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I am sure amidst SWC threads, even before the current debate in the USA, there has been a discussion over the two alternative schools of thought Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and Counter-Terrorism (CT), but I cannot locate a suitable thread.
Preamble aside.
There is a fascinating debate on the Kings of War blogsite on the issue: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009...stan/#comments
Since it is conceptual I posted here and not in the Afghan thread.
davidbfpo
I think there is a lot of non-logical thinking in this area - i.e., COIN vs(?) CT.
Here I'm positing a "terrorist" as a member of a violent non-state actor, who does things that some define as "terrorism".
Posit two different situations:
1. A nation is beset by a domestic insurgency which, as part of its toolkit, uses "terrorism".
In that situation, counter-terrorism is part of the incumbant's toolkit to defeat the insurgency. The incumbant's toolkit includes the military effort and the political effort. It includes an intellegence, counter-intelligence and criminal justice effort which can flop on either side of the military-political coin. In any event, while one can split up tasks, COIN and CT are intertwined.
2. A world is beset by a transnational violent non-state actor, which acts through its own forces (sometimes doing things that some define as "terrorism"), but also acts through domestic violent non-state actors (case 1) via a loose or tight connection.
This resembles unconventional warfare in the traditional sense, except that the violent groups may not be able to reach the stage where conventional forces arise and can conjoin with the irregular forces.
To the extent that domestic violent non-state actors (insurgents) are involved, COIN and CT are intertwined as in Case 1.
To the extent that we look at the TVNSA as something akin to a "SOF Base" and "SOF Teams", more direct CT is called for and COIN does not enter the picture. This can involve direct military intelligence and action (M), but also has to include civilian intellegence, counter-intelligence and criminal justice efforts, which provides a political aspect as well (DIE).
All in all, the COIN vs CT debate is in itself a "red herring" (rotting from the head) and is likely to go nowhere good. In such cases as present Astan, it's a cover for other agendas, which are thought not to be as likely to sell politically.
This, BTW, is strictly an opinion piece.
What do you think ?
Cheers
Mike
Curious, what is the professional, serious argument for CT without counterinsurgency? The problem is stated simply enough. In the first order, your adversary is far more free to range, assemble and attack as he chooses, then scatter in the face of pursuit. The defender is already in his interior, with little to no depth to trade and responsibility for too many exposed targets to maneuver the enemy into concentrating for a defeat in detail. On top of that, insurgents get another handicap in that they're fighting newcomers on their native battlefield, amongst people who they share more in custom with and speak their language and theirs alone.
The solution, elegant or inelegant, is obviously extemely frustrating to arrive at, with eight years in Afghanistan and six in Iraq having yet to produce truly satisfying results. But it seems plain on inspection that counterinsurgency doctrine at least attempts to mitigate the insurgent's advantage. It looks like the popular notion of CT just concedes them wholesale.
People who argue for CT are arguing for a total shift in strategy, where Afghanistan is basically written off. Who controls Afghanistan is not strategically important --- what is important is killing or crippling al-Qaeda.
The Taliban, in this frame, are not relevant nor a threat to the U.S. homeland. We should attempt to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda, under the theory that the Taliban only want Islamic revolution in Afghanistan and have no interest in warring with the U.S.
CT advocates posit that COIN is too costly and politically unsustainable, with amorphous, pie-in-the-sky goal. CT represents a much more sustainable and less costly method in fighting the real threat, which is identified as the AQ organization.
A lot of people looking for an "easy button" solution out there.
Like if your best friend comes to you and he is having some troubles in his marriage to the point where he feels he is nearing a divorce. And he asks you, Should I buy her flowers or kick her ass to solve this problem?
Clearly neither will work in of itself, and he must take a far more holistic approach that will likely require major changes in his own behaveior if he is to be successful. Everyone understands that intuitively when it comes to a marriage relationship, yet in a very similar dynamic between a government and a popualce we seem to go completely brain dead.
Bottome line, you can neither buy nor fight your way out of this one, you (your COIN buddy, as you surely can't do this for him and should not try) must actually take your role in the relationship seriously and perform.
(And for those who enjoy exploring a good analogy further, you, as the buddy providing advice are conducting FID. Your buddy is conducting COIN, his spouse is the subversive/insurgent, and her lover or even her girlfriends who validate her every notion, are conducting UW. If you just go after the UW actor (the CT option on the table currently) you will do little to address the insurgency and the UW actor will be quickly replaced by others ready to fill that role. If you merely work to be the most effective spouse ever (though you possess no real history of being one) without actually asking your spouse what is bothering her and working to make changes in your behavior to addres those specific concerns regardless of how irrational you or your FID conducting friend think they are, you will likely fail as well.
