Just read this article from the current Military Review on your Brain in combat. Thoughts on this?
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...630_art010.pdf
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Just read this article from the current Military Review on your Brain in combat. Thoughts on this?
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...630_art010.pdf
Not a bad article. I can provide a short version of an element he cites that has long been known and that we used to practice but seldom do today. From the article :Exactly.Quote:
Decades of neuroscience research have firmly shown that the brain is highly adaptable and that repeated activities designed to create specific behaviors—like combat training—literally “change cellular structure and strength of connections between neurons.”50 (emphasis added / kw)
I do not rabidly disagree with his recommendations but suggest that it is far less important they be implemented than it is that more and better combat training be conducted. Not necessarily at a CTC. Perhaps ideally not at a CTC...
Initially I thought this article would relate to combat leadership meaning the commander being "under fire" himself rather than merely commanding troops who themselves are "under fire" (or in contact). However, I quote from the article:Quote:
Originally Posted by slapout9
If this is the case then I can hardly think what would distract the "leader" (as defined) from the cognitive processes command in battle requires. Those given to emotional responses and propensity for cognitive distraction would surely be weeded out early in the officer selection and training process?Quote:
In this article, the term “leader” refers to any individual who is responsible for leading several groups of soldiers in maneuver against the enemy and must manage multiple battlefield systems. This leader spends most of his battlefield time outside of his weapon’s sights.
Outside of the weapon sites has a lot of different meanings. Could mean you're in the TOC, could just mean you're in the thick of it with a rifle in one hand, and the handset up to your ear with the other hand - in both cases you're outside of the weapon sites. Kind of vague in the description.
Selecting officers based on their responses in realistic training....sounds great. How do we get started? We still have commanders that take their LTs out for a run in order to determine who the new Scout PL is going to be; and base moves of company commanders on year group, time of CCC, staff time, and other measures that generic nothing in the way of a leadership metric.
Maybe my experiences are out of the norm, but I've never had to run in PTs and running shoes over to establish an LP/OP, or conduct reconnaissance on an NAI, and the last I checked my PT card didn't cover my ability to adjust fire, call in a MEDEVAC, or conduct a KLE.
I think Ken White is hinting at some very salient and noteworthy points. However, as we rush to close theaters and begin an age of austerity, we are likely to see the dime & washer drill replace reflexive fire; see Table XII (using SLAP-T rounds of course, $15 as opposed to about $1200 avg cost for training rounds for a main gun, IIRC) replace force-on-force maneuvers; and then to see CCTT replace Table XII, Table VIII; and thought experiments will likely replace battle drill training for our infantry. It's just too expensive to buy ammo, pay for fuel, and replace uniforms and equipment that get destroyed in a typical field exercise. That said, I think we need to suck it and find a way to sustain (assuming it's already done) good training.
From where I'm sitting (on my lofty perch as an 18 y.o. highschool student) I think that officer selection and training weeds out the canidates who can't operate effectively because of the severity of their emotional responses and/or cognitive distractions, however, I also believe that these two reactions are something that every combat leader undergoes to one degree or another, and that teaching techniques to suppress or eliminate these responses would allow leaders to focus more on the nessecary cognitive task at hand, making them more effective at their positions.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
Unfortunately, the incompetent will always be with us -- at all ranks and grades. The system catches many but can never catch all and the number of shoddy leaders that slip through varies, it's cyclical. A good CofSA has his effect 15-20 years down the road. Conversely, a bad one does the same thing. The Personnel system rewards conformity and mediocrity so that has been true since WW I and the Army thus waxes and wanes.Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
It also reflects civilian society...That's the been there, done that. All you mention and more has occurred before and the Army survived. There were times in the late 50s-early 60s and again in the late 70s and the 90s when all those things were problematic -- even to the extent of inadequate funding for fuel causing vehicles to stay in the motor pool for entire fiscal quarters. :oQuote:
However, as we rush to close theaters and begin an age of austerity...That said, I think we need to suck it and find a way to sustain (assuming it's already done) good training.
Good news is there is an unintended benefit. In austere times, people learn literally to do more with less and one has to innovate and use initiative. Those latter two things get stifled all too often in periods of excessive money being available. :mad:
There's also the benefit that less funding is available for the micro-managers to stick their nose into things. :D
Consider that the 'broke' Army of the 1930s did okay when committed after a few minor bubbles and the almost equally relatively poorly funded Army of the early 60s did okay in Viet Nam -- until the money kicked in, the second team got hired and the politics got overly intrusive. The American solution of throwing money at things that do not work rarely really succeeds in fixing the problems. Making do has its merits... :wry:
At the risk of being a heretic, I think the CTCs are also inimical to good training and they are ungodly expensive in all aspects including travel and equipment. They have some merit but having seen Army units before their inception and after, I'm not convinced the results justify the significant expense. Just the opposite, in fact. Aside from the CTCs, the Task, Condition and Standard solution of BTMS severely and adversely affected Army Training.
Dump both those and the picture ahead may not be nearly as bleak as one might think.
Got so busy being philosophical I lost the thread -- in austere times, you can't just buy stuff and do things by rote or even afford running shoes, you have to THINK and not waste money on inessentials. That in itself is what they call "good trainin'." Great exercise for the brain...
I understand one of the claims the author is making is that one part of the brain (the limbic system) does what most of us would call reaction and a different part of the brain (the prefrontal cortex) does what most of us would call thinking. What I have a harder time understanding is where exactly the concept of “reflexive” fits into his model. On the one hand there are responses to immediate stimuli that are neither written nor spoken (hearing a rattlesnake or seeing a shark’s fin sorts of things) that I think most everyone would agree are reflexes. But if you have ever seen an excellent poker player or offensive coordinator you can get the sense that they are working with No Mind. I don’t understand whether or not the author is claiming that the limbic system is involved with reflexive actions.
