ISAF Campaign Plan Summary
ISAF Campaign Plan Summary - John Nagl, Small Wars Journal Blog
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I was struck during my recent visit to Afghanistan by an impressive understanding of counterinsurgency principles in the
International Security Assistance Force and at subordinate headquarters (See In
Afghanistan, 'New Spirit' To Confront The Taliban at
NPR).
At the request of the small group of think-tankers I was travelling with, General David McKiernan's headquarters has agreed to release an
unclassified version of the ISAF Campaign plan specifically for posting on
Small Wars Journal. Things I find particularly interesting in this plan include the upfront acknowledgement that this is a counterinsurgency (vice peacekeeping) campaign (obvious to us, but hugely important in the NATO context); the addition of "Shaping Operations" to the classic "Clear, Hold, Build" COIN methodology; an acknowledgment that in this still critically under-resourced theater, ISAF cannot be strong everywhere and must therefore prioritize areas to clear and hold (
a point Dave Kilcullen made well on Sunday with Fareed Zakaria); and the overt emphasis on buildling Afghan governance capability and capacity as the objective of all of our operations.
Could be way off, but that has never stopped me before!
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Can anyone explain to me what this actually means. Particularly why the word "Shape" is used.
Wilfo,
Shape in my mind is doing things like reforming the local police, and holding shuras to inform the populace of our intent before we go in searching houses and ticking people off. I submit that shaping (I would prefer "condition setting") up front pays dividends in the long run. Lining up the PRT, NGO's (a mission in and of itself) identifying issues through ASCOPE (particularly through SWEAT-MS), selecting short term projects that quickly make security gains or good will projects pays big during the clear, hold and build. I hate to sound like a jargon monkey but that is the quickest way I can explain what it means to me.Although you can clearly argue that reforming local officials, conducting projects can/should be done during hold/build. I think shaping the envirmoent through a competent police force or estasblishing good relations with the populace first is best. Use build for long term capacity type stuff. My only complaint with this current campaign plan is a lack of mechanisms to ensure we are synched with the ANSF. We have been here for a few minutes, I truly see nothing new in our approach to how we will synchronize efforts with the ANA/ANP.:(
Just for grins, I looked it up in the dictionary.
Tons of definitions as a noun and as a verb; since its use, militarily ( ? :rolleyes: ) is as a verb, here's the one I think most appropriate:
"To embody in a definite form: shaped a folk legend into a full-scale opera."
I particularly liked the example... :D
Agree with Hacksaw and Eden
Re: the one pager, there's no 'there' there. I always get worried after I read "the latest revelation" and know less than before reading it... :eek:
Europe doesn't care what we say and the strategy comes from the politicians and CentCom (but only to the extent the former allows the latter to dictate a bit :wry: ).
I'm totally unsure what purpose that Unclas document serves other than to mystify an already ignorant media. :confused:
for some reason I cannot edit my previous post
The line about the IO / Narrative campaign LLO should read 'Why isn't there one?'
I defer to the more learn'ed but in a word yes.
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
Many thanks.
So if I said "Preparatory activity to help achieve the campaign objectives" it would mean the same thing?
Yes, But other Council members are correct, I gave examples of shape as it will more than likely be used in the context of this campaign plan. But as you know we can use Fires, IO, Checkpoints, etc, to shape the battlefield of the terrain or populace…
Also as I have read the Campaign Plan, I do not disagree with Eden that most of these guys know their stuff (they are not on the staff at ISAF by accident)
I feel Mark's comment about platitudes is dead on. I realize that you dont hammer out details at the theater level inside of a campaign plan. However I dont see subordinate staff's in the regions as even having a jump off point for refinement, to make the dream come true.
Tony
At least we now have something to dissect!
I am not sure how much real insight anyone expected to get from a 5-line mission statement and 13 bullet points that summarizes a joint and combined operational level campaign plan. I for one was rather heartened by John’s post and the tiny insight it offered, so my hyper-tension is under control. I am not sure how many of have seen a summary of the OIF Joint Campaign Plan. It would not say a great deal more than we have been offereded in the ISAF summary: lines of operation (political (Main Effort), security, diplomatic, and economic) and the supporting activities (information, intelligence, engagement and logistics). Linda Robinson provides a really good open source summary in [I]Tell Me How This Ends[/I.