Maybe this is why COIN is so hard. We screw it up in our own daily lives constantly, what hope do we have of working it at a governmental level? But the principle dynamics are largely the same.
Bob's World, I think COIN is so hard because like LE there is a certain class of people that are going to be criminals(predators) no matter what. I think a lot COIN leaders fall into that category. Just like predators you could give them everything they want and they would still be causing problems.
Bob's World,
Your analogy assumes that the husband wants to save the marriage or preserve through changing himself and compromise with the wife. It may be the case that the husband isn't interested in the marriage or is only interested for his own benefit. For Afghanistan I think the Afghan government is not only incompetent at governing but also isn't much interested in governing.
When doing arraignments I got to meet a fair share of dysfunctional couples. Typically the husband was in the plexiglass box having the charges for assault being read to him, while his battered wife was in the gallery blowing kisses, vouching for the loser, and generally begging the judge to send her husband home. Meanwhile I would be reviewing a police record that often had a dozen such arrests over a span of years with the wife always refusing to sign the complaint.
We know governments like this as well, and when we have national intersts within their borders and a friendly relationship, we tend to overlook their questionable domestic habits. "Control your wife." Better yet, let me train and equip you to control your wife if you can't do it yourself. Still struggling buddy? here, hold my beer while I show you how to really lay one on her...
Its a new era, and those who have been historically powerless are growing more and more connected and empowered. Its time for a new approach to these problems, as they can no longer merely be overlooked or contained.
Of course COIN is hard, because in its purest sense COIN is the day to day conduct of governing a populace in a manner that meets their needs both individually and collectively. Harder still if you think COIN is just the beat-down you deliver when the populace dares to stand up to your ineptitude.
You just need to do a better job of picking your friends. Family you are stuck with, but your friends are a choice.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
I'm not so sure "friends" are a choice in international relations.Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Besides the fact that when one stops believing they have choices they start becoming a "victim," as I stated recently "friend" and "foe" are very limiting constructs, best to see all as "competitors."Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
But again, irrelevant to the appropriateness of the analogy. In fact, I would go so far as suggesting that this analogy is a very good metric to see if someone has a grasp of the fundamental nature of these types of operations.
If you give them the analogy and they go "Ahh" or "of course", then you can get on with discussions of the problem.
If they instead simply can't see the connection, then, in my professional opinion, they really aren't prepared to discuss the problem at all, as they think it is something very different than what it actually is.
IOW, if they agree with your analogy, you're willing to talk? If not, they're stupid? Good approach. I take it you're not in sales... :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Professional opinion? As a Psychologist? As a Lawyer? As a Soldier? If not the first, then a degree of irrelevance is introduced.Quote:
If they instead simply can't see the connection, then, in my professional opinion, they really aren't prepared to discuss the problem at all, as they think it is something very different than what it actually is.
Is it remotely possible that a particular focus blinds you to other possibilities?
Take your analogy a step further -- think of Seven Brides for Seven Brothers; put a mix of five Husbands and two Wives in the dock for assault. Then consider seven defense attorneys, one of whom is your Cousin and another of whom is a former law partner who is Godfather to your son. A third is a high national profile defense Attorney with an unlimited budget, a fourth is your Wife's brother. Have fun, Mr. Prosecutor. :D
Your analogy this time, like many of them, leaves the political milieu out of consideration and the quality of all players. Every nation where there is an insurgency will pose different political considerations dependent upon the number of external players and their roles -- and there are always external players. Plus, luck of the draw ascribes different capabilities to own forces, opponents and others and the domestic political milieu behind them.
In your analogy and in mine you get the advantage of breaking the case down to two individuals as with mine your response could be "I don't have to deal with seven defense attorneys at once, I can deal with each singly." True, however in dealing with nations, there is no dealing singly; there are always others with diverse interests involved to some degree -- to include the internal politics of your own nation. Also always present is the question of capabilities; own, opponent and interested parties. Those are real factors that will impact all you suggest and you cannot just wave all that away as you are prone to do. Not if you really want to be taken seriously.
BW,
Don't get me wrong, I don't think it's a completely bad analogy, but like any analogy, it will only get you so far.
What I do like is the "dysfunctional couples" you mention and how such dysfunctional relationships go on for years and years. In such cases, though what influence can a friend/competitor really have?
