What have we learned (2000-2010)?
What have we learned (2000-2010)?
Over the course of the next several weeks, I will pose several questions for serious response and debate. Here is the first.
At the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the U.S. military spent a decade rebuilding, refitting, and reorganizing itself to face the perceived threat of an interstate conflict with the U.S.S.R. The hardened combat veterans that remained after Vietnam faced significant challenges in manpower, morale, and training. The military transformed itself from one of conscription to an all-volunteer force, BG(R) Huba Wass de Czege designed and developed the concept of AirLand Battle Doctrine to replace “Active Defense,” and future Secretary of State GEN Colin Powell adopted the Powell Doctrine. While some Army Officers on the fringes argued against such a narrow focus to war and warfare, events seemed to coalesce with the fall of the Soviet Union and the limited offensive of Operation Desert Storm.
Operation Desert Storm proved to be a beginning, not an end, to the types of engagements we see today. Much has changed in the last decade. This question is broad, deep and wide, but it is specific to the military,
What have we learned?
-Mike
what we learned is actually worrisome
I'll be the naysayer and argue most of what we learned since 2010 needs to be unlearned quickly.
Bad ideas that won't go away:
So called effects based operations continues to pollute our staff modus operandi resulting in multi slide briefs that have little to do with achieving our military or strategic objectives. There has never been a military operation conducted throughout history that didn't intend to achieve desired effects. Now we're foolishly trying to measure the results of our operations, while missing the large collective picture. The commander that relies on his intuition will defeat the commander who relies on his daily stats brief.
Lines of operation, effort, etc. are also a farce that have done more to enhance disunity of effort than any other CONOP. They are a very poor substitute for a real operational/strategic strategy and appropriate objectives. Yet again they look very pretty on a powerpoint slide and create the false perception that we actually know what we're doing.
Good governance and economic development first, then focus on defeating the enemy by offering ice cream and other nice incentives, while ignoring a credible coercive element. We have wasted billions of tax payers dollars in failed economic development projects, largely because we attempted to substitute economic development for fighting. We embrace these ideas with great faith despite the facts pointing to opposing conclusions.
While technology has always played a role in war, and sometimes a decisive role, it does not eliminate the human element of war. One lesson we claimed to learned is we now do a better job of understanding the populace, but I think the reality is quite different. Despite the hoards of social scientists now roaming the battlefield, we still don't seem to understand how to influence the local populace as effectively as our foes. Learning about the local culture is not a new idea, and I would argue we probably did a better job of it prior to 9/11.
Excessive use of contractors and private businesses has resulted in a corrupt wartime/conflict economy where there is now financial incentive to continue the conflict. How many millionaires/billionaires were created since 9/11 based on providing services and equipment to the war effort? How much of them really contributed something worthwhile to the fight.
I hope we learned that half stepping doesn't work, and it still isn't clear to me why we had to wait for several years to implement a surge in Iraq? I remember, our economic development efforts were supposed to take the wind out of the insurgent's sails.
The military was not wrong to focus on winning the big wars, but they were wrong for largely ignoring the unique characteristics of irregular warfare. However, it can be argued that they're learning the wrong lessons now based on political correctness versus what actually works.
As for conventional forces getting involved in training local forces, I think the results speak largely for themselves. Our conventional force training efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely a failure (we generated large numbers of troops that couldn't and / or wouldn't fight). Just recently we started making the advisor positions command select positions (a lesson learned that good people are required to do this).
The list could go on for two pages, but since we're overly focused on force protection (JIEDDO), we have focused a good portion of our efforts/investment in developing a force that is IED proof, and less effort in actually defeating the enemy.
I would be very careful in identifying which lessons we learned since 2000 that are worth keeping.
The Army is built on people
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jcustis
Appropriate investments in the small unit leader, in the way of training, equipment, and education, can make him a force multiplier beyond our wildest imagination. I have seen it in some of the young men who fill billets that I had direct command over during the invasion of Iraq. There is a definite difference between the strategic corporal of then, and now. Can't quite put my finger on exactly what, but it's there.
This is what I hope will be the enduring lesson. I fear however because it is neither sexy in terms of procurement nor revolutionary in its inherent truth it will be shelved as too obvious and too simple to excite the collective id of the Big Army.
Tom
HBO Documentary To Air September 11, 2010
I was going to post this on my thread about the second american revolution because it is probabaly one of the most important documentaries I have ever seen. With the recent events about book burning and mosque building it is more important than ever. It origanlly aired September 7, 2010 so I could not post it on the other thead but it will air again on September 11,2010 check local HBO listings. It is the story of a reporter/writer/producer who tried to understand AL-Qaeda and find out why they attacked out country and what we need to learn about it. And yes he uses good old police methods:)so you know it is good stuff! A link to the short conclusion is below. His conclusion is so important I will write it out even though I kant spel stuff two good.:D
http://www.lawrencewright.com/scripts.html
"The country that we were is being sucked inside. Al-Qaeda cannot destroy our country only we can do that to ourselves!"
