PMC in COIN (general theme)
What role will contractors play in future COIN ops? Will their role increase, stay the same or decrease relative to the role they play today? I don't see their role doing anything but increasing given the success they are meeting in current ops. Streamline the vetting and regulating processes and almost everybody is happy.
Contractors will go on.....
The use of contractors will continue to grow for the following reasons:
1. High-tech: for tech contractors the government can no longer compete on the open market. High-tech contractors are rare within military ranks today, and are rare even within civil service.
2. Perception of decreased cost: although the short term cost of a contractor is high, the government doesn’t have to worry about keeping on a long-term employee, especially one that requires retirement. (I use the word “perception” because there’s still a debate about whether contractors are cheaper than regular employees.
3. Contractors vs. military: this administration does not want to increase the end-strength of the US military so it has to use contractors for all kinds of work, from info-tech to security.
4. Contractors create less of a PR problem if they are killed or captured: using contractors for all kinds of security duties means you don’t need to put soldiers. And if a contractor is killed or captured, it’s no big deal to the public at large. (Remember that there are still three US contractors being held by the FARC in Colombia – how many Americans know or care? But if they were soldiers, politicians would make an issue of it periodically.
I don’t think the issue of “success” or “failure” is a big factor. In the end I think cost, public perception, and politics will trump “success” or “failure” because there are no standardized measurable criteria to make a valid determination – people have opinions generally based on anecdotes. In situations like that politics, public perception, and cost drive all.
You started this thread...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
cobot
You have assumed, but not demonstrated, that the use of PMCs was a failure. If you can "show me the meat", your contention might hold more weight.
Begin by providing examples ("meaty" and "weighty" would be best) of PMC success stories in Iraq and Afghanistan. Again, read my lips, this site is not about winning a battle here and there - PMCs can kick in doors with the best of them - it is all about winning small wars. Think more operational and strategic rather than tactical - that might help.
MI Contractors as a "negative"
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Jedburgh
However, the use of contractors in several of those roles raises many troubling operational issues; i.e. from my perspective, the over-reliance on contractors in many intelligence roles is doing long-term damage to the MI field, from which it will take a tremendous effort to recover. This is a significant negative impact that ripples well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
cobot
Now we're getting somewhere-this is the level of analysis I was looking for-thank you.
I would have to add to this that using contractors for MI is not only damaging to the field itself, but is also damaging to the reputation of the US forces globally. Many people can understand why contractors would be hred for specific support services (e.g. driving, tech support, etc.), but for something as crucial as MI and interogations? Surely this is sending a message that the administration wishes to bypass all intenational conventions surrounding prisoners - regardless of the "truth" of such a message.
Marc
100,000 Contractors in Iraq
A relevant article in the Wash Post today:
Quote:
There are about 100,000 government contractors operating in Iraq, not counting subcontractors, a total that is approaching the size of the U.S. military force there, according to the military's first census of the growing population of civilians operating in the battlefield.
The survey finding, which includes Americans, Iraqis and third-party nationals hired by companies operating under U.S. government contracts, is significantly higher and wider in scope than the Pentagon's only previous estimate, which said there were 25,000 security contractors in the country.
It is also 10 times the estimated number of contractors that deployed during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, reflecting the Pentagon's growing post-Cold War reliance on contractors for such jobs as providing security, interrogating prisoners, cooking meals, fixing equipment and constructing bases that were once reserved for soldiers.
Official numbers are difficult to find, said Deborah D. Avant, author of the 2005 book "The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security," but an estimated 9,200 contractors deployed during the Gulf War, a far shorter conflict without reconstruction projects. "This is the largest deployment of U.S. contractors in a military operation," said Avant, an associate professor at George Washington University.
Best
Tom
BW/MPRI/NG awarded $200M GPOI Contract
The "80%" contractors for COIN
I am sorry that I am responding 7 months later to this great thread but want to share some ideas I have been harboring for awhile....
My response is particularly directed to the seemingly elusive quest to find a solution to the perceived USG resource gap for the political element of COIN operations. As stated below, conventional wisdom notes that successful COIN solutions are 80% political and 20% military.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
SWJED
Bill,
Could not agree more. I just take exception to sweeping generalizations about the "value" of PMCs beyond specific tactical actions and tasks in a U.S. COIN enviornment that conventional wisdom says the solution is 80% political and 20% military. PMCs are not going to give us the 80% - at least not now or in the near future. Maybe later once we sort all this out...
