Agree with you -- and so would several guys I know
who left a Group to go to the Agency. Different jobs...
Interesting, thanks for the link.
Shooter oriented from the word go...
He advocate more SF oriented to the Arab World and the ME/South Asia. he also notes that it takes time to build SOF people -- one presumes he's given some though to the facts that by the time his reorganization is complete, it may no longer be needed and that his total focus on the Islamic issue -- which is not our only problem -- may lead us into not being ready elsewhere.
That's a shortsighted and wrong headed approach.
I did get a laugh out of this quote:
Quote:
"Additionally, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR frequently operate under the control of JSOC."
See some things differently
Quote:
he also notes that it takes time to build SOF people
He does but I took it to be tinged with sarcasm:
Quote:
What makes SOF special? The short answer to this question
is: carefully selected, highly trained personnel that can conduct
challenging missions that often exceed the capabilities of
general purpose forces. However, the rigorous and lengthy
selection, assessment and training required to create SOF has
a downside: small force size. A truism within the SOF community is that special operators cannot be mass-produced. (Bold for my emphasis)
I did get a laugh out of this quote:
Quote:
"Additionally, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR frequently operate under the control of JSOC."
Oh, if only most knew what was truly happening within JSOC these days, goes back to my previous statement: Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.
I cannot agree with the shifting of forces focus as well. When one looks globally, Russia is awakening, Central/South America are running right up there with ME, so I personally do not see reorganizing focus as a good thing.
Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.
Quote:
Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
• MARSOC is a recent addition to SOCOM
• Still not fully stood up
– Currently at around 1500 personnel
– Building to 2600
• Will eventually consist of three primary elements
– Marine Special Operations Advisory Groups (MSOAGs)
• Formerly know as Foreign Military Training Units (FMTUs)
• Focus on FID
– Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOBs)
• Organized into deployable companies that focus on DA and CT
– Marine Special Operations Support Group (MSOSG)
Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.
As a retired SOCOM reservist...
..who is Air Force but enjoyed the purple suit world, I think the SOCOM/CIA interoperability is already there and works just fine.
In days of yore (mid-1960s) the US Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan CIA In-coountry team was headed by a CIA pureist or careerist, but his Deputy was a retired Navy Commander (05) who had been a pilot.
As the then USAF Liaison Officer for the US Base at Badabur, Peshawar, in the NWFP part of Pakistan (then West Pakistan) the National Secuity Council was our uppermost command structure. We had CIA involvement with our U-2 survelliance site associated with our base, as well as Army Security Agency involvement with our USAF Security Service communications (over the horizon communications intercept intel)... across the Arabian Sea in several North Africa nations we had related Naval Intel field sites (small, communications related) as well.
History repeats itself, people are forever trying to feather and refeather their career and economic nests by various forms of mixing and matching. Nothing new here, really.
I do like the role and good work which the Navy SEALS have as a key part of USSOCOM, but the Army and Air Force Special Forces play equally important integrated and inter-related roles also.
You youngsters know today's structure and world of SF, etc. much better than us old coot retirees so I will shut down. But, history repeats itself, we hope for the good, but not always is that the outcome.
A peculiar historical perspective
on original sin. "Once upon a time" :), COL William O. Donovan, Coordinator of War Information was granted license by Pres FDR to create a full blown intel agency. Donovan borrowed a great deal from the British but concluded that having a separate intel collection/analysis agency (MI6/SIS) and covert action/paramilitary agency (SOE) was inefficient so he combined the capabilities in the OSS. This "original sin" was incorporated in the National Security Act of 1947 when the CIA was created. It has been, IMO, responsible for all sorts of mischief such as the Bay of Pigs, among other dumb ops.
Fast forward: The Intel Reform Act of 2004 did not rectify the original sin. So, combining military SOF with CIA will likely compound the error. What needs to be done, IMO, is to separate CIA's paramilitary capability from the intel collection and analysis functions, preferably in a new organization that is civilian run, similar in function to SOE. I would also keep it separate from SOCOM although there could be much work done together under an OPCON authority.
Cheers
JohnT
That's the American way, George; we're great at
doing just that.
That's why Winston noted "You can always trust the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative."
