I'm getting sick of the bad report cards.....
Agree, for years I was told that all the shiny whiz bang high tech weapons are great, but the core of our Army was that Soldier manning it. When did that change? Frankly, I'm getting to the point that I'm sick of hearing about this stuff. Imagine the Army we could have built by now if we invested the same amount of money in training and equipment for our conventional combat arms, SF and SOF units that we have dumped into FCS. And to top it off from the information I've been reading FCS is on life support, and now from lack of funds, so is the rest of the Army, hell I know it, I'm experiencing it myself! The more that Rumsfeld demands the Army transform itself into this high tech robotic Army, the less and less capable it seems that our Soldiers will be in the future for lack of training and equipment because the lions share of the budget is being spent on these high tech gadgets!
I'm sick! Just sick of the inept civilian leadership at the Pentagon! So sue me, Rumsfeld should tender his resignation and leave this to the Army, we were tracking just fine until he came along and upset the apple cart. Now look at us. It's a damn shame!
Rumsfeld isn't the only problem
Rock, your rant is good but not complete. The Army itself (or at least its higher leadership) was moving down the high-tech road before Rumsfeld came on the scene. It's a problem they've faced in one form or another since the Second World War and accelerated in Vietnam. Why Vietnam (again)? If you look at the track record there, the Army constantly turned to technology for answers instead of techniques (airmobility, ground sensors, night vision gear, etc., etc.). Technology became an end of its own instead of a tool. This, in my view, accelerated through the years of Active Defense and AirLand Battle. Often the answer to an operational problem was determined to lie with a new system or weapons system (the Abrams, which worked, and the Sgt. York, which didn't, are two examples). This tech bleed-over might come from the Air Force, which has traditionally relied on systems instead of personnel. It may also spring from low retention levels many of our current senior leaders experienced in their early days, leading them to want (at least on a subconscious level) systems that could be counted on to be in service for some years instead of people who may or may not decide to stick around.
Rumsfeld is a very handy lightning rod for discussions, but he's really not the main problem. He's more a symptom of the main issue. You have to remember - the civilian leadership comes and goes, but the military higher leadership remains longer and has a much greater impact (look at the behavior of the JCS and higher generals during Vietnam if you want historical examples of this).
And Jones, you've hit on one of my favorite "endless lessons learned." How many times do we have to relearn what a German study concluded in the mid- to -late 1800s (if memory serves): that any combat load over about 40 pounds degrades the ability of infantry to do their job. Or the ever-popular "troops in dry or hot areas of operations should carry more water."
I had to get that off my chest.
I spent lastnight regaining my composure.
Steve, it isn't the technology itself that I take issue with, certainly we need new systems and FCS is a great idea. But I don't think we need it in Iraq. So, I don't see the need for this big push, for spending huge sums of money on it right now. I'd rather see the Army address Iraq through training, and educating our Soldiers in counterinsurgency, technology isn't going to help us win the support of the Iraqi people. But Soldiers who understand their culture, are sensitive to their desires and their fears will.
It's frustrating Steve. The CBO has warned of a serious cost overrun in developing FCS and delayed fielding by about two years. FCS just doesn't seem to be the right place to be spending our money. I'd rather see our Soldiers be properly trained and equipped for counterinsurgency ops. We all know that COIN is up close and personal, and we are doing a miserable job in preparing our troops for it. Our DACs at Fort Leavenworth are losing their jobs left and right as money continues to be siphoned away to support the GWOT and while a realize that the GWOT is CSA's top priority as it should be, but I see signs that the Army is beginning to buckle, and it troubles me.
Rumsfeld might be a convenient target, but there is no denying that he has shown himself to be a stubborn, inflexible leader who seems loath to change his mind. This might be a personality flaw, or it might be because he actually beleives that sticking with the current TTP will win the fight (I don't beleive that, I think we need a dramatic change). At any rate, we have been in Iraq for five years. Do you see signs that we have turned the corner? I don't. How long should we wait? Afterall, considering the fact that we were told this would be over in short order, one has to start questioning the leadership at some point. When is the proper time? Personally, I've reached it.
I'm not disagreeing with you, Rock
I do, however, think that there's more than enough blame to go around for the mindset you're seeing right now. Rumsfeld is stubborn and inflexible, but there have also been several failures of higher Army (and other services) leadership to focus on the current situation and what's needed to deal with it.
Vietnam had Westmoreland, we had Franks. Since World War II, the Army has been very reluctant to focus on LIC/MOOTW/whatever your favorite acronym is. Maybe it's because senior leadership saw retention as a problem and focused on technological solutions instead of manpower. Maybe it's because they saw the technology focus work for the Air Force (which it really hasn't in practice, but it did get them large chunks of the defense budget for many years), or maybe it's because the promotion system for officers keeps them moving around so much they never really get a good feel for the problems the troops face. Or (most likely) it's a combination of these factors and a few more.