The interesting omission from the ISAF summary is any mention of diplomatic activity to support the plan. Aren’t the regional context and the role neighbours can play to support or undermine the plan pretty important considerations when it comes to developing a theater plan? While the summary mentions Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuaries in the border region, shaping the diplomatic environment in a wider sense than the effects strike operations have is a crucial, but as yet unstated task that has to be met.
Not much and that's the point...
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Originally Posted by
Alex Alderson
I am not sure how much real insight anyone expected to get from a 5-line mission statement and 13 bullet points that summarizes a joint and combined operational level campaign plan.
It doesn't pass the "so what" test. That's to say it serves no useful purpose, so why bother -- except as a platitude for the media and punditocracy / civilian strategist crowd.
Thank you so much Mr White
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
It doesn't pass the "so what" test. That's to say it serves no useful purpose, so why bother -- except as a platitude for the media and punditocracy / civilian strategist crowd.
For once again bursting the bubble for those of us who like to at least pretend someone actually might care what we have to say
We all have our talents. I'll thank you to know
that several Commanders who have said things like "You could rain on a Medal of Honor ceremony" were not correct. I'm good but I'm not that good...
(Your comment also applies to my deathless prose. ;) )
Wait 'til the GAO gets involved
While the sketchy ISAF campaign plan summary has created more itches than it scratched, it's interesting that at least a glimpse of what may be in store has been offered. And who knows, the authors might be avid readers of Small Wars Journal and might take account of some of the concerns raised. For me, the interesting thing is to compare this vorspeisen with the way the 280 page Petraeus/Crocker Joint Campaign Plan (and all its 14 annexes) was kept on a very tight hold for a long time. True, plenty of visitors to Baghdad were briefed on the plan and the method, but very little was said publicly. Indeed, a rather amusing game of cat and mouse developed between those in Baghdad and the GAO (see http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081021t.pdf) over the very issue of public statements of intent.
Ken justified to ask 'What's the point?' If it is to stimulate a bit of discussion among those who are interested and care, and to get a different take, beyond tell us more, John's post has worked.
Heh. The logical question is "Why should they" but we know logic is not involved.
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Originally Posted by
Alex Alderson
GAO get involved, I mean. Why should they? (I know their answer; I'm looking for a real and sensible answer...)
GAO is always amusing, very much so. They're also tedious, eminently predictable and mostly a waste of money. That tends to happen when you approach your job with foreknowledge of what your 'audit' will produce...
Still, I can visualize the haggling across the table and -- has anyone invented an automatic word parser yet? ;) -- the general ignorance of most auditors on the topic du jour. :wry:
I too have had a lot of fun with them. You get a sharp, knoweldgeable one who's done his or her homework occasionally but it's regrettably rare.
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Ken (is) justified to ask 'What's the point?' If it is to stimulate a bit of discussion among those who are interested and care, and to get a different take, beyond tell us more, John's post has worked.
Could be and if so, you're correct that it has worked. Though I have noticed over the last 20 years or so an Army tendency to produce and publish too many such papers that really say little if anything in an attempt to defer scrutiny -- and what those sorts of papers really do is virtually beg Auditors and worse to come calling... :eek:
Congress and the GAO may not be very bright but they are incredibly sensitive to tap dancing and Army attempts to plant angels on the heads of pins generally fail as Tom Odom pointed out elsewhere. CALL ought to do a paper on the futility of that...
That dead German guy again ....
This is not totally thought out, so excuse me for thinking out loud - with thoughts based on CvC Book 8 (see quotes at this post).
Let us posit a situation where the People are split 5% for the insurgents (Taliban if you like); 5% for the incumbant (Astan govt if you like); and the other 90% are elsewhere.
Would this not resemble the pre-French Revolution situation in Europe, where the objective set by Politik (damn Germans have the same word for politics and policy ;) ) is necessarily limited and the plan of the war is also necessarily limited ?