Am I correct in assuming that there is an HR problem for the U.S. Army insomuch as any junior officer who shows a knack for the sort of leadership described in the paper is soon enough promoted to a rank where it is no longer part of his job?
The Peter Principle is not limited to the military, but it is perhaps the most profound in bureaucracies like the military. That said, poorly designed ticket punching structures / systems do a lot to exacerbate the Peter Principle.Quote:
Originally Posted by ganulv
The priest who was my French instructor once told us that “[w]e have a saying in the Church—‘You will be promoted to your level of incompetence.’”
As someone with no military experience I just had the impression that up or out might be counterproductive if your institution restricts combat leadership responsibility to a group made up of individuals who by definition can only have so much experience.
Am I correct in my understanding that NCOs in the USMC are entrusted with some of the combat leadership responsibilities that fall upon junior officers in the U.S. Army? If so, is this done (at least partly) with an eye towards enabling proven combat leaders to remain in a place where that matters for a longer period of time? Or is it more about the tendency to pay Marines less for doing more?
Good stuff in this thread. I'm not quite as optimistic about the possible benefits of austerity. I think we'll go into a massive dog & pony show. I hope not, but that's my hunch.
If that happens, "your brain in combat" will be something we can only take wild guesses about. But, perhaps the fact that this subject is getting discussed now will preclude or at least mitigate these potential problems later.
No, while I can't speak for the US Army, I think you are going in the wrong direction with this.Quote:
Originally Posted by ganulv
Officers become valuable to the military when the reach field officer (major) and beyond. Their time as junior officers is merely to prepare them for real command say from battalion level upwards.
Platoon commanding (while considered by many to be the happiest and most personally rewarding command experience due to the intimacy of the personal combat leadership experience) is merely an apprenticeship. In this a bright eyed and bushy tailed lieutenant will find an old and bold and hairy ass'd platoon sergeant a few steps behind him to support/guide/assist/advise and when necessary press him in his first command experience. Note platoon sergeant is not a command position as they go from section/squad to platoon to company and so on. The platoon sergeant should be tactically qualified to company level and be able to take over command should casualties demand. So why not give command of a platoon to the most experienced and capable? Because this officer apprenticeship is most often the career make or break for a young officer and an important testing/proving ground. Yes, there are a few late bloomers but that's another story.
Where I come from it is the time as platoon commander (30 months for rifle platoons) which sets him in a career stream. The first thing that happens is that the course order these youngsters passed out with gets "adjusted" career wise over the next 30 months and then thereafter every year with the annual assessment until the pecking order is resolved. So in the simplest terms out of every 12 platoon commanders you get 4 company commanders and then of the 4 one Lt Col battalion commander. Now out of this process you will still get a number of company commanders who don't shape up and then even a number of battalion commanders the same. There is a continual selection and weeding out process... which is not fool proof.
I say fool proof specifically because politics play a more and more important role the higher the rank level. This would be internal politics and then from the idiots in the government departments or congress/parliament/whatever. Then of course should a general mobilization take place then due to war-time escalation everyone gets over promoted by a few levels and quality flies out the window.
After all that it is probably only for a few years in a thirty odd year career where an individuals performance in the closeness of the "look into his eyes then kill him" type combat counts. However this performance (positive or negative) will live with him for the rest of his career.
You need to credit the military with the knowledge that comes through experience that it appreciates that there are certain young officers who may prove to be outstanding combat officers but may not be suitable for higher command and then there will be those (as stated) who will be "carried" by their platoon sergeant but grow into capable, possibly even outstanding, senior officers as they would be late bloomers.
You will find many complain about "check the box" personnel management in the larger militaries. This takes the personal out of career management so it is unlikely that truly meritorious officers will rise (as the should) above the rest as they too are trapped in a system where everyone gets a chance regardless of how unsuitable.
So don't hold your breath that some fire-ball of a young officer will have an accelerated career due to his prowess in combat.
...then one must have a war when one is a platoon commander to prove this matter as much to oneself as to the military. A quick 6 month tour is not really enough but is better than nothing.
In a steep pyramid hierarchy like the army it should not happen as there are fewer posts into which place people. But yes this has been countered by the exploding number of senior staff officer posts created to accommodate B-and C-stream officers. But these staff officers are seldom incompetent as they prove to be lethally effective in screwing up the military.Quote:
Originally Posted by Kiwigrunt
Make half the senior staff officers redundant tomorrow and it will probably improve the functioning of most militaries.
Well, to somewhat more clearly define the terms, the author is laying out the idea that the limbic system handles decison-making and information processing when one is in a fight-or-flight state. So, yes, according to him, the limbic system is involved with what you're calling reflexive actions.Quote:
Originally Posted by ganulv
...Yes.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
Two thirds might be even better as most staffs are wildly overlarge...:wry:
Actually, both Army and USMC NCOs are responsible for junior officer combat development and the pay grades for both NCOs are in fact exactly the same regardless of the level of efforts :D. However, by regulation, only Navy Chiefs (E-7s) are tasked with junior officer development.Quote:
Originally Posted by ganulv
Well, yes and no. Sr NCOs are leaders who remain with troops more or less throughout their careers. As has been noted, Jr offrs are really apprenticing for Sr command, so there is a slightly different basket of traits being sought or developed.Quote:
Originally Posted by ganulv
Which is the other point we need to recall - you dont select good leaders, you make them. Not everyone has the potential to become a good leader, so you select those that do. But then you train them to lead. Even instinctive leaders still need training and study to be their best.
Thats what the article is about - some suggestions on training leaders to remain more calm and more effective in battle.