Dave
What is not widely known in military circles is that there exists an extensive cadre of private firms that have been implementing the EXACT requirements of the political/civilian element of COIN/Stability Operations for over 30 years. But, sadly, due to interagency turf wars and a myopic understanding of the civilian capacity, this private resource is either entirely invisible to most or tends to get readily dismissed and lumped into the category of "soft" NGOs (ie. humanitarian organizations that have a deep aversion to directly coordinating and closely working with the military).
From my observations, the military policy discourse (and those of RAND and other think tanks) on the role of civilians in The Long War suffers greatly from this near sightedness. The civilian contribution seems to be framed from what "is known" or "has been in front of us" versus "what is out there" but not yet seen first hand (or misunderstood if it is seen). The usual definition of civilian contributions is it comes from either contractors from the private sector or NGOs. The definition of private sector contribution seems to be soley focused on what is known - firms that provide operational surge capacity (logistics, supply, camp ops, security) and operational support or implementation firms (engineering/construction). NGOs are all lumped as non profits that implment humanitarian programs and are a good USG resource to coordinate with at a national level through OFDA/USAID and directly within local AORs. What is missing is the inclusion of the multitude of private sector companies that provide the 80% COIN types of activities in pre-current- post conflict/war zones.
This brings me to the Who, What, Where, When, How of these companies.
WHO:
Field and headquarter staff and consultants are veteran conflict zone implementers of a variety of political/economic/social programs. Most have advanced degrees but more importantly all are chosen due to their cultural and regional expertise. Some come from USG (military agencies, State, USAID) or former UN peacekeeping staff and many got their start in Peace Corps.
Most if not all US based companies are predominately implementing partners of USAID. Yet, many have also implemented programs for the World Bank, Asia Development Bank, UN agencies, and have also been funded by the State Department to fully staff UN or OSCE civilian operations (civilian police or election administrators - not to be confused with circuit junkie election monitoring gigs).
WHAT
Services provided have been in rapid response economic development (national level and micro-finance/micro enterprise, workforce development, vocational training, private sector development), community basic services/infrastructure, governance, rule of law, democratic institution building (including civil military institutions), agriculture/natural resources, health, education, etc.
WHERE
Even prior to Iraq and Afghanistan, many private firms have been implementing critical COIN like activities in Bosnia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor, Congo, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Mindanao, etc etc.
WHEN
The prevelant assumption is that development firms implement activities after the dust has well settled. This is not the case. In Iraq for example, through the USAID Office of Transitional Initiatives funding, a private firm (DAI) implemented quick impact essential services projects that utilized rapid employment in places such as Sadr City, Talafar, Falujah, etc. This was all done in direct coordination with the military.
How
COIN like activities are all based on Do No Harm principles which essentially is "be cognizant of local culture, history, norms, social fabric to avoid causing more conflict" and are steeped in participatory community engagement methodology. What is crucial is that the "Western" face is kept to a minimum and that local partners are engaged to assure access, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Typical engagements relevant to COIN include:
Conflict/Situational Analysis Assessments of Operating Environments (to focus on political, historical, cultural, socio-economic, social and informal governing networks);
Community Level Engagement including Quick Impact (QIP) basic services/infrastructure Projects with heavy emphasis on rapid job creation; community economic development (microfinance/enterprise/agribusiness); private sector development (vocational training, workforce development, etc)..
Public Information Campaigns through all media elements - FM, AM, Short wave radio, tv, street theatre, etc.
Small Grants and Local Subcontracting Management - for example, a QIP Iraq program totaled over $300 million in local grants/subcontractors in 2 years;
Remote implementation of programs through the use of vetted local
Rapid Response - many can deploy 72 hours after contract signature and often can cut grants within a week;
The "so what" question
Many of these private sector development firms recognize that the USG Civilian Agencies are understaffed and under-resourced and will not be able to assume the leadership required to engage at the levels required. As some of these firms have already closely coordinated with the military, many recognize the inherent need to more directly engage with the military so that the totality of the USG response is more targeted and more efficient.
