U.S. alpine warfare capabilities?
My understanding is that the 10th Mountain Division carries the <Mountain> designation for reasons related to its history rather than as a description of its contemporary capabilities and that the relevant Army and Marine Corps schools do primarily individual rather than unit training. Is the lack of a large unit dedicated to alpine warfare a calculated decision on the part of the DoD? Are there any small units optimized for mountain warfare? If my understanding of what the Special Forces do is correct I would assume there are SF teams for which this is true, though I understand that there might be some OPSEC concerns there.
Appreciated,
Matthew
All the above is correct. Probably not good that it is...
The 10th is now only historically linked to its forebear which was trained for alpine warfare when it formed and trained at Camp Hale Colorado during WW II. It did fight in Italy; in the Appenines and the Alps.
Hale post WW II shifted from unit to individual training and later was closed in the 50s. Mountain and Cold Weather Training was moved to Fort Greeley, Alaska. It was closed post Cold War and the VT ArNG picked up the mountain training mission to include for the Active Army. It is individually focused but the School used to be willing to send out Mobile Training Teams to aid units training, probably still do but certainly could if deemed necessary. People in the Active Army also get sent to other nation's real mountain warfare schools (that's not a knock on the Vt Guard but on the fact that, in Vermont, the available mountains aren't...), to include India's but as Gunlv says, to do units, a western location would be necessary.
Anaconda suffered from more flaws than a lack of training, an overweening bureaucracy being but one. That overly bureaucratic bit and its allied overemphasis on force protection is in part a reaction to our less than stellar training; one cannot expect better than average or even average performance from below average training so one tends to be excessively cautious in employment. The sad thing is that Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, the Somalia affair and even moving into Bosnia where Rick Sanchez was afraid to have his Engineers bridge a river in an end 1995 non combat situation all were harbinger and examples of how not to do things. Or, more correctly, how to do things wrongly, expensively, cautiously and without achieving the desired effect in a timely fashion while taking and causing unnecessary casualties... :mad:
That's what happens when you treat your Army not as a real and existing military force but as a mere holding pool of people, funds and equipment for a mobilization and big war you might not ever see. That attitude BTW, is not totally a post Viet Nam phenomenon but it has grown exponentially and dangerously since VN. I believe that is true due to a -- flawed and failing IMO -- effort to influence US policy. The effort has not done that and has instead done the institution itself and the people in it a grave disservice. Not done well by the nation, either...
As Jon Custis once wrote, it's fortunate that most of the folks we fight are even more screwed up than we are... :wry:
Nah, wouldn't trade it for anywhere else...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Did you already give back your U.S. citizenship?
With all our flaws, we still do better on more things than do any others of whom I'm aware. Many nations out perform us in specific areas but no one nation is as lucky to have so many fortuitous synergies roll into one acceptable but admittedly not great package. :cool:
Quote:
You sound so totally un-American...after all, hooah!!!, Tom Clancy, easy bashing of underdeveloped nations' militaries, huge budgets and so on have convinced MANY U.S. Americans (and others) that all that shines is platinum.
I think much of that is due to the failings of our media -- that's one area where even the worst in the world are ahead of us. A senior British Officer once said of our news people that their pathetic performance made us look like intemperate and rather ignorant clowns in the eyes of most of the rest of the world -- and he was IMO absolutely right. He added that he was truly shocked in actual interplay to find out that the truth was quite different.:eek:
Contrary to what those Squirrels say, show and write, my observation is that most Americans are pretty well aware of our benefits and shortfalls. The problem is that we're individualistic enough to squabble endlessly over what to do about correcting said shortfalls so needed results are agreed to but the routes are subject to almost endless negotiation and argument. Thus correction comes slowly -- though I sense that may be changing. Exasperation with Washington is always present and waxes and wanes but I think it has edge now that I've never seen before. The political crowd, the media, the White House and Congress really need to wake up and smell the coffee. :wry:
Mix and match, plug and play works quite well with well trained troops.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Mix and match has become one of our other hallmarks, and we never remember that it quite often doesn't go well...
Lacking well trained or experienced troops, the results are predictably really bad -- and thus caution inspiring...
An unfortunate side effect is the creation of a culture of "I want only people I know to work for me." This attitude means eschewing the pipeline (which will be the only source of replacements in a larger war...) and creates sycophants. It also drives many good people out of the forces (plural...)
Some online refs - WWII 10th Mtn Div
These two deal primarily with training:
Studies in the History of the Army Ground Forces, No. 28, "History of the Tenth Light Division (Alpine)."
Studies in the History of the Army Ground Forces, No. 23, "Training for Mountain and Winter Warfare."
This one covers one regiment's combat history:
History of the 85th Mountain Infantry in Italy
One of the factors giving rise to the division's formation was the relative success of Finnish skiers in the Winter War.