There's also the institutional denial factor. Since Korea, the Army has shown a very distinct reluctance to prepare for smaller-scale conflicts. This trend accelerated after Vietnam. There are other historical/institutional factors that could play into it, such as the American reliance (before WW 2) on a small standing army to be augmented by draftees in time of trouble. It's a complex question. I see many parallels between the Army's behavior today and its behavior in the early 1960s. Does that mean Iraq is Vietnam? No. But it does indicate that some of the same institutional blindspots and behaviors may still be functioning. McNamara was also stubborn, inflexible, and focused on one way of doing things. Many generals responded to him the same way they are now responding to Rumsfeld.
Sometimes the Army does get it right
Think about the massive investment in new doctrine and soldier training in the 1970's. In the middle of Vietnam it wasn't possible to take those new concepts and put them into action. It was only in the war's disastrous aftermath that lessons could be learned and programs fixed.
The leadership is fixated on the wrong issues because the military is working for them at this moment. Their replacement will come eventually.
And technology doesn't always develop on schedule, either. Eugene Stoner's AR-10 was a high tech failure in 1957. In 1964 it morphed into the M-16 which is still with us 42 years later. My guess is that the Future Combat System will be quietly shelved, and in a few years a newer (and more modest) set of requirements will come about, the old research dusted off and new systems fielded. Of course, they could still blow billions on it in the meantime that would be better spent training soldiers who are about to be stepping into a lethal and politically charged warzone . . . .
Tech, money, and don't forget people
I don’t want to throw the baby out with the bath water, the right technology is important, but in a COIN type fight like we’re engaged in with OIF and OEF people are absolutely critical. I joined the Army in the late 70s and was shocked at the poor training and lack of discipline, but the transformation to rebuild our Army lead by empowered officers and NCOs with vision during Regan’s Era convinced me to stay in. It was this Army that we saw perform so splendidly during DESERT STORM. It was the same Army to a large degree that we saw go into OIF (fortunately great conventional war fighters, but unfortunately poorly trained for COIN). We had the quality personnel, so fixing the COIN training shortfall could have been addressed quicker if there was acknowledgement that there was an insurgency sooner. We will save that for a different discussion.
The Army we went into OIF with is in danger of lapsing back into the hollow Army of the late 70s if we don’t aggressively hold the line with standards. When the Army started taking hits in the press that they weren’t meeting their recruiting goals it appears that the fix was to lower recruiting standards. There is a lot of wisdom associated with the old adage that one rotten apple can spoil the entire bushel. It isn’t just one bad soldier; it is an institutional and cultural acceptance of not enforcing standards, not will rapidly spread into all areas of performance. I think most Officers and NCOs are still holding the line, but you can see weak points in the line due to policies coming out of the beltway. The soldiers who fit into the lower standards were referred to as Rumfield’s 10,000, but now that number is greater than 10,000 category IV personnel. We now have more than our fair share of kids who are physical and emotional cupcakes, or have personality problems, or simply are not all there intellectually. Some bean counter in the beltway doesn’t see a problem with this and that is a crying shame.
The results will be more prisoner abuse cases, more murder/rape cases, and cases where soldiers can’t trust their back to certain squad members. Longer term it will result in the exodus of good soldiers who don’t want to be associated with this society if we don’t go back to walking our talk, and focus more on the most important battlefield system the soldier.
Good point Strickland.....
I don't want to turn this into bashing the young generation but, as unfortunate as it is, it is a true statement, our kids have had it pretty good. The Army ought NOT to lower it's standards to fill recruiting goals. I'd rather have quality over quantity. But the quantity mentality has taken hold over the past ten or fifteen years. I once had a Soldier who had nothing to offer the Army, he was a complete waste of time. I carefully mentored him and spent countless extra time and effort on him trying to instill the warrior spirit, trying to turn him around. When I'd finally had enough I approached my SGM and asked for his support in chaptering this kid out of the Army. The SGM refused, even after I had collected a pile of counseling statements, had all the documentation to support my request. The SGM told me my workload would increase, that my other Soldiers would have to pick up his slack and I told him I didn't care, that his failure to pull his load required us to pick up the slack anyway. In short, I'd given this kid plenty of opportunity to straighten himself out, I'd spent alot of extra time personally in that endeavour. The SGM told me that at least he was a "warm body" whom I could task with extra details etc. My SGM refused to support me. So, the Soldier was transferred to another section that was supervised by a MSG, (I was a SSG at the time). The MSG bragged about how he would turn the kid around, that it was just a leadership problem. Well, a year later, he went to the SGM and made the same request I did, to chapter the kid out of the Army and they did. So, thats just one small example of what I call the "warm body" mentality that has infected the Army. And the officer corps has the same mentality. Avoid looking bad on paper at any cost, even if it means chaos within the ranks.
I was disappointed in my SGM for not backing a fellow NCO, he acted as though I didn't know what I was doing. But earlier in my career, as a buck sergeant, if I thought a Soldier needed to be chaptered out of the Army it was a done deal. I got support all the way up the chain of command.
The hand writing is on the wall, I don't know why there is such institutional reticence to take corrective action.
It started years ago.....
The warm body mentality actually began years ago when we pushed troops to divisions and the support/service support units began to experience real shortages.
I don't know if OPTEMPO is having an impact on the combat arms personnel readiness or not for sure. One would think so, since recruiting standards have been degraded recentley.