OTOH, whenever we try to organize things, we generally screw it up -- ad hocery is what we do best.
Competition is good for everyone...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ODB
What would be the advantages to doing this and why?
None that I can discern
Quote:
What would be the disadvantages to doing this and why?
Hard to work for two masters. Army folks working for another agency would essentially become throwaways; there would be no agency loyalty to them. The agency would have different rules and playing by theirs might be a bad lick for those so seconded.
That's just off the top of my head. There's more not openly discussable.
Quote:
Lastly if you had complete control what would you do to reorganize our current system?[
I'm with John T. and Tom Odom, a civilian Humint intel organ; a new separate civilian DA organ; DNI; USoD Intel; Army, Navy, USMC, USAF, USCG Intelligence; DIA; DoE; DHS; DoS INR; Treasury; DEA; FBI; NGIA; NSA; NRO; A uniformed DA crew and SF (Not involved with any of the foregoing except on an as required, mission basis).
Competition keeps everyone honest. Consolidation is turf protection
Where and how does this fit into the overall structure ..
Quote:
from Ken
... a new separate civilian DA organ ....
Thoughts about what it would look like ? Mission ? Command and control ?
How different from the "... uniformed DA crew ..." ?
Possibly, violent agreement, Ken ...
but I have to think about this a bit - from the viewpoint of the poor SOB who has the legal advisor's role to the civilian DA and CI branches.
I assume that the military DA wants to keep its combatant immunity status, as much as possible - so a mix with civilian DA would flunk that test.
Also, civilian Disinformation and other softer forms of direct political action would have to fit in somewhere - at the national C2 level ?
Hooray, Hooah, Oorah for Ken
A couple of comments.
1. Not just DA but other covert political actions.
2. DA and other covert political actions are NOT intelligence. Intel is the direction, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information - intel cycle. I do see DNI overseeing the cycle for all intel agencies but not for my proposed US SOE (by whatever name). The analogous position to DNI is, IMO, the CJCS.
Cheers
JohnT
Churchill and Teddy Roosevelt
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
doing just that.
That's why Winston noted "You can always trust the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative."
OTOH, whenever we try to organize things, we generally screw it up -- ad hocery is what we do best.
Not to digress but Churchill is my favor historic figure from my youth, followed by Teddy Roosevelt and Ike.
And of course Churchill himself epitomized trial and error in his repeated moves "across the floor" of Parliament from one party, back to the other, back again, it makes historians dizzy. His failed Dardinelles campaign was another example of his "under belly" attack theories which didn't work.
Churchill was originally opposed to the coast of France landings, wanted to go in from the south, as best I can recall, Vichy France.
Have a good weekend. Correct me if my history recall is flawed.
Three different functions - how to meet the twain
I'm seeing three different functions here:
1. Intel is the direction, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information - intel cycle. Intel consumers should not be their own analysts.
2. Political subversion, economic subversion, propaganda (I'd use "disinformation" here, since propaganda which is white on white should be totally separate from disinformation operations), and the "etc." of this softer side of covert ops.
3. Paramilitary operations (e.g., Bay of Pigs, which was neither clandestine nor covert in its execution; but very compartmentalized in its preparation); but more so in the present context, DAs which should not be handled by the military (Gary Berntsen's pitch).
In any given situation, two or more of these functions can and probably need to be linked. So, one agency fits all; or separate agencies ?
If the latter, there are at least two problems:
1. Co-ordination of efforts (joint task forces ?);
2. How to hide the appropriations for their efforts (dumping all the $ into one agency makes that easier) ?
Is this roughly where this discussion is at ?
Minor terrminology differences, John ...
Quote:
from JTF
#2 - first, we designate propaganda as white = source acknowledged, gray = source not acknowledged, and black = source disguised. For both the US military and DOS, the information in all propaganda messages is truthful (although it need not be the whole truth). Disinformation (deception) is, in the US, not psychological operations but rather an intelligence operation but one that may use PSYOP assets.