I suspect we are in agreement that the raw material selected for officer training must have displayed prior leadership ability at school in the playground, on the sports field and in any other group activity. Once the raw material is there it can be honed and polished but it must be there already. Courage in battle is a more difficult animal to predict.Quote:
Originally Posted by Raymond Farrell
From the Falklands War (2nd Battalion Scots Guards) comes this on how outstanding natural leadership in difficult circumstances when shown still surprises as it is not a norm that can be anticipated or taken for granted.
Note: Kiszely himself led a bayonet charge during Tumbledown shooting two and breaking his bayonet on a third while taking a bullet through his compass in a pouch on his belt. He was awared the MC.Quote:
Major John Kiszely on Mount Tumbledown 13/14 June 1982
The youngsters were very brave. For example, this young Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant James Stuart, who was only nineteen, had arrived in my company straight from Sandhurst in April. There he was a month later in the Falklands. He was aged nineteen, green behind the gills, and within the first five minutes of coming under fire he’d had his Platoon Sergeant killed - Platoon Sergeant dead in his arms - this other man killed, two other people wounded and his Company Sergeant-Major shot in the hand. But he did extremely well, this young boy. In many ways it was proof of the system. You think, how could someone like that possibly cope? You know he’s way out of his depth, obviously very frightened, but knew what he had to do and got on with it.
Right the way through the night he commanded his platoon, really under fire all the time, clearing right the way through Tumbledown. But you know, a young boy like that, I just wonder when I was nineteen whether I could have done that. You think, could I have done it? An adult experience for a teenager. And yet he commanded his platoon right the way through it, with all these disasters. Just imagine having your Platoon Sergeant being shot right beside you! When you come to a platoon, the Platoon Sergeant’s a pretty key guy, keeps you straight, says, ‘Look, Sir, don’t do that, best do it this way’. When that is taken out of your life and disaster is all around you, you think – why me? I think he related quite closely to the casualties at the time too. It hit him. He came up on the air to me and said, ‘What do I do?’ So I just talked in a very calm matter-of-fact voice and said, ‘Well done, one or two things are going wrong, but it’s not a disaster. You’re doing well; keep plugging on with it and we’ll be up alongside you again. You’re winning through, well done, keep going’.
He probably thought I was mad, but he went on doing it, and did a bloody good job. He soon steadied them down.
He got a Mention in Dispatches.
Max Arthur (ed) Above All Courage (1985).
Both men were tested on Tumbledown and proved their worth as officers.
Thanks to all who have been in on this informative post. One of my personal favorite blogs—Neuroanthropology—deals exclusively with just the sort of neurological/endocrinological/psychological/social overlap discussed by Steadman in his article; links to the archived threads from their original site as well as to their current site at PLoS for anyone who might be interested.
Don't want to create an argument but above it was stated that the NCOs are responsible for the combat development of young officers. I would add that the officers' superiors are also responsible for that. Having been enlisted and officer, I tell you they are different worlds. We need officers heavily involved in the development of other officers. NCOs are great leaders and essential warehouses of advice and wisdom. But, we absolutely must have officers involved in the development of other officers.
Also, I vehemently disagree with the notion that junior officers "really don't count", and that officers should only be trained for eventual life as a senior leader/commander. This is part of what's wrong with our system. It's lazy, it's incompetent, and it stinks for lack of a professional approach to the commissioning of our officers.
We provide our junior officers with about 50% of the training minimum to step in front of a platoon, and that's being generous. We then throw them out to the Force and expect the NCOs to do the rest, and expect their superior officers to chip in a bit. Wrong, wrong, wrong. We should expect and train our officers to step in front of a platoon from day one. Otherwise, why have PLs? Why have junior officers at all? If we're going to sell the nobility of leadership, and speak about our officers as being leaders, then they need to be leaders from the start. There are learning curves - we all know that. But, the mentality where we exercise the "care and feeding of lieutenants" is 100%wrong. They wear the rank, they are paid the salary,they should be acting accordingly from the start. Will our NCOs still advise them and assist them - of course. Will their superiors mentor, correct, and train them additionally - of course. But to accept less than true leadership is wrong. To train for less is wrong as well.
Right now we have a completely hypocritical system, full of double speak and we hang our junior officers out to dry. We set them up for failure continuously. Our BN and BCT commanders will stand up at a promotion for 2LT going to 1LT and tell the troops that the LTs are just overpaid SPCs, then turn around and dismiss the formation and expect the LTs to go "lead" those platoons, after the big commander told his troops the LT is effectively a SPC. Then, when a situation like Wanat takes place, the Army will come in and write the history books and effectively place the blame on a LT for not doing x,y,z. Wrong answer.
Working on "your brain in combat" needs further study. It's a fascinating topic. But, when it comes to officers and their brains in combat, the Army needs to invest more time and energy into commissioning programs and branch basic schools.
I'm game for a discussion on this matter. Oh yes the officers are responsible for the career development of their subordinate officers. With platoon commanders who spend most of their time with their platoons the platoon sergeants have a special role to play in this regard as well.Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
I think you may misunderstand the system. Junior officers are indeed important because every colonel and general will start his career as a junior officer. Therefore it is important that they are nurtured and exposed to the necessary experiences that will provide them with the fundamental understanding of what impact their orders later from on high will have on the soldiers at the sharp end. This together with the understanding of the ability and means of units and subunits to operate in different tactical situations and terrain and climatic conditions is essential knowledge senior officers must have under their belts.Quote:
Also, I vehemently disagree with the notion that junior officers "really don't count", and that officers should only be trained for eventual life as a senior leader/commander. This is part of what's wrong with our system. It's lazy, it's incompetent, and it stinks for lack of a professional approach to the commissioning of our officers.