Under the current situation, private companies contributions to stability operations are confined to the stove pipes of USAID and State. If and only if personalities in the field mesh, one will see seamless coordination of USAID funded programs with Regional COs and or Battalion COs or the occasional IDAs of Special Operations Forces.
My argument for direct contracting by US military agencies is based on the following:
1. The National Defense Strategy, QDR, and Directive 3000.05 point to the need of "out of box thinking for irregular warfare"
•“need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with . . . irregular challenges more effectively”
•National Defense Strategy 2005, at 3
2. Private development firms provide the services required as outlined in Directives...
•“Immediate goal . . .to provide . . . local populace with
–Security
–Restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.”
DoD Dir. 3000.05, sec.4.2
•“Long-term goal to help develop indigenous capacity” for
–Essential services
–Viable market economy
–Rule of law
–Democratic institutions,
–Robust civil society
DoD Dir. 3000.05, sec.4.2
3. The military is moving ahead to prepare itself to address tasks when "civilians cannot". Directive 3000.05 This statement refers to the civilian agency leads - USAID and Department of State. USAID has a severe lack of officers and a continous cutback in funds so there is a hiring freeze. What many do not realize is that USAID officers themselves do not implement but they set scopes of work based on negotiations/diplo efforts. They also are the contractors that manage the administrative details. Thus, there are not enough of them to subsequently hire private development firms to implement programs. As an aside, many observers tend to think State officials and USAID officials are interchangeable. They are not. State has never been in the business of designing, contracting and managing stability operations development programs. They have had experience with funding humanitarian programs but by and large, State officials do not have the training required to oversee such a program. This is why when Bing West asked the State Department official in Iraq if they had a "economic development model" to be distributed to commanders...the response was no....they would and do not...this is not their business. Private development firms/Implementing partners have them however...
Instead of the Military re-creating the wheel, it seems to me that engaging contractors to assist in this arena makes infinite sense and makes for a more expeditious response/solution.
What is exciting is that some have already started to see the connection of the dots. As previously cited, the Quick Impact Projects in Tal Afar Iraq that targeted rapid job creation (and was implemented in lock step with the 3rd Cav) was cited as a successful model for Clear, Build and Hold in the recently released COIN Field Manual. Over 50% of the 300 million in grants in Iraq were conducted in strict coordination with the military. The program was such a success, the Commanding General (Chirelli) inquired as to how he may directly obtain the services of the private firm (DAI) to continue the important work (as USAID funding had ended). Sadly, the idea was too new to overcome bureacratic hurdles.
Look forward to hearing your thoughts.
Thanks,
Bronwen
Private development firms
Thanks Tom for your question. SHould have included these specific names earlier...big oversight. Thanks for pointing out...
I am not sure if my previous post was successful so wanted to jot down the names of a few of the major firms again... sorry for inconvenience if repeated...
DAI - www.dai.com - econ development, agriculture, governance, conflict mitigaton/community development
Chemonics - www.chemonics.com - similiar set of services
RTI (Research Triangle Institute) - North Carolina - IR division - governance and education
IRG - International Resources Group - disaster response, governance, economic development
PADCO / AECOM - reconstruction, governance,
ARD - Associates in Rural Development - agriculture, governance, econ development
ABT - Health
Bearing Point - finance / econ growth
MSI - Management Systems International - Institutional Support / Governance
Nathans and Associates - Economic Development
PA - infrastructure / energy / governance
PAE - police and election administration deployments
Louis Berger
Creative Associates - education and governance
RONCO - in addition to mine clearing, they have been USAID partner on community development programming
There are also a few Non Profits that will enter into contracts such as CHF (community development), IFES (election administration and governance), AIR (education) and AED (education), IRD (international resources development group - community rehabilitation)
Also, IOM (International Organization of Migration) enters into contracts with the US to implement community development programming.
I was not familiar with this world when I worked in UN peacekeeping missions in the field and was surprised to find a very large parallel universe so to speak out there.
Best,
Bronwen
International Development Companies
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
And what exactly would that firm (or those firms) be? KBR? Raytheon?
I served in the Stability Operations environment for 15 of those 30 years. I would be most curious to know about whom you are speaking.