Here's a situation using your analogy which might be familiar: Suppose you, as the friend, come into the house, shoot the current BF/Hubby and boot him out because he killed your inlaws. Thinking he was mortally wounded (you followed the blood trail to the neighbor's yard), you help the woman find a new boyfriend who, it turns out, may let her watch some TV and listen to the radio but can't hold a job, buy groceries or pay the rent like the last guy could. More importantly, neither you nor the new boyfriend can protect her from the ex you shot but didn't actually manage to kill. He comes around from the neighbor's yard and gives her the good-cop/bad-cop treatment of threats + inducements when you and the BF aren't around, which is quite often. Then there's the new boyfriend's old-boys-network of friends who are fleecing and exploiting the woman so she can't even buy food with the little bit of money the new boyfriend hasn't squandered. The (probably feigning) sympathetic ex gives her a bit of money and a shoulder to cry on. The woman starts to think maybe the ex wasn't so bad after all and she blames you, the friend, for bringing about this course of events and screwing up her life completely. You, as the friend, can't catch the ex and finish the job and you can't seem to convince your buddy, the boyfriend, to change his ways. What are your options?
Sounds kind of like an episode of Dallas. Maybe studying soap operas can give us some insights here! ;)
Sounds more like the average Domstic Violence case I worked on. Which are very mapable using Warden's 5 ring system which I used often.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
This analogy is excellent, and I don't think any of the most effective short-term solutions are ones that we would want to do.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
...Until you have your basic math, agebra and geometry down pat
(Which I learned quite painfully when Dr. Stacy gave me an "F" in integration calculus the first time I took it. I wasn't "stupid", I was just in over my head and did great the following term.)
Its a metric (which I know you are a fan of). We'll talk, we just won't begin the conversation with "What should the strategy in Afghanistan be." We'll probably begin more with "tell me what you think AQ is really all about," and then from your answer we will begin exploring the many interconnected pieces of the problem. Never know where the really good idea is going to come from.
Many think because they have an opinion it is also an informed opinion; good to have some metrics to sort out if that is true or not up front. We all do it informally in every aspect of life.
Oh, and when you find a psychologist that is also versed in insurgency let me know, we probably have work for him/her.
Air Force study from 1997, go to chapter 3 and you will find good 5 rings analysis of a basic CT/COIN organization.
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...uote=1&p=85693
Here is an attachement of a real 5 rings analysis for a real DV case I worked.
This is one of the first models so ring 5 was called the Fighting mechanism. Anyway if you look at all the variables it is a lot like what Entropy talks about.
The penciled in squres were my targets I used to develop my campaugn plan.
My reason for saying that is: a commonly-accepted definition of the tactic called "terrorism" does not exist that does not have one or more holes in it. Still, like pornography, we tend to recognize it when we see it.
1. The various small groups in the 70s that practiced "terrroism" are examples of nearly pure "terrorism", which had no clear political effort. Their apparent strategy was disruption of the existing systems of government (except for those with which they were temporarily allied), and thus, in some not clearly identified way, to result in a system acceptable to them. Of course, they also rented themselves out to other groups to do their dirty work.
2. An insugency, whether totally homegrown or whether supported or instigated by an external power (which is then waging a form of unconventional warfare), is a totally different animal, because the political effort (in effect, a populace-centric approach) is equal to or exceeds the military effort (in "best practices insurgency"). The tactic of "terrorism" is often part of that toolkit.
3. AQ is another animal, as to which COL Jones' unconventional warfare concept finds a home with me - others may not buy it. Our (US) waging counter unconventional warfare is not new. We waged it against the KGB and GRU throughout the Cold War in the many brush fires which were supported or instigated by those organizations (or by us, where the roles reversed).
The critical difference then was that they were part of a government with which we could also engage (not only using "M", but also using "DIE"). Another difference was the unwritten rule that the KGB & GRU and the CIA & US Mil would not engage directly. Because of that, we and they were forced into a series of brush fire, proxy wars (Vietnam and Astan I being the classic examples).
We do have more freedom of action with AQ because we can attack AQ directly (via a number of avenues, not necessarily kinetic); or we can engage AQ in the various brush fires that they support or instigate.
The latter can be addressd by what is primarily a military effort ("best practices COIN"); or by what is primarily a civilian effort (some form of "nation building", whether in James Dobbin's classic models, or Bob Jones' non-military solutions - which I confess to either not understanding, or by looking on them as too Utopian, where I do).