It is critical for the success of the company, the platoon in question and the junior officer himself that he succeeds and for that to happen it needs a combined effort of all the company officers and the applicable senior NCOs. Yes I agree it is primarily the company commanders duty to take the junior officer under his wing and mentor him, guide him, show him leadership and makes sure that he learns all he needs to know about tactics and skill at arms at platoon and company level. As it is the duty of the other "older" platoon commanders to help/protect/assist him. Sometimes if the company commander is weak the other platoon commanders may ignore him and even in the worst circumstances bully him. The duty of the company sergeant major is to make sure that the platoon sergeant keeps a grip on the platoon and provides subtle guidance to the junior officer without ever undermining his authority. It is a complex process and only necessary because platoon commanding is an essential and vital part of an officers career development.
If you "rose through the ranks" (as we call it) I can appreciate your sensitivity in this regard. Under normal circumstances - meaning in peacetime - the training of officers and recruits is probably fine given that soldiering in peacetime can be used to round off the training of both officers and soldiers. In wartime however it is a different kettle of fish. I agree you can' just throw these raw (maybe half trained) kids into platoons at war just as you can'y throw in half trained troopies either... but they do.Quote:
We provide our junior officers with about 50% of the training minimum to step in front of a platoon, and that's being generous. We then throw them out to the Force and expect the NCOs to do the rest, and expect their superior officers to chip in a bit. Wrong, wrong, wrong. We should expect and train our officers to step in front of a platoon from day one. Otherwise, why have PLs? Why have junior officers at all? If we're going to sell the nobility of leadership, and speak about our officers as being leaders, then they need to be leaders from the start. There are learning curves - we all know that. But, the mentality where we exercise the "care and feeding of lieutenants" is 100%wrong. They wear the rank, they are paid the salary,they should be acting accordingly from the start. Will our NCOs still advise them and assist them - of course. Will their superiors mentor, correct, and train them additionally - of course. But to accept less than true leadership is wrong. To train for less is wrong as well.
The problem I suggest may lie with the training in that the training needs to produce an officer trained to a tactical level of competence and troopies at the required skill at arms level. And in war don't hold your breath for all these legendary platoon sergeants of myth to be there to take the new comers under his wing... quite often due to the war time expansion you don't have the 7-10 year service sergeants there anymore and the junior officers are lierally thrown in the deep end and must either sink or swim. The only saving grace in all this is that the situation is probably worse on the enemy's side. Remember in war it is the least incompetent side that usually wins.
But essentially you are correct... get the training right and then if the kid is worth the Queens Commission (or national equivalent) he must be treated with the respect that goes with the rank... and that respect he will be expected to earn over time starting with his troopies.
Being a platoon commander is not for the faint hearted. On my first operational deployment I read the map wrong and put my ambush in on the wrong place. I was hung out to dry so I know where you are coming from. But I learned more from that experience - the humiliation and snide remarks - that I became a master map reader using out of date maps in the era before the GPS. The failure of my then company commander to guide me/nurture me/ ease me in to the job was something I never repeated under any command I ever held. Take the positives out of negative situations.Quote:
Right now we have a completely hypocritical system, full of double speak and we hang our junior officers out to dry. We set them up for failure continuously. Our BN and BCT commanders will stand up at a promotion for 2LT going to 1LT and tell the troops that the LTs are just overpaid SPCs, then turn around and dismiss the formation and expect the LTs to go "lead" those platoons, after the big commander told his troops the LT is effectively a SPC.
When I returned to South Africa after Rhodesia I found that lieutenants - especially the conscripts -were treated appallingly by the other officers and with disdain by the snr NCOs. I could not change the system but I can assure you it never happened in my company.
I did what I believe you allude to as the requirement and that was to take the platoon commanders under my wing and help round off their training in preparation for the coming combat role. That meant I would often leave the company to the "IC (exec officer) and the CSM (company sergeant major) and take the platoon commanders out to the field to walk ground and work through the tactical field exercises we would conduct later with the company. it was hard work... but it was my job and it paid dividends.
Read the stuff on Wanat and am not sure how much wider the responsibility for that should be spread. I would like to hear about the role of the platoon sergeant in that, the role of the company commander and so on. It would be difficult for the ground commander to wriggle out of it as he ultimately owns the screw-up if it happened under his command.Quote:
Then, when a situation like Wanat takes place, the Army will come in and write the history books and effectively place the blame on a LT for not doing x,y,z. Wrong answer.
This would apply to all soldiers across the board. The difference with officers is that they are mostly direct entry into a command position possibly in a war where they are expected to perform (but have a platoon sergeant on their shoulder just in case) while NCOs rise through the ranks based upon their performance over a period of years at the different rank levels. This system is tested during times of war when newly commissioned officers are inserted directly into a command position in war.Quote:
Working on "your brain in combat" needs further study. It's a fascinating topic. But, when it comes to officers and their brains in combat, the Army needs to invest more time and energy into commissioning programs and branch basic schools.
There is a debate about whether officers should be drawn from the body of other ranks with service of three years or at least a year to 18 months prior service. This would be before the individual gets into the NCO (noncom) groove so to speak. The Israelis do it and it has been touched on in discussion elsewhere here before. There is genuine doubt that given the number of officers who drop out along the way whether initial officer training for more than a year is worth the investment. Another topic?
JMA....great comments.
My only substantive comments would be:
1) The training must get better. And yes, it certainly should be better for enlisted as well. I don't subscribe to the peacetime v. wartime issue. We are warfighting organizations - scrimping is lazy, wrong, and inexcusable. I see no room for compromise. I know I'm in the minority with that, but I don't see it as an issue where any of us should give ground. I hear you about taking people under your wing and so forth. One thing I've noticed in our military is that many times it's the LTs (NCOs too) that are squared away that get the least mentorship. Another wrong answer.
