and on focusing on a particular thing at the same time--at least until the "assault upon the works!" Ideally, a successful siege never gets that far--the place surrenders/succumbs before then.
So here are the quibbles/challenges to this idea and the USMC Maneuver Warfare doctrinal responses:
Challenge: Speed alone is not enough. Even speed with focus means little if the focus is misdirected and/or speed only is in a single spurt and cannot be sustained.
Response. MW/OODA Loop theory has no argument with this particular challenge, but nevertheless maintains that an uncertain environment puts a premium on capabilities to enjoy greater speed of action/response than one’s opponent and the ability to focus that action effectively. The theory does not encourage reckless speed in a number of instances:
MCDP 1 Warfighting says (pages 62-64):
Quote:
In a military sense, there is more to speed than simply going fast, and there is a vital difference between acting rapidly and acting recklessly. With time we must consider the closely related factor of timing….Making maximum use of every hour and every minute is as important to speed in combat as simply going fast when we are moving….A good tactician has a constant sense of urgency. We feel guilty if we are idle. We never waste time, and we are never content with the pace which events are happening….We employ speed and use time to create tempo. Tempo is not merely a matter of acting fastest or at the earliest opportunity. It is also a matter of timing—acting at the right time.
Additionally, MCDP 1 argues (pages 65-66
Quote:
As with all things in war, speed is relative. Speed is meaningful militarily onlyl if we are acting faster than the enemy. We can do that either by slowing the enemy or by increasing our own speed.
To be consistent, superiority in relative speed must continue over time. It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then because when we are not moving faster, the advantage, the initiative, passes to him. Most forces can manage an intermittent burst of speed but must then halt for a considerable period to recover between bursts. During that halt, they are likely to lose their advantage. We realize that we cannot operate at full speed indefinitely, and the challenge is to be consistently faster than the enemy.
I’d like interject here that most of the complaints I’ve read in the threads are about acting so fast that no good judgments are possible. Nobody is talking about the other half of the way to win the OODA Loop contest, which is by slowing the enemy down. If you think your force is going too fast to effectively understand what it’s doing before it does it, then there’s the other option of getting the enemy to slow down to the point where this is less of a risk to your force.
Challenge: An overemphasis on speed/tempo in this sense means there is little provision for times when it is best to wait for the situation to develop out of uncertainty.
Response: The MW/OODA Loop is designed to help us concentrate on building capacity for speed/tempo and focus in execution of operations. There is a difference between the German and Soviet schools on how this works in planning, which we’ll have to cover in the future. But USMC MW theory admits that knowing when to act—and when not to—is part of the speed/focus emphasis. Again, from MDCP 1 Warfighting (pages 64-66):
Quote:
Timing means knowing when to act, and equally important, when NOT to act [Emphasis in the original—EMW]…If our concept of operations involves a diversion, we need to allow time for the diversion to take effect. If we have laid an ambush for the enemy, we need to give the enemy time to fall fully into the trap. If a situation is still forming, we may want to develop it further before we commit to a course of action….Decisive action is our goal, and it must be timed to occur at the proper moment. There are times to act, and there are other times to set the stage and wait.
As has been said, simply using speed and focus is no panacea for effective thinking. Discrimination in application matters--and practice/experience in doing so is essential.
Challenge to MW Essential Premise #2--Part 1
To recap:
Quote:
MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."
What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).
Challenge: If the OODA Loop concept was originally designed to explain how the F-86 could generate a higher and better tempo in “fast transients” against a MiG-15 in a Korean War era dogfight, is it still relevant/valid in understanding missile versus aircraft engagements?
Response: I would argue it certainly is. This is very clear if we look back to Vietnam War surface-to-air missile engagements—Randy “Duke” Cunningham knew exactly when to put his F4 into a steep dive when one of those “flying telephone poles” would come up to greet him. Timing was everything; the advantage the pilot had was he knew how the missile would react—after all, missiles had no brain. So if the pilot understood the guidance system, the pilot knew the missile G-loading characteristics (which were usually more than what humans could tolerate), the pilot knew the characteristics of his own aircraft, he could devise a response based on what he knew the missile was capable of.
Certainly as guidance systems and missile performance has improved, this has gotten harder and harder to do. Certainly the OODA Loop as ONE of a number of analytical lenses would help to paint the problem. Still, aircraft countermeasures against missiles (whether inherent to the aircraft or from other aircraft executing SAM suppression missions) are aimed at lengthening the missile engagement OODA Loop to the point where the pilot can effectively react and negate the threat. If we need to get into specifics here, we can, certainly…even if we are talking about theoretical scenarios.
But just an example, Missile Warning gear is intended to alert the pilot that a missile is in the air, giving him the option to divert or abort (or press on). In other words, it provides an “earlier” observation than he might otherwise get, leaving him more time for “orientation” and “decision” and “action.” “Wild Weasel” missions flying support for strike packages have a number of options that can be described in OODA terms. Is this the ONLY way to express what is going on? Certainly not. There are a number of other tools that are necessary to understand what is happening, what can be done, etc. Especially for the air defender, there’s a lot of game theory/queuing theory going on before the engagement so that decisions can be made in split seconds. Is that an application of the OODA Loop concept? One can argue it either way. On the one hand, some will say that “orientation” and “decision” times must be cut to an absolute minimum, so automated/algorithmic solutions are sought. On the other hand, some might argue that the OODA loop as the maneuver warfare advocates portray it is pretty much useless in such scenarios. Okay. This is a technical argument—I think the OODA concept applies, but I’d readily concede you won’t find any discussion of “reconnaissance pull,” “commander’s intent,” and “mission tactics” in this. Roger. But given what we have talked about regarding maneuver warfare, this would be seen as a relatively arcane discussion compared to the “larger” issues regarding command and control of larger units on the ground. That’s where most the arguments come in.