Our neighbor's son (item 8 iii - F.A. Romberg) was a good skier and 100% Finnish, and ended up in the 85th Mountain Infantry (KIA 14 Apr 1945, Castel d'Aiano, Italy - SS citation).
Regards
Mike
1 Attachment(s)
Pete, any good Finlander....
can handle making molehills into mountains. Look at what the Delaware Finns (the first Finns in the US in the 1600s) did to West Virginia - and that was by long-distance sorcery. :D
Seriously, a major Russian problem (leading to ceasefires in the Winter and Continuation Wars) was not just the Finnish capability to inflict casualties, but also the Finnish capability to accept casualties. Let's look at some KIA comparisons.
In the Vietnam War, the USA had ~58,200 KIA, as compared to a 1970 pop. of ~203,000,000. That works out to .287 KIA per 1000 pop.
South Boston (per Jim Webb) had 25 KIA, as compared to a pop. of ~34,000. That works out to .735 KIA per 1000 pop.
Our "Copper Country" area (4-county totals; specifics in the Vietnam Wall.pdf attached to this post) was between the USA and South Boston - 29 KIA, 1970 pop. 55,253; .525 KIA per 1000 pop.; although Ontonagon County exceeded South Boston - 9 KIA, 1970 pop. 10,548; .853 KIA per 1000 pop.
Before we hit the next paragraph, one should reflect on the fact that the Vietnam War was not an "existential war" to the USA.
My grandfather was born in the village of Pörtom (Pirttakylä), Finland. During the Winter & Continuation Wars, the Pörtombor sustained 75 KIA, from a 1940 pop. of 3,324. That computes to 22.563 KIA per 1000 pop. For a pop. of 203,000,000 (USA 1970), equivalence would require 4,580,300 KIA !!! The two Finnish wars were more "existential" than not.
The Pörtombor have no particular claim to fame, but were simply representative (Finland for both wars: ~88,000 KIA & MIA, 1940 pop. ~ 4,000,000; 22.0 KIA & MIA per 1000 pop.).
A possibly substantive factoid (from my cousin whose ancestry is Pörtombor, but who grew up in another nearby community) is that young, male Pörtombor have a reputation for cruising around in neighboring communities looking for festivities (e.g., wedding receptions) and picking group brawls. Cf., Dave Grossman's and Lonnie Athens' theories on violence.
Regards
Mike (and from Mannerheim the Dog :))
PS: just for the sake of the record (from AGF No. 23 cited in post #14 above):
Quote:
... As American newspaper readers became bored with the war in December 1939 a new conflict broke out between small Finland and the giant Soviet Union. The Finns, instead of being overwhelmed as most observers expected, surprised the world with the tenacity and effectiveness of their resistance. Ski troops, clothed in white to mask their moves' disrupted Russian Supply columns and won victory after victory.
Those initial victories of the highly Specialized Finnish winter troops aroused the interest of American political and military leaders. On 6 January 1940, Louis Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of War, asked General Marshall what consideration the General Staff had given to the subject of special clothing, equipment' food, transportation and other essentials necessary for an effective field force under conditions approximating those of the campaigns in Finland and Northern Russia.[1]
Three weeks later The Chief of Staff replied that operations of this nature had been under continuous study in connection with the problem of the defense of Alaska. Winter training had also been conducted annually by troops stationed in severe climate and had been especial y successful at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, where some of the men had become highly skilled in the use of skis. "It is my intention," General Marshall added' "to continue, accelerating where practicable, tests of food, clothing, equipment and transportation in order to standardize for the purpose the types best suited to operations under severe winter conditions. The campaign in Finland is being studied and should be of considerable assistance. Winter maneuvers, on a larger scale than yet attempted are desirable, but to date funds for this purpose have not been available."[2]
1. Memo of Mr. Louis Johnson, ASW, for the CofS, USA, no file, 6 Jan 40, sub: Campaign under Extreme Conditions of Weather. In AGO 370.22 (1-6-40)
2. Memo of the CofS, USA, G-4/31624, 24 Jan 40, sub as above. Ibid.
So, blame the Finnish link on Louis A. Johnson (a resident of West Virginia).
Atmospheric pressure doesn’t care how mentally tough you are.
I lived at 2350 meters for a year in Central America. A couple of days after my arrival I was invited in on a game of pick-up football with the members of a catechism class. Despite being in reasonable condition, about five minutes later I was feeling a kind of pain I had never known before. And 2350 meters isn’t really that high!
Acetazolamide can help acclimatization but it isn’t a Golden Hammer. Being in Royal Marine condition at sea level would certainly speed acclimatization but no more than that. Seems a lot of time and money to spend on an exercise which was bound to fail.