2) Platoon Sergeants are indeed vital to the development of a young officer. However, I see it too often where Platoon Sergeants get tired of mentoring the officer, as well as all the other people in the platoon. How can you blame him? It is terribly frustrating to see people come in, over and over, without proper training. And, in today's military, too many of our schoolhouses are doing horribly bad at training, so the burden is worse. We are all going to pay a terrible price if these types of issues are not addressed, soon.
3) Regarding Wanat. If I remember correctly, the Army came out and said that X was done poorly, Y was selected inappropriately, Z signs of attack were ignored, etc. The company commander did not get on site until a day prior to the attack, I believe. I don't believe the BN Cdr or similar (BN XO, S3, etc) were on the ground at all prior to the attack. From my reading the Army said the ground force commander, which would be the platoon leader, was primarily responsible for the shortcomings that lead to some bad things happening. I totally agree - except that we should not be doing that to LTs, knowing the dearth of training and knowledge we bestow upon them before hitting the force and joining the fight. We took a situation that would be challenging for a seasoned company commander and handed it to a LT, knowing we don't train LTs appropriately. To me that's negligence.
Anyway, once again...no beef with your comments. They are excellent. My beef is with the system that continues to settle for what it knows to be inadequate because we've been lucky to fight, of recent memory, a 3rd rate Army in Iraq - and too often we thump our chest as a result. Then when we are challenged by the so-called hybrid, irregular threats, we struggle to find solutions. Still, we thump our chest as a result. I don't look down on our military and our capabilities. But the hubris I witness at times is disturbing.
And lastly, if we are to develop that 'brain in combat' it must start with training. To do otherwise is to deprive ourselves of critical lessons and robbing ourselves of time spent being "full mission capable". To me that is just not acceptable for a fighting organization.
His too...Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
Man after my own heart -- I've been screaming we need better initial entry training, officer and enlisted -- and better training across the board -- here and elsewhere for years. We do not embed the basics of the trade at all well and that is a very expensive and shortsighted error.Quote:
...The training must get better. And yes, it certainly should be better for enlisted as well.
Howsomeever, I have to differ with you on some of that. I don't think you're in the minority among your peers and fellow soldiers. It is however a minority view in an open democratic society; toughen up training to wartime standards (and we have not done that as we write tonight...) and the Mommies of America will get upset that we're injuring their little darlings; they in turn will howl to their Congress Critters and the service will be told to belay the rough stuff (except for certain specialized triple volunteer units who can get away with hard training). Not desirable from a military standpoint but understandable from a political view. That certain softness is the penalty for the society from which we come. In my experience, it's worth the cost. Good news is that in more intense warfare than today's variant, it gets tough enough...Quote:
I don't subscribe to the peacetime v. wartime issue. We are warfighting organizations - scrimping is lazy, wrong, and inexcusable. I see no room for compromise. I know I'm in the minority with that, but I don't see it as an issue where any of us should give ground.
All that said, we can and should do far better than we are now doing. :mad:It is and that too is a result of political problems. The good guys will not kill your career; the bad ones can and often do... :rolleyes:Quote:
...One thing I've noticed in our military is that many times it's the LTs (NCOs too) that are squared away that get the least mentorship. Another wrong answer.
All true. The first step to improving training, mentoring and not having leaders spend 90% of their effort on 10% of their dirtbags is to fix the Personnel system so it does not reward mediocrity. That can be done; it will be politically difficult but it can happen. There's unlikely to be a significant improvement in training until the Per system is fixed.Quote:
Platoon Sergeants are indeed vital to the development of a young officer...We are all going to pay a terrible price if these types of issues are not addressed, soon.
What is the place of Ranger School in the current training regime?
Taking your reply in bite sized chunks...
Actually it starts with selection. Not sure how it works in the US but the Brits work off an AOSB (army officer selection board). This is the crux of where officer selection should begin and one should note that it is conducted in groups of no more than 40 candidates under the eyes of a Brigadier, a full colonel, a half colonel and assorted majors and senior captains - AOSB Main Board. More than 80% of the officer cadets that start the course at Sandhurst these days are university graduates already.Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
Then the training starts. Sandhurst does 44 weeks while the Royal Marines do 62 weeks. This is where the Brits are diabolically cunning in that in the army after your 44 weeks of Phase 1 training you get commissioned (get the rank) but before you can command a platoon you need to go to the Infantry Battle School to do a 8 week Platoon Commanders Course where "leadership and tactics are taught to new platoon commanders". (Lets not ask if they need this course after having been commissioned what on earth they were doing for the previous 44 weeks)
Certainly in 50 odd weeks they can (any army can) produce an adequately trained officer as a platoon commander.
Now the Phase 2 of the officer training covers this Platoon Commanders Course and his time as a platoon commander (approx 30 months). He is then considered trained and ready for a productive career as an officer.
If the company commander and the 2IC (exec offr) and the Senior NCOs are weak/poor/disinterested then there is a danger that our little platoon commander can get too big for his boots during this time. Lieutenants (certainly 2nd Lieutenants) should be seen and not heard and must be made to focus on the skill at arms and tactics at platoon level until he masters such to the required level. As Gen Bill Slim said in an address at West Point in 1953:
Now if the young officer can survive the 4 and a half years of Phase 1 and 2 of his officer training with some degree of distinction he will possibly have a good army career ahead of him... but until that time one has to keep one's fingers crossed.Quote:
You will soon have bars on your shoulders; I’ve got things on mine that you’ve never seen before - but they both mean that we are officers. We have no business to set ourselves up as officers unless we know more about the job in hand than the men we are leading. If you command a small unit, like a platoon, you ought to be able to do anything you ask any man in it to do better than he can. Know the bolts and nuts of your job, but above all know your men. When you command a platoon you ought to know each man in it better than his own mother does. You must know which man responds to encouragement, which to reasoning, and which needs a good kick in the pants. Know your men.
OK... all that said there is still the wild card so difficult to predict and that is how the youngster will perform under fire.