If so, should we not see something that is quite different from CvC's "ideal war" (the theoretical construct where the passions of the People are indeed aroused, etc.) ?
And, one might ask, is not this more limited construct applicable to most armed conflicts that we call insurgencies ?
In short, are we in fact unlikely to see an "ideal war"; remembering that is not what CvC endorsed as the best way to wage war, but only as the theoretical construct which is approached when (from link to Book 8 above):
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Thus, therefore, the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose, with all its natural force. The cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on the internal affairs of countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the French towards all nations.
As a matter of political theory, I suppose that involving the People as active participants (even if only moral supporters) in an insurgency would be a great plus for whichever side could capture their unqualified support. However, if that were the case (that the People would participate en masse), there probably would not be an insurgency in the first place - or, if started, would not last long.
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The objective set by Politik for Astan (based the 13 Jun Guidance) is:
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Success will be defined by the Afghan people's freedom to choose their future--freedom from coercion, extremists, malign foreign influence, or abusive government actions.
These "Four Freedoms", leading to the ultimate freedom ("to choose their future"), certainly relate directly to the People and are certanly political enough (Rove and Carville would be at home in that environment).
However, looking to strategy as here defined:
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Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the end of the war; it must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms the plan of the war, and to the said aim it links the series of acts which are to lead to the same, that is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns, and regulates the combats to be fought in each.
I find it hard to visualize the "series of acts" (military) which would lead to the penultimate objects (the "Four Freedoms") and the ultimate objective - allowing the Astan People (if that posited entity exists as a real entity) the freedom to choose their future.
The Command Guidance does present what seems a localized plan:
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The ongoing insurgency must be met with a counterinsurgency campaign adapted to the unique conditions in each area that:
- Protects the Afghan people--allowing them to choose a future they can be proud of
- Provides a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency
but, if (repeat "if") it works "in each area", how will it then proceed from what local Afghans want to the much higher level of what the "Afghan People" want ?
In short, can the "Afghan People" be treated as a monolith; or, in fact, is there such a thing as the "Afghan People" in reality, as opposed to an international legalism ?
There Is No Insurgency To Counter!
According to this Afghan official who lives in a country run by the Mafia and Drug Dealers. This is a smart guy he not only knows Afghanistan but also Ecocnomics......Money is never the limiting factor! Need to throw Kharzid(kant spel) out put his drug dealing brother in jail and make this guy King! Then he can come fix America. Especially his talk about all the ASSUMPTIONS made about Capitalism and how good it is that are not true!
http://www.ted.com/talks/ashraf_ghan...en_states.html
That is one of the most intelligent generic tactical statements
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Originally Posted by
IntelTrooper
The brigade should simply support the battalions with the needed assets, nothing more.
I've read in in years.
Should apply generally and not just in Afghanistan... ;)
Just work at puncturing egos
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Originally Posted by
IntelTrooper
(now I get to be righteously indignant every time I hear something was overriden by Division!)
above you. That helps everybody!!! :D
Really.
Okay, so he knew one thing...
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Originally Posted by
Oldpilot
Actually, Boyd did know it all, in the sense that he knew very well that every war is different.
I think that's along way from 'all.' No one knows it all; not Old Pilots like thee or Old grunts like me. We may be good but we aren't that good. Boyd was good but he wasn't that good. :wry:
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He believed in policy, but not in doctrine, or at least not in a single doctrine: 'If you got one doctrine, you’re a dinosaur. Period.'
I think that's true of anyone with any sense. Problem is getting people who know better to stop being lazy and relying on saurian principle because it's easy. :mad:
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That was in 1992. Seemingly it is a lesson that we are given in every generation, and that is subsequently ignored.
I don't think it takes nearly that long -- my guess would be two changes of command or job, max. :rolleyes:
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Bernard Fall in 1965: 'I would like to close with one last thought, which applies, of course, to everything that is done in the armed forces, but particularly to revolutionary war: If it works, it is obsolete.' (Italics his.)
Bernie didn't know it all either; Not even in my purchased at the time first Edition -- nor did Galula (same note). One has to synthesize the thoughts of many to get anywhere near decent knowledge. No one will ever have all the answers. :cool: