1964 Tri-Service Tilt-Wing Launch From Aircraft Carrier
This was scheduled to go into actual production but Vietnam budget priorities intervened. Not the idea ducted fan version but still pretty good IMO.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buh7_xLG4ZE
Interesting point and I experienced that mindset long ago
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Originally Posted by
Entropy
I'm reminded of something. When I was in the Navy during the 1990's we and the Marines had an expeditionary raiding mindest. We didn't do campaign-level planning - that was something left to the Army and Air Force. I've been out of the Navy for a while now and wonder if raiding is still a part of the culture and skill-set.
and was convinced it was wise and an excellent strategy. I've heard, read or seen nothing in the past 60 years to suggest different. My sensing it is that it is not part of the skill set and I believe that is highly regrettable as well as a major shortfall in capability. In the Army, Airborne units also once had that as viable skill set and I know it's lost there. That technique is apparently not looked upon favorably by many today. Fortunately, not all agree...:wry:
We lost the bubble due to political games in DC IMO. Political games, political correctness and lack of political will... :mad:
Unfortunately, even though we went through a dril to develop such
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Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Funnily, that's exactly what I expected to happen after 9-11: A few raids (I thought of rangers, though), a few snatch ops, but staying out of the civil war.
capabilities in the 80s, the then senior leadership in DoD fought it to a standstill due to risk aversion. USSOCOM grabbed the ball when the Pentagon wasn't looking and convinced a lot of folks that such missions should be theirs and they developed minimal capabilities (not large or robust enough in my view -- plus large raids shouldn't be their job) but every attempt to employ those capabilities (and there were some) was stymied by DoD or the NSC. :mad:
Thus the 'invasion' occurred more due to a lack of other capability than for other reasons.
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And then imagine my surprise when it became clear that the Westerns were there to stay...*insert board-incompatible language here*.
Heh. You were not alone... :D
Hopefully, we'll get smarter in the future and develop both the capabilities for strategic raids and the political will to employ them. :cool:
Apparently the EFV is causing concern to others too ...
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22.
The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.
In fact, it's not just the USMC vision, but ideas about the capabilities of future regular threats in general that always seem to default to "this is how we would like them to be, to justify our equipment program."
Building a better mousetrap: The Unnecessary Capability of the EFV from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (link may be fernickity)
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Yet the overwhelming impetus driving the development of the EFV is operational maneuver from the sea [OMFTS]. The vision behind the EFV is one in which a group of vehicles move from apmphibious shipping twenty-five nautical miles from the shoreline and then travel at a high speed to a littoral penetration point to come ashore and seamlessly complete some tactical mission.
The layout and construction of the EFV have been optimised for that high speed movement over water. but this is not a reasonable focus. The mission profile guidance originally given to the EFV (then the AAAV) team was for a 20% operational time in the water and 80% on land. Since then, the mean operational time in the water for all envisioned EFV missions has been revised to 8.2%[!]. Thus the Marine Corps predicts the EFV to operate eight out of every one hundred hours of vehicle operation in water.
If the Marine Corps had fielded the EFV in January of 2001, the high water speed capability would not have been used in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation IIraqi Freedom both expeditionary operations by any standard. (p.9-10)
Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq from the Centre for American Progress.
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It [the EFV] is significantly faster on water, slighty faster on land, and has betetr armor and firepower than the AAV. On land, the EFV is also larger, more powerful, and has betetr communications than other armored personnel carriers, including the Army's Bradley. It only lacks increased armor protection, which the Marines have readily sacrificed for greater mobility. Even though the cost of the EFV has jumped to more than $12 million per vehicle....(p.14)
That last statistic made my eyes water, was a time when you could buy a JAS 39 Gripen fighter for that much (c. 1995-ish). Talk about inflation. If I'm not mistaken an M1A1 costs about $5million?
The Marines' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress from the ever informative Congressional Research Service
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Twenty years ago when the EFV was conceived, some defense officials suggested that the fleet could operate 20 to 30 miles from the shore, debarking EFVs for amphibious operations, but with the advent of these new weapons [anti-ship missiles, mines, small fast attack craft, etc.] and tactics, this is no longer possible. Instead in order to sufficiently protect the large amphibious ships that transport Marines and EFVs, it has been suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 miles from shore - beyond the EFV's range.(p.7)
Not a good idea due to the stern ramp. However,
An all MV-22 fleet would be nice, but it's too expensive
COMMAR, I'm a MV-22 fan, but also a believer in helicopters. A mix of both might be more mission and cost effective for the Marines.