Ironically, by engaging in the brush fires, we are continuing to employ the Cold War models for "COIN" and "nation building". Are those brush fire models the better course for us to follow today ?
Regards
Mike
No problem with any of that, though I would suggest that AQ really has little to do with Afghanistan and vice versa (at this point). I agree with most of your theories, I merely contend that your bulldozer approach on this forum (which I realize may not be how you interface in person -- this is not really a good communications medium) is not going to win you as many converts as you'll need to embed your good ideas...;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Allegories, even simplistic ones that eliminate nuances one knows or should know are present to make a more pithy tale may sway juries but they're unlikely to sway most Politicians or hardly any soldats. Good logic and full answers can make a difference. That's not a knock, just stating a perception.Umm, you should already have some. If you don't, then perhaps... :DQuote:
Oh, and when you find a psychologist that is also versed in insurgency let me know, we probably have work for him/her.
That is if anyone is really versed in insurgency. As I said, I am really beginning to wonder about that...:eek:
Interesting little bug. Attempting to reply to tequila's post (#4), but quote is capture jmm's (#2). Anyways...
No argument here, and outside the NGO-sphere I don't think anyone considers any other objective remotely as important.Quote:
Originally Posted by tequila
Only if you can cleave enough native insurgents from al Qaeda quickly and enough numbers to make a difference. And presumably you need to do it in a way so that you're not catching the same amount of grief from your (potentially former) host nation allies.Quote:
The Taliban, in this frame, are not relevant nor a threat to the U.S. homeland. We should attempt to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda, under the theory that the Taliban only want Islamic revolution in Afghanistan and have no interest in warring with the U.S.
CT advocates posit that COIN is too costly and politically unsustainable, with amorphous, pie-in-the-sky goal. CT represents a much more sustainable and less costly method in fighting the real threat, which is identified as the AQ organization.
AQI did half of the work for the Coalition in Anbar, and it helped that they were fighting a war not only against the Coalition and the host government, but going at it with a parallel Shia insurgency as well. Their relationships with their Triangle allies were only a few years in the making before the Awakening. AQC, on the other hand, appears well entrenched with the radical Deobandis on both sides of the AfPak line.
I can accept in theory that coopting an adversary to get a bigger fish is a great idea, but I'd be surprised the execution didn't look a lot like counterinsurgency.
Missed this before:
I don't think that's necessarily the case, at least the writing off Afghanistan part. One could shift, for example, from a strategy designed to defeat the Taliban to a strategy designed to prevent the Taliban from from winning. We'd be ceding most of the Pashtun areas, but we could certainly prevent Taliban control over the non-Pashtun areas, which is a significant part of the country. In other words, it's not all or nothing. In my opinion, abandoning Afghanistan is not a wise move, but neither is trying to achieve everything without the resources and will to see it through. I don't think we have adequate resources and political will, just as important, a reliable partner in Kabul worth defending. If that is true, then the latter strategy is probably just a longer, bloodier road to eventual abandonment.Quote:
People who argue for CT are arguing for a total shift in strategy, where Afghanistan is basically written off.
What I think what really needs to happen is for the US to separate the strategy by separating the fight against AQ (and its associated movements) from the problem of what do to about Afghanistan. I think once one does that it becomes obvious that COIN and CT aren't mutually exclusive and that the "choice" between COIN and CT is a completely false one. For one thing, CT is going to happen regardless as long as we still perceive that AQ remains a threat: If we abandon Afghanistan we'll be doing CT and if we decide on a generational nation-building enterprise in Afghanistan we will be doing CT as well. I think our strategic problem is that we've put blinders on and can only see either-or solutions trying to simultaneously address what are really two different problems.
TLDR version: We really need to see Afghanistan as a problem independent of AQ.
Just my 2 pul.
What Entropy says. That is why I say the LE framework is better. People cause crimes and wars, not terrain. Go after the people and their assets that actually did something to us. The 3 most current threats happend on Amercian soil.....the Enemy is already here!!!! and we are talking about fighting over there?
