What Wilf said. I am particularly horrified at the
overall size and the wasted space. For huge vehicle to carry only six dismounts -- five if you leave one to pass 25mm ammo up to the turret as is the norm is borderline criminal IMO. That goes to only three or four if you're short a man or two in the squad (which is typical). The height of the vehicle makes it a shot or missile magnet. It is over-armed for its role; the TOWs encourage tactical misuse. It's range limited...
It's supposed to be an infantry carrier -- it's not, it's a light tank. Too light...
The vehicle was a compromise in too many respects. Instead of the needed heavily armored, accompany the M1 vehicle (like a Namer) AND a battle taxi for volumes of Mech infantry (M-113 updates) AND a decent Cavalry Scout vehicle (M-113 would also work for that...) we got a compromise vehicle on a drug deal between the Chief of Infantry and the Chief of Armor. The former would support buy of the M1; the latter would support buying the M2 and its M3 variant. Both agreed to give up something, Armor the Future Scout Cavalry System and Infantry the XM-8 Protected Gun system. Bad deal all 'round...
It's perhaps noteworthy that the two Cavalry Regiments in Europe at the time of adoption called the M3 Cavalry BFV the 'burning fighting vehicle' contending there'd be a trail of hulks all over Europe if the USSR were to attack. They also sensibly lobbied to get rid of that humungous turret and replace it with a .50 cal overhead weapons station (thus allowing 7-8 dismounts...) to lower the profile.
I have no clue who had what when but could
Quote:
Originally Posted by
82redleg
Got a reference for this? First I've heard of it. My friends that took Bradley's on the Thunder Runs, and multiple rotations since all talk about how survivable they are.
the various mods make a difference? IIRC, the base and A1 mods differed only in missile fit but the A2, A2(ODS) and A3 were all successive upgrades with increased survivability as a goal??? Dunno...:confused:
I do know that many guys from both the 2d and 11th ACRs at the time the Wall came down were not Bradley fans...
Development of the Bradley
When I attended OCS at Fort Benning in 1977-78 the Vu-Graph slides of the future "Infantry Fighting Vehicle" the instructors showed us looked just like what the Bradley later turned out to be. Later in 1982 at Camp Roberts, California (where my dad had trained in WW II) a team from the Bradley manufacturer, FMC Corporation, would fire the automatic gun on a Bradley into the impact area all day long Monday through Friday. They must have been doing some sort of Mean Rounds Between Failure testing--that's the only plausible explanation I can think of for the amount of ammo they were expending. Some of my forward observers had to ask the FMC guys to stop driving their tracked vehicles so fast past our bivouac area because they were raising huge clouds of dust that settled all over the campsite. A year later I took a tour of the FMC factory in San Jose and asked why the M548 cargo carrier was so unreliable. The answer I got was that it must be Army maintenance because they were perfect when they left the factory!
Ever heard of ceteris paribus...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
@Tukhachevskii:
You have truly internalized the deficiencies as normal. Those deficiencies weren't normal pre-70's, though. There was a fabled time when armies had enough infantry (or at least no greater lack of infantry than of most other things).
There were even armour corps operations through forest areas (Ardennes anyone?) for the sake of surprise (you know, the opposite of limiting yourself to a handful of tactically acceptable corridors, which does essentially announce your route to the enemy!).
Look at a map; the utter inability to advance through slightly defended forests and settlements limits the manoeuvre options of a brigade to only 2-4 even on such open and relatively tank-friendly terrain as Belarus or the Ukraine. Armour brigades on rails.
Most if not all NATO brigades are fair weather brigades; good for only a few weeks on desert-like terrain or alternatively too light and therefore unable to defend themselves on open ground.
There was a time when it was perfectly self-evident that a first rate army is supposed to be able to fight offensively on all terrain, not only on open plains.
I agree that mechanized infantry was originally not meant to be true infantry, but tank-accompanying infantry. It was the same with German Panzergrenadiere and Soviet Desants; they were mostly meant to sweep trenches and suppress very short range AT weapons (Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck, Bazooka).
The armour divisions that had Panzergrenadiere on APCs or Desants on tanks had truck-mounted infantry as well, though.
Sadly, modern armour and even mechanized "infantry" brigades aren't combined arms formations any more; they lack a serious infantry component. "Combined arms" has long since become a mere slogan. There are even examples of armour and mech infantry brigades that lack organic indirect fire support, but that's another story.
WW2-experienced generals would likely attest that our force planners are incompetent (or worse) if they were able to look briefly on our TO&Es.
Ok. A bit of the ceteris paribus fallacy there. You can't compare the ACR or DIV 86 with a WWII era German division which had infantry battalions (truck borne) attached to them and, as you point out, had half-tracks which could caryy half decent numbers of infantry. Even Soviet tank bdes had at least a battalion of truck borne (more often than not foot mobile) infantry attached for break in ops) The question asked concerned the Armoured Cavalry Regiment company team organisation. Sure, if you want to frame the discussion in temporal terms (WWI vs post/Cold War) diametirically opposed to those in question then I concede your point but it would be nice to compare like for like. It is also true that a proper apc as opposed to an IFV would be preferable but in today's cash-strapped economies you have to work with what you've got.
You can 'up' armor all you wish, add larger weapons
until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :
Agility, speed, unrefueled range and employment.