A UH-60M costs around $3,000 per hour of flight time. A MV-22 around $10,000.
A little back-of-the-envelope calculation leads to these estimates:
• MV-22: $72 million upfront flyaway cost and $10,000 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $600,000 per aircraft per month
• UH-60M: $18 million upfront flyaway cost and $3,000 per flight hour x 60 hours/month in theater = $180,000 per aircraft per month
Multiply these figures by each MV-22 squadron yields $7.2 million monthly cost for 12 MV-22, and $2.16 million for 12 UH-60M PER MONTH.
Sure, Marines need speed and unrefueled range to go ship-to-shore and for some distant area of responsibility flights. But for shorter flights, why wouldn’t Marines be better off using more capable than UH-1N helicopters already in use by Navy brothers?
Similarly, a Marine Expeditionary unit might need just 12 MV-22s to get to shore repeatedly for any assault whereas 12 UH-60s would make the ship-to-shore trip once and then support locally at a fraction of the cost/logistics (360 gals per fill-up for a UH-60 vs. over 1200 gals top-off per V-22).
The UH-60M would have:
• greater high/hot HOGE and similar payload capability
• similar external load speeds
• less brown-out risk
• more small LZ capability
• more aircraft in larger LZs (no 250’ separation between)
• easier and more dispersed shore maintenance
• closer proximity to forward Marines for aerial QRFs and MEDEVAC…not CASEVAC without onboard care
At current flyaway costs a notional pair of Marine Squadron with 12 MV-22, and 12 UH-60Ms w/ folding rotors would cost around $1.08 billion to procure. Two squadrons with a total of 24 MV-22s would cost $1.728 billion for procurement. Savings: $648 million for just 24 a/c.
Similar savings result from the difference in monthly flight hour costs for 1440 hours of $14.4 million for 24 MV-22 vs. $9.36 million for a mix of 12 MV-22, and 12 UH-60M. The savings in recurring monthly cost per hour of flight is over $5 million, or over $60 million saved annually for just 24 aircraft. In a decade you equal the procurement savings.
In reality, you probably would discover that you could shift more flight hour burden to the helicopter fleet for most shore missions thus saving even more money. Let's say you plan on using 35% of flight hours in the MV-22, and 65%flying the cheaper UH-60M. That ratio would result in a cost per month for 1440 hours equaling about $5.04 million for the 12 MV-22 (504 hrs), and $2.808 million for 12 UH-60M (936 hrs) or about $7.848 million a month vs. $14.4 million for 24 MV-22s flying the same 1440 hours. That is $78.6 million in annual O&M savings.
And because a mix of 12 MV-22 and 12 UH-60M would use less deck/hangar space aboard Marine ships, several CH-53Ks could fit in the remaining space.
Sure the UH-60M would carry fewer Marines. But a few more CH-53K per boat would make up for it:
• 24 MV-22 carrying 20 Marines (heavier body armor/center belly gun/ hot/high) = 480 Marines in one lift.
• One squadron of 12 MV-22 and another with 12 UH-60M, and just four CH-53K carry 240 Marines in the MV-22, 120 in 12 UH-60M, and 120+ in just four CH-53K for a greater lift of 480+ Marines the first lift.
Add a 60% MV-22 mission capable rate to the equation and 80% rate for the UH-60M, and 75% for the CH-53K, and suspect the lift per mixed-squadrons-alternative is more than a little in favor of the 12/12/4 mix…with ample taxpayer money not spent, initially and annually. In fact the savings would purchase all the CH-53K fleet and its flying hour costs.
Just my personal views.
Red Wine with fowl try lobster and crustaceans at the Airmens Mess
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Originally Posted by
Valin
That's why I joined the Air Force. Although there were times when the cooks served red wine with fowl....yet somehow we managed to survive. :D
The catering officer at RAAF Base Tindal (Think Nellis without Las Vegas or an Alaska town in the desert) used to hold back a little of the daily mess budget for a once a month big lunchtime spread. It worked out to more than one lobster be person, not counting prawns, oysters, balmain bugs, hot scallops etc per person. The army engineers who had just spent two months in the bush eating ration packs were speechless, when they came in for lunch before flying back 'down south'. We just told them this was the normal spread for lunch. Best base I ever ate at followed by Darwin. Memories......