Just a general response and that being that if there are problems and weaknesses in the peacetime training structure then if a general mobilization were to take place it would be more chaotic than normal to the point of being unworkable and a total shambles. I would be interested to learn how this massive increased need for instructors would be met. Is there a plan?Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
Whether platoon sergeants like it or not their whole function revolves around mentoring/training/leading/guiding/kicking ass the whole platoon. The moment he tires of doing that maybe he should seek commercial security work outside the service?Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
Platoon sergeants are the backbone of the army... but only if they do their job. If they don't (and are allowed to get away with it) and they stay in the service within a short time the army will be nothing but an armed rabble.
Coming back closer to the topic I found this gem and rather than just refer to it in passing I thought it deserving of attention in it s own right.
Combat Leadership
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES M. FISHER, USA 1990 gets it just about perfectly right IMHO.
Apart from the first paragraph of the Analysis which is just too specifically US for my understanding I agree with and relate with everything.
I just love it when by chance I find a kindred spirit.
For Ken White's comments...brings more perspective than I can. I'm often too idealistic to see the real-world constraints. I believe in what I wrote, but I understand there are constraints that will always be there.
For ganulv...my 'once over the world' on Ranger School is that it has a lot to offer, graduates should be proud of finishing the course, but it is in no way an assurance, on any level, of providing excellent leaders to the Force. The left shoulder check needs to disappear. The entire 82nd is one giant "left shoulder check" organization. The fascination with schools, tabs, and qualifications probably started out with good intentions. It has become a check the box venture where people focus on getting the requisite uniform bling, and many just rest on their laurels after that. I've seen tabbed guys with some of the poorest leadership skills, tactical incompetence, and little to no work ethic. I've also seen some that are straight warriors. From my position it's a scatterplot. I'm not a "schools guy". But, I've seen a more positive correlation between Sapper School and overall performance than with Ranger School. In theater I've worked with 1ID, 2ID, 3ID, 10th MTN, 82nd ABN, 101st, and various support and SOF elements. Good leadership was never predicted or predicated on a tab. If all the tabs had been taken off uniforms I would have never predicted who went where and graduated from what. I don't see this as a failing of any school. It's a failing in the institution.
For JMA....downloaded your link, will read that with interest.
I echo and agree with your comments about PSGs - to a point. They are human like the rest of us. One problem is the rushed promotions. That is another topic. But there are PSGs that are not ready or that responsibility. RGR...check. As for their training responsibilities, there is a breaking point. Certainly being the Platoon Daddy brings some roles & responsibilities. However, all platoon members must hit the force with a certain level of training and competence. I think we are close to or may have reached the threshold where that level is too low. We in the Army seem to be turning over more and more training responsibility to FORSCOM. That's a big burden and there's only so much time for a PSG to train his plt. Challenges are good, but they must be realistic. As an officer I take issue with the officer side of it, naturally. I think it's outright negligence to send officers that PSGs must babysit. Our NCO Corps will train those Soldiers. Asking (demanding) they pick up our slack in training the officers doesn't sit well with me.
I may have read your comments wrong on training...but from my perspective our training gets better in wartime. We have/develop a sense of urgency in wartime. As our uniformed instructors disappear for deployment responsibilities, contractors (often retirees) are hired. They are gold for instruction and legacy knowledge. As for the needed instructors - well, it's time to purge our supply rooms, stop putting color printers in every office, implement some effective ways of increasing efficiency and stop wasting money - that will go a long way toward paying the salary/benefits etc for added instructors. Instead of issuing smartphones and spending millions to develop gaming technology, we need to invest in people and expertise.
Great points on selection. I consider selection part of training - in my mind it would be part of the same pipeline. That may be too simple though. What you state and post in this regard will get no argument from me. I think the British system is more comprehensive than ours. Some quick points though...I would like to see officer education/selection taken to a new level. I'd like to see us withhold that commission until training is complete and they are ready to step in front of a platoon/section/shop, whatever. Give some incentive. As it is, once commissioned, incentive drops for many - they know they'll be pushed through. Huge problem in my opinion. You mention where people get 30 months as a platoon commander. Wow...not sure I've known anyone that got past 24 months, and the overwhelming majority got less than 18 months. Another problem in my opinion.
All in all, looking at the direction this thread has gone, I think we have some obstacles getting in the way of developing our 'brains in combat'. Namely, the pers system and selection/training. They are providing significant barriers to a cohesive and comprehensive force generation process. It's hard to refine a product when your means of producing it are inefficient.
That is, how should I say, fairly "ate up".Quote:
Our BN and BCT commanders will stand up at a promotion for 2LT going to 1LT and tell the troops that the LTs are just overpaid SPCs, then turn around and dismiss the formation and expect the LTs to go "lead" those platoons, after the big commander told his troops the LT is effectively a SPC.
When in doubt return to the doctrine. In this case THE ARMY NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER GUIDE - FM 7-22.7. What does it take to make platoon sergeant? 10 years?Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
The split between officer and NCO in terms of training is the officers deal with the collective training while the platoon sergeant (specifically) deals with the individual training within his platoon. To assist him he should have corporals (or whoever the next level down is). If at company level all the training is carefully coordinated where the burden is spread then no one should become over-extended.