How do you do cleave the two, though? You can't do it geographically; Afghanistan and Pakistan don't exist in separate bubbles and you face village and nomadic networks that cross minimally scores of thousands of square miles. You can't do it ethnically; there's no clear line of delineation between the FATA Pashtun and those in Afghanistan, and AQ apparently feels comfortable co-existing with both. You can't do it religiously; AQ's Islamists and the Deobandis are natural allies if not co-religionists. You're increasingly unable to do it linguistically.Quote:
Originally Posted by Entropy
The physical and human terrain is rough, rugged, noisy and uneven. The Coalition doesn't have the convenience of fighting an enemy who concentrates, respects national borders or even declares his own territory. In many ways, you can say the bulk of the landscape is uncharted, if not currently unchartable given how sparsely and fluidly the enemy chooses to base himself. If defeating AQ and their diehard support requires you deal with hundreds of spatter pools individually, what can you possibly do except throw enough force to soak up the mess?
They aren't the same thing so no cleavage is required. Our big error was in conflating the two initially. AQ is one problem, Afghanistan is another.That conflation still exists in the eyes of many and it excessively complicates things. Those are two separate problems and contrary to all the hotshot strategists, Pakistan is another. When all is said and done, the two separate nations who do share similar and related large, troublesome majorities are in fact recognized nations with polities and borders. Like it or not -- and the Pushtuns do not -- those two nations are not going away and neither is going to give up territory to the Pushtuns if for no other reason than to keep them divided and therefor easier to control.Quote:
Originally Posted by Presley Cannady
Thus one solution is required for AQ who are simply in Pakistan (possibly) and Afghanistan (to a lesser extent) as a result of diplomatic failures by many including the US. As you point out, they have no infrastructure to protect -- nor any population. The key factor is that they can leave their current location and settle in elsewhere. They are essentially a law enforcement problem and military efforts will have only a marginal effect on them.
Afghanistan is a military problem at this point but only because we foolishly made it one -- now we have to solve that.
Pakistan is not a military problem and we should work very hard to avoid making it one. It is a diplomatic problem, purely and simply. Handled correctly, it can make life uncomfortable for AQ -- but that handling entails ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a destabilizing threat to Pakistan.
We have not done well with any of the three -- but most of that failure stems from making Afghanistan a military problem in the false hope we could make it a friendly democracy. What happens when the folks in DC do not do their homework...Realize that you aren't going to defeat AQ? That would be a good start. You can marginalize them, reduce their damage ability to a bearable level and it would help if everyone would realize they are not a military problem and they are not going to be defeated -- indeed, by upping their threat appearance and wrongly using military effort we merely enhanced their appeal temporarily.Quote:
If defeating AQ and their diehard support requires you deal with hundreds of spatter pools individually, what can you possibly do except throw enough force to soak up the mess?
Neither is Pakistan a military problem. Afghanistan is only one because we made it so...
That is exactly right, the Ends,Ways and Means strategic framework will not work with criminal/terrorist groups like that because there is no end! LE is a process and as long as we have people it will continue forever. AQ can be suppressed through proper techniques to where they are a manageable threat and it would be a heck of lot cheaper then a military option. Through proper asset seizure it would almost be self funding. Evey once in awhile the History Chanel runs programs about Pablo Escabar and they have a lot of interviews with DEA agents that created the plan. And yes they attacked him with a 5 rings analysis and figured out which COG's they needed to attack. They new it would work but even they were shocked how well and how fast it worked. It would have been over in a matter of months it wasn't for interference by the Columbian government, which finally changed their tune.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
This is written from a "We are there, dammit" viewpoint; has little or nothing to do with an independent strategy vs AQ (Astan & AQ are better considered as separate problems); and is suggested more to allow time to coldly consider whether an acceptable (note "acceptable") political effort can be mounted in a more limited geographical region.
This pertains to Entropy's nugget (post #22):
but is more particularly based on his maps to be found here.Quote:
I don't think that's necessarily the case, at least the writing off Afghanistan part. One could shift, for example, from a strategy designed to defeat the Taliban to a strategy designed to prevent the Taliban from winning. We'd be ceding most of the Pashtun areas, but we could certainly prevent Taliban control over the non-Pashtun areas, which is a significant part of the country. In other words, it's not all or nothing.
A demographic line approach was suggested for Vietnam (Krepinevich, The Army & Vietnam, pp.266-268). I floated a form of this using Highway 1 as a rough demographic line in another context - this post and this post (maps), forcing through a Peace Enforcement strategy (e.g., Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Chap III, as updated by more recent operations); and, in effect, offering the Taliban a limited truce if they stay south of the Tripfire Line.
This Peace Enforcement strategy would be of little comfort to those who want either a minmum force increase, none or an immediate force drawdown. The 40K to 80K increase would be, if nothing else, a good PSYOPs move (by not indicating a current intent to withdraw - as we did with Vietnamization); that increase would be incremental and take a long-time (and could be halted at any time).