Every conflict is relatively static for foot infantry...that still weigh a lot
A primary tilt rotor weakness, aside from cost/complexity, is lack of hover maneuverability and lift. Wilf’s RUSI reference at the bottom of page 2 has a footnote showing:
“A UH-60L helicopter can lift (fuel and useful load) over 5,600lbs at a takeoff altitude of 10,000 feet versus only some 2800lbs of equivalent load for the V-22 Osprey. The UH-60L can also carry 3000lbs of useful load at this altitude to some 250 nautical miles, a feat unmatched by the V-22.”
In addition, the hover-out-of-ground-effect ceiling (required for sling loads and hover maneuver well off the ground) is just 5400’ for MV-22 which isn’t particularly helpful in places like Afghanistan. For a UH-60M at ¼ the cost, it is a higher 6,000’. I'm also wondering why the 82nd CAB Army helicopters were used to air assault Marines into low altitude Marjah instead of MV-22. LZ size? Night LZ brown-out concerns? Are MV-22s well suited for desert landings at night given their tremendous downforce in a small disc-loading area?
The other point about the MV-22 is that most Army and Marine AOs are not so large that tilt rotor speed and range are essential. This is especially true when all you can carry with an MV-22 is foot infantry and a few growlers. There is little difference in times between a helicopter and tilt rotor flying from airfields to Now Zad or Marjah LZs. While tilt rotor advocates like to talk nautical miles, fighting AOs often involve lesser kilometer distances.
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Originally Posted by
Rifleman
I think tilt rotor technology has promise. Remember Operation Rhino? The raid force from 3d Ranger Battalion was inserted by parachute and withdrawn by helicopter. That works but it's an extra link in the plan.
With tilt rotors the drop aircraft could also be the extraction aircraft for parachute raids. At least sometimes. I know it's not the answer for every situation but it has application for some.
Good point. There are contingencies where ship-to-AOR distance is extensive, as COMMAR points out. But if Wikipedia is correct, at Rhino, 200 Rangers parachuted from 4 MC-130s. Not sure room exists in a MV-22 for 20 paratroopers. Even if so, 10 tilt rotors would be required to match 4 MC-130 that have better jammers, terrain-following radar, etc.
Wikipedia also mentions that CH-53Es moved Marines to Rhino 372nm through Pakistan using aerial refueling. That, too, could have been a good MV-22 mission accomplished in only 1.5 hours. But MV-22s did not exist then, so the cited four CH-53E must have carried the Marines in around 3 hours, and other Cobras, Hueys, and CH-46 from several different landing ships used an en route FARP probably requiring 4 hours. However, C-17s and KC-130 moved the rest and tilt rotors would never substitute for that kind of extensive continuous lift.
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Originally Posted by
COMMAR
The USMC has a Vertical-Lift package that utilizes the V-22 not only as a Medium Lift Asset but as a intra-theater High Speed Connector, the CH-53 for Heavy Lift, & a Light/Medium Lift Cargo UAS, Greatly Reducing the Foot Print at the Coy-MAGTF Level.
What Helo only Package allows the USMC to act in their Expeditionary Role as efficiently?
But as pointed out in my last sentence (above your quote) about the Rhino Marine expeditionary assault, intratheater high speed lift will always be primarily a large USAF C-17 and C-130/KC-130 function.
Plus, I've read that a San Antonio Class LPD can launch four helicopters or just two MV-22 from its open deck area...meaning an equal 40 Marines get to shore initially, and with H-60s another three aircraft could be moved out from inside the hangar area...which I believe holds just one MV-22.
So that suggests the Marines would be better off to station more numerous helicopters on LPDs and fly MV-22s in from centralized land locations in CENTCOM, PACOM, etc. rather than putting them on boats where maintenance for the few carried is still complex, time-consuming, and underresourced. That way a smaller total procured quantity of MV-22s could be maintained together at primary theater land bases while still able to support intratheater contingencies due to their speed/range. Helicopters would commence the air assault from on board LPDs, with MV-22 linking up just in time to pick up and move troops off now empty decks. Best of both worlds.