If they tire then post them away for awhile and then bring them back once they have recharged their batteries.Quote:
What a hard time young officers of the army would
sometimes have but for the old sergeants! I have pitied
from the bottom of my heart volunteer officers whom I
have seen starting out, even in the midst of war, with
perfectly raw regiments, and not even one old sergeant to
teach them anything. No country ought to be so cruel to
its soldiers as that. -LTG John M. Schofield, 1897,
Forty-Six Years in the Army, p. 18
What I am saying is that the US has had a few shots at wartime mobilization of troops. I am assuming there is a plan for this somewhere which gets updated annually (or whatever). The scale of this type of activity is beyond my imagination but obviously a nation will need the skeleton staff now on which to build the larger army. My point simply is that if there are significant problems being experienced with training resources and instructors with the current (say) million man military how does the military cope when the immediate need becomes to treble, quadruple or more the current strength? Where do you find the quality NCOs? Where do you find the quality officers? Where will you find the sergeant instructors of quality to take raw recruits and turn them into capable trained soldiers in say 90 days or whatever? I suggest that unless there is a clear staffing plan to cater for such a mobilization eventuality which is adhered to you immediately start watering down your instruction and command quality.Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
Yes one can retread (as in a worn out tire) retirees who at one time or other showed some instructional ability and reintroduce them back into the system. What would you rate the efficiency of these retreads as compared with your current crop of instructors? 50%? 60%? More? Less?
Once general mobilization begins quality of instruction starts to diminish. I have no idea whether the line on the training efficiency graph keeps heading downwards or does it bottom out after time and start to rise again. I would be interested if anyone has experience of this.
I suggest that one relies on the fact the enemy are having similar problems and strives to keep one step ahead of them.
I don't know what the US system is.Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
I suggest that the time spent in officer selection is wisely invested.
The better the selection the lower the drop out rate and the more optimal use of instructor time and resources. I would be interested to look beyond mere training statistics (like how many start the course and how many get commissioned) to longer term results like how many make it to major (in the A-stream) and then beyond. This will help to ensure selection and focus is in the correct areas.
I agree too that receiving a commission means you can be trusted to be placed in command of a platoon. If there is any doubt the person should not be commissioned. I Brit idea to send newly commissioned officers on a Platoon Commanders Course for 8 weeks is getting the sequence wrong IMHO. I believe the brief to Sandhurst must be that they must produce an officer ready to command a platoon in battle and not some "thing" that needs 8 weeks of tactical and leadership training after being commissioned. Whose responsibility is it for what the final product is? Sandhurst or the Battle School?
How long should a platoon commander command a platoon? Unless he gets fired it should be the standard Brit 30 months. This also takes some of the pressure you talk of off the platoon sergeants. With the right mentoring and guidance you can produce an efficient youngster who can lead his platoon to close with and kill the enemy within a year of platoon commanding. If he can't then I suggest he should be thanked for his contribution and sent on his way.
A lot of how a young officer performs in combat will depend on how he was selected and the quality of the training received. I suggest that when the initial selection is poor we start to hear things like "leaders can be created" and "courage can be developed". Really one needs the basic ingredients from the get go which can be honed and polished and whatever.Quote:
All in all, looking at the direction this thread has gone, I think we have some obstacles getting in the way of developing our 'brains in combat'. Namely, the pers system and selection/training. They are providing significant barriers to a cohesive and comprehensive force generation process. It's hard to refine a product when your means of producing it are inefficient.
The source document to this thread suggests that officers and sergeants should receive special training on how to command during combat by reporting, issuing orders, calling in fire support and those good things while the soldiers to his left and right are returning fire. Well I suggest that should assessed and that ability proven before the person is commissioned or long before the person makes sergeant. The ability to be able to think and act under fire is IMHO a non-negotiable precondition of any infantry officer or NCO. Outside wartime to test this one needs to create conditions in training to test this ability. Not foolproof but the better armies get it right.
Probably fair to say that the Ranger course is not a dedicated leadership course. I do however agree with you regarding tabs but that's life at Bragg and Benning. Most of the folks we work with have no uniform and they are generally not brought in for leadership skills :DQuote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
I don't think the "institution" failed our young officers with lack of training because leadership is an individual trait and some just can't cut it. Where the institution and senior officers failed was weeding out those that will never become leaders. Without NCOs even the finest of young leaders are doomed.
I agree. I guess my breaking point in the argument is that when an officer arrives and is not ready to handle individual or collective training, there's a problem.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
As an example...I did "OK" as a PL. Was surrounded by some outstanding NCOs. Another PL arrived and for whatever reason he was not as well prepared as I was. Not only was collective training beyond the furthest reaches of his mental grasps, but he was in dire need of judgement, and individual training. I struggled to park tracked vehicles with millimeter precision in the motor pool as my NCOs could do - but I could get them parked easily. This guy would pivot steer vehicles that were six inches apart, thus crashing them. I'm just not sure how that PSG attacks that situation, with an officer that arrives with such poor training, judgement, and so forth - then he has to train his platoon. That's the sort of thing I'm talking about when I say that PSGs are human and there has to be a point where we say enough is enough and don't allow ourselves to send officers to the Force that are so ill-prepared. I feel it irresponsible for us to do so - and it jeopardizes the credibility of the officer corps.
It's funny...the leadership issue is what I hear Rangers say the most in defense of the course. And, I'd say that the tab checks are more a part of Bragg culture than Benning. I give Benning and many of the Infantry guys there a pat on the back: they are proud of their institution and proud of their schools, but they often will no hesitate to simply go with what works and not what looks prettiest or what's put forth by the guy with the most bling.Quote:
Originally Posted by Stan
I think you hit my point regarding weeding out those that will not become leaders. As a military we need to stop selling the GI Bill and sell the nobility of service. We need to stop pushing people through commissioning sources and OBCs and thoroughly screen them or at least make them prove themselves rather than worrying about graduating them before their allotment of TDY days has expired.
As far as I can tell, there is no "plan", there is only hope.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
As for the retirees, I have to say they are awesome. They provide so much in the way of legacy knowledge. Also, it is very, very rare that we see a retiree instructor who's last day of duty occurred before 9/11/01, now that we are ten years past the event. So, they are pretty current. Also, because they are enduring elements in the schoolhouse, they are generally more polished as instructors. I have no problem with our retirees, especially in more cerebral disciplines. I had them as enlisted and officer. Great stuff each time.