Tom
Tom,
Check out the companies posting jobs at this link to get an idea.
http://www.developmentex.com
COIN is not the Same as Development or Support to Relief Ops
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Mark O'Neill
Hi Bronwen,
I see where you are coming from, and I agree that many of these organisations can offer an array of really useful capabilities. However, I would also offer the following observations from personal, practical experience of working with INGO and Corporate Service providers on stability and development activities:
1. Many of these organisations work best (that is, are effective) in what could only be regarded as very benign security situations.
2. If the security situation is not benign, providing security to enable them to achieve their programs can be a very taxing experience. This task is not helped by the fact that the majority of them have no collective corporate culture - you can almost guarantee that if you have three of them in your AO they will want to go three different, mutually counter -productive directions simeltaneously in order to meet their own perceptions of priority (and, frequently, their own perceptions of importance). It makes herding cats seem like a simple activity.
3. Another factor if the security situation is not so flash is that, understandably perhaps, they do not want to associate with the security forces for fear of being 'linked' to them by belligerants, and subsequently attacked. This is one of those 'no-win' situations for everyone involved.
4. Many (that is, 99%) of them cannot be trusted with intel related material. This can be a major problem when attempting coordination. Apart from the ones that inadvertently leak information and intel like a sieve, I am aware of other actors who have , for reasons often best known to themselves, deliberately compromised missions.
5. INGOs, despite themselves, often act in a way that is counterintuitive to what they should be achieving. I have personally seen examples that range from minor issues like poor personal examples being set by overpaid and immoral expatriate staff through to corruption, overt criminal activity and payment of 'protection' to militias and criminal gangs. All of which is the antithesis of what should be happening in a COIN/ Stability environment.
6. Some organisations have a disproportionate number of incompetent staff. They sail from conflict zone to conflict zone, leaving chaos in their wake. Many are 'found out' and have to move on because of this, but they invariably are attracted back to the next conflict because they become addicted to either the money (no one else would pay them that much) or the ego trip. They always get a job because 1) there is an effective 'old boys' ( or girls) net, or 2) Many people of ability are not willing to accept either the risks or compromises that these people are.
7. Many organisations are ultimately only there to make money. This can lead to dodgy actions. One well known organisation that provided 'services' to a humanitarian project I was once associated with provides a ready example. During the work year, when donors turned up for inspections, everything was 'roses' - they were only too willing to parade their success with the indigenes we were training. Then, every year when contract renegotiation time came around - lo and behold, everything was 'disaster' and would require more time, money and services. We got jack of this and undertook an independent audit -only to find out that things were fine. This example is just one of many I am aware of where commercial firms routinely rort hard won humanitarian funds in order to satisfy their bottom line.
Summing up, INGO and corporates can be very useful and do great good. However the rosy 'pollyanna' - like picture that you depict defies reality.
Just like Government Agencies and Militaries, there is a fair bit of room for improvement of their performance in a range of activities. They are not a panacea, rather a useful part of the response mix that needs to continually improve its game in concert with state actors and agencies.
Cheers,
Mark
Bronwen,
What Mark said, especially on security and reliabilty.
FYI I had RONCO working for me in Rwanda and I have seen many of the firms you list in the field. As I suspected, you are confusing a stability/support operation with COIN. Most of these firms are ill-suited to doing the "armed civil affairs" that is necessary for COIN. In fact, the security threat against such firms in Goma was a major headache for all of us dealing with the issue.
Others like NGOs are agenda driven -- that of proving they are needed in the case of NGOs or for commercial firms the almighty dollar. IN COIN--as Rob Thornton has said in discussing advisors--the ideal is to work oneself out of a job. I have yet to meet an NGO who truly has that as a goal. Don't get me wrong, NGOs do good work; it is however work that must have set goals and limits otherwise it is a self-licking ice cream cone.
Best
Tom
Ugly Americans In Native Drag
"1. Many of these organisations work best (that is, are effective) in what could only be regarded as very benign security situations"
There has been a tendency in some agencies to adopt a quasi anti-American mentality through which to better identify with elements of the host nation. I saw some of this with the Peace Corps and USAID in W. Africa though by no means was this official doctrine/policy. The polite term would be to say some of the people were not professionally objective. The reluctance of many Humanitarian missions to partner with the military should not be surprising because their principal success is based on relative security and that alone IMO, yet elements within said agencies regard the military as the sole problem. That's hard to overcome and I can't imagine the nightmare involved in trying to provide security for such divergent and numerous civilian groups and I wonder how tense it gets at times between the military and private security contractors? ...been any throw-downs with Halliburton??