Although I'm shaking at the thought of responding to the Great Ken White...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
until you cross the threshold of basic load cube x caliber/capability to enter the realm of diminishing returns and you'll accomplish little; (1)they can still be easily killed and will not be able to kill everything they may meet. We got it wrong with the Brad. The CV 90, while the best of breed currently available still, IMO, is of the wrong breed. For success in combat and survivability of your troops, there are only four critical factors to consider :
(2)Agility, speed, unrefueled range and (3)employment.
... I'd thought I'd give it a go anyway. The comment I have labelled (1) above piqued my interest. So am I right in assuming that you find the concept (if not the practice) of mechanised infantry eesentially sound and ruined only by a sub-standard vehicle (BFV/CFV)? Which leads to my second query about employment (3). BFV and IFV TTPs in general haven't really been well thought out IMO (though FIBUA/MOUT may be the exception thanks to the recent troubles). Generally, the IFV/MICVs tend to follow MBTs and provide some sort of anti-infantry/ATGM protection. They aren't doctrinally or materially equipped for much else. How does one remedy (if that is the case) the situation? Obviously, if you intend your IFVs to cross the line of departure then you really need something the equivalent of a MBT in terms of protection. Firepower is a whole different issue altogether.
This impacts on (2). The power to weight ratio is also going to be a factor in terms of armour protection (active armour may help but you still need a baseline of physical armour) and add to the "diminishing returns" you speak of in your post (of course thats probably what you meant, and if so, I apologise for mis-understanding your statement:o). As does the issue of whether tracks or wheels are best which, again depends, I suppose, on whether or not you intend your vehicles to leave the assembly area and accompany/carry troops into combat; for the former case (troops debus in the assembly area) then I quite fancy the GPV Captain (2+14pax) whereas for the latter I'd convert however many old Challenger 1 hulls we have lying around, install a europack compact engine (at the front).
I only asked because I was always enamoured with mech units while denigrating line inf as "archaic" until I really tried to get my head around them; the pendulum has now swung firmly the other way:o
Agree on the CV 90 platform and your
wording is better. "A high degree of reliable mobility." I like that... ;)
No one has it right IMO but of things available, the Merkava IV with
a new MTU 890 series pack @ 1,750hp would be the tank (not least because it can engage Helicopters, carry wounded and has a back door :D ), the Namer with 9 Infantrymen, a full squad, plus a crew of three and a .50 cal Overhead Weapons Station would be the best available Armored Infantry carrier IMO. In action, the Squad dismounts with ALL its people and the SL or PL fight the dismounts while the PSG (or, better, the senior track commander) controls the track(s) in supporting the dismounts. Obviously, they operate in conjunction with tanks and there should be couple of those nearby should more firepower be needed than the '50s provide.
For a Utility track and a Scout Vehicle, an upgraded M 113A3 with 6 composite roadwheels, hydropneumatic suspension and possibly Soucy tracks if they continue to improve -- Diehl instead of US tracks otherwise. A .50 OWS is all that's required. Overgunned tracked carriers are not tanks but invite misuse because of the weapon capability -- misuse because the vehicle is simply not adequate for the job.
Wilf's CV-90 minus the MICV turret and plus a .50 OWS would do for those who wrongly think the 113 is too old... ;)
My big objection to the CV-90 variant is the weight. It may be slightly more survivable than the 113 but I don't think the added weight is adequately offset by that. The key to any light track is that you are buying mobility, not protection -- so you have to avoid placing them in bad situations. That's not difficult.
Though it is entirely too often forgotten... :mad:
In all cases, more range is desirable, best obtained by reducing powerpack size and replacing that cube and weight with fuel or in add-on side armor blister packs (which should be accompanied by a track width change to maintain agility). Powerpacks should be optimized for power and response curve, not fuel economy or mileage. It should be possible to engineer a variable horsepower / fuel demand engine which could be the best of both.
The 113 Scout track is for mobility in terrain or climates where tracks are necessary; for most purposes, a light unarmored but powerful and agile 4x4 wheeled vehicle is an excellent scout vehicle. The lack of armor has the advantage of keeping both the Scouts and more importantly their commanders honest -- they will be careful...
Armor has a flaw, a dangerous flaw -- it cocoons. People are then reluctant to leave their cocoon or to tell others to leave their cocoons and thus a lot of harsh, necessary combat stuff does not get done or isn't done right due to that syndrome. Today, it's easy to forget the guys below are Armored Infantrymen. Fighting dismounted but they weren't called 'dismounts.' I think there's a message in that...
Agree with Wilf. There is a loss of situational awareness
and of the deterrent effect of certain opponents or would-be opponents actually seeing a pair of human eyeballs on them as well as a restriction of weapon choice (i.e. can't use your M4 to fire a warning shot or just point at a minor menace as opposed to firing a round or few of .50 cal -- which some ROE might preclude) is real and is a serious concern.
Most of that however is offset by the sensors and stabe on the OWS. Proper training will solve some of the problems, so on balance, they're IMO a net plus. The down side is the cost but even that is less than some of the turreted solutions used today.
The SA and other issues that are concerns are not totally restricted to FID and similar ops but loom far larger there than they do in MCO. The larger advantage in a shooting war as opposed to FID is the lower and smaller silhouette and the under armor protection offered. That's my main reason for believing they're the way to go.
I'm not a COIN fan -- and I believe in special purpose equipment for special uses. Thus SO vehicles should have the simplest and best equipment tailored for the use they're likely to put those vehicles to -- and that will change from time to time, place to place and war to war. An Infantry combat vehicle OTOH should be designed to survive in close combat and therefor must meet different considerations and detectability and protection are more important.