Are leaders born or made? Great question and impossible to answer in my opinion. I think it's both. Some innate qualities are essential. Some need to be developed or brought to the surface.Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
I believe the US Army (and USMC) have done decent at developing/screening for the tasks you mention above - within the NCO Corps. At times each service has resorted more to having officers plan and manage training, and neglecting the participating bit. This hurts us.
I think the US Army has brought better training to the forefront during the GWOT, out of necessity. On the flip side. personnel strength considerations have caused us to bring people along that are not well suited for the tasks of leadership.
In the future, with likely budget issues, this is going to become problematic and that's putting it lightly.
Finally, your comments about the comments we are likely to see, such as "courage can be developed" are resonating with me. I'm beginning to see a shift to that mentality. Not that I find it impossible. Truthfully I don't know. However, it's troublesome when we speak like that with constant doctrinal revisions, new initiatives, and so forth that attempt to reinvent the military. All that tells me is that something is broke and that it was broke before the current wars. If that is indeed the case, why should we believe it won't go back to being broke once we return to a peacetime footing?
Hmmm, correct me if I'm wrong, but the leadership portion of the Ranger course is but part of the 21 days at Benning. Correct ? This is why I think most of the young troops at both Bragg and Benning are so worked up about those tabs you spoke of. Benning is the start and stop for more than 50% of Ranger and SOF (at least for me it was way back when). I was once of the opinion that wearing any tab or CIB was something to be proud of (not bling... We didn't have bling back in the 70s :confused: )Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
You got me on this one. Since I'm part of the GI Bill era and constantly hear about me getting a free education for my 23 years of service (as if I wouldn't have joined without some financial Bennie), I have to wonder what would entice a future leader with an education and ability to endure and lead in combat ? Hell, I can barely sell my sister on the fact that being military is noble.Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
On Ranger School:
For me, as a brand new Engineer 2LT, Ranger School was a good leadership exercise (my Ranger School time dates back to '97, so ymmv). I saw what worked and what didn't work and had to do all the troop leading procedures under the most stress I faced in my relatively short military career. I got to see how different folks reacted differently to stress and learned a little about how much nudging folks needed. I saw firsthand one of the most physically tough and intelligent officers from my OBC class fall apart under the strain. I fell apart under the strain a little myself.
While the troop leading procedure training and giving an operations order Ranger School style was all done in the Benning phase, there were tests of your ability to lead, plan, organize, and control under stress throughout the school.
Was Ranger school a necessary or sufficient check for "good leaders"? No. I saw some idiots with the Ranger tab. One of my best ROTC cadre was an infantry captain who didn't make it, and he's a man I learned much from and a big reason why I developed into (I think) a fairly decent Platoon Leader.
As an Engineer, who had to work with Infantry companies that rotated leaders fairly frequently, showing up with the Tab I think at least showed that I had a shared experience with the Infantry folks. There was some value in that. I think the NCOs who got stuck with me at least respected that I had tried to take every opportunity to make myself a better leader before I showed up at the Platoon.
As far as folks joining ROTC for the scholarship money, I think that can end up working in a couple ways. Some folks show up for the scholarship money and find comraderie and a sense of service and dive in. Other folks just do the minimum to get the scholarship money. So, I think an incentive to "try it" may not be out of line. But somehow you need to weed out the folks who are only there for the incentive.
All of this is just from my own (limited and out of date) experience. One data point does not a trend make.
Ken, I believe your experience confirms Bumperplate's concerns about officer training (in the US). If you needed the Ranger course to "find yourself" what do you suggest was wrong with your officer training course in that it failed to apply the necessary "stress tests"?Quote:
Originally Posted by KenWats
Quote:
Originally Posted by Stan
As to your first comment...I'm talking about the culture within the operational Army. I say Benning but it could apply to Riley, Campbell and some other posts - but in my experience - not to Bragg. To simplify (too much perhaps): when my buddy tells me about his time with 3/82, it's about schools, tabs, and checking the block in order to "earn" credibility to be placed in a leadership position. When I speak to my buddies and evaluate my experiences at other places, it's more focused on the performance and not the uniform attachments. I do think people should be proud of their accomplishments. However, that is too often supplanted by pride with what they wear. Too very different things. What you accomplished yesterday does not provide a strong correlation with your performance tomorrow. In an ideal world, yes it does. However, we have placed so much importance on that, that it's the school and the tab that have become important - not the accomplishments, lessons learned, and capabilities developed.
Not sure what you're getting at with the second comment, although I'm guessing that you want to know what our sales pitch should be. Well....it needs to be related to service and not to the benefits granted. Will people take the benefits into consideration? Yes, naturally. But we need to appeal to those people, with those characteristics of leaders. Nowhere in SLA Marshall's writings, for instance, does it say that a good leader seeks personal benefits, or selects jobs because of the GI Bill, SRB, etc.
If that's the message we send: come to us and we'll give you things for showing up, how can we be surprised at the caliber of people entering the service. Many of our newest Soldiers want likership and not leadership.
I would tend to agree with you even as far back as 1974. Everything was about schooling and the uniform accoutrements you wore. Perhaps not lessons learned, but certainly personal accomplishments. However, had little to do with leadership potential !Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
Yep, our sales pitch to potential leaders. I'm sure there are some just in it to serve our country but I sadly doubt that without some benefits attached many potential leaders would join out of simple patriotism today.Quote:
Originally Posted by bumperplate
I left Bliss in 75 and wished I had the chance to meet Marshall as I had read about his research and opinions. But much later I would also read about what the CGSC and others had to say about the General's findings. Back when Marshall was writing the benefits as a soldier were fairly miniscule and/or the soldiers conscripts. That doesn't say much for his theories IMO.