With 100K contractors in Iraq, no wonder war funding gets passed. I had no idea there were that many there yet the Public certainly isn't getting this message. It contradicts the picture of total chaos and bloodshed.
-Like the Paycheck, Hate the Boss
I wonder what the estimate is for the percentage of Iraqis that buy into the private contractor system and actually like them, aside from earning money because of them that is? Probably even more difficult to ascertain would be the impact PCs have on the number of Coalition KIAs/WIAs , either plus or minus on the continum. Each side of fence on this icomplex issue could make their case without citing examples of abuse as mentioned in this report and things like Abu Ghraib, Haditha and errant bombs to bolster their case.
PMCs: A Possible Solution to the Lack of Embedded Training Teams?
Hello everyone,
I am currently working on a journalism project discussing ways to strengthen the Afghan National Army (ANA). Throughout my research, it's become evident that the lack of Operational Mentor Liaison Teams (OMLTs)/Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) has hindered the development of the ANA. NATO and the US have recognized this and have put forth a considerable effort to supplying more troops to fulfill these positions, but still there are many positions available.
One possible solution I have been contemplating is outsourcing some OMLT/ETT positions to private military contractors (PMCs). Within the past 1.5-2 years, I've learned a great deal about PMCs and am fairly familiar with them. My previous research has showed me that many PMCs provide a large array of resources, enough to conduct these kinds of operations. Even though PMCs have never conducted such an operation, I strongly believe that they have a capabilities.
Of course, PMCs do have some negatives and there would be some obstacles to implement this policy successfully. If unregulated with no oversight, the US would be taking a gamble. Also, some are worried about the idea of arming and paying civilians (an anonymous official familiar with the industry said that in such an operation, the ROE would likely be restricted to self defense). Lastly, as PMCs have never done such an operation, they would really change how ETTs run and possibly how PMCs and the US Armed Forces act together.
There just isn't enough OMLTs. Plus, if the ISAF is able to reach their high recruitment expectations, they need someone to train the recruits. PMCs do have the resources and are qualified; a firm that I interviewed said that over 50% of their operatives have military experience. After diving deeper into the specific responsibilities of OMLTs/ETTs (partly thanks to the expansive library at SWJ :-) ), I am convinced that PMCs have the capabilities to do the task. If their complete interactions with the Afghans are worked out and the oversight is present, I think that it could work.
What are your thoughts? Will this have a positive/negative effect on COIN? A person that I discussed this issue with suggested that I bring the debate here.
Thanks
Some partial precedents .... and problems
MPRI trained the Croation Army under contract to the GOC (but with the approval of the USG) in the 1990s. Their trainees were successful. MPRI had a USG contract in Colombia that was less successful as was one in Iraq. In Iraq, the MPRI leader was COL (ret) Jim Steele who had run the USMILGP in El Salvador and the Military Support Group in Panama. So, it is possible to use contractors who, depending on the circumstances, may or may not be effective.
Another partial precedent is found in the PRTs where contractors (from other agencies) arefully integrated into the teams and follow the orders of the PRT chief. Applicable law differs between USG agencies.
I see few conceptual problems with the approach used in the PRTs although there may be legal ones for DOD. I do see a major conceptual problem in the MPRI approach where we turn over to a private corporation decisions that are properly those of the USG. No reflection on the patriotism etc of MPRI princiaps or employees but they are not responsible to the govt or the people of the US for actions that may be necessary but are not spelled out in the contract (see Pete's post).
cheers
JohnT
Bill O'Reilly, PMCs and ISIL
Big Bill's getting a lot of flak for his suggestion that the Allies bankroll a standing force of contractors to deal with threats like ISIL. By a lot of flak, I mean most of it is coming from the left-wing snark machine. However, very little time (arguably none at all) has been spent actually discussing the proposal's feasibility.
So, discuss amongst yourselves.