I was limiting #2 to disinformation (not from US military, DoS), which in my twisted mind is a part of a two-level (outlet and message) black to white disinformation and information construct:
1. outlet spectrum - outlet is black when outlet is 180 degrees from originating agency which remains clandestine and covert (e.g., info, regardless of its color, comes from CIA and is published by the KGB). Outlet is white when outlet is in phase with originating agency (e.g., info comes from CIA and is published by VOA). A gray outlet would be the perfect neutral (90 degrees out of phase with the main adversaries). Obviously, a broad spectrum of gray outlets is possible.
2. message spectrum - message is black when it is false in main focus part; message is white when it is true in main focus part. Again, many shades of gray can lie along the spectrum.
Can you have a white on white, covert and clandestine, disinformation operation ? Sure - Czech Intel's planted WWII German docs (which were mostly real) in the lake - discovered by TV documentary types, given to Czech government and eventually released through Czech government agencies, to some consternation in German Intel circles.
------------------------------
Quote:
from JTF
#3 - I see no reason why DA should not be carried out by military SOF (SEALS, DELTA, and SF C companies and the like).
Neither do I - and this should be the default (IMO).
I am no big proponent of civilian DAs; but there are situations where they are needed - primarily because of legal reasons. In those situations, the actions "should not be" carried out by military SOFs - which is what I meant by "DAs which should not be handled" (not all DAs, but a limited class of them).
--------------------------------
As to the "problems", I don't see them as insurmountable hurdles - just possible hurdles that can be overcome. As to co-ordination, I should have cited Ken's post:
Quote:
All could routinely meet or convene in part for emergencies as does the UK Cobra Team
LINK. Not to be copycats, we could call ours Sidewinder (for Selected Intelligence, Domestic Emergencies, Wars, Information, Disinformation, Extractions, Raids).
Love that Sidewinder :)
Not a practitioner but I have a question...
I recall and understand the doctrine -- as well as what you are saying about -- black, gray and white propaganda. However, I also recall from a few classes at Holabird long ago (howzat for dating ones self... :o) that the colors can and do also identify purpose; i.e. Black written by Black says White is ba-a-ad (though I'm actually an angel... :cool:); Gray written by Black says White is good but well, he's not really all that angelic and Blue, after all does not trust him. It plants seeds for further tilling...
White written by Black says Black is the good guy.
While I understand we are always truthful (... ;)), adhering strictly to your and the doctrinal definitions would seem to raise a couple of questions. Why have / do Black and Gray? For what reason would we not want to reveal the source? Or disguise it?
I'd submit, for example that "Bright, Shining Lie" is gray. It purports to tell some of the story of the US Army and Viet Nam but it is, in my opinion, a well written polemic that attempts to justify the less than stellar way the media covered that war by pointing out enough Army and Viet Namese (as well as the John Paul Vann speculatory denigration; 'even the good guys had issues...') warts (and I certainly know and acknowledge there were plenty...) to make the media look like the real good guys -- when in fact, they were no better at doing their job or being truthful, all things considered, than was the Army.
I remember the "bird" Ken but
didn't go there because I didn't transfer to MI or take the Advanced Course until it was at Hoochie Cooch.:D
I suspect you are right that at one time colors could refer to content but it became obvious that separating PSYOP from deception and disinformation was more useful than maintaining the color scheme for content.
Regarding your specific question: I guess telling the story again is worthwhile. My friend worked sub-Saharan Africa. They were looking for ways to discredit the Soviets in the region. Someone came across Soviet anti-Islam propaganda designed for use in Central Asia. Still, it was real Soviet stuff. The op took this stuff and ran it in the Muslim countries of sub-Saharan Africa claiming it originated from the Soviets (true) and passing it off as targeting the Muslim population of the region by the Soviet govt and embassies in the region. Hence, this was a classic case of a Black Propaganda op with great results. To use the content and source scheme you would have to call this Black source and white content. too confusing for my littel brain.
Cheers
JohnT
Policy, Policy, Policy. ODB, Long But pls read Thru
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ODB
Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.
Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.
MarSoc wasn't about money but a much more Powerful Motivator, Policy.
Its Policy that sets what is a Conventional Force, what is a Special Operations Force, what is a General Purpose Force... Its Policy thats says XYZ conventional units are Rapid Deployment Forces & can deploy immediately on the word of the President.