This strategy does not in any way change my opinion that the prospects for an acceptable future political effort are lousy (a classy legal term ;)); but, if an acceptable political effort cannot be mounted in the "Northern Alliance" region (above the Hwy 1 line), it cannot be mounted.
Huh? So what you are saying is "Strategy" doesn't work against criminals? Maybe true. Strategy to me is the use of force to achieve a policy. As criminals can only be "defeated" by the rule of law, then I guess you mean, the "the enforcing of laws to achieve a policy." If so then the law will have to be applied for instrumental purposes and within the framework of a strategy - thus ends, ways and means.Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
Whose funds? Money found in Pakistan can fund the DEA?Quote:
AQ can be suppressed through proper techniques to where they are a manageable threat and it would be a heck of lot cheaper then a military option. Through proper asset seizure it would almost be self funding.
To me, the death of Pablo Escobar plays out along classical and ancient strategy lines, similar to that of the demise of Napoleon. Escobar was an idiot. His demise was determined the day he tried to gain office. DEA or no DEA, the Colombians (some worse than Escobar) were never going to let it happen.Quote:
..... the History Chanel runs programs about Pablo Escabar and they have a lot of interviews with DEA agents that created the plan. And yes they attacked him with a 5 rings analysis and figured out which COG's they needed to attack. They new it would work but even they were shocked how well and how fast it worked. It would have been over in a matter of months it wasn't for interference by the Columbian government, which finally changed their tune.
Pressley,
Ken saved me a lot of typing (thanks Ken!). I think that AQ and Afghanistan, as distinct policy issues, are certainly related, but not enough that they can be coherently combined into a single policy issue.
But there you have it, how could we not conflate AQ, the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan? AQ lives, eat, sleeps, bathes, and travels with the former ruling clique of Afghanistan, a group which in turn works, plays, fights, trades and intermarries within a Pashtun landscape spread from Kandahar to Miranshah.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
Pashtun radicals likely overreach in Pakistan, but let's be frank. They did once hammer their Afghan neighbors across 90 percent of that country's territory and ruled for almost five years, a situation Islamabad found extraordinarily positive from their security point of view. If that's no longer to be the case, then how do you achieve it without building an Afghan state that can secure its territory?
They have no infrastructure, but they certainly have population--14 million in Afghanistan and 28 million in Pakistan. Surely they have lowered expectations when it comes to population security, and as we seem to agree they have little infrastructure to protect, and if they lived in pockets the size of Los Angeles with 30,000 police watching over them then yes, I'd agree we're talking about a police problem. But that's just it, the 400+ clans aren't just gangs fighting a turf war. Their semi-nomadic, ranging across vast tracts of hostile terrain. If your lawmen need to be supplied from the air to deal with even a decent sized cluster of heavily armed fighters, then I think we've effectively blurred the line between law enforcement and military operation.Quote:
Thus one solution is required for AQ who are simply in Pakistan (possibly) and Afghanistan (to a lesser extent) as a result of diplomatic failures by many including the US. As you point out, they have no infrastructure to protect -- nor any population. The key factor is that they can leave their current location and settle in elsewhere. They are essentially a law enforcement problem and military efforts will have only a marginal effect on them.
The Pashtun did rule almost the whole of Afghanistan when the war started--city and countryside. Exactly how is law enforcement adequate to that problem?Quote:
Afghanistan is a military problem at this point but only because we foolishly made it one -- now we have to solve that.
I've no argument here, but as you point out preventing the war from spilling unendingly into Pakistan requires securing Afghanistan. Is this not counterinsurgency?Quote:
Pakistan is not a military problem and we should work very hard to avoid making it one. It is a diplomatic problem, purely and simply. Handled correctly, it can make life uncomfortable for AQ -- but that handling entails ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a destabilizing threat to Pakistan.
So what was the alternative, negotiate with Mullah Omar whose starting position was that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was to "try" Osama bin Laden? Did we have a chance in hell of putting together a Taliban-FBI joint task force to stamp out AQ's leadership, training camps, and access to points of entry and departure?Quote:
We have not done well with any of the three -- but most of that failure stems from making Afghanistan a military problem in the false hope we could make it a friendly democracy. What happens when the folks in DC do not do their homework...
