Quote:
"Military Intel: Telling It Like It Is
... received via Larry's friend, from a Marine intelligence analyst on the ground in Iraq ...
If there are 300 analysts I never saw them; we sure as heck did not talk to each other, and I was assigned to the shop from 8 Aug 05 to 2 Nov 06…the shop tasked with monitoring Iraq..we had a very few dedicated solely to Anbar…not enough to map out the insurgency like the Baker Hamiliton report noted because of production requirements. Additionally, the shop as of 2 Nov was split on several floors of the Pentagon where effective interface cannot be affected. Bottom line, the shop is tasked the majority of the time to support J2 briefings, briefing slides, executive highlights, notes in brief, etc…CURRENT INTEL…newspaper crap. And even then, other members of the staff have their own intel sections to identify what they see occurring in Iraq…Very little emphasis is on long-term analysis because of the concern over metrics (SHAREPOINT)…if you do not produce enough material regardless of how useless it is, it looks bad on the numbers.
Sharepoint justifies your manpower, money, etc. Intelligence is an art, not a science, but the intelligence effort is subordinate to institutional processes instead of quality, original, candid military judgment and critical analysis of what is actually occurring, and the actors involved.
Ask a member how long it often takes to get out a DAR…about a month now…what good is that in a rapidly changing amorphous environment?
There are some very talented and intelligent people working the problem set from Lieutenant Colonel on down, but they are slaves to the system, and the system mitigates effective, original and critical thinking. The 101st and 82nd Army Airborne Lieutenant Colonels I worked for come in anywhere btwn 0300 and 0400 daily until about 1900 [every day], to include holidays, just to keep up with the admin and the ad-hoc requirements that come in from political leaders and those within the Pentagon. Those two officers took care of their people and stabilized the shop so others still had some semblance of a normal life, but they take the pain daily without complaints and I have a lot of respect for them for that reason. I’ve had good experience with most of the senior intelligence analysts, whom I will not name for obvious reasons.
Additionally, there are some outspoken intelligence analysts who are restricted with regards to what they publish since it counters mainstream thinking…specifics are sensitive. Analysts are not allowed to candidly identify enemy gaps with appropriate remedies to engage them since it is considered as directing policy or being policy prescriptive. I think of Pearl Harbor, 9/11, etc when such analysts are ignored.
Papers that address information operations, engaging enemy information operations has been ignored because some senior reviewers consider the issue mute at the strategic level. When papers were denied processing via the approval chain, or if the wording was softened so much that its context would be lost, I would personally forward my pieces, to other agencies so what I saw at least got out, even if I could not get approval. It was an underground com network.
Interest in supporting the warfighter stops at the Lieutenant Colonel Level…the papers are focused towards policy makers…reach back capability to deployed forces fighting in competing and exhausting battle rhythms are fighting on their own without someone covering their six. The senior intel leadership wants to get products to the President…justify the organizations existence. I’m not saying this is bad, but what about the exhausted people in the field who need networks tracks, exploitable gaps identified and nascent trends mitigated. CIA personnel have better access information than DIA anyways, so why doesn’t DIA focus more on supporting the JCS and the warfighter in military terms, and brief that perspective to the President?
The JCS, General Pace, demanded early in his tenure that he wanted honest and bold assessments and our “military judgment”, but analysts do not have direct interface with him (as they have briefed him in the past), and what we think and see is closely guarded by gatekeepers who do not want controversy with regards to what the analysts see as the actors posing the REAL threats and why. I personally posted his Commander’s Intent on my bulkhead to ensure I focused my efforts to that guidance…and you know what? We never followed his intent…the words disappeared to both air and memory. We were also restricted from using appropriate military terms, although the organization is known as the Defense Intelligence Agency. I went through hell trying to use the word “subversion” in order to describe insurgent modus operandi…and that word is in the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms. Why have an organization that cannot talk the talk so the implications of military actions on the ground can clearly be ascertained and engaged?
I think an inquiry needs to be conducted. I think people should not take my word for it. People should say Bill (the author of this), you are full of crap and I’m going to prove it to you by investigating myself. This is all I’m going to say about the situation…we all have congressman and flag grade officers, they can do the rest and forget about little ole me.
I’m not perfect, and I’m not trying to sharp shoot…just telling it like it is…others can judge for themselves…and its not like these issues were not addressed via the chain of command.
Semper fidelis,"
Quote:
"Basically what he is saying is that outside of rare instances like this,intel in Iraq is your standard DC office job goat-screw, with IEDs. Bogus bean-counting, middling, medling bosses who think they can read the chief's mind but don't have the stones to actually ask questions, grunts watching days of hard work get boiled down into a PowerPoint bullet devoid of any meaning or context.
Regurgitating the news, pummeling original thoughts into mindless gov-speak, a process that turns "current" intel into ancient history . . . it's like reliving the bad old days . . . must be what a bad acid trip feels like.
Is there really any doubt in anyone's mind that radical change could not possibly be worse than the status quo?"