...It was Policy that the Marine Corps successfully used to argue to keep its SOF capable Forces fr/ being chopped to SoCom in the '80s. Arguing that unlike the other services the Marine Corps as a whole is listed as a GPF who's missions can border whats defined as S-O. Also unlike the other services, its SOF capable units are Totally integrated in the day-day Operations of the MAGTF on all levels.
At the time, a successful argument on the Grounds of Policy.
It was The USMC that found itself on the wrong side of Policy in the yrs leading up to MarSoc w/ a SecDef (Rumsfeld) set to write New Policy regarding SOF & their usage in the future of the GWOT.
W/out getting into the details, as some of you already know, that SecDef changed Policy & said that in Matters of the Pursuance of Terrorism the T-SOCs in each Theater Command would be the Lead Commander. ALL other Theater Deputy Commanders including the Theater Commander Himself were to be in a Supporting Role.
This was a major Policy shift for the Marines. Prior to this it was standard practice for the Theater Commander to use Marines, usually already on scene Forward Deployed on a MEU(SOC), as an In-Extremis(time sensitive) SOF until a SoCom/JSOC sponsored force, usually CONUS, could be assembled.
This POLICY changed w/ Rumsfeld who made all things Terror related strictly the Purview of SoCom's T-SOCs.
But for the Marine Corps the writing was already on the wall. This was already known to them since the opening days of A'stan when their MSPF's were constantly denied High Priority Missions & their highly trained Raiding Companies on the MEU(SOC)'s were often relegated to guard duty by the T-SOC who was mostly running & assigning the early missions.
Rumsfeld's Policy change, in I believe '06, would make that kind of tasking in the long run in Terrorism Assignments... OFFICIAL.
To add INSULT to INJURY after using the MEU ships & an empty Carrier as a Launch Pad & early Base of Operations, SoCom began looking into developing a FwdDep'd Composite SOF Strike Force that they hoped could be based on the MEU's ARG ships, much like the old SEAL Strike Plt.
SO the MARINES went Proactive. In '02 they signed the MOA that established Joint Ops w/ SoCom & re-established the by then defunked USMC-SoCom Board which was supposed to meet every 6mths since SoCom's inception.
In '03 the Marines tried to get ahead of the proposed Composite Strike Force by Proposing another MOA that was a Proof of Concept for a Test Unit that would prove its MSPF Concept as capable of filling this role, which became DET-1.
HQMC was not however originally looking to begin a New Command under SoCom or turn over any forces, but just establish that its MSPF was as or more capable of running various Spec Ops as any Tier II Force and therefore should be competitive for all High Priority T-II Missions.
This was constantly repeated by the Commandant when asked if the Corps was trying to create a new SOF & his answer was, "The Marine Corps does not like Headquarters on top of Headquarters." & that "Present relationships were fine". This was echoed by Rumsfeld who repeatedly stated he had to literally force the Marines hand.
You see the Marine Corps as a whole faced being BLANKED out of the whole Global Fight against Terrorism in any Proactive & Meaningful way. So It provided MOA's to Prove it could provide units that could play on SoCom's level & Rumsfeld forced the Merger b/c it was a good fit.
SoCom was not going to sign off some of its future Global Hi-Pri Missions to Marine units they don't control & disbands every 18mths & is not totally dedicated to S-O; they won their arguement.
The Corps was determined not to permanently lose its Marines & have an Operational Structure that put other(Traditional) Marine Units in a position to play a part in future SOF Missions; they won theirs.
There's more detail to it but that about sums it up.
I could go on & on from here but would rather just go back & forth.
Also___ The Idea that the Corps was after SoCom's money is baseless, its really something that gets batted around on Discussion Boards then PARROTED until it becomes GOSPEL.
The USMC is asked by Congress every yr to greatly expand its budget but it declines. Could they use more money, sure, but that ignores the long history of fiscal discipline the Corps is known for. There've been some exceptions for some must have big ticket items, but even that was few & frugal compared to the other services.
This move was about Policy, plain & simple.
Bear with me I'm a bit slow these days
Think I'm getting COMMAR. The gist of things is that they will some day fill that void, but like most of us today, are not being utilized properly. This is the first time I've heard of them being a forward deployed strikeforce, then that may lead into another conversation to have elsewhere. Only time will tell how they end up being utilized. Thanks for putting things into perspective.