So how does law enforcement deal with a gang that had the means and will to kill thousands of Americans on their homeland in a matter of hours and lives in an area where the threat of WMD proliferation is extraordinarily high?Quote:
Realize that you aren't going to defeat AQ? That would be a good start. You can marginalize them, reduce their damage ability to a bearable level and it would help if everyone would realize they are not a military problem and they are not going to be defeated -- indeed, by upping their threat appearance and wrongly using military effort we merely enhanced their appeal temporarily.
Wilf,
1- Strategy is the use of force in the service of a Nation/State Policy, which makes it a War, which should have an End. When force is used by a Private Person or Private Organization it is a crime. Something that Police Officers are trained to deal with from day one, and we also understand deescalation as opposed to escalation,Armies are not good at those things. The Strategic Framework is Motive,Methods and Opportunities. The main motives are Greed,Power and Revenge. Because of the human condition I see no end to be achieved but you can establish a process to suppress it (crime) to an acceptable level.
2-I am not sure about your money question. Many LE organizations (not just DEA) seize assets both local and foreign on a regular basis. Criminal organizations are like insurgencies in that they need people,guns,and money to exist. When you focus on those three, mostly people and money you can suppress it effectively.
3-Pablo may or may not have been dumb but he acted like most criminals and rich people he became drunk with power and felt he was above the law. Which led to his downfall.
4-I am not surprised you see a CvC parallel with attacking Pablo's supply lines the more I read CvC again and again the more I am convinced he would have made a better Cop then General. The first targets against Pablo were his Lawyers and Bankers an adaption of what I call the Shakespeare Method of crime control.:wry:
So when organisations or Societies, which are not nations use force to set forth policy, then they are criminals? Really? That would make the Contra's criminals. It would also make the Northern Alliance criminals, and all so-called non-state actors "criminals."Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
If there is a government that has a monopoly on the lawful use of force and some private organization comes along and decides that it is going to violate that monopoly arrangement, then yes. They're criminals. If we are talking about an ungoverned space where there is no lawful monopoly on the use of force then the private organization is not necessarily criminal in nature (though it probably is violating some international law), but it almost certainly uses tactics very similar to those employed by a criminal organization.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Wilf,Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
The answer is no, both the Contras and the Northern Alliance were acting under the legal authorization and cooperation of the US military and Congress (an act War) against what were/are stated to be enemies of the US. Part 2 of your question is yes, true non-state actors are criminals.
So the Northern Alliance were criminals until the US declared war on the Taliban, at which point they became lawful in the eyes of the US?Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
When did the US declare War on the Sandinistas? - and when did the Contras become legal and illegal?
Point being, none of this helps characterise the issue in a way that instructs guidance. It's a "so what?" categorisation.
:eek:Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
It's not April, 1st yet!
Seriously, you cannot believe this *certainly not allowed language*.
To quote Schmedlap:
THAT GOVERNMENT IS NOT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT except if it's happening on U.S. territory.Quote:
Originally Posted by Schmedlap
It's far beyond my limits of understanding how certain Americans think. Seriously, far beyond. It's like how Monty Python invented its sketches - I cannot imagine and I know nobody personally who can imagine how that works. It's too absurd.
I mean; think of it: Would you consider AQ a legal force if it gets endorsed by PR China? That idea is so absurd - it exceeds my English vocabulary.
All insurgent movements are, I believe, by definition "illegal."
To add confusion to that, the U.S. officially recognizes the "unalianable" right and duty of a populace to rise up in insurgency when it believes its government has become "despotic."
Complicate it one step further, when the US comes to town it does so with a broad proclamation that it is "bringing the rule of law" (of note, all Americans, King George was similarly bringing the rule of law when he sent his Army and Navy to Boston to quell the illegal insurrection there a few years back...).
Law is a tricky thing. Emposing your laws on others trickier still. Might does make right, but it doesn't make many friends.
We live in interesting times.
Not sure if that is directed to me or Slap. If AQ were operating within Chinese territory, then yes.Quote:
Originally Posted by Fuchs
Wilf,Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
To see just how important the "so what?" factor is read the link below, the Contras became illegal from a US point of view in 1984 with the Boland amendment, after this it nearly cost Reagan his Presidency with the Iran Contra scandal.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contras
Well aware. So the "so what" is that giving "legal" status creates the condition where your own branches and representatives in government can effectively work against each other. - thus an example of how not to do it!Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
So assigning legal status is not actually good a policy as it makes the implementation of strategy far more difficult. Assuming most folks know this, how much further along are we?
Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
It depends. In a democracy the assumption is that once the vote of yea or nay happens everyone will support the side that wins. The way it actually works, as you point out, is one side will try to exploit political advantage with the intent to create a policy failure which will allow a political advantage during the next election for their own party. So the nation suffers as a whole.
Which leads me to point two, if the violent act is committed by a non state actor(s) it may be best to treat it as a Law Enforcement problem as opposed to a lets invade every country and turn them into a democracy problem.
In reading the Long proposal, it looks neat and clean, and almost sterile of sorts...nice little packages that are able to employ significant freedom of maneuver in order to get the job done. It also makes me think on Takur Ghar mountain, and the challenges faced by similarly-equipped task forces going into a prepared action against particular targets.
It also makes me think of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, C Sqdn SAS, and Selous Scouts...but those folks were fighting pure COIN in a very classical sense. And the insurgents still "won". There were a ton of other factors at play, but they still won.
Long seems to totally wave off the arguments presented by Bruce Riedel and Michael O'Hanlon in their Op-Ed piece, and I've seen that trend apparent in other folks who opine that we should transition to a CT effort. That we can transition to said effort isn't so much the question (we've become particularly adept at dropping from the sky in the dark of night to spirit bad guys away or kill them outright), as is the issue of "well, so what?"
I don't buy into everything presented in the O'Hanlon and Reidel argument, but the Long piece seems...just odd. The outline of his CT force reads like something I could find in a Popular Mechanics article, or worse yet, on some Call of Duty clan board. I've seen how this works at the pointy tip of the spears, and it takes a lot of "beat cop" sort of work that comes from patrolling, key leader engagements, patrolling, project work, patrolling, security force training, patrolling...you get the picture by now. Bottom line is that it requires a ton of intelligence that I don't think Long can really appreciate because he simply hasn't been part of a targeting cycle for a mission that really counts.
I like your points Entropy, as I like this snippet from one of the posters to the KOW thread:Quote:
the debate is now so intense that it’s in danger of also acquiring a cartoon-like quality to match it’s blind-faith style structure.
What often gets missed is that by 1979 the Rhodesians had inflicted such appalling casualties on the Insurgents and wrecked the economies of every neighbouring country that harboured them, thatQuote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
a.) The Insurgents were going to transition to becoming a regular force with aircraft and armour - and might still loose!
b.) The UK, US and SA were no longer able to stand by and watch things get worse if the insurgency used regular armies.
Rhodesia was proof of classic Clausewitz. Rhodesia solved the military problem. The Insurgents had to negotiate their way into power Power was going to change hands. It was just when and how.
I've always wondered if the AQ/Taliban link is as absolute and unbreakable as some propose. There seems to be a natural cause of internal conflict there: I'm sure at least some in the Taliban have noted that if Osama hadn't taken his show to America - an act which did nothing at all for the Taliban - they'd be running the show in Kabul today, instead of hiding in caves.
I've also wondered what might have happened if we'd got to Kabul in the first place, seen the Taliban off, and left... with a widely distributed statement that we are leaving Afghanistan to the Afghans, it's none of our business what they do with it, leave us alone and we'll leave you alone... but if you attack us or harbor those who do, we will be back, and if we have to come back we are going to level every structure that stands more than 6" above ground.
Impossible to assess a road not taken, but I wonder if the point would have gotten across.
My basic reservation with COIN in Afghanistan is that ultimately the success of COIN rides on the development of an Afghan government that has the capacity to govern the entire nation in an effective - or at least functional - manner, and I'm not sure we have the capacity to make that happen.
Even after we had slaughtered them and driven the survivors across the border, the Taliban did not turn on al-Qaeda. They instead turned to them to provide the funding, the weapons, the leadership, and the training to take us on again.Quote:
I've always wondered if the AQ/Taliban link is as absolute and unbreakable as some propose. There seems to be a natural cause of internal conflict there: I'm sure at least some in the Taliban have noted that if Osama hadn't taken his show to America - an act which did nothing at all for the Taliban - they'd be running the show in Kabul today, instead of hiding in caves.
This dream that somehow we can sever the link between the Taliban high command and the al-Qaeda leadership always strikes me as severely misguided. What in the history of the Taliban makes anyone believe that these people (senior leadership) are believers or practicioners of realpolitik? That would they abandon a key ally of decades to satisfy an infidel power?
The Taliban made deals with many past Afghan enemies on their climb to power, but that was always on their terms and to assist their own rise to power --- not compromising their own ideals, but forcing others to compromise theirs to assist them.